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EDITORIAL FOREWORD 
The appearance of Rem B. Edwards's What Caused the Big Bang? marks the 
introduction of the first title in the Philosophy and Religion (PAR) special 
series. I cannot imagine a better way to introduce the special series to the aca-
demic world than to do so through the thought of a frequently cited scholar. 
This is PAR's first book, Edwards's sixteenth. 
Edwards's erudition is everywhere in evidence as he devours the pages of 
Big Bang literature, separating fact from fancy, the examined from the unexam-
ined. Socrates would recognize his sting as belonging to the most energetic of 
gadflies, unrelenting, pestering those who would readily ascribe the origin of the 
universe to anything less than disciplined reason requires. What caused the Big 
Bang? Now that the 15 billion-year-old cosmic dust has settled, several likely 
explanations emerge from the cosmic broth. But not all explanations are proven 
equal, as Edwards amply demonstrates: Steady State and Plasma Cosmologies; 
Antecedent Universe Cosmologies; Big Fizz and Big Divide Quantum Cosmol-
ogies; Quantum Observership Cosmology; Big Accident Quantum Cosmology; 
Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology; the Final Anthropic Principle-each view 
contains fatal flaws. 
Edwards's thesis that God caused the Big Bang follows a detailed decons-
truction of alternate models showing their weakness: where and how they 
commit fallacies. The burden of proof now falls squarely on the shoulders of 
those who do not accept the claim that God caused the Big Bang. Critics must 
point to the deficiencies in Edwards's argument and defend the superiority of 
their own view. This is a hard sell, given the breadth and depth of his work. But 
if God created the universe, what is our place in it? Who is God, why did God 
create, is God responsible for the suffering of innocent victims, and since the 
universe is contingent, does God sustain creation? Like all good philosophy, 
Edwards's answer to questions raises more questions! 
In my own work on death and immortality, the mysterious nature of the 
nothing has long beckoned forth, inviting me to visit the nurturing intelligibili-
ties it incloses. In discussions on death and dying, I find useful the distinction 
between the absence of something and the removal of ground in which the 
possibility of this absence arises. For instance, is death the absence oflife or is 
it the removal of the possibility in which the possibility of absence arises? The 
simple answer is that it is both. The complex answer is that one distinction 
(ontological) raises the question of what death might be like to the dead (if post 
mortem states exist), while the other (epistemic) addresses the ordinary-lan-
guage view of death as absence of life. The investigation into the ontological 
character of death (death as such), then is conducted from the perspective of the 
nothing as reversal in the possibility of temporal existence. Death is a return to 
the conditions that existed before the Big Bang. In part, my thesis depends on 
the existl!nce ofa state in the likeness of the nothing. Edwards's What Caused 
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the Big Bang? provides solid evidence and confinns my own belief that God is 
at work in this domain. 
If God caused the Big Bang, then, the universe had a beginning. It might 
not have had a beginning in time (the universe could be eternal), but it must 
have had a beginning in the order of existence (thereby providing an answer to 
the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"). If matter has a 
beginning, science cannot reach that far. The laws of the universe only become 
applicable at Planck Time and Planck Space or length; at I o-43•d of a second, the 
size of the universe was 10-33rd centimeter in diameter (see pp. 98-99 of this 
volume). This is as close to the moment of creation as science can get. So how 
can the Big Bang have a cause? Philosophy and/or religion take over at that 
point. Edwards's inquiry reveals that the gap separating the before and the after 
of existence (beyond scientific measurement) is not nothing at all since it is 
pregnant with the divine laws and patterns of existence. How else would the 
universe know to open the first act of existence in a scene of well-orchestrated 
expansion and contraction? Planets could not have fonned in the absence of 
laws and patterns. The existence of the law implies structure. And structure 
points beyond contingency to the existence of a Necessary Being-or God at 
work in the ex nihilo. 
Edwards's book is powerful and timely. His cogent analysis of quantum 
physics provides at least one indubitable truth that cannot be deconstructed-God 
exists! The current crisis in Ethics is due to the excesses ofrelativism. Once we 
accepted Hume's invitation to skepticism, Heidegger's critique of the Absolute, 
Nietzsche's death-of-God movement, and the genetic secularization of our 
species, nothing special was left to unite us. We found ourselves doing moral 
theory in the absence of a unified ethical vision of our common origin, nature, 
and destiny. Edwards's book provides the ontological grounding required for 
a fresh start. It should be required reading, not only where physics is taught, but 
whenever Philosophy and Religion matter. 
Kenneth A. Bryson 
Editor, Philosophy and Religion 
University College of Cape Breton 
Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada 
January 200 I 
PREFACE 
In 1988, Stephen W. Hawking wrote, 
Up to now, most scientists have been too occupied with the development 
of new theories that describe what the universe is to ask the question why? 
On the other hand, the people whose business it is to ask why, the philoso-
phers, have not been able to keep up with the advance of scientific 
theories. 1 
My professional training as a philosopher has contributed immensely to my 
preparation for writing this book; and I have done my best to try to understand 
those scientific theories which have a direct bearing on my central question: 
What caused the Big Bang? I hope that my inquiry brings together successfully 
both the what and the why of the origin of the universe. This topic has long 
fascinated me, and I have read and thought extensively about it. My consider-
able reading about the Big Bang, my background in Process Philosophy, with 
its emphasis on uniting philosophy and science, and my training, teaching, and 
writing in the philosophy of religion have all helped to prepare me for this 
enterprise. 
Almost everyone is curious about the origin of the universe; and my 
intended audience is philosophers, theologians, scientists, and all inquisitive 
persons who wonder how and why it all began. I agree with George Smoot that 
there is a "deep public interest in understanding the origin of the universe and 
our place in it;"2 so this book is written for the average literate person, not just 
for professionals. In places, however, the subject matter is difficult. To quote 
Hawking again: 
.. .Ifwe do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable 
in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, 
philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in 
the discussion of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the 
answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason-for then 
we would know the mind of God. 3 
With Smoot and Hawking, I share this ultimate goal and address this broad 
audience. My contribution will be to ask and try to answer philosophical ques-
tions of scientists, who are usually at least as naive about philosophy as philoso-
phers are about science. I also want to show ordinary people what the best 
scientific minds are saying about the origin of the universe, and how to think 
critically and philosophically about their theories. In thinking about the ultimate 
origin of the universe, we are in the borderlands between science, philosophy, 
and religion. 
xvi WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
I will try to present the major answers that contemporary scientific cosmol-
ogists are giving to: What caused the Big Bang? For many persons, this question 
has a simple and direct answer: God did it. When the Belgian astronomer/priest 
George Lemaitre first understood the evidence for the Big Bang, he was proba-
bly convinced personally that science had discovered the moment when God 
created the world;4 but he tended to keep his views on how religion relates to 
astronomy to himself. In a 1951 address, Pope Pius XII claimed that "True 
science discovers God in an ever-increasing degree-as though God were waiting 
behind every door opened by science .... Science has provided proof of the 
beginning of time .... Hence, creation took place in time. Therefore, there is a 
Creator; therefore, God exists."5 
Those who believe that things are so easy will be surprised to learn that 
most contemporary scientific cosmologists are doing their best to avoid the 
hypothesis that God created or caused the Big Bang. Most presuppose a Natu-
ralistic metaphysics, according to which the universe has been around in some 
form from eternity with no conceivable dependence on Deity. Many scientists 
believe that the Big Bang, which initiated our cosmic epoch, was caused by an 
antecedently existing universe, not by God's creative activity. Some scientific 
cosmologists try to avoid God by maintaining that the Big Bang had no cause 
at all. Coming chapters will survey both secular and religious accounts of 
cosmic origins and evaluate them on their own merits. 
Chapter One of this book reviews the overwhelming evidence that con-
vinces most scientists today that our universe began with a Big Bang somewhere 
between eight and twenty billion years ago; and it charts the course of the 
evolution of the universe from an initiating Big Bang to where we are today. It 
explores the possibility that science cannot answer the question of ultimate 
origins because the topic lies beyond the proper bounds of legitimate science. 
Good science involves both theory and empirical confirmation, but many con-
temporary scientific cosmologists are producing only content-less theories about 
what caused the Big Bang. Scientific Cosmological Agnostics deny that our 
question is properly scientific and indicate that the pseudoscientific theories 
which try to answer it cannot be verified, even indirectly. Only experience can 
separate actualities from abstruse possibilities, reality from wild speculation; yet 
we have no experience of worlds creating other worlds. 
In Chapter Two, Naturalistic Humanistic theories ofreality (metaphysics), 
ofknowledge (epistemology), and ofhuman origins (humanistic anthropology) 
and well-being (ethics and axiology) are introduced, subjected to thorough 
philosophical analysis and criticism, and shown definitively to be untenable. All 
the non-theistic answers to: What caused the Big Bang? examined in Chapters 
Three through Nine are deeply embedded within an indefensible Naturalistic 
Humanistic philosophical outlook. 
Chapter Three explores significant challenges to the idea that our universe 
originated in a Big Bang. Steady State Cosmology, developed by Fred Hoyle 
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and his associates in the 1940s and 1950s, affinns that the universe is uncreated 
and that it maintains its present general appearance from eternity; so there was 
no Big Bang. The Hubble expansion of the universe results from the continuous 
creation of hydrogen atoms out of nothing by matter. New atoms fill in the 
blanks left by the Hubble expansion of the universe. Steady State Cosmology 
is not alone in affinning that the physical universe is spatially and temporally 
infinite. In The Big Bang Never Happened,6 Eric Lerner offers seemingly 
powerful objections to the evidence that convinces most scientists that the Big 
Bang really happened, and he presents his own Plasma Cosmology which, when 
all is said and done, relies upon a local Mini-Bang to explain what is happening 
in the finite part of the infinite universe that is observable to us. Decisive objec-
tions to his position are developed. 
In Chapter Four, two versions of the theory that our universe was created 
by the collapse of an antecedently existing universe are discussed. George 
Gamow thought that a shrinking universe infinitely preceded our own in a time 
before our time and finally collapsed in a Big Crunch. It then rebounded, and 
our resulting universe will expand forever. We exist in a life-supporting phase 
of the endless rebound period. Where Gamow's Cosmology postulates only one 
contraction, one crunch, one Bang, and one rebound, Oscillation Cosmology 
conjures up an infinite number of antecedent universes, each of which began in 
a Big Bang, expanded to a maximal state, recontracted, then renewed the whole 
process with another Big Bang. Oscillationists propose that an influx of energy 
from an antecedently existing universe caused the Big Bang and our resulting 
cosmos, but the position is fatally flawed, as this chapter shows. 
Quantum theory has powerfully influenced cosmological speculation since 
the early 1980s. Chapters Five through Eight explore a variety of Quantum 
Cosmologies, each of which has its own peculiar answer to the question of 
cosmic origins. 
Big Fizz Cosmology covered in Chapter Five says that our Big Bang was 
created when energy bubbles fonned through spontaneous quantum fluctuations 
in the womb of an antecedently existing Superspacetime or Mother Spacetime. 
Infinitely many bubbles fonn spontaneously to make infinitely many universes, 
which co-exist within Mother Spacetime. Our bubble inflated fifteen billion or 
so years ago, so here we are! Big Divide Cosmology says that every universe 
sub-divides itself into infinitely many universes at every tum of events, so we 
are here for a brief moment within a universe that looks like it began in a Big 
Bang, but it really began only a fraction of a second ago when an antecedent 
universe sub-divided to actualize all possibilities. But these cosmologies are 
utterly implausible, as demonstrated. 
Quantum Observership examined in Chapter Six emphasizes the important 
role that some interpreters of quantum mechanics assign to scientific observers, 
measurers, and experimenters. It maintains that the indefinite and indetenninate 
domain of quantum events takes on definiteness and detenninateness only when 
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observers view it. Evidence for the Big Bang exists only as human observers 
find it-and thereby create it. So what created the Big Bang? We did! (But we 
didn't, as the concluding critique proves.) 
Big Accident Cosmology contends, as explained in Chapter Seven, that the 
question of what caused the Big Bang presupposes something that supposedly 
is not true, namely that everything which comes into being has a cause. Quan-
tum physics denies this, we are told, and discloses that our universe originated 
out of nothing, was caused by nothing, exists for no purpose, and is nothing. 
Nothing caused the Big Bang. It is so easy for nothing to cause nothing! Just 
why our universe did not originate this way is carefully explained. 
Chapter Eight considers Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology. Many recent 
scientific cosmologists note that our universe is exceptionally fine-tuned for the 
creation of life, including intelligent forms of life. Tiny changes in any of the 
initial conditions, constants, and Jaws of nature would have resulted in a uni-
verse inhospitable to life. For every successful way of creating a life-supporting 
universe, there are infinitely many futile ways to get it wrong. Lifeless universes 
are infinitely probable, and life-supporting universes are infinitely improbable. 
Why, then, do we live in a life-supporting universe? The Anthropic Principle 
says that we live in a life-supporting universe because we are here, that is, 
because if the universe were not life-supporting, we would not be here to ask 
questions about it. Even atheists do not deny the remarkable life-supporting 
design of our universe, but they think that they can account for this without 
having to appeal to God. Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology explains that if infi-
nitely many worlds exist, as many Quantum Cosmologies prof~ss, then uni-
verses as rare as our own will just happen occasionally. Given an infinite num-
ber of shoes, one will fit now and then by pure chance. The metaphysical 
Principle of Plenitude, that all possibilities must be actual somewhere, guaran-
tees the existence of an infinite number of universes. For Atheistic Quantum 
Cosmologists, the Principle of Plenitude is the ultimate cause of our Big Bang 
plus infinitely many other universes, very few of which life-sustaining. The 
innumerable flaws of Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology are spelled out in detail. 
Chapter Nine deals with the bizarre claims made by the Final Anthropic 
Principle, according to which our universe and an infinite number of others will 
ultimately coalesce into a single omniscient and omnipotent Omega Point that 
will be God. God does not now exist and did not create the world; but the world, 
which began without God, now exists and will ultimately create God. Human 
life is meaningful because through our android descendants we can contribute 
to the development of the Omega Point by traveling in space and ultimately 
inhabiting our entire universe. The position borders on madness, as explained! 
These atheistic theories and a few theistic accounts of what caused the Big 
Bang are explained and critically examined in significant depth in chapters to 
follow. When considered critically and seriously, much of the atheistic cosmo-
logical speculation being done by today's astronomers, astrophysicists, and 
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other scientists is quite outlandish, as the preceding paragraphs suggest. Once 
this is fully understood and appreciated, the door is open to reexamine the 
possibility that God caused the Big Bang. Still, some ways of conceiving of the 
nature of God and of God's relations with the world are much more intelligible 
than others, and much easier to relate to the universe disclosed to us in Big 
Bang Cosmology. 
Two quite different concepts of God are examined in Chapter Ten. Classi-
cal Theism is committed to the absolute changelessness of God in every con-
ceivable respect. Process Theism, by contrast, affirms that God is indeed 
changeless in certain desirable respects but is in process in other highly desir-
able respects. It is desirable both that God be changelessly good and that God's 
experiences change as God interacts with created worlds and their creatures as 
they come in to being in spacetime and history. A comprehensive but modified 
Process Theology best reconciles science and religion. Chapter Ten also dis-
cusses several senses in which God may be said to "exist" and develops and 
justifies several changes in Process Theism that seem desirable, upon examina-
tion, if it is to be rationally and religiously appealing. 
Chapter Eleven presents a revitalized Biopic Teleological Argument for 
the existence of God, based upon massive evidence for the fine tuning of the 
universe for life, as disclosed by contemporary scientific cosmology. Note that 
when masculine pronouns are used occasionally in reference to God in this 
chapter and elsewhere, this is done merely from convention and for economy 
or convenience of expression; but it in no way implies that God is masculine in 
any intelligible or defensible sense. 
Chapter Twelve further develops the case for Theism with a refurbished 
Cosmological Argument from Contingency for the existence of God, again 
based upon what contemporary physics and astrophysics have revealed about 
the radically contingent nature of physical reality. 
To my knowledge, no existing book covers and critically examines philo-
sophically all the major options for explaining the origin of the Big Bang. The 
astute debate between William L. Craig and Quentin Smith in their Theism, 
Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology7 focuses almost exclusively on the Standard 
Model of the Big Bang, with its initial singularity, and on the quantum Big 
Accident option; but it neglects all the other theories of origin explored here. M. 
A. Corey's God and the New Cosmology: The Anthropic Design Argument 
deals mainly with the teleological but not in depth with the cosmological argu-
ment for God's existence. As endnotes for each following chapter will indicate, 
numerous books and articles examine and defend one particular theory or 
another. Yet, no previous book takes a hard philosophical look at all the basic 
options presented here while critically examining the Naturalistic assumptions 
that underlie the non-theistic scientific (or pseudoscientific) cosmologies cov-
ered in Chapters Three through Nine. Many cosmologists emphasize scientific 
xx WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
data and theories. While not neglecting these, I also introduce relevant philo-
sophical questions, analysis, and theories. 
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gion and Philosophy special series of the Value Inquiry Book Series, was 
immensely helpful in spotting defects that I was not able to see, but final re-
sponsibility for imperfections in the book rests with me. And many, many 
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One 
SCIENTIFIC COSMOLOGY AND 
THE BIG BANG 
Greek philosophers assumed that the world, the universe, the cosmos, or nature 
as a whole, existed in some form from eternity, that is, infinitely into the past, 
and that the basic stuff of the universe is uncreated, everlasting, self-sufficient, 
and indestructible. The official Christian view, by contrast, was and is that the 
world was created by God out ofnothing (ex nihi/o) at some point in the finite 
past. Naturalistic cosmologists through the centuries have sided with the Greek 
view and affirmed the everlasting self-existence and self-sufficiency of nature 
as a whole. Traditionally, each view was affirmed solely as a matter of dogma 
and blind faith, though Naturalists consistently intimated that science confirms 
their metaphysics. Up to the present century, however, no convincing evidence 
was available to resolve the dispute. Has this now changed? 
In the twentieth century, cosmology tried to become a science, something 
more than mere speculation and dogma; and up to a point it succeeded. Twenti-
eth-century cosmologists produced a plethora of astonishing discoveries about 
the universe as a whole. 1 The most amazing is that the world of nature as we 
know it came into being at a definite point in the finite past. Our universe has 
not existed forever after all; it was created between 8 and 20 billion years ago. 
Do not conclude too hastily that God created it. or even that the origin of the 
world had a cause. Controversies about what, if anything, caused the Big Bang 
constitute the main subject matter of this book. We cannot address our central 
concern-What caused the Big Bang?-until we first survey evidence for the Big 
Bang and this theory's story of the evolution of the universe. Later, some 
significant challenges to Big Bang Cosmology will be confronted. 
The astronomer Fred Hoyle, who did not favor the view, coined the apt 
pejorative phrase "Big Bang" for the theory that our universe began with the 
greatest thermonuclear explosion of all time in the finite but far distant past. In 
1993, Sky and Telescope magazine ran a contest designed to find a better name 
for it, but after reading over 13,000 entries, some quite imaginative, the panel 
of prestigious judges decided that "Big Bang" is the best name after all. The 
winner of the contest was Fred Hoyle! As expressed in Sky and Telescope, 
"And the winner is ... Nobody. Or Fred Hoyle, really, though he didn't submit 
'the Big Bang' as an official entry last summer, having coined the term 44 years 
ago." Some imaginative losers were: "Hubble Bubble," "Planck Point," "Bertha 
D. Universe," "What Happens If I Press This Button?" and "You're Never 
Going to Get It All Back In There Again."2 
As the theory developed in the twentieth century, differing estimates were 
given about how long ago the Big Bang happened. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
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Edwin Hubble greatly overestimated the expansion rate of the universe; and this 
resulted in a significant miscalculation of the age of the universe-first at a 
billion years, and later at around two billion years. In 1952, George Gamow, an 
early popularizer of the view, published his The Creation of the Universe. 
Gamow calculated that the Big Bang occurred between l. 7 and 3 .4 billion years 
ago.3 In 1958, Werner Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy placed the origin 
of the universe at about four billion years ago.4 During the 1950s, available 
estimates of the age of the earth and its solar system showed them to be older 
than the universe, so something had to give! 
Periodic improvements in methods for estimating cosmic distances and 
velocities bring about more accurate estimates of the time of the origin of the 
universe; but uncertainty lingers. The work of Allan Sandage and W. A. Baade 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s immensely expanded time/distance estimates 
in astronomy. In 1978, Robert Jastrow estimated the age of the universe to be 
around 20 billion years, give or take a few billion years one way or the other;5 
and Frank Tippler uses that figure in his 1994 book titled The Physics of Immor-
tality.6 Today, most cosmologists accept 15 billion years as a workable compro-
mise between the 8 to 20 billion year estimates generated by the inexact dating 
techniques and calculations available to today's astronomers. 
Much more detailed observations and exact measurements by the Chandra 
X-ray Observatory launched in 1999, and the Hubble Space Telescope (de-
ployed in 1990, repaired during 1993, and upgraded in 1997 and 1999), will 
yield a more precise time for the origin of the universe. At first, as many ques-
tions were raised as answered. Late in 1994, some data from Hubble observa-
tions suggested that the universe may be only 8 to 12 billion years old, in which 
case the age of some stars seems to be greaterthan that of the universe-perhaps 
twice as great! Still, most available data indicates a 10 to 18 billion-year-age. 7 
Astronomers scrambled to reconcile conflicting data, either by reintroducing an 
Einsteinian cosmological constant, by correcting the Hubble constant, by look-
ing for ways to lower the estimated age of the stars, by developing more accu-
rate measurements of celestial distances, or by greatly reducing estimates of the 
critical density or mass/energy in the universe. 8 In early 1997 and thereafter, 
new and more accurate measurements of celestial distances were made public 
that harmonize the age of the universe with its stellar and galactic contents.9 
With the availability of much more accurate measurements, by early 1999 some-
thing close to a fifteen billion-year-old cosmos seems very plausible. 10 I will use 
the convenient 15 billion-year figure for the age of the universe. Exact timing 
is not essential for identifying the ultimate cause of the Big Bang; what really 
matters is the well-founded scientific consensus that our world came into being 
somewhere between 8 and 20 billion years ago. In a later discussion of Big 
Accident Cosmology, the mass/density of the universe will be important for 
deciding whether the universe actually had a cause. 
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According to Big Bang Cosmology, how did the universe evolve after its begin-
ning, and what evidences support this sensational view of cosmic origins? 
1. The Evolution of the Universe 
Contemporary scientific cosmologists apply the concept of evolutionary devel-
opment to the cosmos as a whole, not just to living things on earth. They are 
convinced that they can trace the broad outlines of cosmic evolution back to the 
beginning, around fifteen billion years ago, and that we can know more about 
the origin of the universe than about today's weather and earthquakes. The 
Standard Hot Big Bang Model prevailed between 1965 and 1980, when it was 
modified to take account of inflation and quantum effects. According to the 
Standard Model and a few widely publicized modifications, the universe as we 
know it developed as follows. 
A. The Initial Singularity 
Those ofus who take pride in our common sense would be skeptical if told that 
in the distant past all of the material comprising the building in which we now 
live or work was once compacted into a ball no bigger than a basketball or a 
baseball. We would be astounded if further informed that at one time in the past, 
all of the matter/energy comprising the entire universe was compacted into a 
space no bigger than a baseball or a golf ball. Once, space itself was even 
smaller than that. We would be utterly incredulous to learn that in the beginning 
the totality of spacetime and all its contents were the size of a penny, a pinhead, 
or even a point. Yet, this is precisely what the Standard Model tells us, not as 
a matter of baseless dogma or mere speculation, but as grounded presumably in 
hard evidence. The historical development of Big Bang theory in the twentieth 
century will concern us only minimally. That story is well told by many other 
authors, 11 but science cannot be divorced entirely from its history. 
In the beginning, at T = 0, there was a singularity, according to the Stan-
dard Big Bang Model; and in this initial singularity, all the mass/energy of 
creation was compressed infinitely to zero size. The initial singularity had the 
volume of an Euclidean point, which has position but no magnitude at all; but, 
since no space existed in which it could assume a position, the initial singularity 
had neither position nor magnitude. In singularities, including the initial one and 
those that may exist in black holes and collapsed neutron stars, mass/energy is 
infinitely curved, infinitely hot, infinitely dense, and infinitely small. 12 For the 
universe as a whole, at T = 0, the being of the world was as close to non-being 
as it could get! Perhaps, as some suggest, it just was non-being. 
Between 1965 and 1970, two eminent British astrophysicists, Roger Pen-
rose and Stephen Hawking, collaborated to prove that our universe began in a 
singularity, assuming that classical general relativity theory is correct. 13 In his 
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1988 best selling book, A Brief History of Time, Hawking reported that he had 
changed his mind; he wrote that he was "trying to convince other physicists that 
there was in fact no singularity at the beginning of the universe," that "It can 
disappear once quantum effects are taken into account." 14 Like Hawking, many 
other contemporary cosmologists are greatly troubled by the initial singularity, 
as we will see in Chapter Four. 
B. Planck Time and Space 
Quantum Cosmologists trace the origin of the universe back to a tiny fraction 
of a second after the initiating explosion emerged from near nothingness, but 
they reject the initial singularity. Momentous developments occurred in the first 
milliseconds after creation, including the arrival of time, space, and all the laws 
of physics. 
Planck Time is how long it takes a photon oflight, which obviously travels 
at the speed oflight, to traverse a unit of Planck Length or Space. In contemp-
orary Quantum Cosmology, time and space are physically inseparable; and both 
have minimal quantum energy units, below which the very concepts of time and 
space have no meaning. These minimal units are called Planck Time and Planck 
Length or Space; at 10-43 (1/1043) ofa second, the size of the universe was 10-33 
(1/1033) of a centimeter in diameter in volume. At those dimensions, Planck 
Density can also be calculated (I 090 kilograms per cubic centimeter). The 
universe had to be at least that big and that old to exist at all. In Standard Big 
Bang Cosmology, by contrast, time and space can be condensed all the way 
down to a pointlike singularity; but Quantum Cosmologists think that physical 
time and space have no meaningful referent at less than Planck dimensions, 15 
and that it makes no sense to ask what happened before that in lesser quantities 
of spacetime. Yet, we will see, the question of "before that" is almost irresist-
ible. Before that was a singularity, or the laws of quantum physics, or a vacuum 
fluctuation, or an antecedent universe, or Divine creation ex nihi/o--0r some-
thing. 
Scientific cosmologists agree that all laws of physics break down or 
become totally inapplicable either at the initial singularity or at Planck Time. 
This includes the First Law of Thermodynamics, according to which energy is 
neither created nor destroyed. Laws ofnature are employed in reasoning back-
ward in time scientifically. If natural laws break down totally at an initial singu-
larity or at the Planck Wall, nothing before that can be known scientifically 
because nothing remains to guide our extrapolations. As John A. Wheeler put 
it, "There never has been a law of physics that did not demand 'space' and 
'time' for its statement.... With the collapse of space and time the framework 
falls down for everything one ever called a law ofphysics."16 The exact point 
of breakdown is a major controversy. If what Wheeler says is true, and if Planck 
spacetime is the point of ultimate collapse, extrapolating back to an initial 
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singularity is impossible. Wheeler once did so, as we will see in discussing 
Oscillation Cosmology in Chapter Four; but this extrapolation assumes that the 
laws of physics continue to hold earlier than they can be known to apply, if 
Plank dimensions really are the ultimate limits of scientific knowledge. 
C. Inflation 
Several versions of Big Bang Cosmology were formulated early in the twentieth 
century, initially by Willem de Sitter in 1917 and Alexander Friedmann in 
1922.17 Other interpretations were developed in the 1920s and 30s by George 
Lemaitre, Arthur Eddington, and James Jeans. In the late 1940s George Gamow 
and his associates, Ralph Alper and Robert Herman, made major contributions. 
The Standard Model of the Big Bang based on relativity physics dominated 
astrophysics between 1965 and 1980. It affirms that the early universe emerged 
from a singularity and thereafter expanded at a fairly uniform rate. 
No model published prior to 1980 made a place for inflation. What is 
inflation? Some scientific cosmologists now believe that when the universe was 
around 10-35 of a second old, it underwent a short but spectacular period of 
exponentially rapid expansion from Planck dimensions to roughly the size of a 
grapefruit. 18 This lasted until 10-33 of a second after creation. Then the universe 
returned somehow (a great mystery) to the more leisurely and uniform pace of 
expansion predicted by the Standard Model. Alan H. Guth, who proposed the 
idea in 1980, 19 called this rapid expansion "inflation." Today, many cosmolo-
gists accept inflation, though not in the exact form originally proposed by Guth, 
not even Guth himself. Significant modifications of the inflationary scenario 
were proposed by Andreas Albrecht, Paul Steinhardt, and the Russian cosmolo-
gist Andrej Linde.20 Guth now acknowledges that inflation is more ofa family 
of theories than a single theory of cosmic origins and recognizes more than fifty 
varieties.21 Some cosmologists are concerned that inflation may be so elusive 
that it could never be falsified, thus casting doubt upon its status as a scientific 
hypothesis. Although there is no direct empirical evidence for it, inflation is still 
widely accepted as a viable explanatory hypothesis because it is aesthetically 
appealing and provides plausible solutions to the horizon, magnetic monopole, 
and flatness problems. However, inflation theory may create the very problems 
to which it is supposedly the solution! 
The horizon problem is the puzzle about why the observed universe is so 
homogenous and isotropic in structure and content, that is, why the universe is 
observed everywhere to be so remarkably uniform in temperature, background 
radiation, and large scale distributions of matter, despite the minor irregularities 
introduced by intermittent concentrations of matter in planets, stars, gaseous 
clouds, galaxies, and supergalaxies. Inflation suggests that the irregularities 
occurred when the universe was larger than the Standard Model could allow, 
and that the homogeneities were established when the universe was smaller than 
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the Standard Model pennits, thus enabling diverse parts of an initially tiny 
universe to influence one another causally and bring about the universe's ob-
served unifonnity. According to later versions of the theory, the universe did not 
begin homogeneously; but the chaotic perturbations and inhomogeneities that 
might have existed prior to the inflationary epoch were smoothed out by infla-
tion itself. After inflation ended, additional fluke deviations or quantum fluctua-
tions occurred; and these eventually carved out the stars and galaxies.22 Of 
course, inflation is not needed if the universe began homogeneously and 
isotropically, that is, ifthe unifonnities were given as initial conditions. 
The problem of magnetic monopoles is logically implied by Grand Unifi-
cation Theories (GUTs), according to which four basic physical forces were 
unified as one force in the earliest trillionths of a second of creation. GUTs 
imply that massive numbers of large physical particles should exist with either 
a south or north pole, but not both. Such particles would be radically different 
from and incompatible with the existence of all physical particles identifiable 
today, which have both poles. According to Guth's first inflationary scenario, 
all the magnetic monopoles were extenninated during the inflationary era. Now 
he is convinced that this would not happen; and a new scenario is accepted 
because inflation's prediction of magnetic monopoles is "at odds with observa-
tion." In inflationary models, the production of magnetic monopoles is either 
avoided by delaying the genesis of material particles during a brief period of 
rapid supercooling that released the energy that caused inflation,23 or they are 
so dispersed by inflation itself that we just can't find them. None of this has 
been verified directly by observation; but supposedly the inflationary hypothesis 
is justified by its fruits, by its power to resolve otherwise intractable problems. 
Yet, it seems to create the very problems it solves, which otherwise don't exist! 
Inflation theory says that the universe should be rife with magnetic monopoles, 
but not one has ever been seen, and inflation theory tries to explain why non-
existent entities don't exist! 
The flatness problem is the mystery over why space may be so little 
curved. It is closely related to the question of whether the universe contains so 
little mass/energy that it will continue to expand forever, or so much of it that 
gravity will eventually halt its expansion and bring about a contraction phase 
during which the universe slowly shrinks toward an ultimate Big Crunch. All 
the early versions of inflation predicted that the universe was blown out nearly 
flat at the beginning and that it is either just barely closed or perfectly balanced 
between open and closed. If these predictions cannot be sustained and con-
finned, inflation is in deep trouble. As explained later, our universe looks very 
much like an open one, and inflation theorists are now scurrying (without great 
success) to develop models of inflation compatible with an open universe. 24 
The issues of homogeneity, inhomogeneity, and the ultimate fate of the 
universe will be considered again later. Alan Guth believes that inflation is close 
to gaining universal acceptance, but it actually has many serious critics. Cosmo!-
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ogists like Roger Penrose,25 A. Karel Velan,26 William L. Craig,27 and many 
other critics28 have serious doubts about inflation. Profound questions about it 
remain unanswered. Since scientists cannot repeat, verify, or falsify inflation, 
should it be taken seriously as a scientific hypothesis? Is it instead just meta-
physics at its worst? Once inflation got underway, what brought it to a halt? 
How do we know that the universe was not just created by God or something 
else with initial conditions at the outset that insured general uniformity, the 
absence of magnetic monopoles, and whatever the curvature of space happens 
to be? Is inflation just a clever ruse for avoiding God? As Joseph Silk indicates, 
"Initial conditions are an alternative to inflation. Inflation is really a way of 
trying to erase arbitrary initial conditions. And it hasn't succeeded."29 By assum-
ing arbitrarily that the conditions for which it wishes to account were not pres-
ent as initial conditions forthe universe, inflation theory creates all the problems 
that it tries to resolve. 
Is the universe really as flat, as uncurved, as most theories of inflation 
imply? If so, does inflation really explain this flatness? If wrinkles and irregu-
larities existed in early spacetime, why didn't inflation just blow them out into 
bigger wrinkles and irregularities? More seriously, how can inflation's usual 
presupposition that Omega (critical density) equals at least I, that the universe 
is either closed or ultimately balanced between open and closed, be reconciled 
with empirical findings of only a tenth to a thirtieth or so of the mass/energy 
required to balance or to halt and reverse the expansion process? Peter Coles 
and George Ellis indicate that, though controversial, "An open [not a closed] 
universe might arise from inflation;" and they caution that "We do not in fact 
have any proof that inflation ever took place .... "3° Considerations strongly 
favoring the openness of the universe will be presented later, especially in 
Chapter Three. At any rate, with or without inflation, the universe began about 
fifteen billion years ago, give or take a few billion here or there. With or without 
inflation, What caused the Big Bang? is a very good question. 
D. Evolution of Physical Forces, Particles, and the Laws of Nature 
During the remainder of the first minutes of creation, extremely important things 
happened that brought about the universe recognizable to us today, or at least 
to today's astrophysicists. During the first one to four minutes of time, the 
universe continued to expand and cool very rapidly; the four basic forces of 
physics separated from one another; the most elemental physical particles were 
formed; and the laws of nature came into being. 
According to Grand Unification Theory (GUT), which aspires to be a 
theory of everything, the four basic forces of nature originally were only one 
force that divided into four at around I 0-39 of a second. These physical forces 
are: I. gravity, the force that holds together large-scale objects like those per-
ceptible by our senses; 2. the strong nuclear force that holds protons and neu-
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trons together in atomic nuclei; it is immensely more powerful than gravity, but 
operates only at short distances within the nuclei of atoms; 3. the electromag-
netic force that holds electrons in orbit around atomic nuclei; and 4. the weak 
force that causes the slow decay of radioactive elements like uranium, ionium, 
radium, and radon. All of these forces are presumed to be mediated by messen-
ger particles like gluons, gravitons, and w+, w-, and Z0• The last two of these 
elemental physical forces have now been combined into an "electroweak force;" 
but gravity is especially resistant to unification. At present, Grand Unification 
has not been confirmed; it is a hope, not a fact, an aspiration, not an accomplish-
ment. When and if Grand Unification is achieved, this will be additional power-
ful evidence for the Big Bang. 
Sub-atomic physical particles first emerged from the matterless energy of 
preceding phases of creation at around I 0-6 of a second, but nothing as complex 
as atoms and chemical elements then existed. A dense unstable soup of photons 
plus sub-atomic matter and anti-matter particles evolved from pure energy. In 
particle accelerators, when particles are generated from energy, an equal number 
of matter and antimatter particles are always created. Forth is reason, astrophysi-
cists believe that for a short time equal numbers of quarks and anti-quarks, 
neutrons and neutrinos, electrons and positrons, protons and antiprotons, and 
a vast plethora of particles and anti-particles were created in dense thermonu-
clear reactions in the very early universe. None of these particles and antiparti-
cles endured for very long. When they collided, they annihilated one another, 
released more energy, and generated additional radiation and sub-atomic parti-
cles. By the end of the first thirty minutes, by some process mysterious even to 
astrophysicists, the symmetry of matter and antimatter in the universe was 
broken. Somehow matter came to predominate over antimatter; and thus we live 
in a world of matter, not antimatter. 
Natural laws describe general features of structures and processes in the 
world of public, perceptible spacetime. Laws of nature that apply to the four 
basic physical forces and to diverse sub-atomic, atomic, chemical, biological, 
psychological, and social entities came into being along with the realities whose 
patterns they depict. Through the centuries, the precise kind of reality possessed 
by natural laws has been much debated. A once popular view, now outmoded, 
affirmed that natural laws are powers or forces that compel things to be what 
they are and do what they do. The dominant view today is that laws of nature 
are merely statistical patterns that describe but do not forcefully compel or 
restrain natural structures and processes.31 Natural laws have no causal efficacy 
in themselves; they do not cause things to exist; they neither force things to do 
what they do nor to be what they are; and they do not impose external restraints. 
At best, natural laws are only formal causes, not efficient causes. They do not 
even exist prior to the things that they "regulate" or "govern." They tell us 
nothing about the behavior of a single entity like a single atom or molecule; they 
merely summarize the average behavior of actual things in large groups. They 
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do not describe the activities of individuals with absolute precision. Individuals 
come first; and their existence, natures, activities, and habits gradually engender 
recognizable statistical patterns. Knowledge of these general configurations by 
intelligent beings comes much later. Laws ofnature merely describe how things 
behave on the average, as we discern them. Until entities exists in quantity, their 
configurations and the laws that portray their functional patterns do not exist, 
except perhaps as possibilities or exemplars in the mind of God. The real signif-
icance of natural laws is not that they are efficient causes but rather that they 
permit us to reason from the observed to the unobserved. Our abilities to predict 
and control future events and to understand past events depend upon this rea-
soning. Natural laws are only formal and probabilistic, not efficient and exact, 
causes of groups of physical events. They do not pre-exist these events to 
impose anything upon them. 
Natural laws operate within given physical conditions. Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy prompts astrophysicists to inquire about the initial conditions of the uni-
verse. What kind of habituated or habit-forming stuff was given originally for 
the laws of nature to describe? Attempts to dispense with initial conditions by 
converting or reducing them to natural laws seem doomed to failure. The quan-
tity of mass/energy in the universe, extremely low entropy or disorder, no more 
than four basic physical forces, their relative strengths, permissible kinds of 
physical particles, the directionality of time, and other conditions resulting in 
regular or lawful patterns of events were simply given at the beginning of 
creation. These primordial conditions spawned numerical constants of nature 
like the relatively unchanging numbers associated with the four basic forces, 
Planck's constant, charges for electrons and protons, definite masses for differ-
ent kinds of physical particles, the rate of Hubble expansion, and the speed of 
light. Physical constants are extremely useful to us in predicting past and future 
courses of events. Natural laws merely describe the formal patterns of processes 
and realities in nature; but in themselves they are devoid of energy or power. 
E. From a Universe of Radiation to a Gaseous Universe 
The nuclei of hydrogen and helium atoms were formed when the universe was 
about one second old; but for the first 700,000 years, the cosmos, composed of 
turbulent radiant energy, was almost without form and void. Stable atoms could 
not form during the first part of this radiation era because electrons were con-
stantly being knocked out of place from their orbits around protons. The 
"primordial fireball," as it is often called, was at first completely dark and 
fireless for many hundreds of thousands of years. After around 300,000 years, 
atoms began to form as the universe further expanded and cooled. Until then, 
darkness was upon the face of the deep; but as atoms formed, more space was 
created, and photons were set free to illuminate the universe for the first time; 
and suddenly, after 300,000 years or so of darkness, there was light. The all-
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pervasive microwave background that we detect today reflects these processes 
and originated during this era of cosmic evolution. Finally, after 700,000 to a 
million years, the universe became a dense gaseous cloud consisting of about 
75 percent hydrogen and 25 percent helium, with traces of deuterium and 
lithium. This gaseous plasma continued to expand and cool; but it contained no 
heavy elements. No quasars, galaxies, stars, or planets graced the skies. 
F. Creation of Quasars, Galaxies, Stars, Solar Systems, Heavier Elements 
When the gaseous universe was a billion or so years of age, two powerful forces 
and an initial irregularity or fluke fluctuations finally separated and produced 
massive objects in the heavens. The two forces were (1) the kinetic expansive 
energy of the original cosmic explosion that continued to dissipate the hydrogen 
and helium gases and (2) the opposing attractive force of gravity that slowly 
assembled huge masses of hydrogen and helium gasses to form the stuff of 
millions of quasars and supergalaxies, plus billions of galaxies and their innu-
merable stars. 
Either irregularities were built into the universe as initial conditions, or 
quantum flukes explain why, despite gravity, the gaseous universe did not 
expand indefinitely as a homogeneous gaseous plasma. Most astrophysicists 
today think that quantum physics accounts for these flukes. Just where quantum 
physics begins to apply to the early universe is highly problematic. Some think 
it doesn't apply at all because they interpret quantum physics only phenome-
nologically or epistemologically as informing us only about how quantum 
conditions appear to us, not about how they really are or were. 
As better explained in Chapter Six, quantum physics is interpreted in this 
book as applying realistically and ontologically to the actual structure of the 
physical world. Some ontological realists think that quantum physics applies at 
or very near the beginning of creation, perhaps at or immediately following the 
very earliest Planck or inflationary moments; others think that it begins to apply 
only when quantum fields of energy or tiny individuated quanfum objects like 
electrons and photons made their first appearance. In any event, minuscule 
quantum fluctuations occurred at some point in the very early universe, and 
these significantly affected the density and distribution of existing mass/energy 
in the later universe. Eventually these perturbations had massive cumulative 
effects. Persisting and spreading for a billion years or more, the initially small 
effects of very early sub-microscopic vacillations caused huge clouds of gas to 
separate. Then gravity pulled their ingredients together to form quasars, galax-
ies, and stars. 
Although only .002 percent of all existing hydrogen is heavy hydrogen or 
deuterium, that tiny amount is indispensable for igniting all stellar furnaces. 
Gravity alone is too weak to condense and heat the hydrogen in evolving stars 
to the temperature required to ignite the process ofnuclear fusion that drives all 
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stars and suns; but gravity can and did produce the lower densities and tempera-
tures required to initiate deuterium fusion. Deuterium fusion then inaugurated 
the fusion of hydrogen into helium, and flaming galaxies, quasars, stars, and 
suns graced the skies many hundreds of thousand of years afterthe initiation of 
the Big Bang. 
G. Formation of Our Sun, Its Planets, and Life on Earth 
Aristotle and Ptolemy believed mistakenly that the heavens were absolutely 
perfect in their changelessness. They and their ancient and medieval disciples 
could see only the deceptive stability of stars in our Milky Way and a few 
"wandering stars," the planets. Unknown to the ancients, many other galaxies 
of stars exist, and so did earlier generations of stars. Eventually, some of these 
stars, the giant supernovas, exploded and filled the heavens with stardust. 
Five billion or so years ago, ten billion years after the onset of the primor-
dial Big Bang explosion, gravity assembled enough stellar debris to form our 
sun and its planets, including our earth. Our sun presently has enough nuclear 
fuel to bum for another five billion years, so it is a middle-aged star. The earth 
existed for about one to one and a half billion years before the most primitive 
forms of life appeared. Don't ask how! No one really knows! All the oxygen, 
carbon, nitrogen, iron, and other heavy elements that constitute our bodies and 
those of all living things were forged earlier in stellar furnaces. No life could 
have formed anywhere during the first generation of stars composed almost 
entirely of hydrogen and helium. Supernovas first had to manufacture the 
heavier elements, then explode to scatter their stuff oflife into the cosmos. The 
process is cumulative, so later and later supernovas consist of more and more 
metals and other heavier elements. Our sun, all its planets, and we ourselves 
were fabricated by gravity out of the rubble of numerous supernova explosions. 
As William Fowler said, "Each one of us and all of us are truly and literally a 
little bit of stardust."32 This may explain our fascination with and Immanuel 
Kant's being filled with awe by "the starry heavens above." We are all stuff of 
their stuff. 
Assuming a 15 billion-year-old universe, about three and a half to four 
billion years ago, eleven and a half to twelve billion years after the Big Bang 
was initiated, microscopically small forms of life first appeared on earth. Much 
later, after more than 2,500,000,000 years of evolution, our earliest upright-
walking hominid ancestors, members of the species Australopithecus anamen-
sis, first emerged in Africa around 400 to 300 million years ago, more than 14.5 
billion years after the Big Bang. They and their descendants like Australopith-
ecus afarensis and Homo erectus flourished for well over a million years. Homo 
erectus migrated from Africa into Asia and Europe. Exactly when the earliest 
members of our own hominid species, Homo sapiens, descended from them and 
first appeared is a matter of great controversy; but it happened somewhere 
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between 500,000 and l 00,000 years ago, most probably around 200,000 years 
ago. We are newcomers in creation. 
2. Evidences for the Big Bang 
What evidences support the Big Bang account of the origin and development of 
our cosmos? Why do scientific cosmologists believe that our universe began in 
a cataclysmic thermonuclear explosion? Evidence accumulated slowly for most 
of the twentieth century. Today it is so overwhelming that almost all contempo-
rary astronomers, astrophysicists, and scientists are convinced that our world 
origi-nated in an astronomical explosion at some point in the finite past. Its 
present structure evolved from a primordial fireball. Only a very few cosmolo-
gists like Eric Lerner are unconvinced. His serious challenge to Big Bang 
Cosmology will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
Explosions familiar to us take place within a pre-existing spacetime sys-
tem, and their debris scatters into that system; but the initial Big Bang was very 
different from familiar bomb and dynamite blasts. The Big Bang created space-
time itself. Space is not sheer nothingness, as common sense tends to assume; 
it has its own physical properties. It is a primordial physical medium that has its 
own energy density and texture. It is grainy, granular, or foamy; and it is elastic, 
temporally expanding, but capable of being shrunk, bent, knotted, and warped. 
All physical things, including explosions, are manifestations ofit. The following 
converging lines of evidence imply that the basic spatiotemporally extended 
stuff of our universe originated in a thermonuclear explosion around fifteen 
billion years ago. 
A. Receding Galaxies and the Redshift 
Only since the early 1920s have we known with assurance of the existence of 
other galaxies, profuse with stars. Before powerful telescopes were built early 
in this century, astronomers could not see any individual stars beyond our own 
galaxy. They could see a few nebulae, but they could not confirm that they are 
composed of stars or that they exist beyond our Milky Way. With the naked eye, 
we can only see individual stars in our own galaxy, the Milky Way with its 
hundred billion suns. We can also see a few dim nebulae, like the nearby 
Andromeda Nebula, whose composition was unknown before the 1920s. 
With his feeble telescope, Galileo could see the moons orbiting Jupiter. He 
was the first to see that the Milky Way is composed of individual stars, but he 
could not see any single stars within the hundred and twenty five billion or more 
galaxies that lie beyond our own Milky Way. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, telescopes were powerful enough to see many nebulae; and in 1784, 
Charles Messier published a list of 103 bright clusters and nebulae, some of 
which turned out to be extragalactic.33 Thomas Wright conjectured as early as 
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17 50 that the spiral nebulae are clusters of stars. In 1850, Baron Alexander von 
Humboldt called them "island universes. "34 Without empirical verification, most 
astronomers accepted this view from Messier's day to late in the nineteenth 
century, when a few influential astronomers shifted to the position that they are 
only clouds of gas located within the Milky Way.35 
Edwin Hubble first confirmed the island universes hypothesis. Beginning 
early in the twentieth century, astronomers employed much more powerful 
telescopes to probe the distant universe. In 1924, Edwin Hubble, using the 100-
inch telescope at Mount Wilson Observatory in California, confirmed that the 
nebulae contain individual stars and that giant galaxies of stars exist beyond the 
Milky Way, our local galaxy. Hubble developed methods for measuring cosmic 
distances based upon the luminosity of"standard candles" in the sky, but we 
now know that his original computations greatly underestimated these distances 
and the corresponding age of the universe. He proved, nevertheless, that the 
universe is immensely larger and richer in contents than most people had ever 
dreamed it to be. 
Edwin Hubble and Milton Humason, his associate, made and reported 
numerous observations that confirm another startling truth about the galaxies, 
the redshift; but they were not the first to see and discuss it. V. M. Slipher at the 
Lowell Observatory noticed the redshift in 1912 while observing and charting 
a small number of spiral nebulae, but he did not realize that they are clusters of 
stars and stardust, and that their redshift evidences an expanding universe. 
What is the redshift, and what is its significance for the origin of our 
universe? In the middle of the nineteenth century, Christian Doppler discovered 
some important truths about light emitted by moving objects. If light coming 
from an object moving toward an observer is filtered through a spectroscope, 
its wavelength shortens and shifts toward the blue end of the spectrum. If the 
object is moving away from the observer, its wavelength lengthens and shifts 
toward the red end of the spectrum. Radar guns used today by traffic police 
make use of this "Doppler effect." Light waves coming from distant objects 
moving rapidly away from us are stretched toward the red end of the spectrum; 
and the further away and faster these objects are, the redder the shift. The 
degree of this shift is proportional to their speed and distance from the observer. 
Hubble and Humason examined numerous galaxies and found in most 
cases that they manifest the "Doppler effect," the redshift; and they inferred that 
most observable galaxies in the universe are moving away from us. This was, 
as they recognized, the first hard empirical evidence that the universe expands 
as time marches on. The redshift of the galaxies does not result from their 
moving through space like projectiles, but from the expansion of space itself. 
Galactic redshift is extremely important evidence for Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy. If the spatiotemporal universe expands as it moves into the future, then 
earlier and earlier in the past it must have been more and more compacted or 
concentrated. The calculable rate of cosmic expansion, expressed in Hubble's 
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1929 law of unifonn expansion, implies a relatively unifonn rate of contraction, 
applied retroactively. Calculations reveal that at some point in the finite past, the 
universe was compacted to zero, an initial singularity; but this implication did 
not become clear for some time. Much later in the century, quantum physicists 
discerned that all laws ofnature break down or become inapplicable at less than 
Planck time. If so, compaction below Planck dimensions to an even earlier 
initial singularity cannot be inferred after all; but that story will be told later. 
Hubble found that although most galaxies manifest the redshift, a few do 
not. Our nearest neighbors, the Andromeda galaxy, the Magellanic Clouds, and 
twenty five or so other small galaxies nearby, do not exhibit the redshift because 
they are sufficiently close to be gravitationally bound to our Milky Way. In 
1994, astronomers discovered a large, nearby, and previously unknown galaxy 
hidden behind our Milky Way; and there may be others.36 The Andromeda 
galaxy, with a blueshift, is actually heading towards us and will collide with our 
Milky Way in about five billion years. This should not cause alarm, however; 
neither we nor our descendants will be around to see it; and it may only pass 
through the Milky Way with few collisions between vastly separated stars. 
B. Hubble's Law ofUnifonn Expansion 
In 1924 Edwin Hubble established that most galaxies are moving away from us; 
and by 1929 he realized that they do so in a lawlike manner. They move away 
from us and from one another at a unifonn and calculable rate, like raisins in a 
rising loaf of bread, or dots on the surface of an inflating balloon. According to 
Hubble's law ofunifonn expansion, in a homogeneous universe, galaxies move 
away from us and from one another at speeds proportional to their distance. 
Improved contemporary estimates of cosmic distances and velocities differ 
significantly from the results of Hubble's initial computations. We now know 
that the galaxies will double their distances from one another and from us in less 
than ten billion years. Before late 1997 or early 1998 astronomers assumed that 
the rate of cosmic expansion is being slowed by gravity, so it was much more 
rapid in the distant past when cosmic distances were smaller, and it will be 
much slower in the far distant future when the size of the universe is signifi-
cantly greater. It now appears, as explained in Chapter Three, that the rate is 
accelerating, not slowing. This rate of expansion, known as the "Hubble con-
stant," remains nearly the same during the lifetime of any human astronomer; 
but from a cosmic perspective, the pace of intergalactic distancing is anything 
but constant. Very recent work pins the Hubble constant down to between 60 
and 75 kilometers per second for each megaparsec (3.26 million light years) of 
distance.37 
The reverse of expansion is contraction. Hubble's law is significant for 
Big Bang Cosmology because it implies that in the finite but far distant past, all 
the mass/energy in the universe, including all matter in all the galaxies, was 
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compressed together and belonged to one exploding primordial fireball. Even 
earlier, it was compacted either to zero, an initial singularity, or to Planck or 
other finite dimensions. If the laws of nature collapse at or beyond the Planck 
Wall, nothing smaller or earlier could exist as a part of our universe. 
C. The First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics 
The law of increasing entropy affirms that order and energy are constantly being 
lost or dissipated in closed systems that are not drawing and renewing them 
from elsewhere. Loss of order and energy is irreversible and time-asymmetrical. 
Applied to the whole universe as a closed system, this law indicates that disor-
der increases universally, and perhaps that overall energy concentrations de-
crease, as the cosmos expands and cools over time. It also implies that the 
energy and order of the universe were more and more concentrated and orga-
nized earlier and earlier in time. The universe began in a state of low entropy, 
and if it were infinitely old it now would be in a state of maximum entropy. 
However, since it is not infinitely disordered, it cannot be infinitely old. At 
some point in the finite past, about fifteen billion years ago, the universe was 
totally concentrated into a singularity or to Planck or other minute dimensions. 
The First Law of Thermodynamics affirms that energy is conserved, that 
it can be neither created nor destroyed, that it can only be transformed into other 
types. This well verified law ofnature implies nothing metaphysical about the 
ultimate origin of the mass/energy of the universe. It does not imply that mass/ 
energy existed everlastingly and necessarily throughout an infinite past, though 
it is occasionally given this metaphysical interpretation.38 Standard Big Bang 
Cosmology affirms that all the mass/energy of creation came into being with its 
laws about fifteen billion years ago. As a law of science, the First Law of 
Thermodynamics says simply that once created, energy is conserved and that 
we know ofno physical way that we can destroy it. Superficially, the First Law 
of Thermodynamics, which says that mass/energy cannot be created, appears to 
conflict with Big Bang Cosmology, which says that all the mass/energy of the 
universe was created around fifteen billion years ago. However, the empirical 
or scientific claim that "The amount of energy in the universe is constant" 
should not be confused with the metaphysical claim that "The amount of energy 
in the universe is necessary, uncreated, self-sufficient, and everlasting." If our 
universe was actually preceded by an earlier universe that gravitationally col-
lapsed to a singularity, all previous conservation laws would have collapsed and 
terminated as it crunched to spatiotemporal nothingness. As Charles Misner, 
Kip Thome, and John A. Wheeler say, 
Of all principles of physics, the laws of conservation of charge, lepton 
number, baryon number, mass, and angular momentum are among the 
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most finnly established. Yet, with gravitational collapse the content of 
these conservation laws also collapses. The established is disestablished. 39 
Conservation laws are really not incompatible with Standard Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy because the conservation of mass/energy, like all other laws of nature, 
begins with and does not antedate the Big Bang. 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics applies fully only to closed systems 
that do not draw energy and order from other systems. The growing bodies of 
living things, including living human beings, concentrate order and energy; but 
this does not violate the Second Law because all living things eat, drink, respire, 
photosynthesize (if plants), and draw their sustenance from outside themselves. 
They are not completely closed systems, so the Second Law does not apply fully 
to them. Considered apart from the energy that they draw from elsewhere, the 
law does apply. Animal bodies constantly lose and expend ordered energy, 
which is why they require renewal meal after meal, breath after breath. If not 
fed, they starve. Plants also lose ordered energy and renew it through photosyn-
thesis and by absorbing nutrients through their foliage and roots. 
The concept of"entropy" may involve subtle ambiguities. Roger Penrose 
notes that "Entropy is a concept that may be banded about in a totally cavalier 
fashion!"40 He suggests that there may be something subjective about the "or-
der" involved in low entropy, that "Various observers' aesthetic judgments 
might well get involved in what they deem to be 'order', rather than disorder."41 
Increasing entropy is decreasing order, so to understand it we must ad-
vance and comprehend a concept of order. Contemporary discussions of entropy 
give many different accounts of what counts as order. Astrophysicists identify 
order with the undifferentiated homogeneity of mass/energy in the earliest 
universe, with matter that has not yet been converted into pure or unavailable 
energy, with an intense concentration of energy, with the relatively low ratio 
between the number of photons and the number of other particles in the uni-
verse, with the ability to recover infonnation from antecedent states of affairs, 
with energy states not pervaded by destructive ripples, with complex environ-
ments that can support intelligent fonns of life, and perhaps with all of these. 
But can all of the above be consistently combined? Measured by the standard 
of being life-supporting, the earliest universe was chaos, high entropy, great 
disorder, "without fonn and void." Yet, it was low in entropy when order is 
identified with the original concentrated and homogeneous soup of radiant 
energy or sub-atomic particles that ultimately produced an available-energy-
environment supportive of and usable by intelligent life. Whether the very early 
universe is characterized as ordered or chaotic may be a matter of wording and 
emphasis. George Gamow opted for chaos or high entropy when he wrote that 
"In the distant past our universe was considerably less differentiated and com-
plex than it is now and the state of matter at that time could be accurately 
described by the classical concept of 'primordial chaos. '"42 This is really not 
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incompatible with Roger Penrose's emphasis, discussed later, on low entropy 
as an initial condition of the universe because Penrose employs different con-
cepts of order and entropy. 
Entropy is often conceived as a decrease in the concentration of both 
energy and order, but these are two very different things. In the expansion 
phase of our universe, they normally hang together, but not necessarily, not 
always, not in the contraction phase if one is to occur, and not in contemporary 
regions of gravitational collapse. Neutron stars are so massive and dense that 
gravity has fused their electrons and protons into neutrons. In black holes or 
collapsing neutron stars or universes, energy concentrates but disorder in-
creases. Neither black holes nor collapsing universes violate the First Law of 
Thermodynamics, for they are not losing energy absolutely. Spacetime and 
energy are continuously constricted and concentrated in them while life-support-
ive order, available information, usable energy, and recoverable information 
deteriorate, and destructive ripples increase, so most astrophysicists now be-
lieve; but the issue is contested. 
With respect to energy, black holes as well as collapsing stars and uni-
verses actually do violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the law of 
increasing entropy, for energy concentrates in them; but with respect to life 
supporting, ripple-free usable energy and available information, they do not 
violate this law, for these elements of order decrease within them. Concerning 
order, but not energy, Roger Penrose affirms that "The second law will hold 
sway just as much inside a black hole as it does elsewhere."43 By this, Penrose 
means that human existence in black holes and collapsing universes would be 
utterly impossible because the kind of order that could support us would be lost 
and lacking. 
Penrose thinks that no living space traveler could survive being sucked 
into a black hole; the violence and disorder would be unendurable. 44 Reflecting 
on recollapsing universes, Stephen W. Hawking agrees and confesses, 
At first, I believed that disorder would decrease when the universe 
recollapsed. This was because I thought that the universe had to return to 
a smooth and ordered state when it became small again. This would mean 
that the contracting phase would be like the time reverse of the expanding 
phase. People in the contracting phase would live their lives backwards: 
they would die before they were born and get younger as the universe 
contracted. 45 
After reading a brilliant article by Don Page titled "Will Entropy Decrease ifthe 
Universe Recollapses?"46 Hawking decided that he had made a mistake. He 
came to believe that "disorder would in fact continue to increase during the 
contraction" and that "Conditions in the contracting phase would not be suitable 
for the existence of intelligent beings .... "47 On this view, in black holes and 
18 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
collapsing stars and universes, energy concentrates; but life-supporting order, 
available infonnation, and ripple-free usable energy do not. In his work on 
radiating black holes, Hawking contends that the wave functions of all objects 
sucked into black holes, and thus all infonnation about them, would be lost 
irretrievably. Entropy in this sense would consist in the loss of wave function 
probabilities and infonnation about them. Yet, some astrophysicists are not fully 
convinced and argue that entropy would decrease (meaning presumably that 
both energy and order increase) in a collapsing universe, 48 and that infonnation 
initially lost into a black hole might be recovered from the radiation it slowly 
emits.49 This issue will arise again in later discussions. 
D. Inferences from Einstein's Theory of Relativity 
In 1905, Albert Einstein developed his special theory ofrelativity. It denied the 
reality of absolute Newtonian time and space, which were always and every-
where the same. It affinned that space and time are inextricably united; no 
timeless space or space less time can exist. Their apparent constancy depends on 
the speed at which observers and their immediately surrounding spacetime 
frames are traveling. The speed of light is Einstein's only constant; observers 
always find it to be the same no matter where they are or how fast they are 
moving; but this implies the relativity ofN ewton' s absolute constants, space and 
time. 
In 1915 Einstein developed, and in 1917 he published, his general theory 
of relativity. It was a new theory of gravity and curved non-Newtonian space. 
Einstein regarded them as identical. General relativity affinns that space itself, 
and the path of light waves and other particles in tenns of which we measure 
space, are curved or distorted in the presence of omnipresent gravitational 
fields. Light travels in curved paths in such fields. Space is more than a homo-
geneous empty fonn; it is something real in itself that can be concentrated, 
stretched, shrunk, bent, and straightened. The curvature of space just consists 
of gravitational fields that vary in intensity with variations in mass. 
To Einstein's surprise and dismay, when combined with Hubble's observa-
tions of the redshift, his relativity field equations indicated that the universe is 
actually finite but expanding with unbounded potential, and that it had a begin-
ning in time. When he realized this, Einstein was horrified! He mistakenly 
assumed that a finite universe must have an absolute center, and this was pro-
hibited by his special theory ofrelativity. The Copernican Principle affinns that 
there are no privileged positions and observers in a relativity universe. 
Einstein was both a theoretical physicist and a philosophical metaphysi-
cian. When he first discovered his general theory ofrelativity, he believed with 
Spinoza in a universe that is static, unifonn, infinite, and eternal. Robert Jastrow 
tells us that, "When Einstein came to New York in 1921 a rabbi sent him a 
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telegram asking, 'Do you believe in God?' and Einstein replied, 'I believe in 
Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists. "'50 
Most Theists have a suspicion that Spinoza's God is no God at all. Spin-
oza's God is Nature, and Nature is his God. Spinoza did not deify nature; he 
naturalized deity. To believe in Spinoza's God is to affirm that the universe is 
penetrable to reason, that determinism reigns inexorably, that "God does not 
play dice" (as Einstein put it), and that the world is spatially infinite, eternal, 
necessary, unchanging, and static. Initially, Einstein accepted this metaphysics, 
believing that reality is timeless and changeless, and that human distinctions 
between past, present, and future are illusions. Einstein once wrote that "Space 
and time are not conditions in which we live, but modes in which we think."51 
Jastrow asks: "Why did Einstein object to the idea of a beginning?" and 
he answers: 
I think it is plausible that he did not believe in God the Creator. A 
beginning presupposes an agent that set in motion the events, which we 
call the explosion of the universe. That was anathema to Einstein. He 
believed in Spinoza's God, who created order and harmony in the universe 
and is revealed in equations like Einstein's relativity equation, but he did 
not believe in a personal God or God the Creator.52 
Given his metaphysical inclinations, it is small wonder that Einstein 
reacted with powerful negative emotions when Willem de Sitter, a Dutch astron-
omer, showed him in correspondence during 1917 that his relativity equations 
have non-static solutions which imply an expanding universe that originated in 
the finite past. According to Jastrow, Einstein wrote back, "This circumstance 
irritates me" and "To admit such possibilities seems senseless."53 Notice, says 
Jastrow, the emotionally loaded language! When Alexander Friedman, a Rus-
sian mathematician, proved that Einstein's rejection of an expanding universe 
was based on a mistake in calculation, Einstein first ignored him, then attempted 
to prove him wrong, and finally published a confession of his error.54 After 
Edwin Hubble decisively confirmed the redshift of the galaxies, Einstein re-
fused to accept an expanding universe until he traveled from Germany to Cali-
fornia in 1931 to see for himself. Then theory yielded to facts. 
Einstein finally realized that his preferred static but finite universe would 
collapse under the weight of its own gravity; so he postulated a "cosmological 
term" as an equal repulsive force that would prevent this collapse. Later, he 
confessed that this was the greatest mistake of his career. It prevented him from 
discovering the Big Bang. 
What is the nature of this repulsive force that might so nicely counterbal-
ance gravitational attraction? Einstein had no answer. Big Bang Cosmologists 
know that a repulsive force does operate in the universe-the kinetic energy left 
over from the primordial explosion; but whether there is an additional repulsive 
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force, a Cosmological Constant, is still being debated. For billions of years, the 
repulsive force of energy released by the Big Bang has exceeded the cohesive 
force of gravity. It may or may not do so always. The ultimate destiny of the 
universe hangs in the balance. Stay tuned for breaking developments! 
E. Nucleosynthesis of Hydrogen, Helium, Deuterium, and Heavier Elements 
In contemporary cosmology, astronomy merges with sub-atomic particle phys-
ics. Astrophysicists now believe that the smallest things in the universe can tell 
us something significant about the universe as a whole, and vice versa. Research 
with particle accelerators discloses both the laws of physics and the conditions 
under which stable atomic elements were created out of sub-atomic particle 
soup in the very early universe. Alchemists' dreams of converting one element 
into another come true in nuclear physics, but only under extremely exotic 
conditions. Particle physicists recognize that some states and processes pre-
dicted by their theories were realized only under the extreme conditions of 
density and temperature of the Big Bang, and in the stars as nuclear furnaces. 
Conditions were right in the very early universe for the nucleosynthesis of 
hydrogen into helium, but not for producing the heavier elements. Big Bang 
Cosmology predicts thatthe universe consists of about 75 percent hydrogen and 
24 percent helium. Spectroscopic examination of countless stars and galaxies 
confirms this prediction, which is powerful evidence for Big Bang Cosmology. 
The remaining heavier elements, quite abundant in our local terrestrial 
environment, constitute only about one percent of the stuff of the universe. In 
1950, George Gamow argued that the heavy elements were created very shortly 
after the initial explosion as the universe expanded and cooled. However, 
research with nuclear reactions and "atom smashers" shows that conditions in 
the earliest universe could generate only the prevailing hydrogen and helium 
abundances. Also, if all of the radioactively unstable elements had originated 
in the Big Bang, they would have completely decayed by now; but they have 
not. The primordial fireball expanded and cooled too quickly to produce the 
heavier elements. Aeons of "stellar cooking time" were required to convert 
hydrogen and helium into heavier elements like oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, 
manganese, iron, and radon. The bodies of living things as we know them 
consist, in part, of elements synthesized only by nuclear reactions in the stars. 
The heavy elements were dispersed through the cosmos only when giant super-
novas exploded. Their debris forms the planets of our solar system and others 
like them throughout the universe. This account of the origin and distribution 
of the heavy elements in and through the explosion of supernovas was dramati-
cally confirmed in 1987 when, for the first time in the modem world, astrono-
mers actually observed a supernova explosion in the relatively nearby Large 
Magellanic Cloud of stars. 55 Late in 1992, astronomers detected another super-
nova explosion almost five billion light years away. The Hubble Space Tele-
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scope has since located many more in far away galaxies, and astronomers use 
them as "standard candles" for measuring vast cosmic distances. 
Stellar cooking could not and did not produce the quantities of deuterium 
(heavy hydrogen) and helium that exist in the universe. Only the extreme tem-
peratures, densities, and pressures that existed during the earliest phases of the 
Big Bang can account for them. Stars generate some helium at a rate that ac-
counts for only 2 percent of all the helium in the universe. The Big Bang is 
required for all the rest. The Big Bang directly generated hydrogen, helium, and 
traces of deuterium and lithium. Irregularities in the primordial fireball eventu-
ally separated vast clouds of gas, which gravity then condensed into quasars and 
stars; and the stars later cooked up the heavy elements. Everything observable 
came out of the Big Bang, one way or another. 
F. The Cosmic Microwave Background 
Today's astronomers can "see" the universe in many ways. They view it through 
powerful optical telescopes; they listen to its radio waves; and they detect its 
radiant x-rays, gamma rays, ultraviolet rays, and infrared rays. These types of 
radiant energy, coming to us from local and non-local regions of the universe, 
can now be converted to visual images. Radio waves furnish some of the most 
powerful evidence available for the Big Bang. 
Prior to 1965, many scientific cosmologists, especially those attracted to 
Steady State Cosmology (to be examined later) still had doubts about Big Bang 
Cosmology. A remarkable achievement of modem astronomy occurred in 1965, 
providing crucial evidence for the Big Bang. In 1965, two relatively new 
Ph.D.s, Amo Penzias and Robert Wilson, worked for Bell Laboratories in New 
Jersey on projects in radio astronomy. They tried to eliminate all extraneous 
sources of radio static from their instruments so they could obtain the purest 
possible signals from outer space, but they found that some noises could not be 
eradicated. These noises resembled the static we have all heard between stations 
on AM radio bands and the familiar snow between existing television channels; 
in fact about one percent of the photons that cause snow on TV belong to the 
microwave background that Penzias and Wilson discovered. To eliminate this 
radio hiss, they even shooed away pigeons and cleaned their droppings from 
their antenna. Nothing worked. No matter what they did, their radio telescope 
picked up rumbling noises from every direction. They did not realize at first that 
they had stumbled upon the still enduring echoes of the Big Bang. 
Earlier cosmologists had predicted that a microwave background continued 
to exist as a remnant of the primeval explosion that created the universe. Some 
actively searched for it. As early as 1947, George Gamow and his associates 
predicted its existence at around 5 degrees Kelvin, which was off by two de-
grees, yet quite good for its day; but these predictions were ignored and forgot-
ten. In the early 1960s, scientists in Russia and the United States again predicted 
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its existence and calculated its temperature to be about 3 degrees Kelvin, the 
currently accepted figure. At Princeton University, astrophysicists under the 
leadership of Robert Dicke and P. J.E. Peebles were building a radio telescope 
to search for this microwave background; but Penzias and Wilson found it 
before the Princeton group completed construction. After Penzias and Wilson 
contacted the Princeton group, Dicke and Peebles visited their radioscope to 
listen. They realized that Penzias and Wilson had found what they were looking 
for, a cosmic radio hiss coming from everywhere in space. Most cosmologists 
now agree that the microwave background consists of continuing reverberations 
from the Big Bang. In 1978, Penzias and Wilson received a Nobel Prize for 
their discovery. 
G. The Dark Sky at Night 
The Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe is accepted for its explanatory 
power. It accounts for a vast amount of data that no other theory can explain-the 
receding galaxies and their redshift, Hubble's law of uniform expansion, the 
ongoing dissipation of energy and order within the world, Einstein's relativity 
theorems, the origin of the chemical elements, and the cosmic microwave 
background. It even accounts for something very commonplace that has puzzled 
astronomers since at least the middle of the eighteenth century: it explains why 
the sky is dark at night. Most of us have never wondered; the sun goes down; 
and that explains it. But if we live in an infinite universe, there is a puzzle, 
formulated first by the German physician Heinrich Olbers in 1826, and thereaf-
ter called "Olbers' Paradox." 
Olbers knew perfectly well that the sun sets at night, but he wondered why 
there is not enough starlight to make the night sky as bright as day, or even as 
bright as the sun, assuming as Olbers did under the influence of Sir Isaac New-
ton, that the rest of the static but endless universe is as richly populated by stars 
as our visible universe. Imagine being at the center of a sphere surrounded by 
all the stars we can see. lfwe double the size of that visible sphere, as we might 
do with a more powerful telescope, stars will be only a fourth as bright, as 
predicted by Newton's inverse square law; but there will be four times as many 
of them to negate this effect. This doubling process could and should go on to 
infinity in an infinite universe until it encompasses an infinite number of stars. 
Light from each of these has had an infinite amount of time to reach us, so a star 
should shine in every last niche in the heavens, and the night sky should be as 
bright as the sun. Yet it is not. Why? Olbers thought that a gaseous medium 
filled the sky and blocked out most of the starlight; but this will not work. Given 
enough time, as Hermann Bondi showed, these gases would heat up and eventu-
ally radiate as much energy as they absorb.56 And infinity is enough time! 
Many attempts have been made to resolve Olbers' Paradox, but the most 
successful is provided by the Big Bang. Except for a few discussed in Chapter 
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Three, today's cosmologists accept the Big Bang and agree that it provides the 
ultimate solution to Olbers' Paradox. Big Bang theory says that neither time nor 
space are infinite. Finite spacetime can contain only a finite number of stars that 
shine only for a finite amount of time. Stars come and go; they are born from 
cosmic debris, burn for a few billion years, exhaust their nuclear fuel, and die. 
The spatiotemporal finitude of the universe explains why most of the sky is dark 
at night and counts also as powerful evidence against the naturalistic claim that 
our universe is infinite in both space and time. 
Additional evidence for the Big Bang origin of our universe will be pre-
sented in later chapters. To anticipate a bit, the hydrogen cycle, the gradual 
conversion ofhydrogen into the heavier elements in supernova nucleosynthesis, 
could not have been going on forever, or there would be no hydrogen left in the 
universe; but there is. The same is true for all radioactive elements; if they have 
been losing electrons through nuclear decay for an infinite amount of time, no 
radioactive elements would remain today; but they do. The ripples in the micro-
wave background discovered by the COBE satellite confirm the basic Big Bang 
scenario for galaxy and supergalaxy formation. 
We have now reviewed the primary scientific evidence for Big Bang Cos-
mology; in Chapter Three we will consider putative evidence against it. If Big 
Bang Cosmology does not survive under critical scrutiny, there is no point in 
exploring our central philosophical question: What caused the Big Bang? Can 
natural science answer this question? Cosmological Agnosticism says that it 
cannot. Naturalistic and theistic metaphysicians give philosophical and religious 
answers to our question of ultimate causes, but there may be no scientific 
answer. 
3. Scientific Cosmological Agnosticism 
Scientists now advance a variety of explanations for the origin and evolution of 
the universe; but agnosticism says that we really do not know the answers. 
General Cosmological Agnosticism does not deny that many cosmological 
puzzles can be resolved. It focuses on the central question of this book: What 
caused the Big Bang?; and it says that we do not know. We know only what 
happened after the Big Bang was inaugurated, and science can not tell us what 
caused the Big Bang. Coming chapters will examine naturalistic theories that 
purport to offer scientific answers; but they actually give only highly speculative 
and dubious philosophical accounts of the ultimate origin of the universe, 
without acknowledging their subtle shift from science to unverifiable metaphys-
ics. Scientific Agnostics claim that a plausible scientific account of the cause of 
the Big Bang is not and never will be available. 
Agnosticism in cosmology may be either scientific or philosophical. 
Scientific Agnosticism says that the cause of the Big Bang lies beyond the limits 
of scientific methodology and knowledge. Philosophical Agnosticism extends 
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this outlook. It says that the cause of the Big Bang lies entirely beyond the limits 
of philosophical knowledge, beyond all human reason, broadly understood. The 
remainder of this book will accept Scientific Cosmological Agnosticism, but 
total Philosophical Agnosticism will be rejected. Standard Big Bang Cosmology 
is inherently agnostic because it recognizes that scientific methodology and 
knowledge break down completely at or near the onset of the Big Bang. It 
makes no attempt to go behind the initial singularity or the earliest Planck 
dimensions. 
If an initial singularity existed at T = 0, there were no laws of nature, no 
space, no time, and no physical causation. Cosmologists disagree about whether 
the breakdown of the laws ofnature occurs at an initial singularity or at Planck 
dimensions; but most agree that they become inapplicable at some point. We can 
extrapolate scientifically all the way back to where these laws break down 
completely; but we cannot go beyond that because we must appeal to these laws 
just to get that far. Observable processes in nature like the redshift of the galax-
ies, the Hubble expansion, nucleosynthesis of the elements, the microwave 
background, and the dark night sky, all imply a Big Bang origin for the universe. 
Extrapolating from known laws of nature, these processes can be traced back-
ward in time; but calculations result in zero time and space and infinite energy 
after eight to twenty billion years. Scientific Cosmological Agnostics insist that 
science itself cannot take us beyond and before that to a space beyond space, 
and a time before time began. 
The fact that a world-creating Big Bang erupted billions of years ago is 
scientifically well established. The laws ofnature can take us back to an initial 
singularity, but they can take us no further for at that point all physical laws 
break down completely and become inapplicable. The zero spacetime and 
infinite energy of the initial singularity indicate methodological failure as well 
as a cosmological beginning. Science cannottranscend its own limitations. With 
no laws of nature, spacetime, physical causation, or empirical data to work with, 
no further scientific extrapolations are possible. At an initial singularity, the 
ultimate limits of scientific knowledge are reached, the Scientific Cosmological 
Agnostic insists; and What caused the Big Bang? has no scientific answer. We 
cannot know what would make an initial singularity explode because it lies 
beyond the limits of all known laws of physics. 
If a collapsing universe could shrink below Planck dimensions, the same 
agnosticism follows if all laws of nature become inapplicable at or below the 
Planck Wall. Later we will see that Quantum Cosmologists deny that anything 
can exist on the nether side of this Wall; if a sub-Planck collapsed universe 
existed, we could have no scientific knowledge of it because physical laws and 
causation appear for the first time at Planck dimensions. Many cosmologists are 
convinced that scientific knowledge terminates at the Planck Wall, that the 
Planck Wall is a blank wall. If the laws ofnature only become applicable when 
the universe was I 0-43 seconds old and I 0-33 centimeters in diameter, then these 
Scientific Cosmology and the Big Bang 25 
dimensions represent the ultimate limits of scientific knowledge. What caused 
the appearance fifteen billion years ago of a universe with minimal Planck 
numbers? What caused the Big Bang? There are no scientific answers if, look-
ing backward, scientific knowledge ends before these questions arise. 
Theologians and philosophers may address the question of ultimate ori-
gins; but science has no answer, Scientific Cosmological Agnostics insists. 
Those scientists and naturalistic metaphysicians who affirm on allegedly scien-
tific grounds that "Nature is eternal" must recant. Even "Every event has a 
natural cause" must be relinquished, for science ultimately reaches back to a 
point of origin beyond which no natural physical causes can be found. Natural 
causes are those that operate within our system of spacetime; but scientists 
generally agree that space, time, natural laws and physical causation began with 
the Big Bang and did not exist prior to either Plank dimensions or an initial 
singularity. Numerous prominent cosmologists and scientists today are Scien-
tific Agnostics on the question of the cause of the Big Bang.57 In 1980, Robert 
Jastrow began his essay on "Science and the Creation," with these words: 
I should like to say at the start that I am an agnostic in religious mat-
ters. I am fascinated, however, by some recent developments in astron-
omy-partly because of their religious implications and partly because of 
the peculiar reactions of my colleagues. In a nutshell, the astronomers, 
studying the universe through their telescopes, have been forced to the 
conclusion that the world had a beginning. Scientists have always felt 
more comfortable with the idea of a universe that has existed forever 
because their thinking is permeated with the idea of cause and effect; they 
believe that every event that takes place in the world can be explained in 
a rational way as the consequence of some previous event. If there is a 
religion in science, this statement can be regarded as its main article of 
faith. But the latest astronomical results indicate that at some point in the 
past the chain of cause and effect terminates abruptly. An important event 
occurred-the origin of the world-for which there is no known cause or 
explanation within the realm of science.58 
Jastrow, convinced that science does not know what caused the Big Bang, in-
sists that "We cannot find out what caused that beginning" because the scientist 
comes to a blank wall where the big bang occurred. The cosmic explosion, 
the birth of the universe, is an effect for which he cannot find the cause. 
Some might say that ifhe cannot find it today, he will find it tomorrow; 
and we will read about it in the New York Times when Walter Sullivan 
gets around to it. This, however, is one finding in science that seems likely 
never to succumb to scientific investigation because in the first moments 
of the universe's existence the temperature and the pressure were infinitely 
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high, which means that all relics of a pre-creation universe that might have 
given us a clue to some natural forces that conspired to bring about the 
explosive moment we call the big bang are gone. All of the evidence the 
scientist could examine to explain this cosmic holocaust has been melted 
down and destroyed in the fiery heat of that first moment itself. That is 
why it seems to me and a few other people that this is a blank wall, a 
curtain covering the mystery of creation never to be raised by human 
minds, at least in the foreseeable future. 
This brings us to a very interesting pass. The world has come into 
being as a product of forces that are today, and very likely forever, outside 
the reach of scientific inquiry. These forces do not fit into the present body 
of natural forces-gravity, electricity, nuclear forces-and, being outside the 
realm ofnature, as the scientists understand it, they must therefore, prop-
erly be termed supernatural. In this statement cosmologist and astronomer 
finally come face to face with the theologian, who has always thought that 
what one might call a supernatural force, a creative force, has been respon-
sible for the origin of this world.59 
If our system of nature is the only cosmos, the whole of physical reality, 
and if it was brought into being by causes that transcend nature, these causes 
must be classified as "supernatural." Were the supernatural causes of the Big 
Bang Divine? Not necessarily. In the next few chapters, we will consider meta-
physical Naturalism and a variety of prestigious but pseudoscientific naturalistic 
cosmologists who contend that the transcendent causes of our universe were not 
Divine. Yet, if Scientific Cosmological Agnosticism is correct, their own meta-
physics is no more verifiable or scientific than that of the theologians. 
Standard Big Bang Cosmology affirms that scientific knowledge breaks 
down at the beginning of our cosmos, so there can be no scientific knowledge 
of what caused the Big Bang. The question must be turned over to philosophers 
and theologians. Can they do any better? In particular, can philosophical Natu-
ralism or Theism do any better? We shall see in the following pages. In his 1978 
book, God and the Astronomers, Robert Jastrow first takes us on a scientific 
journey through the evolution of the universe all the way back to the primordial 
cosmic fireball. Then, speaking from the vantage point of Standard Big Bang 
Cosmology, he identifies the final step that science takes in its cosmological 
inquiry into origins. 
Now we would like to pursue that inquiry farther back in time, but the 
barrier to further progress seems insurmountable. It is not a matter of 
another year, another decade of work, another measurement, or another 
theory; at this moment it seems as though science will never be able to 
raise the curtain on the mystery of creation. For the scientist who has lived 
by his faith in the power ofreason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has 
Scientific Cosmology and the Big Bang 27 
scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest 
peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of 
theologians who have been sitting there for centuries.60 
Jastrow first wrote his book before the 1980s, when inflation and quantum 
physics were added to the Big Bang theory of origins. Chapters Four through 
Eight will consider more carefully whether Quantum Cosmologies can over-
come the apparent limits of scientific knowledge by introducing quantum laws 
and effects at the beginning of our cosmic epoch. 
In sum, Standard Big Bang Cosmology is agnostic on the question of 
ultimate cosmic or supercosmic causes. As a scientific theory, it deals with the 
evolution of the universe from either the initial singularity, or from Planck time, 
to today. It incorporates all empirical evidence that supports the theory; but it 
offers no scientific answer to: What caused the Big Bang? It turns this question 
over to agnostics, philosophers, and theologians. Can they do any better? We 
will see. Robert Jastrow suggests that this is "the most interesting question of 




Humanistic Naturalists should be strongly inclined to reject Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy. They should be horrified by its development, for they are committed to a 
philosophical outlook which appears, at least at first, to be completely refuted 
by Big Bang theory. Humanistic Naturalism had its heyday during the early and 
mid twentieth century, but the view is as old as some of the ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophers. Prominent twentieth century philosophers who are identi-
fied by themselves or others as Humanistic Naturalists were George Santayana, 
John Dewey, Morris Cohen, Sterling Lamprecht, Roy W. Sellars, John H. 
Randall, Jr., Sidney Hook, Ernest Nagel, Corliss Lamont, Bertrand Russell, 
Samuel Alexander, J. B. Pratt, William P. Montague, Paul Kurtz, Kai Nielsen, 
Daniel C. Dennett, and many others. Among recent naturalists, Nielsen men-
tions A. J. Ayer, C. I. Lewis, W. V. 0. Quine, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, 
Hilary Putnam, P. F. Strawson, Donald Davidson, David Armstrong, and J. J. 
C. Smart. 1 Many prominent scientists like Carl Sagan are or have been Human-
istic Naturalists, and we will examine some of their positions in later chapters. 
Members of this philosophical family tend to share a common metaphysi-
cal, methodological, ethical, and anthropological outlook, though they do not 
completely agree with or perfectly resemble one another in every respect. 
Humanistic Naturalists subscribe to most ifnot all of the following philosophi-
cal doctrines; but individual Naturalists may reject, de-emphasize, or ignore a 
few of these family traits. As less and less of these traits are affirmed, the 
legitimacy of calling a position "Naturalism" becomes more and more doubtful. 
Because most natural scientists regard themselves as Naturalists, David Griffin 
tries to reconcile science and religion with what he calls a "naturalistic theism," 
by dropping almost everything Naturalists have ever meant by the term. His 
"minimal naturalism" retains only metaphysical trait D below, and he modifies 
it significantly by making divine causation a regular part of all natural 
causation.2 Naturalists are likely to regard this as a purely verbal victory, but 
Griffin also launches more fundamental and substantive attacks on Naturalism's 
"scientific" status. So will the following pages, even with respect to D below. 
Humanistic Naturalists tend to believe: 
A. Only nature exists; the supernatural does not exist. 
B. Nature as a whole has no purposes, values, or traits of personality. 
C. The most general features of nature like time, space, and the basic 
physical stuff within them exist infinitely, eternally, and necessarily. 
D. All events have natural causes; there are no supernatural causes. 
E. Scientific method is the only legitimate method for discovering truth. 
F. A Humanistic ethics and "philosophy of man" are adequate.3 
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The first four of these claims are metaphysical, and the fifth is method-
ological. By "metaphysical" claims, I mean those pertaining to the most univer-
sal or fundamental features of reality, the traditional meaning of the term. 
Unlike Kai Nielsen, who calls only a priori versions of such claims "metaphysi-
cal,"4 I recognize both a priori and empirical approaches to such claims. Natu-
ralists do not avoid metaphysics just because they profess to be empiricists. 
Humanistic Naturalists try to combine the fifth methodological claim with the 
sixth ethical and anthropological thesis. The first five of these have the most 
obvious importance and direct relevance to Big Bang Cosmology. 
1. Family Traits of Humanistic Naturalism 
Historically, the philosophical outlook of Humanistic Naturalism was developed 
expressly as an alternative to Theistic Supernaturalism, which takes just the 
opposite position on every point. Consider first how Naturalists themselves have 
expressed their fundamental beliefs. 
A. Nature as All Existence 
Humanism believes that nature or the universe makes up the totality 
of existence and is completely self-operating according to natural law, 
with no need for a God or gods to keep it functioning. Corliss Lamont5 
Nature in which all interactions exist. John Dewey6 
We find insufficient evidence for belief in the existence of a supernatu-
ral; it is either meaningless or irrelevant to the question of the survival 
and fulfillment of the human race. As nontheists, we begin with humans 
not God, nature not deity. Nature may indeed be broader and deeper than 
we now know; any new discoveries, however, will but enlarge our knowl-
edge of the natural. Humanist Manifesto IF 
What, then, are the controlling principles of naturalism? Essentially 
those of science: the beliefs that nature is an all-inclusive, spatiotemporal 
system and that everything which exists and acts in it is a part of this 
system. Roy W. Sellars8 
The Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be. Carl Sagan9 
This first humanist principle, the rejection of the supernatural world-
view, is shared with materialism and naturalism. Paul Kurtz 10 
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There is nothing beyond nature. There is no supernatural reality, 
spiritual beings, or any purely mental realities. Kai Nielsen11 
The claim that "Only nature exists; the supernatural does not exist" is essential 
to being a Naturalist. Doubters about this may be skeptics, agnostics, or positiv-
ists; but they are not Naturalists. This claim invites the question: What is nature? 
Sometimes "nature" is conceived so broadly that it covers the whole ofreality, 
in which case a real God who transcends our world would be an object in 
nature. "Nature" or "the universe" usually refers to our system of spacetime, but 
Frank J. Tipler defines "the universe"as "all that exists." Without the additional 
premise that our system of space time is all that exists, this definition implies 
that an existing transcendent God belongs to the universe. Tipler, for instance, 
insists that God is a natural entity and that theology is a branch of physics. 12 He 
actually wants to naturalize God and treat God as purely immanent in and 
ultimately produced by spacetime as we know it-in conjunction with infinitely 
many other spacetime universes that actualize all possibilities. 
Philosophical Naturalists deliberately use "nature" in a more limited way 
to exclude even an immanent God, to say nothing of Heaven, Hell, Angels, and 
all other-worldly entities. Nature is all; nothing more exists. For atheistic Natu-
ralists, especially in their debates with Theists, "nature" denotes this world, the 
visible universe in its totality; there is no other world; and no other-worldly 
entities are real. Nature, the cosmos, the totality of our public spatiotemporal 
universe, is the only reality. 
The creative, transcendent, and eternal God of traditional western Theism 
supposedly caused nature, the totality of spacetime, to come into being. By 
definition, supernatural entities can only exist outside of and before our system 
of spacetime; but no such beings exist, Naturalists insist. We can only speak 
metaphorically at best, or unintelligibly at worst, they contend, of their exis-
tence, and no reliable scientific evidence supports belief in supernatural entities. 
"Before time" is a temporal metaphor; and "outside space" is a spatial meta-
phor; but these metaphors have no literal or intelligible extensional meaning or 
reference. Scientific method, they contend, does not and cannot verify the 
existence of other worlds or other-worldly entities, so nothing warrants belief 
in their existence. 
B. Nature as Purposeless 
Our world has been made by nature through the spontaneous and 
casual collision and the multifarious accidental, random and purposeless 
congregation and coalescence of atoms. Lucretius 13 
[Naturalism} excludes cosmic purpose, a meaningful totality, and any 
variation of the Platonic form of the good. Roy W. Sellars14 
32 WHAT CA USED THE BIG BANG? 
This cosmos, unbounded in space and infinite in time, consists funda-
mentally of a constantly changing system of matter and energy, and is 
neutral in regard to man's well-being and values. Corliss Lamont15 
To a naturalist, evidence for purpose, needs, organization, and ends 
in nature, is discovered in the behavior of specific things and organisms. 
No reference to the purpose of the whole is empirically relevant to the 
purposes he discovers by natural observation and experiment. Sidney 
Hook16 
Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern 
science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of 
human values. Humanist Manifesto I17 
Nature for the humanist is blind to human purposes and indifferent to 
human ideals. Paul Kurtz18 
Most if not all Naturalists insist that "Nature as a whole has no purposes, 
values, or traits of personality." They hold that no valuational, personal, or 
psychological attributes apply directly to nature as a whole; and nature does not 
indirectly express the purposes or personal will of either a God who transcends 
the world or a God who is immanent in the world. Impersonal nature has no 
values, pursues no goals, makes no judgments about good and evil or right and 
wrong, has no aims or intentions, does not care what happens, takes no attitudes 
towards anything, whether favorable or unfavorable, thinks no thoughts, knows 
not what it does, has no awareness or consciousness of its own, and does not 
consciously and purposefully try to do what it does or try to achieve anything 
at all. All personal, psychological, or "anthropomorphic" attributes must be 
excluded from our thinking about nature as a whole, no matter how appropriate 
these categories are for thinking about local earthly organisms within nature like 
animals and human beings, and no matter how impressive and powerful the 
creative natural forces are that bring living things into being. Cosmic-level 
teleology has no reality. 
C. Nature as Infinite, Eternal, and Necessary 
If we ask whence came matter, we say it has existed always. If we be 
asked whence came motion in matter, we answer that, for the same rea-
son, it must have been in motion from all eternity .... These elements ... are 
sufficient to explain the formation of all the beings that we see. Mirabaud 19 
The law of the conservation of energy includes in its operation an 
unceasing transformation of one form of energy to another, so that the 
Humanistic Naturalism 33 
basic energy, but none of its individual manifestations, is eternal. Corliss 
Lamont20 
The ultimate elements of the body, as the Law of the Conservation of 
Mass implies, have always existed in some form or other and will go on 
existing forever. The indestructible matter that makes up our physical 
organism was part of the universe jive billion years ago and will still be 
part of it frve billion years hence. The infinite past comes to a focus in our 
intricately structured bodies; and from them there radiates the infinite 
future. Corliss Lamont21 
Nature stands on its own feet and explains itself. Roy W. Sellars22 
Why assume an absolute beginning for reality? If change is an event 
in nature, may not both change and nature always have been? .... Neither 
science nor philosophy, then, assume any absolute beginning/or reality. 
Roy W. Sellars23 
Nature is ontologically ultimate and self-sufficient. Roy W. Sellers24 
Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not cre-
ated. Humanist Manifesto ps 
Undoubtedly, our knowledge of the universe is meager, given the vast 
infinity of space and events. Paul Kurtz26 
Naturalists believe that "The most general attributes ofnature like time, space, 
and the basic physical stuff within them exist infinitely, eternally, and necessar-
ily." The fundamentals of the natural order of things, whatever they are, are 
uncreated, everlasting, indestructible, and self-sufficient in their being. Space 
and time are fundamentals that every naturalistic philosophy affirms, but consid-
erable room must be allowed for Naturalists to disagree about the constitution 
of the basic stuff of the world. Thales, the first philosopher, thought that it is 
water and that all things in the universe are composed of transformations of 
water. The most sophisticated Naturalistic metaphysics developed in the ancient 
world was that of the Greek and Roman atomists, Democritus and Leucippus, 
according to whom nature is composed entirely and only of uncreated and 
indestructible atoms swimming everlastingly in an uncreated infinite void of 
empty space. This atomistic view is no longer tenable because modem nuclear 
physics finds no uncreated and indestructible atoms or sub-atomic particles. 
Contemporary views of the basic stuff of nature identity it with energy as such. 
Naturalists ascribe the same metaphysical attributes to nature as a whole 
that traditional Theists ascribe to God. They argue that the rational ideal of 
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simplicity requires that we think of nature, not God, as infinite, eternal or 
everlasting, necessary, self-sufficient, and uncreated reality. Theists think that 
it is appropriate to ask: Who created the world? but it is not appropriate to ask: 
Who created God? Divinity, in its very conception, is the uncreated creator of 
all else. Metaphysically, Naturalists move to pinpoint necessary being before 
getting to Divinity. Nature, not God, is the infinite, everlasting, necessary, self-
existing, uncreated creator of all. So who created nature? No one, for nature 
exists necessarily; nature itself is everlasting, self-sufficient, and uncreated; and 
nothing that transcends nature is required to explain it. 
D. Nature Causes Everything 
Natural processes (including those of human living) do not imply 
anything beyond themselves and do not require for their explanation any 
grounds but the further stretches of natural processes, which we observe 
or inductively infer to be their context. William R. Dennes27 
The occurrence of all qualities or events depends on the organization 
of a material system in space-time, and .. their emergence, development 
and disappearance are determined by changes in such organization. 
Sidney Hook28 
And naturalism is the metaphysical theory which maintains that every-
thing that exists comes into being, endures for a time, and then passes 
away because of the interactions of the things and forces of the natural 
world Sterling Lamprecht29 
•. 
The universe as a whole has no cause, since by definition, there is no 
thing outside it that could be its cause. Hans Reichenbach30 
[Secular humanists} consider the universe to be a dynamic scene of 
natural forces that are most effectively understood by scientific inquiry. 
Paul Kurtz31 
Naturalists claim that "All events have natural causes; there are no supernatural 
causes." With this metaphysical causal principle, Naturalists rule out the cre-
ation of the universe ex nihilo by God, for that makes God the supernatural 
cause of all creation. All miracles and direct acts of God upon the world are also 
excluded because miracles, by definition, are temporary suspensions of the laws 
and causal processes ofnature, accompanied by causal interventions by a Divine 
Being who transcends nature. 
The naturalistic assumption that "All events have natural causes" should 
not be confused with the more general causal principle that "All events have 
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causes." About the second, Naturalists and Theists are in complete agreement. 
Since supernatural causes are indeed causes, Theists wholeheartedly agree that 
all events have causes, including the creation of the universe, miracles, and acts 
of God. Naturalists insist that the general causal principle is insufficient without 
the qualification "natural." "All events have natural causes" means that every 
happening in spacetime is brought into being by some other happening or set of 
conditions or happenings within our spacetime system, which as a whole has no 
cause beyond itself. Nothing comes to be through spatiotemporally transcendent 
causes. No acts of God or any other realities transcend our system of spacetime. 
Descartes and many later rationalists regarded the metaphysical claim that 
"All events have causes" as one of many self-evident truths ofreason. This truth 
needs no empirical confirmation, though it is confirmed in every experience. To 
understand it is to be certain that it is true. Most philosophers today think that 
Descartes confused logical certainty with psychological certitude; they reject all 
rationalistic synthetic or substantive axioms ofknowledge. But Naturalists need 
not be epistemological rationalists; they can and do advance their principle of 
universal natural causation as a broad generalization from experience. 
Supposedly, Cartesian self-evident truths are composed entirely of clear 
and distinct ideas; but the idea of causation is anything but clear and distinct, 
whether we are Cartesian rationalists or not. The concept of "cause" greatly 
needs clarification. To clarify we must distinguish between conditions that are 
necessary and those that are sufficient for bringing about events. Necessary 
conditions are those in the absence of which events cannot occur, and sufficient 
conditions are those in the presence of which specific events must occur. Causes 
are either necessary or sufficient conditions, or both. 
Naturalists may or may not be determinists, may or may not believe in free 
will, despite their conviction that all events have natural causes. "Cause" in this 
formula can mean necessary conditions, or it can mean sufficient conditions, or 
both. Determinists construe the principle of universal causation to mean that 
antecedent conditions are completely necessary and sufficient to explain the 
occurrence of all events, including human choices. Since necessary and suffi-
cient conditions exist for absolutely everything, they believe, only those events 
and choices that actually come to be could ever occur; and no other events and 
choices were or are really possible. Destiny, like some other things, just hap-
pens! What is actual is all that could have transpired. All events are rigidly 
determined or necessitated. Many determinists hold that the strongest desire or 
set of cooperating desires is sufficient to explain every choice. Naturalists may 
or may not be determinists, depending on whether they interpret the principle 
of universal causation in the strong sense just explained or give it the weaker 
interpretation explained next. Deterministic Naturalists may or may not be 
reductive materialists who think that stupid matter causes everything. Many 
non-reductive alternatives are open to Naturalists, and so is belief in free will, 
depending in part on how seriously they take their commitment to sense experi-
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ence alone as integral to and admissible by glorious scientific method, which 
alone yields truth, they say. If they (inconsistently?) allow a place for non-
sensory modes of experience like introspection, perhaps they can avoid psycho-
logical behaviorism and mechanistic determinism. 
Naturalists may hold that universal causation means that only necessary 
but not sufficient conditions exist for at least some choices-those that are free. 
They (and non-naturalists, too, who affirm free will) may claim that active or 
effortful choices occur only when character and motivation are still being 
developed, only when no desires, inclinations, or habits clearly prevail. When 
some desires or disposing mental states are decisively strongest, we simply act 
on them without making creative, effortful choices. Free choices function to 
create strong desires where none previously exist. Choices add the weight of 
effortful attention to selected alternatives when no conditions are sufficient for 
appetitive dominance. Of course, some conditions are necessary for every 
choice. We cannot consciously and effortfully choose an alternative unless we 
are aware of it and have some desire for it or attraction to it; but neither this 
desire nor its cooperating motivational determinants needs to be stronger than 
all others. Determinism may be avoided by subscribing to this weak interpreta-
tion of the principle that every event has a natural cause. Theists too may avoid 
determinism by holding that all free human choices have necessary but not 
sufficient causal conditions-usually natural. 
The distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions will come up 
later in discussions of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, according to which 
no absolute knowledge or predictability exists at the level of atomic or sub-
atomic particles. At the level of quantum events, we know only necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for what occurs. At the atomic and sub-atomic levels, 
no ace predictor like God could ever know everything that might happen, 
because conditions in nature are not sufficiently definite to ground such knowl-
edge. Even so, total chaos does not reign in the domains of elemental physical 
particles, or of free moral agents; and we are not absolutely ignorant of what is 
going on, or absolutely incapable of predicting the future within limits. Degrees 
of order and disorder are found both in human complexity and in sub-atomic 
simplicity; about this, Naturalists and Theists can agree. 
E. Scientific Method Alone 
Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific 
methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know. Bert-
rand Russell32 
Naturalism ... wholeheartedly accepts scientific methods as the only 
reliable way of reaching truths about man, society, and nature .... Sidney 
Hook33 
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The mind of man is being habituated to a new method and ideal: There 
is but one sure road of access to truth-the road of patient, cooperative 
inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and con-
trolled reflection. ... There is but one method for ascertaining fact and 
truth-that conveyed by the word "scientific" in its most general and 
generous sense. John Dewey34 
In short, Naturalism is the expression of the desire for explanation in 
terms of objects which can be handled and studied in accordance with 
scientific method Roy W. Sellars35 
Any account of nature should pass the tests of scientific evidence; in 
our judgment, the dogmas and myths of traditional religions do not do so. 
Humanist Manifesto 1136 
There seems nothing in Humanism or human life that is inaccessible 
in principle to scientific methods of inquiry, either in primitive or highly 
elaborated forms. Stuart C. Dodd37 
Naturalism is committed to certain methodological principles, primar-
ily scientific and empirical methods, as the most effective way to arrive at 
reliable knowledge. Thus, to be warranted, a descriptive belief (I) must 
be experimentally verified; (2) must be logically consistent, internally with 
itself and externally with our other beliefs; and (3) may be judged conve-
nient in part by its role in inquiry and its relation to the situations in 
which it arises. Paul Kurtz38 
If we want the best answers to what things there are, it is to science 
that we should turn. ... It is science which yields our most reliable knowl-
edge. Kai Nielsen39 
There is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis 
of science .... From a naturalistic perspective, we should deny that there is 
any a priori knowledge. Michael Devitt4° 
Naturalists contend that "Scientific method is the only legitimate method for 
discovering truth." This methodological claim must be understood both for what 
it excludes and what it embraces. It affirms that many commonplace methods 
for fixing belief and bringing about social agreement are totally unreliable and 
unacceptable, including rationalistic appeals to a priori or self-evident truths, 
and religious appeals to faith and divine revelation. Competing philosophical 
beliefs seem self-evident to different persons in diverse times and places; and 
by blind faith or revelation, we can have either side of any issue that we happen 
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to want. Reliance on a blind faith response to religious revelation alone leaves 
us completely vulnerable to any and every superstition that comes along. Reli-
gious persons who appeal only to faith and revelation have no methods for 
resolving profound and interminable disagreements among themselves. Only 
scientific methods acquaint us with reality, correct their own mistakes, and can 
in principle resolve disagreement rationally. 
Naturalists identify rationality itself with scientific method; but what is 
scientific method? Some contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty41 and 
Paul Feyerabend42 maintain that there really is no such thing as scientific 
method; in doing their work and learning about the world, scientists really do 
an incredible variety ofunpredictable, unformalizable, non-algorithmic things. 
According to Feyerabend, careful scrutiny of what scientists at work actually do 
shows that in science "anything goes," and nothing should or could replace this 
methodological anarchy. 
By contrast, Humanistic Naturalists are convinced that there is such a thing 
as scientific method, and it alone can give us truth. In their disputes with theolo-
gians, Naturalists employ an extremely narrow understanding of scientific 
method to "prove" that religious belief is unscientific and unfounded. When 
refuting theologians, scientific method is understood to consist primarily if not 
entirely in empirical (sensory) verification and/or falsification of descriptive 
statements, in making inductive inferences, and in advancing and testing empiri-
cal explanatory hypotheses. Logical Positivists also emphasize empirical verifi-
cation and falsification; but they insist that all metaphysical beliefs are meaning-
less. Unlike them, Naturalists regard theological beliefs as meaningful but false 
and their own metaphysical beliefs as meaningful, verified, and true. Naturalists 
may at times succumb to the allure of Positivism. 
In their most polemical anti-theistic moods, Naturalists can be quite insen-
sitive to difficulties that plague the methods of the natural sciences, such as that: 
(I) "factual" beliefs are inescapably theory-laden and are often constituted in 
part by, and/or derived from, formal mathematical and logical systems rather 
than from experience;43 (2) how appearances or sensory observations are con-
nected to realities is very uncertain (as illustrated in Chapter Six by the realism/ 
idealism controversy); (3) scientific progress depends upon creative insights, not 
just upon collecting facts; (4) scientific disputes are often resolved, not by 
observation, but by appeals to aesthetic criteria like simplicity, harmony, beauty, 
symmetry, elegance, and intuition; and ( 5) scientific language, not just religious 
language, is often inescapably metaphorical.44 Let us indulge Naturalists forthe 
moment and try to understand their contention that the methods of science 
exclude religious beliefs. 
Naturalists contend that beliefs in God, Heaven, Hell, Angels, and other-
worldly entities are groundless because scientific methods do not and cannot 
directly disclose or indirectly and inductively reason to their existence, and all 
happenings supposedly explained by other-worldly causes can be better ex-
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plained by appeal to this-worldly causes. Scientific explanations are closer to 
experience, simpler, and more elegant than religious explanations. Religious 
affirmations about other-worldly entities or occurrences cannot be verified 
directly, cannot be inferred as inductive generalizations or inferences from 
experience, and cannot be justified as explanatory hypotheses, Naturalists insist. 
To Naturalists, belief in God is like belief in Santa Claus. We can actually 
go to the North Pole and search for Santa. When we do, we find neither the 
residence, the workshops, the toiling elves, the flying reindeer, nor the persons 
of Mr. and Mrs. Claus. Likewise, we can search the world over without finding 
God or any other-worldly entities. Observable worldly entities have properties 
that are incompatible with and exclude the properties of other-worldly entities, 
so we cannot generalize inductively from this world to the next. Thus, we have 
no more reason for believing in God than for believing in Santa, invisible elves, 
or angels dancing on the heads of pins. 
Furthermore, the phenomena that the Santa Claus hypothesis is supposed 
to explain-the presents under the tree, the noises in the night, the missing milk 
and cookies on Christmas morning, and so on, are much more plausibly, simply, 
and verifiably explained: Daddy and Mommy do it. Likewise, whatever happens 
in the world always has a more plausible, simpler and (in principle) verifiable 
explanation: Natural causes do it (ad infinitum). Neither Santa Claus nor God 
is required to account for anything that we ever experience. 
When Naturalists claim that scientific method cannot be used to establish 
religious truths, they usually mean that objects of religious interest and belief 
like God and Heaven can be neither directly perceived, which is obviously true, 
nor inferred inductively, since induction gives us only more of the same and 
thus cannot justify belief in transcendent realities. They usually do not ask 
whether the hypothetico-deductive method, so essential to theoretical science, 
has any sound religious uses. This aspect of scientific method is very complex. 
It involves (I) creatively constructing hypotheses and theories, (2) making 
deductions and predictions from them about what might be observed to verify 
or falsify them, (3) performing experiments and making additional observations 
that actually confirm or disconfirm them, (4) excluding alternative hypotheses, 
(5) appealing to abstract rational/aesthetic criteria like consistency with other 
scientific beliefs, simplicity, elegance, fruitfulness for further research, practical 
usefulness, and coherence or conceptual interconnectedness with other scientific 
concepts and theories, (6) modifying hypotheses to take care of anomalies, (7) 
occasionally abandoning generally accepted paradigms when the anomalies are 
too overwhelming, and (8) making creative gestalt switches, revisions, and revo-
lutions. Scientific methodology is not value free but involves being committed 
(often quite passionately) to the values of truth (empirical alone?), knowledge, 
honesty, scientific subject-matter, scientific methodology, and objectivity-which 
is not uninterestedness but is disinterested willingness to play fairly with ideas, 
to follow out the logic of a position, and to change our minds when warranted. 
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F. Humanism 
We need to extend the uses of scientific method, not renounce them, to 
fuse reason with compassion in order to build constructive social and 
moral values. Confronted by many possible futures, we must decide which 
to pursue. The ultimate goal should be the fulfillment of the potential for 
growth in each human personality-not for the favored few, but for all of 
humankind. Humanist Manifesto 1145 
What these modern ways of life have in common is a devotion to the 
this-worldly welfare of men. The most enlightened of them, such as Hu-
manism, Materialism and Naturalism set up the happiness, freedom and 
progress of all humanity as the supreme goal. This ultimate loyalty to the 
ultimate interests of all mankind, including one's own finest possibilities, 
is, I would suggest, a thing high enough and broad enough for any man 
to integrate his life around. Corliss Lamont46 
Most contemporary humanists have a commitment to some form of the 
greatest-happiness-for-the-greatest-number principle; they consider that 
the highest moral obligation is to humanity as a whole. This involves the 
view that since all men are members of the same human family, it is our 
obligation to further the welfare of mankind. Paul Kurtz47 
Most Naturalists believe that "A humanistic ethics and philosophy of man or 
humanity are adequate." This book is primarily concerned with metaphysical 
and methodological issues, but the usual association of naturalistic metaphysics 
with scientific method alone and with humanistic ethics and anthropology 
cannot be ignored. 
Not all Naturalists are Humanists. Naturalistic metaphysics and scientific 
methodology have no obvious logical connection with humanistic ethics. Fred-
erick Nietzsche combined naturalistic metaphysics with a non-humanistic might-
makes-right ethics, according to which strong, fit, master-race supermen are 
fully justified in exploiting and destroying weak human beings. The Nazis, who 
greatly admired Nietzsche, showed us how this thoroughly naturalistic but anti-
humanistic ideal works out in practice. Nothing in naturalistic metaphysics or 
methodology generates or logically implies Humanism. Logic permits Natural-
ists to be racists, nationalists, egoists, or anything but Humanists. 
As a matter of brute fact, most Naturalists have been Humanists who 
affirm universal human rights and human equality, and who sponsor moral 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors designed to bring about a better and happier life 
for humankind in this world. There is no other life, they contend; belief in 
another world merely siphons off energies that might otherwise be devoted to 
human welfare here and now-the only place where moral effort ever counts. 
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Humanists tend to believe in a technological fix for almost everything, 48 but they 
are not irrevocably wedded to this. They do insist that human values, moral 
principles, and virtues are completely human in origin and neither have nor need 
a Divine origin or sponsorship. Theistic religion is not essential for moral 
motivation; many religious persons are very immoral, and many atheists are 
extremely virtuous. 
Naturalists also accept a Naturalistic/Humanistic anthropology according 
to which human beings are only products of nature, not creatures of God (as if 
the two were mutually exclusive). Evolution accounts entirely for our existence, 
they contend, and human life is continuous with all of life. They reject all 
radical dualisms of body and mind, flesh and spirit, human and non-human. 
Yet, only human beings count in humanistic ethical theories. Humanism 
does not recognize moral duties directly to non-human animals, other living 
things, or the environment. We have duties involving these things because they 
are beneficial to humanity, but we have no duties to them directly since they are 
not human. 
2. How Scientific Is Humanistic Naturalism? 
Naturalists claim to derive all their beliefs, the only legitimate beliefs, from 
scientific method alone. That they actually do this is very doubtful. Their fail-
ure, most conspicuous at the level of humanistic values, extends as well to their 
metaphysical commitments. 
A. Humanistic Values and Scientific Method 
The trouble is, Naturalists cannot derive their humanistic values and moral 
principles from either their metaphysics or from their methodology. Scientific 
method only describes the world, they concede. If so, it cannot prescribe; it 
cannot derive a very powerful "ought" from an "is" or readily bridge the "fact-
value gap." Humanistic Naturalists endeavor to give the impression that "Sci-
ence is on our side," and that their own metaphysical and moral beliefs are 
derived from the only rational methodology that they accept as legitimate-
scientific method; but this is not so. 
The recent scientific emphasis on evolutionary psychology attempts to 
generate some weak prescriptive statements by repudiating the absolute gap 
between "is" and "ought." Evolutionary ethicists like Michael Ruse49 and Neil 
0. Weiner0 propound a few "natural" norms and virtues. Traditional Humanis-
tic Naturalists did not have access to evolutionary psychology, but they still 
endorsed very strong prescriptive statements about universal human rights and 
human welfare that cannot be derived from purely descriptive statements or 
from any elemental natural norms disclosed by evolutionary psychology. 
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Patricia A. Williams argues effectively that although the Christian ethical 
ideal ofloving neighbors as self demands far more ofus than our natural capac-
ity for kin favoritism and reciprocal altruism, something within us nevertheless 
recognizes a more demanding saintliness and heroism as a higher ethical ideal. 
Williams indicates that both philosophical and religious ethical universalism 
extend the scope of moral obligation far beyond the provincial prescriptions of 
evolutionary ethics. 51 We seem to have evolved to act morally toward "insiders," 
immorally toward "outsiders," but not to respect or love all human beings as 
such. Originally, outsiders were members of different hunter-gatherer clans; and 
this perfectly natural, powerful, clannish, anti-humanistic propensity still mani-
fests itself today in racism, sexism, nationalism, and every other distinction that 
divides us and sets us at enmity with one another. 
Humanists actually admit that they cannot derive their own rich universal-
istic humanistic ethics solely from the methods of empirical science. Paul Kurtz, 
for example, espouses a "naturalistic ethics" according to which "Ethical judg-
ments are empirical or may be supported by scientific knowledge."12 Yet, he 
concedes, ethical Naturalism "nnnot hope to derive universal values or princi-
ples that are objectively verified in the same way as descriptive hypotheses and 
theories are";53 and he admits that scientific method merely helps us to collect 
the relevant facts, including facts about causation that pertain to choosing 
effective means to ends. But scientific method does not give us value-ends 
themselves. 
Naturalistic Humanists have a much broader understanding of what passes 
for reasonable belief when universalistic humanistic ethical norms and value-
ends are at stake. Kai Nielsen explicitly repudiates the claim that empirical 
scientific method alone yields all legitimate knowledge, mainly because it yields 
no ethics.s4 To scientific methodology he deliberately adds the axiological 
method of "wide reflective equilibrium" for rationally establishing and applying 
ethical, political, and social norms.ss Nielsen extends this extra-scientific meth-
odology to all of philosophy, science, and every rational quest for human 
knowledge. He calls it , 
a coherentist method of explanation and justification ... [that] starts with a 
society's or cluster of similar societies', most firmly held considered 
judgments (convictions), principally their considered moral judgments or 
convictions, and seeks to forge them into a consistent and coherent whole 
that squares with the other relevantly related things that are reasonably 
believed and generally and uncontroversially accepted in the society, or 
cluster of similar societies, in question.16 
Nielsen, a Naturalist, clearly repudiates some prominent family traits of 
Naturalism, particularly its commitment to empirical scientific method alone as 
the sole source of human knowledge; and we can find much that is congenial 
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and illuminating in his writings. I am substantially in agreement with most of 
Nielsen's philosophical outlook, including his fallibilism, the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium for questions of value, and even his denial of the exis-
tence and intelligibility of God as classically or standardly conceived. We 
disagree primarily in our assessment of Process Theology, to which Nielsen 
gives very little attention, as a plausible alternative to Naturalism. 
B. Naturalistic Metaphysics and Scientific Method 
Most important for present purposes, scientific methodology as usually con-
ceived cannot justify the metaphysical beliefs of Naturalism. Naturalists insist 
that scientific procedures fail to justify the metaphysics of transcendent Theism; 
but they do not readily realize or acknowledge that natural science cannot justify 
their own naturalistic metaphysics. 
Many well respected beliefs in science are not validated by scientific 
method when construed so narrowly as to exclude all theistic belief, as the 
concluding chapters of this book will argue. Put more positively, the beliefs of 
transcendent Theism are better justified by empirical methods, broadly con-
strued, than those of Naturalism, especially with respect to many hypotheses 
about the origin of the universe offered by today's naturalistic cosmologists in 
the name of science. Scientists may not be interested in the kinds of empirical 
evidence that support Theism; but such evidence is abundantly available, as we 
will see. 
Naturalists often intimate that their metaphysical beliefs are high order 
empirical generalizations, well supported by scientific investigation. Theistic 
beliefs are metaphysical, they decree; but naturalistic beliefs are scientific 
discoveries, conclusions proved by science. Yet, this is not so. If only beliefs 
verified by scientific methods are known to be true, naturalistic metaphysics 
cannot pass for scientific knowledge. Neither can the most theoretical parts of 
natural science! 
Both Naturalism and Positivism emphasize verification, but Naturalism 
should not be confused with Positivism. Unlike Positivists, Naturalists do not 
deny the meaningfulness of the metaphysical and theological beliefs that they 
reject. They only deny their truth. Yet, Naturalists often feel the allure of Posi-
tivism and occasionally lapse into it. To understand the difference, let us con-
sider the widely accepted positivistic Principle of Verification as a criterion for 
distinguishing between science and metaphysics. This principle asserts that 
meaningful, and thus "scientific," beliefs are those that are (or that someone 
believes to be), confirmed or at least confmnable (or falsifiable }-at least in 
principle-by sensory observation, experience, or empirical investigation. By 
contrast, metaphysical beliefs supposedly are matters of pure speculation, totally 
devoid of sensory observational import; (or at least someone believes this about 
them). 
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Karl Popper's slight variation on Positivism affirms that scientific propo-
sitions are falsifiable, at least in principle; some conceivable experience could 
count against them; whereas this is not so for metaphysical propositions. Verifi-
able or falsifiable "in principle" means that someone can imagine human sen-
sory experiences or experiments that would count for or against them. 
Meaningfulness, so understood, depends entirely on someone's powers of 
imagination, but whose? The class of meaningful or verifiable empirical or 
sensory beliefs is much more inclusive than the class of true or verified ones. 
What we can know to be true empirically or scientifically must be accessible 
directly or indirectly to human observations. Positivism claims that only empiri-
cally confirmable or falsifiable propositions are scientifically meaningful; but, 
Naturalists would agree, only those actually confirmed are known to be true. 
Many scientists and philosophers accept some variant of Positivism. They think 
that scientists ask questions that have empirically verifiable or falsifiable an-
swers, whereas the questions of metaphysicians and moralists have no empiri-
cally verifiable or falsifiable answers. Scientists observe and prove; philoso-
phers merely guess, speculate, or emote. Scientists discover hard facts, but 
philosophers only concoct ethereal theories that are empirically empty. 
Though attracted to Positivism, Naturalists usually distinguish metaphysi-
cal from scientific propositions on the basis of their generality or particularity 
rather than in positivistic terms. In truth, the line between science and unverified 
metaphysics is not always very sharp. The history of science shows that beliefs 
that appear to have no empirical reference or support at one point in history are 
found to have such import at another. Einstein's general theory ofrelativity is 
a good example. The theory had no empirical reference or confirmation whatso-
ever in 1915 when Einstein first conceived of the curvature of space. Most non-
scientists and scientists at the time were not able to imagine a way to confirm 
it, but Einstein soon showed them. The theory of the curvature of space implies 
that light moving through a gravitational field will be bent by that field; and this 
was confirmed during an eclipse of the sun on 29 May 1919 when stars in the 
background of the immediate border of the sun were observed to shift outward 
slightly from their usual positions as they were about to pass behind the dark-
ened sun. Since then, the theory has received innumerable confirmations. By 
Positivistic standards, Einstein's general theory of relativity was a meaningless 
metaphysical theory between 1915 and 1919; but it became a meaningful and 
verified scientific theory thereafter. 
Again, in 1929, when Paul Dirac deduced from quantum theory that anti-
matter exists, no one could imagine experiences or experiments to verify (or 
falsify) the proposition. At the time no cyclotrons were powerful enough to 
produce antimatter; but in 1932, Carl Anderson determined that it might be 
possible, by using a cloud chamber, to detect cosmic rays bearing antimatter 
particles.57 Was the concept of antimatter meaningless between 1930 and 1932? 
Surely it was by positivistic standards, but not by broader naturalistic standards. 
Humanistic Naturalism 45 
Naturalists usually regard as unknown or false what Positivists typically brand 
as meaningless. 
The initially attractive but excessively simplistic positivistic distinction 
between science and metaphysics is fraught with difficulties. For one thing, the 
Verification Principle is itself meaningless when applied to itself, but it can be 
defended against this charge by indicating that it is a methodological rule and 
not the sort of descriptive statement to which it is intended to apply. More 
seriously, observations are usually if not always theory-laden; so we tend to see 
what our theories tell us we should see, and within limits we are disposed not 
to see what does not fit our preconceptions. 
The meaning of the Principle ofVerification is very ambiguous. When and 
by whom must relevant observations be made?58 Must they be made in the 
present moment, or do remembered past and anticipated future observations 
count? If only present observations count, the very notions of past and future 
are meaningless; and Positivism yields a solipsism of the present moment, as it 
once did for Ludwig Wittgenstein. Must the observations be directly accessible 
to human beings; or do animals, extraterrestrials, or God count as observers? 
Who must the observer be to detennine the meaningfulness of"The dinosaurs 
had halitosis," or "Adam did not have a navel"? If only present human observa-
tions count, all statements about early humans and pre-humans are meaningless. 
If only direct human observations count, our ideas about the Big Bang, infla-
tion, and the activities of dinosaurs and other creatures who lived before human 
beings evolved are meaningless. No human observers saw the dinosaurs at play 
or prey, or smelled their breath. Only a transcendent God could directly observe 
the Big Bang, inflation, and either the infinite duration or finitistic origin of our 
universe. Being directly observable "in principle" by human beings is just 
equivalent to being directly observable by God, an ideal omniobserver. 
Beliefs and theories can be supported by scientific method through: i. 
Direct Observation, ii. Inductive Inference, and/or iii. Hypothesis Formation and 
Testing; and such support comes in many degrees. Direct observation immedi-
ately perceives some object or process. For natural science, only sensory obser-
vation counts; moral and mathematical intuitions, religious experience, and 
introspective awareness do not count. Inductive inference reasons from percep-
tually observed samples to more of the same, which is how natural laws are 
established and justified. The hypothetico-deductive method postulates unob-
served conditions or abstractions to account for observed realities, presumably 
better than alternative postulates. Science, philosophy, and religion all appeal 
to the unobserved to explain things observed. The best postulate is one that (I) 
predicts new phenomena not predicted by other postulates that experience 
actually confirms; or it is superior to other hypothetical explanations in (2) 
simplicity, (3) comprehensiveness, (4) consistency with itself or other estab-
lished beliefs, (5) coherence or interconnectedness with other established 
concepts and beliefs, (6) elegance or beauty, and/or (7) fruitfulness for future 
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research. These criteria are not exhaustive. Are the metaphysical beliefs of 
Naturalism supported by scientific methods in any of these ways? 
i. Direct Observation 
Science, especially astronomy, relies more heavily on sight than on other senses 
like touch, smell, taste, or hearing, though these senses too may be employed in 
scientific investigations. At the level of direct observation, seeing is believing. 
Many empirical beliefs like "The sun rises,'' "The moon shines," and "The stars 
are out tonight" are confirmed by direct observation. Even these elemental 
beliefs are theory laden, however; for us modems, they presuppose the Coperni-
can heliocentric theory, theories of optics, theories about the speed of light, 
theories about the correspondence of perceptions with realities, neurological 
theories, theories of mind/body relations, and theories embodied in the concep-
tual categories of common sense.59 
Let us agree for the sake of the discussion that if something can be seen 
or otherwise consciously sensed while our senses are functioning normally, then 
our beliefs about that something are supported by direct observation. Let us also 
charitably extend the scope of "direct observation" to perceptions available 
through sense-extending apparatuses like microscopes, telescopes, and radio-
scopes. Stars and galaxies that are observed directly are, in a sense, perceived 
only indirectly through the light, sounds, or signals that they emit and the media 
that transmit them to human consciousness. These signals can be amplified by 
optical or radio telescopes, fall upon receptive human sensory modalities, and 
ultimately register in the brain and consciousness of human observers. Both 
direct and extended perceptions are mediated; yet, for simplicity, let us agree to 
say that heavenly bodies are directly observed even when amplified by complex 
scientific instruments and modified by our own sensory modalities. 
Now, to get down to business, are the four metaphysical theses of Natural-
ism really high order empirical facts confirmed by direct human observations, 
broadly construed? Obviously, they are not. No direct human experience or 
scientific apparatus shows them to be true, or to be empirically meaningful in 
positivistic terms. This is most obviously so because no human being, scientist 
or not, and no living creature on earth, has ever directly observed the whole of 
reality-the subject matter of all metaphysics, including the naturalistic variety. 
A. The claim that nature is the whole ofreality, meaning that only nature 
(our system of spacetime) exists, cannot be a truth confirmed by direct human 
observation, for we have not directly observed all of our spacetime system, to 
say nothing of all ofreality. God may do so, but that would be contrary to the 
basic suppositions of Naturalism. 
B. The claim that nature as a whole is non-purposive and non-personal 
cannot be a truth of direct observation for a variety ofreasons. Obviously, no 
human being ever has or ever will observe nature as a whole directly. Cosmo-
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logical reasoning about nature or reality as a whole is inferential, not direct. It 
must be analogical or inductive; it does not and cannot simply report direct 
observations. 
How can we tell if anything, including the universe, is or is not purposive? 
We know ourselves to be directly purposive mainly through immediate self-
awareness, not through sensory observation. To capture all we know, the notion 
of "observation" must be extended beyond the sensory (and thus beyond the 
scientific) to include first person introspective experiences of our own con-
scious interests, desires, purposes, valuations, thoughts, intentions, volitions, 
attendings, and so on. We know (with less than certainty) that other people and 
animals are directly purposive because their bodies are structured like our own, 
because they behave vocally, linguistically, and otherwise in seemingly purpos-
ive ways, and because linguistic criteria indirectly indicate the presence (or 
absence) of inner conscious processes, activities, and values in other persons or 
animals. We infer that comatose persons are no longer directly purposive be-
cause they no longer engage in purposive behavior, and because medical scan-
ners determine that their upper brains are not working sufficiently, or at all. 
Some things are only indirectly purposive, if purposive at all. Rocks and 
rivers are not directly purposive or personal beings because they lack brains, 
sense organs, and self-originated goal-directed behaviors. Yet, rocks and rivers 
can be indirectly or instrumentally purposive and personal if they serve the 
interests, values, thoughts, desires, or choices of directly personal and purposive 
beings like humans, animals, and God. Artifacts like houses, bridges, and 
airplanes are only indirectly purposive. Without minds of their own, they are 
made to serve our purposes. 
ls the universe as a whole purposive? Naturalists insist that it is not di-
rectly purposive because it has no mind of its own; and we have no good reason 
to believe that it is indirectly purposive, that it expresses the purposes of a 
transcendent divine World-Designer. How does the Naturalist know this? Our 
limited human acquaintance with the universe reveals that most of spacetime is 
not organized or structured as brains or sensory organs, but Theist may agree 
completely that the Universe is not directly purposive. Theists claim that the 
universe is only indirectly purposive and personal, that it indirectly expresses 
the purposes, values, wisdom, benevolence, and other personal attributes of a 
God who transcends nature while interacting immanently with and within it. 
Naturalists deny that nature is either directly or indirectly purposive. 
Whether Theists or Naturalists are right about the purposiveness ofnature 
will be explored in greater depth in later chapters. Both positions arrive at their 
conclusions by analogical or inductive reasoning, or by hypothesis, but not by 
direct observations. For Naturalists, the universe resembles a rock; for Theists, 
it resembles an artifact, a clock perhaps, made by an intelligent and benevolent 
manufacturer. We are never outside the universe as a whole to observe it di-
rectly; we are always inside the rock or the clock trying to figure out what 
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makes it click or tick; we can only reason to the whole by analogy with familiar 
parts that are known to click or tick. 
C. Do scientist observe directly that the most general attributes of nature 
like time, space, and the basic stuff within them exist infinitely, eternally, and 
necessarily? Again, obviously not. Infinite duration can never be observed 
directly by finite beings like us. No nuclear physicists, astronomers, other 
scientists, or ordinary persons have ever experienced anything directly that 
exists necessarily, infinitely, and eternally. All experience is against this claim 
of naturalistic metaphysics, not for it. 
D. Finally, does anyone directly observe that all events have natural 
causes, and that there are no supernatural causes? Again the answer must be 
negative, partly because no human observer has ever directly experienced all 
events, partly because some observations actually count heavily against this 
family trait ofNaturalism. That the Big Bang, for example, has a natural cause 
is doubtful. If produced by another world, that world is a supernatural cause, as 
Jastrow indicated. Later chapters will scrutinize naturalistic efforts to show that 
our universe was caused by natural processes-by other worlds regarded as 
natural causes; but no one claims that we human beings can observe these 
processes directly. Precise causal explanation breaks down at the level of 
singularities and/or quantum events, according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle; and some cosmologists submit that the origin of our universe had no 
cause at all. 
Lastly, the world religions report many direct observations of unusual 
events that they regard as miracles, which, by definition, lack natural causes. A 
naturalistic explanation probably works for most of them; but at least a few 
alleged miracles are not readily explained solely in terms of antecedent spatio-
temporal conditions and are highly resistant to naturalistic explanation. The 
essential point is that some human experiences count, even if not decisively, 
against the metaphysical dogma that all events have natural causes. Naturalists 
just refuse dogmatically to allow them to count. Even the most highly unyield-
ing instances of alleged miracles can be explained naturally, they insist, pre-
cisely because all events have natural causes. 
The circularity of this naturalistic reasoning is obvious, as is its metaphysi-
cal nature. Naturalists "prove" that all events have natural causes by appealing 
to the premise that all events have natural causes! Propositions are metaphysical, 
and thus meaningless by positivistic standards, say many Positivists, if they are 
held in such a way that no experiences are allowed to count against them. By 
reasoning in a circle, Naturalists rule out all anomalies a priori, while claiming 
that no knowledge is a priori! 
Plainly, none of the metaphysical theses of Naturalism are truths of direct 
observation; but they may be observational truths of a more indirect sort. Per-
haps they are truths of inductive inference, or perhaps they are just the best 
available hypotheses for understanding our universe. Perhaps not! 
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ii. Inductive Inference 
Inductive logic pennits inferences from the observed to the unobserved, from 
parts to wholes, from particular samples to broad classes, from given instances 
to more of the same. If we reach into a barrel and take out three rotten apples in 
succession, inductive logic pennits us to conclude that most, perhaps all, of the 
apples in the barrel are rotten. Inductive reasoning introduces inescapable 
elements of uncertainty, so scientists do not claim absolute certainty for their 
inductively supported conclusions. Probabilities increase as more and more 
rotten apples are extracted. Yet, some apples in the barrel might be sound, and 
we might have good reasons for thinking so. Realizing that life is chancy, we 
are generally content to live with the uncertainties of inductive inference. 
Inferring more of the same from observed samples is exactly what it means to 
think rationally and scientifically about the unobserved parts of the world of 
nature. If all perceived manifestations of erntrgy confonn to Einstein's E = mc2, 
scientists predict that this fonnula fits all the energy in the entire universe. If 
energy is dissipating in all observed closed systems, scientists inductively infer 
that it is dissipating in all closed systems, whether observed or not, at least in 
the present expansion phase of the universe. 
Can the metaphysical theses of Naturalism be transfonned into scientific 
truths by showing that they are products of inductive reasoning from observed 
samples to more of the same? This is extremely doubtful. 
A. Can we reason inductively that all realities belong to our objectively 
existing system of spacetime because all observed realities do so? This is very 
doubtful. Anti-realistic philosophers would question the basic premise. That all 
observed entities belong to an objectively existing spacetime system is philo-
sophically controversial and depends on hotly contested theoretical or philo-
sophical commitments. Immanuel Kant, for example, thought that space and 
time are mere fonns of appearance, and that only appearances but no realities 
or things in themselves can ever exist or be observed to exist in spacetime 
outside our minds. We will see in Chapter Six thai some versions of quantum 
physics are antirealistic and heavily stress the role of observers in structuring 
what is observed. Let us be generous again, however, and assume with realists 
that we perceive realities, not just appearances, and that these are located in 
objectively existing spacetime. Can we now infer that all realities are located in 
this mind-independent system of spacetime, given that all observed realities are 
so located? This strong presumption may be honestly doubted, if for no other 
reason than that the cause of the Big Bang, if it had a cause, was clearly located 
outside our spacetime system. 
In making inductive inferences, we must be cautious not to generalize too 
hastily. Some apples in our barrel may be sound because they belong to a rot-
resistant variety. Also, energy is not really dissipating everywhere-not for 
example in or near black holes where gravity is strong enough to concentrate 
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energy. Perhaps energy can be created in a quantum vacuum in which "virtual" 
particles become ephemeral actual particles. To account for the Big Bang, some 
naturalistic cosmologies explored in later chapters postulate the existence of 
other worlds that are unobserved by and unobservable to us. On the basis of 
some (extremely inconclusive) evidence, many cosmologists now believe in the 
existence of many other universes beyond ours, perhaps an infinite number of 
them. This, we will see, is very problematic, but if true, then some realities are 
not located in our own system of spacetime or nature. Objectively existing 
nature was created by another objectively existing reality beyond and before 
itself. The contemporary version of the Cosmological Argument for the exis-
tence of God, as developed in our concluding chapter, will give good reasons 
for doubting that our universe exhausts reality. If all created things have causes, 
Big Bang Cosmology itself provides powerful evidence against the claim that 
our system of nature is all that really exists. Our system of nature was brought 
into being around fifteen billion years ago, presumably by something-perhaps 
God, perhaps another universe, perhaps quantum-fizzy Superspacetime-outside 
of itself. The naturalistic claim that nature, our system of spacetime, is infinitely 
old and causally uncreated and self-sufficient has been falsified decisively by 
modem astrophysics; but Naturalists do not concede this without a fight! 
B. Is the claim that "Nature as a whole is nonpurposive and nonpersonal" 
derived from inductive generalization? It is definitely not an inductive inference 
from human acquaintance with many sample universes. We observe only one 
universe from the inside, and only parts of that. Naturalism itself is vulnerable 
to David Hume's inductive objection to the Teleological Argument for the 
existence of God. We cannot infer that order in our universe is created by a 
purposive and intelligent Divinity, said Hume, because we have not seen many 
worlds created before our eyes and thus cannot compare the order of this world 
with that of other worlds known to be made by a purposive and intelligent 
World Designer. 
Naturalists are in exactly the same position; they have not seen many 
purposeless worlds created by other pre-existing godless systems of spacetime. 
Thus, they cannot establish inductively that the order (or disorder) of our world 
is similar to that of other purposeless worlds known not to have been made by 
Divinity. We cannot reason inductively to more of the same when an entity is 
one of a kind; and, as far as human experience goes, our universe is one of a 
kind. Empirically, Charles Sanders Peirce was right: "Universes are not as 
plentiful as blackberries." 
Naturalists may contend that the orderliness of our natural world fails to 
express purposive intelligence because nature as a whole compares favorably 
with certain parts of nature like rocks and cabbages that are known not to have, 
or to express, purposive intelligence. Like Theists, Naturalists must reason 
analogically from parts of nature to the whole; their reasoning is definitely not 
an inductive generalization from several observed non-purposive universes to 
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more of the same. Naturalists contend that nature as a whole is purposeless and 
dumb because it resembles certain parts of itself like purposeless and dumb 
rocks and electrons. Theists, by the same analogical logic, infer that nature as 
a whole is purposive and intelligent because it resembles human beings or 
animals who are directly purposive and intelligent, or, more appropriately, 
because of its similarity to houses, bridges, watches, and the like, that are 
purposefully produced by intelligent beings. The outcome of this debate turns 
finally upon which analogy between parts and wholes actually holds; but the 
conclusion is not derived by simplistic inductive inference from same-kind 
samples to more of the same. We will return to this topic in later discussions of 
the Anthropic and Biopic Principles; but we should note in advance that con-
temporary Anthropic Cosmologists find the universe to be exquisitely fine-tuned 
for the purpose of producing and sustaining life. This is decisively at odds with 
Naturalism's anti-teleology. Chapters Eight and Nine will examine this issue 
more carefully. 
C. Can we know inductively that the most general attributes ofnature like 
time, space, and the basic stuff within them exist infinitely, eternally, everlast-
ingly, and necessarily? Surely not! Induction just gives more of the same, but 
all observed natural processes and objects are spatially finite, limited or tran-
sient in duration, and contingent or dependent in mode of existence. We never 
observe any natural objects or processes that are spatially or temporally infinite, 
everlasting, necessary, self-sufficient, self-caused, and uncreated. Inductive 
reasoning can give us additional spatiotemporal finitude and contingency, but 
it cannot give us their opposites! No inductive evidence whatsoever supports the 
conclusion that nature as a whole exists infinitely, everlastingly, or necessarily. 
Nature just might be infinite, everlasting, and necessary; but we cannot know 
this by inductive inference. 
Naturalistic critics of the traditional arguments for the existence of God 
deny the legitimacy of reasoning from a finite observed world to an infinite God 
precisely on the grounds that we cannot reason inductively from the finite to the 
infinite. If this is so, Naturalists themselves are in the same boat. They too 
cannot reason inductively from observed finite portions of the world to the 
world's infinity in time and/or space. Inductively, from finitude we can only 
infer more finitude, from contingency only more contingency. Naturalistic logic 
returns eventually to devastate its own metaphysics! 
D. Lastly, can the causal principle, "All events have natural causes," be 
known inductively? Initially, this seems to be a scientific inductive generaliza-
tion from experience. Granted, we have not observed all events; still, Naturalists 
contend, all events have natural causes because all observed events have natural 
causes. Unfortunately, solid evidence against this argument is provided by the 
Big Bang, ifnot also by rare experiences of miracles, which cannot be ruled out 
a priori without a vicious circularity of reasoning. 
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Is the principle of universal natural causation a necessary presupposition 
of scientific inquiry? Wouldn't it be impossible for scientists to do their work 
without believing that all events have natural causes? Not at all! To do their 
work, scientists need only the imperative: "Look for natural causes!" They do 
not need an a priori metaphysical guarantee that they will always find that for 
which they are looking. 
Naturalists are on no firmer ground in trying to derive their metaphysics 
from induction than they are in trying to derive it from direct observation. Can 
the empirical truth of their metaphysical claims be salvaged by demonstrating 
that they are rationally justified postulates or explanatory hypotheses? 
iii. Hypothesis Formation and Testing 
Scientists do more than merely switch on their eyes, ears, and other senses, and 
more than just reason from given samples to more of the same. They also 
explain things by appealing to often unobserved hypothetical or theoretical 
constructs. They always try to find the best available explanations, but how do 
we know which explanations are best? 
Scientists theorize about what accounts for what, what in tum explains 
this, what finally explains that, and so on. Scientists creatively construct and 
defend hypothetical unobserved and unobservable entities, processes, and 
principles; they postulate the reality of innumerable things unseen (like initial 
singularities, inflation, or laws of nature) to explain things seen. Some initially 
hypothetical entities might be observed later; but some, like those just men-
tioned, will never be humanly observed. Some postulates predict outcomes that 
can be observed eventually; others make predictions that are falsified by later 
observations. Usually, several hypotheses can account forthe same data, and the 
right one, the best explanation, must be identified, sought, and defended. Much 
scientific inquiry is just a quest for the best explanation using what Charles S. 
Peirce called "abductive reasoning" or what others call "the hypothetico-deduc-
tive method."60 
Entities and processes that initially are nothing more than theoretical 
constructs may be later confirmed observationally, as was Einstein's curvature 
of space, and Dirac's antimatter. Hypothetical entities may be postulated be-
cause scientists hope to observe them in the future, walking by hope and faith 
and not by sight; but their hopes are not always fulfilled. Theoretical realities 
postulated by scientists like natural laws, singularities, inflation, and the Big 
Bang itself, are likely to remain totally unobserved, even with the aid of the 
most powerful instruments; still, scientists affirm them, even when more than 
one purely hypothetical construct explains same the facts. Why? 
What distinguishes rationally justified from unjustified hypothetical 
explanatory constructs? Explanatory constructs tend to proliferate, so how can 
we tell which ones are true or best? Scientists (and philosophers) often choose 
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between explanatory hypotheses on purely aesthetic grounds like simplicity, 
symmetry, harmony, elegance, and beauty.61 Aesthetics is ultimately integrated 
into rationality itself; truth merges with beauty and goodness; the beautiful and 
the rational are ultimately identical. In these respects, no sharp distinction exists 
between theoretical science and speculative metaphysics; and plenty of room 
remains for honest disagreement about whether an explanatory hypothesis is 
rationally justified. 
Still, some hypothetical explanations are clearly better than others. How 
so? Some hypotheses are much more powerful than others in pulling more loose 
threads together and unifying otherwise unordered disarray. Some are more 
fruitful than others, more suggestive of agendas for future search. Some theoret-
ical constructs actually make predictions that come true, or that can be falsified. 
Some hypotheses can be tested in crucial experiments by searching for conse-
quences that they alone, but none of the alternatives, foretell. When explanatory 
entities cannot be observed directly and no crucial experiments exclude alterna-
tive explanations, scientific theories shade off into sheer guesswork. But some 
guesses are more educated, more beautiful, more elegant, than others. 
In both natural science and philosophy, the best justified hypothetical 
constructs are simple, symmetrical, harmonious, elegant, beautiful, powerful, 
fruitful, and testable in crucial experiments that exclude competing hypotheses. 
These criteria can be met in varying degrees, but the best explanatory hypothe-
ses (I) make predictions not made by other hypotheses that are confirmed, not 
disconfirmed, by experience, and (2) are superior to other hypotheses in sim-
plicity, comprehensiveness, coherence, consistency, elegance, beauty, and 
fruitfulness for further research. Some illustrations might help. 
a. The Hypotheses of"Creation Science" 
"Creation science," advocated by many religious conservatives, affirms two 
central theses: (I) our universe was created by God out of nothing at some time 
in the finite past, and (2) the theory of evolution is false because all earthly 
species of living things were created directly by God within six days after God 
produced the universe itself. If Big Bang Cosmology is correct, as it seems to 
be, "creation scientists" are right about (I), although the "by God" and "out of 
nothing" parts remain to be established, and the relevant "finite past" is closer 
to fifteen billion years than to the six thousand years favored by religious funda-
mentalists. But "creation scientists" are clearly mistaken about (2) for many 
good reasons, such as that the universe existed for over ten billion years before 
the simplest living things began to exist and to evolve into more complex beings 
on our earth. Without exploring the evolution controversy in depth, let us 
consider how the hypothetical-deductive method applies to the fossilized re-
mains of innumerable extinct plants, animals, and microscopic life forms. 
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Both "creation science" and "real science" must explain the same observed 
facts. Extinct fossilized animals, plants, protozoa, and bacteria exist in geologi-
cal strata. Real science hypothesizes that the fossils are best explained by evolu-
tionary processes that transpired over at least four and a half billion years. The 
full course of evolution itself cannot be observed directly or repeated under 
laboratory conditions, but this explanatory hypothesis has testable implications. 
Although Naturalists are evolutionists, so are the Theists who do not insist upon 
a literal interpretation of the word "day" in the first chapter of Genesis. Evolu-
tion is incompatible with biblical literalism, but not with belief in God. 
"Creation science" hypothesizes that either (a) God created the earth with 
all the fossils intact, but no such creatures ever actually lived, or (b) all the 
fossilized creatures once co-existed but were killed by Noah's flood, which 
deposited their bodies in existing geological strata as it receded. Hypothesis (a) 
is so egregiously ad hoc that few if any advocates of "creation science" take it 
seriously. It implies no additional observations by which it can be tested. 
The most viable "creation science" hypothesis is (b ). Predictions made 
from the deluge postulate are: ( 1) fossilized remains could be distributed ran-
domly in areas of great aquatic turbulence; but in calmer areas the bones, shells, 
and other parts of the largest and heaviest animals will be in the lowest geologi-
cal strata, and the remains of the lightest and smallest animals will be in the 
highest strata; and (2) carbon 14 and other dating techniques will show that all 
fossilized creatures lived at the same time, around six thousand years ago. 
Unfortunately, innumerable observations decisively disconfirm these predic-
tions. Besides, if Noah carried breeding pairs of all living animals to safety on 
the ark, he presumably did this for all species of dinosaurs. So where are all the 
dinosaurs today? 
"Creation scientists" claim to be doing science, but scientific methodology 
shows that they are wrong. The predictions about the fossils made by real 
science do not suffer this fate. The evolutionary hypothesis predicts that ( 1) 
fossilized bodies will be generally arranged so that the simplest (often the 
lightest weight) organisms will appear in the lower geological strata, and the 
fossils of more complex organisms will be in higher strata, and (2) carbon 14 
dating techniques will show that many of them lived millions or billions of years 
apart, not all at the same time. These predictions are well confirmed by innumer-
able observations and tests. We can observe directly neither the lengthy evolu-
tionary processes that created the fossils nor a direct divine creation of the 
dinosaurs and other extinct creatures; but the evolutionary hypothesis is sup-
ported by, and "creation science" is refuted by, its testable predictions. 
b. Hypothetical Cosmological Entities and Processes 
Turning now to cosmological hypotheses, most astronomers now believe in the 
existence of black holes which, almost by definition, cannot be observed di-
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rectly. They did not originally generalize inductively from a few observed black 
holes to many others. Rather, unperceived black holes were postulated to ex-
plain other things that were visible in the heavens. Astronomers observed that 
stars were being pulled in certain directions by unseen celestial objects, and that 
various kinds ofradiation were emitted by unidentified sources. The eccentric 
orbital movements of the star Cignus X-1 cannot be explained by the presence 
of any visible star, and powerful X-ray emissions discovered in the Large 
Magellanic Cloud of stars and elsewhere come from no visible source. Astro-
physicists accounted for these phenomena by reifying hypothetical black holes 
that suck in almost all surrounding matter/energy. Some, like Stephen Hawking, 
conjecture that black holes emit some radiant energy, so not everything in their 
vicinity gets inhaled if he is right. 
Until quite recently, black holes were purely hypothetical or theoretical 
constructs. The Russian astrophysicist I. L. Rozental wrote as late as I 988 that 
black holes were "created by the fantasy of the theoreticians," and that "Black 
holes are unrivaled in their popularity as theoretical objects yet to be reliably 
observed."62 Rozental wrote before the definitive identification of a black hole 
at the center of the M87 galaxy in May I 994 by astronomers using the repaired 
Hubble Space Telescope. In one sense, this black hole can be seen, but in 
another, it cannot. The core, the hole itself, presumably a singularity, emits no 
light, and in that technical sense it cannot be seen; but some spectacular fire-
works in its close vicinity are very visible. Since 1994, the Hubble Space Tele-
scope has located many black holes. 
Black holes were thought originally to be so dense, so completely domi-
nated by gravitational attraction, that neither light nor any other forms of energy 
could escape from them or their vicinity. Supposedly, their awesome density and 
gravitational effects would devour all nearby objects. Stephen Hawking's more 
recent black hole theory hypothesizes that X-rays and gamma rays escape from 
the outer edges of black holes, and that black holes themselves gradually decay 
and radiate their energy back into the observed universe. Given enough time, all 
black holes will eventually evaporate completely.63 As Hawking puts it, "Black 
holes are not completely black."64 They do "have hair" after all. Radiation 
emitted by black holes is now called "Hawking radiation," even by those who 
do not accept its existence. If Hawking is correct, black holes are not gateways 
to other universes; though not verified, given enough time, they just dump their 
stuff back into our universe. Hawking also suggests, again without verification, 
that black holes occasionally just explode and release their contents back into 
our universe.6s But no known laws of physics permit or predict these explosions. 
Singularity cores of black holes cannot be seen because they allow no light 
to escape; but light definitely does escape from their close environment. If 
Hawking is right, black holes emit detectable X-rays, gamma rays, and 
flourescent electrons. Black holes themselves are hypothetical, invisible, imper-
ceptible entities; buttheir existence predicts and explains certain visible, percep-
56 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
tible effects for which we have no other plausible explanations. At the center of 
the M87 galaxy, astronomers actually see a vortex of swirling gases, the inner-
most portions of which are disappearing into an unseen black something at the 
center of the vortex. Optically, black is the absence of light, so we are not 
"seeing" anything optically when we see black. Scientists calculate that the mass 
of the black hole in M87 equals two to three billion suns or solar masses, all of 
which it has already consumed. 
Great uncertainty is involved in abductive reasoning because other hypo-
thetical constructs might also explain observed phenomena. Scientists aspire to 
construct hypotheses with extensively testable consequences that are not pre-
dicted by other hypotheses; but crucial experiments that decisively rule out other 
hypothetical explanations are rare in the natural sciences (and in philosophy). 
Presently, only the black hole hypothesis explains what astronomers have found 
at the center of the M87 galaxy and in many other places like the center of our 
own Milky Way and perhaps of every other galaxy. 
Scientists often postulate the existence of things that are not themselves 
visible or directly perceptible. Like metaphysicians, they frequently appeal to 
the unobservable to explain things observed. Purely hypothetical or theoretical 
and unobserved constructs abound in theoretical physics and cosmology-like 
singularities, inflation, cosmological constants, magnetic monopoles, dark 
matter, antecedent universes, or tiny vibrating strings within primitive particles. 
Consider one other example. 
Big Bang Cosmologists think that matter and antimatter particles were 
initially created together, and that we live in a material world because, in the 
earliest fractions of a second of the universe, in some mysterious way matter 
came to prevail over antimatter. How did it happen? We can only theorize, not 
observe. "Baryonic Asymmetry" means that baryons (like neutrons and protons) 
came to prevail over their antimatter counterparts in the very early universe. The 
most widely accepted explanation of matter dominance, developed originally by 
the Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov, postulates purely hypothetical explana-
tory entities and processes. I will not give all the details;66 but they involve the 
existence in the earliest universe ofnever-observed, massively large, primitive 
particles called "X bosons." X bosons supposedly decayed into matter and 
antimatter particles at an irregular rate through processes that have never been 
observed, with matter ultimately prevailing. The observed fact that we live in a 
material world is explained by constructs that are purely theoretical and unin-
spected. But why weren't all X bosons destroyed by their own anti-particles? 
One serious problem with this is that a very different hypothesis can 
explain the same facts. The universe just might have been divinely created with 
a massive matter/antimatter imbalance. Matter dominance could be an initial 
condition of existence as we know it, not a product of inaccessible natural 
processes. All existing phenomena would be explained :) >' the God hypothesis, 
which scientists don't like because it appeals to unobservables! Similar consid-
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erations apply to the equally unobservable inflation postulate. Perhaps God just 
created the world with similar or isomorphic generic properties throughout; 
perhaps nearly flat space (if that is indeed what we have), and few if any mag-
netic monopoles were just initial conditions of creation. Is selecting the most 
reasonable or best-justified explanation just a matter of aesthetics-or of preju-
dice-where the most reasonable hypothesis is the most beautiful, or the most 
scientifically conventional, or the most atheistically naturalistic? At this level 
of abstraction, scientific or philosophical truth/beauty may be in the eye of the 
beholder, as later explained. 
So, what has become of the simplistic but appealing dogma that scientific 
beliefs are truths of observation? What remains of the naturalistic claim that 
beliefs about God, like those about Santa, are false because they cannot be 
confinned by observation? Theoretical science regularly postulates ultimate 
unobservable explanatory constructs like black holes, X boson decay, singulari-
ties, inflation, antecedent universes, Superspacetime, and infinitely many uni-
verses; but these are no more empirical than God! Physical science gradually 
shades off into metaphysics. Is purely theoretical science just bad science, as 
Eric Lerner maintains in the next chapter? Even ifX bosons and inflation have 
predictable and testable consequences, alternative but equally invisible concep-
tual constructs can explain the same observed effects. The most abstract scien-
tific theories are shot through with unobservables and uncertainty, and modesty 
becomes their endorsement. At some point, we know not just where, theoretical 
physics becomes raw conjecture, indistinguishable from speculative metaphys-
ics at its worst; but most scientists do not openly admit it. Some spectacular 
examples will be discussed in coming chapters. 
c. Naturalistic Metaphysical Hypotheses 
Now that we understand the hypothetico-deductive method, let us ask the really 
crucial question. Are the four metaphysical truths of Naturalism justified ex-
planatory hypotheses that adequately account for the world we observe? 
A. "Only our system of spacetime exists" explains all that we see, but so 
does "In the beginning, God created our system ofspacetime." These metaphys-
ical hypotheses may be debated on their own merits, but the naturalistic hypoth-
esis yields no testable predictions that differentiate it from the theistic alterna-
tive. The world, our system of spacetime, would be here and might look much 
the same as it does whether its transcendent creator is Divine or not. Claiming 
that our spacetime system is "in principle" all that exists, the whole ofreality, 
adds nothing to what we can see or predict about our universe. No crucial 
experiments show that Naturalism can, but Theism cannot, explain any or all of 
the observable features of our world. Actually, cosmic teleology and contin-
gency, considered in the concluding chapters of this book, show just the reverse. 
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Theism can adequately account for many observable features of our world that 
Naturalism cannot plausibly elucidate. 
B. Perhaps the purposelessness, indifference, and stupidity of nature as a 
whole best explains the presence of evil and pervasive lifelessness in the world; 
but the purposefulness and intelligence of Deity may best explain the presence 
oflife and goodness in the world. Whether Naturalism or Theism best explains 
both good and evil is an ancient and interminable debate, to be considered more 
carefully in Chapter Eleven. Final conclusions about the meaning of value and 
disvalue in the world are primarily philosophical, not scientific. With simple 
empirical claims, we can tell the difference between natural science and philoso-
phy; but in the middle and at hypothetical extremes where scientific theories 
wax philosophical, it is often hard to tell. The presence or absence of ultimate 
cosmic teleology is not an obvious issue for purely descriptive science. The 
facts of life pose questions about both good and evil in the world, and about the 
pro-anthropic orderliness of the cosmos; but the answers belong more to philos-
ophy than to empirical science. So, too, do Naturalism's metaphysical claims. 
C. Naturalists contend that nature and its most basic ingredients-time, 
space, and energy-are infinite, eternal, and necessary. How does this fare as a 
scientific explanatory hypothesis? This and other Naturalistic metaphysical 
claims about the most fundamental features of the universe cannot be confirmed 
by direct observation, and they cannot be inferred inductively since we observe 
only finite, transient, and contingent parts ofnature. Induction yields only more 
of the same, not diametrical opposites. As an explanatory hypothesis, the eter-
nity and necessity of our spacetime system fares no better. Naturalistic claims 
about the infinity, eternity, and self-sufficient necessity of our universe are 
definitively falsified by modem science's massive empirical and theoretical 
evidence for the Big Bang. 
Recall the seven converging lines of evidence that convince most scientists 
that our universe began in a cataclysmic explosion about fifteen billion or so 
years ago. In asserting that our universe is infinite, eternal, and necessary, 
Naturalism affirms just the opposite. The naturalistic hypothesis seems to 
predict that: (I) distant galaxies should exhibit no redshift, (2) the universe 
should not be expanding at a regular pace, (3) order and energy should not be 
dissipating with time, (4) Einstein's field equations should not be satisfied by 
an expanding universe that had a beginning in time, (5) the heavy elements 
should predominate over hydrogen and helium in the universe since they have 
had an infinite amount of time to be cooked up by stellar furnaces; indeed, there 
should be no hydrogen or radioactive elements left at all, (6) no relatively 
uniform cosmic microwave background should exist, and (7) the sky at night 
should be as bright as day! These empirical implications of naturalistic meta-
physics have been falsified overwhelmingly. 
D. That "All events have natural causes" may be hypothesized, but so may 
"Some events have supernatural causes." To do their work, natural scientists 
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require only the imperative, "Look for natural causes." They do not require a 
metaphysical guarantee of success. Ancient and contemporary debates over 
miracles proceed at the fuzzy borderline of science and metaphysics. Input data 
and conclusions drawn from them often just presuppose rather than establish 
metaphysical convictions. Natural science does not settle all such disputes, but 
it has established the truth of creation. Something outside of and preceding our 
universe presumably created it. Just what this something was-whether God, a 
preceding universe, a system ofSuperspacetime, or what have you-and whether 
the universe actually had a cause at all will be addressed in following chapters. 
Clearly, if our universe had a cause, it was supernatural, transcendent, in rela-
tion to our system of spacetime. 
In sum, natural science does not side with Naturalism, the fundamental 
beliefs of which are not verified by, and some of which are clearly falsified by, 
natural science, despite all the huffing and puffing ofNaturalists themselves. Its 
metaphysical claims have no direct observational component; and we cannot 
inductively infer them as more of the same. Construed as explanatory hypothe-
sis, the metaphysical "truths" of Naturalism make no verifiable predictions that 
Theism fails to make. Naturalistic reasoning is often viciously circular and 
"proves" itself only by presupposing itself. It is often defended so dogmatically 
and tenaciously that no experience is allowed to count against it; but much that 
modem scientists have discovered about our universe counts decisively against 
it. Naturalists can confess their faith, and insist that their beauty, or their preju-
dice, is everyone's truth; but they cannot appeal to empirical science to confinn 
their worldview. Naturalism is a priori, unconfinned, and in some instances 
clearly falsified metaphysics, pure and simple. Its metaphysics is not derived 
from experience or "scientific method." Instead, Naturalists presuppose their 
metaphysical beliefs in interpreting all experience; and their ungrounded as-
sumptions set limits to any beliefs, hypotheses, and theories that Naturalists are 
willing to take seriously. Some people are psychologically predisposed toward 




STEADY STATE AND 
PLASMA COSMOLOGIES 
At least two twentieth-century cosmologies offered in the name of natural 
science would regard What caused the Big Bang? as a loaded question because 
it presupposes that the Big Bang really happened, and that it created our whole 
universe. According to Steady State Cosmology and Plasma Cosmology, there 
never was a cosmos-making Big Bang. As Eric Lerner, a Plasma Cosmologist, 
expressed it in the title of his 1991 book: The Big Bang Never Happened; but 
this is a small minority view among today's cosmologists. A few skeptics about 
the Big Bang still cling to Steady State Cosmology,1 but this position is now 
mainly of historical interest, except to Fred Hoyle. Lerner's challenge to Big 
Bang Cosmology is serious, well developed, and deserves and receives the most 
attention in the following pages. 
1. Steady State Cosmology 
In 1948, Big Bang Cosmology did not dominate the field as it does today. The 
redshift of the galaxies was well confirmed by then, and Hubble's law was 
available to calculate their rate of expansion. George Gamow's associates, 
Ralph Alpher and Robert Herman, published a paper in 1948 in which they 
predicted the existence of background radiation as a lasting relic of the Big 
Bang. They calculated its temperature at five degrees Kelvin, two degrees higher 
than currently accepted; but for years no one paid much attention to their predic-
tion or tried either to confirm or falsify it. The Big Bang gained its contempo-
rary dominance when this microwave background was actually found by radio 
astronomers Amo Penzias and Robert Wilson in 1965, but this information was 
not available in 1948. 
In 1948, alternative cosmologies had a chance, especially the Steady State 
theory developed and published that year by Fred Hoyle, Thomas Gold, and 
Hermann Bondi. This theory tried to explain how the universe could appear 
constant, orderly, and unchanging to all observers at all times despite the fact 
that it is also expanding and dissipating its order and mass/energy. Steady State 
Cosmology said that the observable universe of all observers throughout infinite 
time and space would contain essentially the same quantities of entropy, back-
ground radiation, redshifted galaxies, and stars or other configurations. The 
heavens would always be steady or constant, on average, despite the continuous 
disappearance of stars and galaxies over the horizon of visibility in accord with 
Hubble's law. How is this possible? 
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To reconcile sameness of observable mass with disappearance of observ-
able mass, Steady State Cosmologists resorted to creation, but not the all-at-
once creation of Christian or Big Bang Cosmology. Hoyle and Bondi posited 
an infinitely prolonged process of continuous cre(Jtion. Throughout infinite 
space and infinite time, just enough hydrogen atoms are created to replenish the 
supply within every astronomer's observable universe. Given enough time, 
gravitational attraction forms new background radiation and new gaseous clouds 
from the newly created particles. Gravity concentrates these gaseous clouds into 
new stars and galaxies to replace those lost to view through the Hubble expan-
sion process. Thus, throughout infinite time and space, the universe always 
looks basically the same, in a steady state, to all observers everywhere. 2 
Continuous creation is not wrought by God or any transcendent reality, 
according to Hoyle and Bondi. Their metaphysics was thoroughly naturalistic 
and this-worldly. Hoyle asked: "Where does the created material come from?" 
and he answered that matter is responsible for it. "Matter that already exists 
causes new matter to appear. Matter chases its own tail. "3 Matter does not create 
new matter out of old matter or out of pre-existent energy. If it did, nothing 
would be left after a finite interval to feed the Hubble expansion, and the uni-
verse would be empty and dead. Like God, matter creates matter out ofnothing. 
Just how, Steady State Cosmologists did not say. 
According to Hoyle, the creation of matter by matter ex nihilo is a slow 
process, but in an infinite amount of time it really adds up. "The average rate of 
appearance of matter," he wrote, "amounts to no more than the creation of one 
atom in the course of about a year in a volume equal to that of a skyscraper."4 
This is enough, nevertheless, to generate the microwave background, to cause 
the redshift, and to drive the Hubble expansion. "The new material produces a 
pressure that leads to the steady expansion,"5 Hoyle proclaimed. 
2. Critique of Steady State Cosmology 
Most cosmologists today reject Steady State Cosmology, though Hoyle and a 
few others tenaciously defended it. What considerations make it implausible? 
A. No Observational Evidence 
Most seriously, no observational evidence supports the theory of continuous 
creation. Hoyle almost saw the difficulty when he conceded that "It would be 
quite impossible to detect such a rate of creation by direct experiment."6 Bondi 
also acknowledged that "It is utterly impossible to observe directly such a rate 
of creation."7 This is certainly true. However, the problem is more serious than 
detecting the rate of the creation of material particles out of absolutely nothing. 
Namely, no instance whatsoever of such creation has ever been observed! Even 
if hydrogen atoms were being created ex nihilo at the rate hypothesized, no one 
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could find them, no one has, and no one will. In particle accelerators, a great 
variety of physical particles can be created out of pre-existing particles and 
radiant energy; but after the initial creation of the universe itself, no matter has 
ever been created out of absolutely nothing. No empirical evidence at all sup-
ports the theory of continuous creation ex nihi/o. Bondi, who saw this very 
clearly, confessed that the continuous creation of matter by matter out of noth-
ing "is not directly observable."8 He argued for the theory nonetheless on the 
grounds that it is the simplest assumption compatible with the observable facts. 9 
Once the microwave background was discovered in 1965, this was no longer 
true. A few more recent Quantum Cosmologists surmise that new and enduring 
particles may arise from quantum fluctuations in the vacuum of empty space; 
but this, too, has not been verified, and there is ample room for doubt. New 
particles that endure are created only when actualized energy is injected from 
outside the vacuum. 10 The vacuum of empty space is not pure nihilo! 
B. The Dark Sky, Microwave Background, Redshift, and Hubble Expansion 
Without continuous creation of hydrogen atoms from nothing, Steady State 
Cosmology can not account for the dark sky at night, the microwave back-
ground, the redshift, or the Hubble expansion of the universe. Olbers' Paradox, 
according to which there should be no dark sky at night in an infinite universe, 
could be resolved, Bondi believed, by the supposition that redshifted light loses 
energy with distance-enough energy to darken most of the night sky. 11 "High-
entropy energy (in the form of radiation)," he wrote, "is constantly being lost 
through the operation of the Doppler shift in the expanding universe, while low-
entropy energy is being supplied in the form of matter." 12 
Unfortunately for the theory, low entropy energy is not being supplied in 
the form ofnew matter. No fresh hydrogen atoms come into being from nothing 
to replace what is lost to view, to drive the redshift and Hubble expansion, to 
resupply the ebbing microwave background, or to explain why the sky is dark 
at night. The omnipresent background radiation, the almost ubiquitous redshift, 
Hubble's law of uniform expansion, and the dark night sky count decisively 
against Steady State Cosmology. No observational evidence exists that any 
matter is being created continuously out ofnothing, much less that just the right 
amount of it exists to replenish what is being lost to view by a relentless Hubble 
expansion. 
C. The First Law of Thermodynamics 
Critics of Steady State Cosmology protested that continuous creation violates 
the First Law of Thermodynamics, which prohibits the creation and destruction 
of mass/energy. Hoyle replied that the theory is actually necessary to account 
for conservation only in the observable universe. Energy is conserved because 
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exactly enough matter is being created to counterbalance its loss over the hori-
zon due to the Hubble expansion. 13 Bondi claimed that continuous creation 
"prevents the approach of the heat death, the state of thennodynamic equilib-
rium in which no evolution can take place and in which the passage of time has 
no significance." 14 These responses are inadequate. 
Hoyle displaced the "Energy is constant" of the First Law ofThennody-
namics, with "Energy that can be observed at any given time is constant." His 
position is that the total existing amount of mass/energy in the universe is 
constantly increasing. Real energy is being created continuously out ofnothing 
to preserve the appearance of constancy. Both Steady State and some Big Bang 
Cosmologies postulate the creation of mass/energy out of nothing, either gradu-
ally, or all at once. If energy conservation is construed as a metaphysical princi-
ple that guarantees the eternal and necessary existence of all existing mass/ 
energy, Steady State Cosmology violates this incrementally, but in infinite 
quantities over infinite time. Big Bang Cosmology violates it in finite quantities 
during a single resplendent burst. However, as explained in Chapter One, the 
law of conservation is not a metaphysical principle, despite the claim of the 
Oscillation Cosmologies introduced in the next chapter that the energy of our 
universe is derived from an infinite number of prior universes. Understood 
scientifically, all natural laws, including the laws ofthennodynamics, come into 
being together with the universe and do not antedate it. Steady State Cosmology 
violates the First Law ofThennodynamics because it posits creation of mass out 
ofnothing within our existing universe; but Standard Big Bang Cosmology does 
not violate it because "prior to" the universe-creating Big Bang, nothing existed 
to which the law could have applied, so no such law existed. 
D. Antimatter 
In particle accelerators, matter and antimatter particles are always produced in 
pairs; and particle physicists believe that symmetrical particle/antiparticle pro-
duction is a universal law of nature. 15 In the thennonuclear furnace of the Big 
Bang, conditions somehow pennitted enough matter to prevail over antimatter 
to produce the universe as we know it. Within our universe, when particle/anti-
particle pairs are produced, they immediately annihilate one another in detect-
able explosions that leave traces of gamma rays. 
The law of symmetrical production obviates Steady State theory's contin-
uous creation of hydrogen atoms. If the proton of a hydrogen atom is created, 
it will be accompanied by an anti proton; and if the electron of a hydrogen atom 
is created, a positron will accompany it. New particle/antiparticle pairs always 
immediately annihilate one another. Thus, endless hydrogen atom production 
in "empty space" is impossible. Continuous creation fails to provide for the 
renewal of matter and for the elimination of antimatter. If matter/antimatter 
obliteration were transpiring throughout space, the resulting ubiquitous explo-
Steady State and Plasma Cosmologies 65 
sions and the ensuing omnipresent gamma ray radiation would be readily detect-
able; but astronomers detect no such all-pervasive occurrences. According to 
Virginia Trimble, "a few things don't belong anywhere ... [like] antimatter, at 
least not anywhere in the observable universe, or we would see gamma rays 
where it meets matter." 16 We just don't find what the theory predicts. 
E. Verifying Infinity 
Philosophically, Steady State Cosmology presupposes a naturalistic metaphysics 
that is totally unverified and unverifiable. Hoyle explicitly affirmed the infinity 
of both time and space, writing that "Theory requires the galaxies to go on 
forever, even though we cannot see them .... The galaxies are expanding out into 
an infinite space. There is no end to it all .... The same thing applies to tirne." 17 
Bondi said that "There is no point origin and no initial catastrophe in this the-
ory." 18 Unfortunately, there neither is, nor can there be, a direct or an indirect 
inductive confirmation of the propositions that time extends infinitely into the 
past, that it will extend infinitely into the future, and that space extends end-
lessly in all directions. Logically, inductively, we cannot infer the infinite from 
the finite, which is all that we ever observe. 
Is the infinity of spacetime plausible as an explanatory hypothesis? Since 
no empirical evidence favors it, why would anyone want to adopt this postulate? 
Cosmologists like Sandra Faber19 and Roger Penrose20 confess being attracted 
formerly to Steady State Cosmology on purely aesthetic grounds, because they 
found the ideas of endless time and space to be beautiful and those of an initial 
singularity and an absolute beginning to be ugly. In adopting a general world-
view, aesthetic considerations may be inescapable in the final analysis; but most 
rational persons are skeptical of attempts to ground metaphysical worldviews 
primarily or prematurely on aesthetic preferences. Atheistic philosophers and 
astrophysicists definitely would not allow theologians to get away with believ-
ing in God merely because God is beautiful; so why should they get away with 
affirming an infinite Godless universe just because they find the thought of it 
beautiful? 
In 1989, Fred Hoyle still defended Steady State Cosmology in an article21 
and in an interview conducted in August of that year. In the interview about his 
earlier work, he commented: "I don't really work in terms of belief. I didn't go 
beyond saying that the steady theory is apossibility."22 However, his books and 
articles do not disclose that Hoyle cared only about possibilities. Yes, anyone 
who wants to know the actual world must explore possibilities, but mere possi-
bilities are very cheap. They require no empirical knowledge at all, no experi-
ments, and no verification whatsoever (all dear to the heart of Hoyle). As Leib-
niz proposed, being possible means nothing more than that the concept of 
something is free from logical self-contradiction. Matterthat is actually antimat-
ter is not possible; but matter that really is matter is possible. Pure possibilities 
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give us no information at all about our actual world, except that it too is a 
possible world. Philosophers play interminable games with abstruse possibili-
ties; but we expect more from scientific cosmologists. Usually they expect more 
of themselves. 
To summarize, Steady State Cosmology was developed as an alternative 
to the somewhat primitive versions of Big Bang theory that were available in the 
late 1940s. Steady Staters were convinced that Big Bangers did not know what 
they were talking about, and vice versa. According to Hoyle and his associates, 
our universe is infinite in space and time; it has always been here; so no Big 
Bang is required to explain it. Their confidence that on a large scale the universe 
has always looked, on average, very much as it does today had to be reconciled 
somehow with the Hubble expansion. How can the observable universe always 
contain the same amount of intergalactic mass/energy if and when galaxies are 
constantly disappearing over the horizon of visibility due to the Hubble expan-
sion process? Hoyle and Bondi resorted to continuous creation of matter out of 
nothing by pre-existing matter to account for the eternal renewal of mass/energy 
in the visible universe. 
For many reasons, Steady State Cosmology is not plausible. No empirical 
evidence supports the continuous creation of matter out of nothing by pre-
existing matter. Without continuous creation, Steady State Cosmology cannot 
account for the background radiation, the redshift of the galaxies, the Hubble 
expansion, and the dark sky at night. Continuous creation of matter out of 
nothing violates the First Law of Thermodynamics, according to which total 
mass/energy in the entire universe, not just the observable universe, is constant. 
Particles of matter and antimatter are always created together and then annihi-
late one another immediately; but no observations confirm the ubiquitous and 
continuous annihilation that should accompany ongoing matter/antimatter 
creation; and if it happened, we and our material world would not be here. 
Finally, the boundlessness of space and time are totally unverified and unverifi-
able, infinitely beyond the limits of scientific methods and knowledge. These 
metaphysical beliefs cannot be counted as scientific knowledge, and no convinc-
ing philosophical arguments support them. Crucial evidence for Steady State 
Cosmology is Jacking. The evidence against it is overwhelming. 
Perhaps another cosmology that affirms the boundlessness of spacetime 
is more credible. We tum now to Plasma Cosmology. Can it succeed where 
Steady State Cosmology failed? 
3. Plasma Cosmology and Eric Lerner's Critique of the Big Bang 
Today, occasional minor anomalies may not quite fit, but Big Bang Cosmology 
is massively supported and far from discredited. Big Bang Cosmology indisput-
ably dominates all others; but it is not without its critics. A few astrophysicists 
emphasize transient discrepancies between the theory and available data, but 
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these discrepancies are constantly being resolved. In 1991 Eric Lerner published 
The Big Bang Never Happened. Lerner's primary objections to the Big Bang, 
the central physical and metaphysical features of his Plasma Cosmology, and the 
basic flaws in his position will be discussed next. Interested readers should 
peruse his informative and challenging book for themselves. 
A few cosmologists announced during the 1980s that they had found 
serious difficulties with the Big Bang theory of cosmic origins. Eric Lerner 
builds on their work and argues that discrepancies between theory and observa-
tion are significant enough to falsify Big Bang Cosmology. As he summarizes 
his main criticisms, 
The test of scientific theory is the correspondence of predictions and 
observations, and the Big Bang has flunked. It predicts that there should 
be no objects in the universe older than twenty billion years and larger 
than 150 million light-years across. There are. It predicts that the universe, 
on such a large scale, should be smooth and homogeneous. The universe 
isn't. The theory predicts that, to produce the galaxies we see around us 
from the tiny fluctuations evident in the microwave background, there 
must be a hundred times as much dark matter as visible matter. There's no 
evidence that there's any dark matter at all. And ifthere is no dark matter, 
the theory predicts, no galaxies will form. Yet there they are, scattered 
across the sky. We live in one.23 
The following doubts arise about Big Bang Cosmology, according to 
Lerner. 
A. Large-Scale Structures 
Is the universe too immense for Big Bang Cosmology? Astronomers have now 
mapped and measured large sectors of the heavens. They found galaxies clus-
tered together in vast strings, sheets, webs, and tapestries, separated by huge 
voids of seemingly empty space. These clusters of galaxies are themselves 
clustered into superclusters, separated by immensities of near emptiness. The 
superclusters are grouped into patterned megaclusters, divided by vast expanses 
of barrenness, almost without end. Age is correlated with size and velocity in 
an expanding spacetime system, and the age and magnitude of space in the 
observable universe are unimaginably vast. 
Both the age and the size of the universe are far too great for Big Bang 
Cosmology, according to Eric Lerner. Big Bang Cosmology can allow for no 
objects older than twenty billion years at most, and no expanses greater than one 
hundred fifty million light years across; but the universe accessible to the best 
modem telescopes is radically different from what the Big Bang theory predicts. 
Lerner claims that some supergalaxies are between one hundred to one hundred 
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and fifty billion years old, at least five times older than Big Bang theory can 
accommodate.24 If some galaxies formed from an earlier state in which matter 
was spread smoothly through space, this matter must have moved for at least 
eighty billion years to arrive at its visible distribution; but the Big Bang says that 
the entire universe is at most only twenty billion years of age.25 This theory 
cannot be saved by moving back the time of the initial explosion, Lerner con-
tends, for that would be incompatible with the measured pace of the Hubble 
expansion.26 
B. Dark Matter and the Galaxies 
Does enough matter or mass/energy exist in the universe to explain how the 
galaxies were formed? This question is closely related to others, Lerner thinks. 
Is our universe closed rather than open? Does enough mass/energy exist to 
enable gravity to halt and reverse the universe's expansion? Enough mass to 
form the galaxies would equal that required to close the universe, according to 
Lerner.27 Other cosmologists doubt that the relation of mass to forming galaxies 
and closing the universe is so exact. Stephen Hawking, who concedes uncer-
tainty about it, suggests that "A tenth of the critical density would be enough 
matter for galaxies and stars to form."28 
In Big Bang Cosmology, galaxies form as a result of tiny initial irregulari-
ties or fluctuational flukes in the early universe that spread over time to detach 
large irregular chunks of radiant energy and gases from one another. Later, 
many of these gaseous expanses solidified as gravity concentrated them into 
supergalaxies, galaxies, their stars, halos, and smaller clouds of gas and dust. 
Lerner insists that not enough physical mass/gravity exists in the galaxies or 
elsewhere to do the job. Big Bang Cosmologists assume that gravitational 
energy is the dominant force in the universe and that it caused the galaxies to 
form. Many believe that it will ultimately reverse the expansion of the universe. 
Without sufficient mass, there is not enough gravity for either purpose; and, 
Lerner contends, the observable mass definitely is not there. 
The visible mass in the universe is only two percent at most of what is 
required to close the universe and form the galaxies, Lerner claims. Other 
cosmologists readily acknowledge that the luminous mass in the universe is 
barely one to two percent of the critical mass necessary to close the universe.29 
Ninety eight percent or so of the mass required to close the universe and form 
the galaxies is missing, says Lemer.30 If Big Bang Cosmology is right, there 
should be no galaxies; but galaxies exist; so Big Bang Cosmology is wrong, 
Lerner concludes. 
To save the theory, Lerner suggests, Big Bang Cosmologists conjure up 
massive quantities of cold dark matter and claim that it comprises ninety-eight 
percent or so of the physical universe. The trouble is, no one can find it! Astron-
omers can detect only the hot luminous matter that appears in the optical, ultra-
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violet, X-ray, gamma-ray, infrared, and radio regions of the spectrum; but this 
luminous matter falls significantly short of what Big Bang Cosmology requires. 
Rather than give up the Big Bang theory, its advocates concoct imaginary stuff 
that is not there. Big Bang Cosmology can be defended, Lerner charges, only by 
arbitrarily postulating the existence of purely fictional entities, a process akin 
to adding epicycles to defend the Ptolemaic geocentric theory of the solar 
system. 
The cold dark matter of Big Bang Cosmology is merely deduced from 
theory, Lerner says, without a trace of observational support; and other promi-
nent astrophysicists agree. 31 This missing mass, theorists concede, is not conven-
tional matter like protons, neutrons, and electrons; if it were, it would be lumi-
nous. Radically different unobserved kinds of matter must exist in massive 
quantities to close the universe; so theorists concoct exotic particles like heavy 
neutrinos, axions and WIMPs (Weakly Interacting Massive Particles) which, by 
their own admission, no one has ever found. Astronomer Vera Rubin mentions 
"neutrinos, gravitinos, photinos, sneutrinos, axions, magnetic monopoles, and 
dozens more. "32 .if they exist, they could easily supply the missing mass required 
to form the galaxies and close the universe. "Their only drawback," Lerner 
observes, is "that as in the case of cosmic strings, there is no evidence that they 
exist."33 This drawback, if sustained, is quite serious indeed! 
Actually, we possess significant empirical evidence for the existence of 
some cold dark matter. It is obtained by first measuring the velocities of stars in 
galaxies, and of galaxies in clusters. Then the gravitational force, and thus the 
mass, required to hold them in orbit or cause their observed movements is 
calculated. Finally, the mass of detectable luminous matter is subtracted from 
the required mass. The results indicate that observable matter is only a small 
fraction of what is necessary to prevent orbiting stars and galaxies from flying 
apart. According to Vera Rubin, at least 90 to 99 percent of the matter in the 
universe is dark matter that is "detected by its gravitational attraction on the 
matter which we can see."34 Whether enough dark matter really exists to close 
the universe is a matter of heated controversy among contemporary cosmolo-
gists. As William Fowler put it, "According to the Caltech religion, the universe 
is open, and according to the Princeton superstition, it's closed."35 
Lerner attempts to explain away all empirical evidence for dark matter. 
Citing research done by other astronomers, Lerner argues that dark matter is 
accepted by many astronomers because they greatly overestimate the masses of 
measured galaxies and clusters in two ways. These astronomers either count 
"interlopers," on this side or the other of observed galaxies as if they actually 
belong to the galaxies they are weighing,36 or else they count small galaxies 
completely beyond the gravitational field of larger galaxies as if they belong to 
them. Either way, the mass and gravity of a measured galaxy will be greatly 
overestimated. 37 Lerner concludes that "These two errors would account for all 
of the "missing mass"; in pairs of galaxies, groups of galaxies, and clusters 
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there is no dark matter."38 Both of Lerner's explanations seem irrelevant, how-
ever. Whether or not interloper or nearby galaxies are beyond, before, or outside 
the gravitational fields of focal galaxies, their mass is there in the universe 
nonetheless. 
Very few astronomers are persuaded that all cold dark matter can be 
explained away so easily. Much more evidence is available for the existence of 
cold dark matter than Lerner's exposition suggests. As Vera Rubin points out, 
the velocities of the outermost stars in spiral galaxies are not significantly less 
than the velocities of the innermost stars, which indicates the presence of dark 
matter because visible matter cannot explain this motion. Spiral galaxies are 
very different from our solar system, where planetary velocities decrease with 
increasing distance from the Sun, in accord with Newton's law that gravitational 
attraction decreases as distance increases.39 The luminous centers of spiral 
galaxies seem to contain the most matter, so we would expect the velocities of 
their outermost stars to decrease, like the outermost planets of our solar system; 
but this does not happen.40 Why? According to Rubin, "The conclusion is 
inescapable: matter, unlike luminosity, is not concentrated near the center of 
spiral galaxies. In short, the distribution of light in a galaxy is not at all a guide 
to the distribution ofmatter."41 Thus, much dark matter must be there within the 
galaxy and/or its surrounding "dark halo." 
Lerner concludes that even if some dark matter exists, contemporary 
measurements of celestial mass disclose "far too little to 'close the universe' and 
solve the various problems confronting the Big Bang theory."42 Many contem-
porary cosmologists agree. Lerner probably loses the battle over the non-exis-
tence of dark matter, but he wins the war over whether enough of it exists to 
close the universe. Vera Rubin's studies of galactic dynamics disclose some 
missing mass; but, she admits, when all this dark matter is added in, the universe 
still has a critical density of .2 at best,43 still far short of the critical density of 
I. James Trefel remarked in 1988 that after including all detectable dark matter, 
we are left with only thirty percent of the critical value required for closing the 
universe.44 Similarly, in 1990 H. Reeves wrote, 
The best estimates of the total (baryonic and nonbaryonic) cosmic density, 
from dynamic effects on galactic motions, yield values around ten percent 
of the closure density .... There is no sound proof of the existence of a 
nonbaryonic matter contributing in a major way to the total density of the 
universe.45 
In late 1995, Joshua Roth and Joel R. Primack affirmed that "counting the 
universe's luminous inhabitants-galaxies ... only adds up to at most about one 
percent of the critical density," and that "galaxy halos typically contain enough 
dark matter to contribute at least 13 percent of the critical density, with pre-
ferred values exceeding 30 percent."46 Many astronomers estimate the total dark 
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and luminous mass to be around thirty to forty percent of critical mass.47 Sixty 
percent or more of the mass required to close the universe can be provided only 
by postulating the existence of an odd attracting, not an Einsteinian repelling, 
Cosmological Constant, or by assigning significant mass to neutrinos. Neutrinos 
were found in 1998 to have a tiny mass, 48 but they add only another tenth of 
critical mass at most; and an attracting Cosmological Constant is nothing more 
than an ad hoc hypothesis unsupported by empirical evidence.49 Any implausi-
ble theory can be saved if we are willing to posit enough epicycles and to violate 
egregiously the scientific principle of parsimony. 
As far as we can tell, the density of our universe is only a small fraction 
of one, Omega, or critical density. Some non-luminous matter may be tied up 
in black holes, brown dwarfs-as confirmed by the Hubble Telescope in 1995, 
dim stars, and interstellar gas and dust; but astronomers were stunned in 1994 
by the failure of the Hubble Telescope to find such things where most expected. 
Some dark mass may be totally different in kind from any matter with 
which we are familiar; but when all the dark matter we can find is added to 
luminous matter, the total mass is at best only four percent or so of critical mass, 
according to an extensive review of all available evidence by Peter Coles and 
George Ellis in 1994.50 Recent attempts by more than one research team to 
"weigh" the universe by examining the redshift of distant supernovae also favor 
a low-density universe.51 Estimates of the grand total of dark and luminous 
matter obviously differ somewhat, but astrophysicists agree substantially that 
far too little exists to close the universe. Thus, even if some dark matter exists, 
this does not help very much. Emphasis on insufficient mass is not merely a 
Lerner eccentricity; many prominent astrophysicists agree that too little mass/ 
energy exists to reverse the cosmic expansion process and close the universe.52 
As Coles and Ellis indicate, "On the balance of the evidence, an open Universe 
should be preferred."53 
Conclusive evidence that we live in an open universe now seems to be 
available. Astronomers were stunned again in early 1998 when two research 
teams arrived independently at the unexpected result that the rate of cosmic 
expansion is actually increasing, not decreasing, as almost everyone since 
Hubble assumed. Gravitation/mass is not even powerful enough to slow down 
the pace of cosmic expansion, as universally assumed prior to 1998, much less 
to stop it. Supernovae in far distant galaxies were discovered to be much dim-
mer and further away (by ten to fifteen percent) than predictions based on a 
slowing rate of cosmic expansion could explain. The best explanation of their 
having traveled so much further than expected is that the rate of Hubble expan-
sion is increasing, being driven by the pervasive energy of a repelling Cosmo-
logical Constant. 54 These initial findings were confirmed many times during and 
since 1998; and by the end of that year, the prestigious journal Science declared 
the increasing rate of cosmic expansion to be the "Breakthrough of the Year"! 55 
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Most astrophysicists, including Stephen Hawking who at first resisted,56 
are now convinced that the issue is definitively resolved: we live in an open 
universe, one that will never end in a Big Crunch. Thus, all cosmologies that 
presume a closed universe are utterly implausible. Some astronomers caution 
that the dimmer-than-expected light from these Supernovae might be best 
explained by the presence of cosmic dust, or by their taking longer than usual 
to achieve their maximum brightness. So far, the increasing rate of Hubble 
expansion has withstood every challenge;57 and even ifthe Hubble expansion 
rate is not increasing, too little mass exists in the universe to close it. High 
precision observations of the microwave background made in 1999-2000 seem 
most compatible with a flat universe having an Omega of 1,58 but neither flat nor 
open universes ever collapse, and both kinds are absolutely incompatible with 
oscillation ism. 
We probably live in an open universe with a finite past that will expand 
forever, but Lerner contends that an open universe would falsify all forms of 
Big Bang Cosmology. Readers will soon see that and why this is not so. 
C. Cosmic Heterogeneity 
Is the universe as homogeneous and isotropic as required by Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy, or is it too clumpy and structured? Without dark matter and its gravitational 
effects, Big Bang theory cannot account for the heterogeneity of the universe, 
Lerner contends; but Plasma Cosmology can readily explain the formation of 
stars, solar systems, galaxies, superga!axies, and cosmic heterogeneity. Big 
Bang Cosmology assumes that among the four basic forces of nature, only 
gravity is available to consolidate gaseous regions of mass/energy into heavenly 
bodies or into galactic and supergalactic structures. 59 Relying on the theories and 
research of Hannes Alfven60 and his associates in Sweden, Lerner proposes that 
electromagnetism can diversify the cosmos, where gravity alone cannot;61 once 
we comprehend how electromagnetism operates on plasmas, we will know how 
the universe came to be structured. 
Plasmas are "hot, electrically conducting gases;" and "Over 99 percent of 
the matter [in the universe] is plasma," Lerner writes. 62 Plasma Cosmology says 
that flowing electromagnetic currents pervade our plasma universe; the entire 
universe is a gigantic electrical power grid: "Plasma cosmologists envision a 
universe crisscrossed by vast electrical currents and powerful magnetic fields, 
ordered by the cosmic counterpoint of electromagnetism and gravity."63 
Big Bang Cosmology ignores electromagnetism and relies on gravity alone 
to explain the lumpiness of the universe. This does not work, Lerner insists; but 
when both electricity and magnetism are considered, the heterogeneity of the 
universe is adequately explained. Gravity is not the only physical force that 
draws things together; electromagnetism does also. On a cosmic scale, it and 
gravity together structure the universe. Lerner's hero, Hannes Alfven, contends 
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that "Plasma becomes inhomogeneous naturally," that "Plasma, electrical 
currents, and magnetic fields work to concentrate matter and energy, to make 
the universe the complex, dynamic, and uneven place that it is."64 Plasma per-
vaded by electromagnetic currents naturally produces swirling filaments, whirl-
winds, and vortices through a "pinch effect" that pulls currents together when 
they are flowing in the same direction.65 On a cosmic scale, these processes 
produce solar systems, stars, vast strings of galaxies, and enormous filaments 
ofsuper-galaxies.66 Furthermore, "Magnetic fields and currents can concentrate 
matter and energy far faster and more effectively than can gravity."67 Indeed, 
"Plasma interactions can, given a few hundred billion years, form the super-
cluster complexes." This is far too long for a Big Bang universe with only 
twenty billion years at most to spare, but for Plasma Cosmology "time is no 
problem."68 A few hundred billion years hardly matter in an infinitely old 
universe. 
D. Homogeneity and the Microwave Background 
Does the microwave background really originate with the very earliest universe? 
The discovery in 1965 of the microwave background by Penzias and Wilson 
was crucial in persuading most cosmologists to accept the Big Bang theory of 
origins. Both the remarkably homogeneous black body radiation coming from 
everywhere in the universe, and the uniform distribution of matter on a large 
enough cosmic scale, seem to confirm Big Bang Cosmology's prediction of 
homogeneity and isotropy in the universe. Big Bangers construe the microwave 
background to be an enduring remnant of the age of radiation that began only 
minutes after the eruption of the primordial fireball. Lerner challenges the 
presumption that this is the only plausible explanation and offers an alternative 
hypothesis as much more credible. 
Lerner's theory is simple. Electrons flowing through magnetic fields emit 
radio waves and microwaves. The microwave background originates in interga-
lactic magnetic fields that first absorb and then reemit microwave radiation.69 
The microwave background appears to come from everywhere rather than from 
specific intergalactic locales because, after a number of reabsorptions and 
reemissions, microwaves are scattered in all directions, and their radiation is 
"smoothed out."70 Thus, the microwave background originates in intergalactic 
space and requires no Big Bang for its explanation. 
Another problem, says Lerner, is that the microwave background is too 
smooth. Big Bang theory proposes that fluctuations and aberrations very early 
in the universe eventually created supergalaxies, galaxies, and stars. If this 
actually happened, some inhomogeneities in the microwave background should 
show up, but they do not, Lerner declares. Preliminary reports from the Cosmic 
Background Explorer (COBE) Satellite launched by NASA in 1989 indicated 
that "the Microwave spectrum is 'too perfect'," and this "rules out any way of 
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fonning the large scale structure of the universe from the Big Bang."71 This 
challenge to Big Bang cosmology is very serious, but since Lerner wrote, the 
tables have turned decisively against him. 
E. The Hubble Expansion and the Infinite Universe 
Could the universe expand in accord with Hubble's law without a Big Bang? If 
so, how so? Lerner's Plasma Cosmology is not easily reconciled with the Hub-
ble expansion of the universe and the redshift from distant galaxies. Like Steady 
State Cosmology, Plasma Cosmology incorporates a non-empirical metaphysics 
of infinite space and endless time. Steady State Cosmology tried to reconcile the 
Hubble expansion with an infinite and eternal universe by postulating everlast-
ing continuous creation. How can Plasma Cosmology repudiate both the Big 
Bang and continuous creation, yet affinn the Hubble expansion? Lerner admits 
that this is not easy! 
The Hubble expansion cannot be explained away, though Lerner would 
like to do so. Most cosmologists identify the redshift of the galaxies with the 
Doppler effect, and Lerner agrees after examining alternative proposals. In an 
Appendix,72 Lerner discusses and rejects two alternative explanations for the 
redshift, first that light simply gets tired or loses energy as it travels through 
long distances (as Bondi believed), next that some unknown physical law causes 
the scale of everything to expand with time. Lerner repudiates the first because 
it requires a much greater density of matter than is available and because there 
is no evidence that anything absorbs energy from traveling photons. The second 
view is unacceptable because it cannot be confinned and because it involves 
new, unverifiable, and implausible laws of physics. Lerner concedes that since 
light arriving from a source moving away from an observer shifts toward the red 
end of the spectrum, the galaxies must be moving away from us as the universe 
expands. 
To explain the Hubble expansion, Lerner prefers a proposal developed by 
Alfven, according to whom it results from what I will call a "Mini-Bang," 
though this is not Lerner's tenninology. Lerner thinks that a Mini-Bang (per-
haps more than one) occurred when a limited region of the infinite universe was 
blown apart by a colossal matter/antimatter collision to fonn our observable 
universe. 
Alfven and Lerner are convinced that substantial quantities of antimatter 
exist in the infinite vastness of space. It is nonnally separated from our material 
comer of the universe by electromagnetic vortices, but occasionally matter and 
antimatter collide. Billions of years ago, in our small comer of the infinite 
cosmos, matter contracted gravitationally, not to a singularity, but to a hundred 
million light-years across, a tenth of its present size.73 Massive quantities of 
matter and antimatter just happened to be in the same vicinity, so one or more 
matter/antimatter explosions occurred, producing our observable expanding 
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universe or "metagalaxy." If the Big Bang never happened, Lerner must still 
answer the question: "What caused the Mini-Bang?" He answers that ten to 
twenty billion years ago it resulted from a gigantic collision of matter with 
antimatter in our little comer of infinite space. Residual kinetic energy from that 
explosion accounts for the Hubble expansion,74 which was "in no way a Big 
Bang that created matter, space, and time. It was just a big bang, an explosion 
in one part of the universe."73 
Lerner's Plasma Cosmology thus resorts to a Bang after all, but only a 
metagalaxy-producing Mini-Bang. Not surprisingly, he abhors the outcome that 
he embraces.76 He concludes, "The question of the Hubble relation remains 
unanswered," and "Far more theoretical and observational work is needed."77 
But "Why the Hubble expansion?" remains unanswered only if Big Bang 
Cosmology is rejected! Big Bang theory provides a very plausible answer! 
Plasma Cosmology invites a number of serious questions. Is the entire 
infinite universe expanding like the observable universe? Is this a material 
world through and through? Plasma and Big Bang Cosmologies give very 
different answers. 
What would Plasma Cosmologists expect to find if we could see very 
deeply into infinite spacetime? What are those parts of the universe like that 
were not affected by our localized Mini-Bang? Lerner does not answer, but we 
can make some educated guesses and predictions. Since most of the allegedly 
infinite universe was not affected by our Mini-Bang, it would not be involved 
in our Hubble expansion. Other metagalaxies might express their own expan-
sions or contractions. Some of them might be headed directly toward us. Some 
might be composed of antimatter or, heaven forbid, even dark matter; and they 
could exhibit radically different natural laws. 
How could our own metagalaxy belong to the "same universe" with 
innumerable causally unrelated metagalaxies? Lerner neither asks nor answers, 
but the question deserves some serious consideration. Could any two metagal-
axies belong to a single universe without any causal connections or lawful 
spatiotemporal continuities, at least at their edges? These edges might be so far 
away from local astronomers that they could not observe any metagalactic 
interactions. Totally independent universes might exist without causal contact 
and spatiotemporal continuity; but if metagalaxies belong to the same universe, 
surely they must affect one another, be spatiotemporally continuous, and share 
many if not all natural laws. Actually, Plasma Cosmologists do not have the 
slightest trace of scientific evidence that the universe is infinite, that other 
metagalaxies exist (like Lerner's alleged matter and antimatter worlds that 
collided to produce our world), or that they are distantly continuous with our 
own. Even if these presumptions were true, we could never know it. Very few, 
if any, metagalaxies in Lerner's infinite universe ever affect our observable 
world, so how could they belong to our universe? 
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Big Bang cosmologists, by contrast, do not identify the whole expanding 
universe with the observed or observable universe, but they think that it is finite 
and in principle observable and continuous with our own causally, spatially, 
temporally, and in other ways. They expect to investigate more and more of it 
as better instruments like the Hubble Space Telescope are deployed, repaired, 
and upgraded. They predict that the most general features of the as yet unseen 
far distant universe will significantly resemble what we have seen already. This 
has always been the case as better scientific instruments have allowed us to 
probe deeper and deeper into the unknown universe, and it should not change. 
Big Bang Cosmologists expect the now unknown universe out there to be 
composed mostly of matter, not antimatter, and to obey familiar physical laws, 
including Hubble's law ofuniform expansion. Results obtained from the Hub-
ble Space Telescope consistently confirm these expectations. 
The further out we look in space, the further back we see in time; even at 
the speed oflight, considerable time, billions of years in some instances, lapses 
before photons and radiant energy reach us from far distant objects. Big Bang 
Cosmologists expect the most distant objects in the universe to be moving away 
from us and from one another at speeds roughly proportional to their distance, 
with minor variances due to local gravitational fields. These speeds, they antici-
pate, will gradually approach the speed of light. They expect that the most 
distant objects in the heavens will be observed in their youth, as they were 
billions of years ago when their light and radiant energy now arriving here 
departed from there. So far, with every improvement in technology, their predic-
tions pan out. 
Some of the most distant objects that astronomers have discovered thus far 
are the quasars-starlike objects that contain as much mass/energy as entire 
galaxies. In late 1998, quasars that are thirteen billion light years away were 
detected. 71 Quasars, seen in their youth, are some of the most distant and thus 
the oldest celestial objects known to us, but they obey familiar physical laws. 
In January 1993, radio astronomers, using the facilities at Kitt Peak Observatory 
in Arizona, discovered giant clouds of gas twelve billion years old in which 
galaxies are being formed. These clouds contain as much mass as entire galax-
ies, but no stars had formed in them twelve billion years ago. Since 1996, many 
additional observations with the Hubble Space Telescope disclosed galaxies as 
they existed nearly twelve billion years ago, within three billion years of the Big 
Bang, and found them to be smaller but much closer together and more numer-
ous than those nearer to us in space and time; the small early ones probably 
merged over time to form the large later galaxies. 79 
The Hubble Space Telescope now provides us with a vision of embryonic 
protostars and new stars being formed in and ejected from dense clouds of space 
dust.10 Big Bang theory predicts that galaxies go through gaseous phases before 
they develop into stars and galaxies; and this prediction is now confirmed. In 
1994, in a closer galaxy, astronomers identified for the first time a planet in 
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orbit around a distant sun in our Milky Way. By the end of 1995 at least four 
were recognized, with new ones being added almost every month thereafter. By 
the end of 2000, nearly fifty or so were known, some earth-size, most Jupiter-
size. 81 As we learn more and more about our universe, we find no far distant 
metagalaxies or alternate antimatter universes. We just find more and more of 
what Big Bang Cosmology predicts. 
Nothing can be accelerated through existing space faster than the speed of 
light and cross the speed of light barrier, says the theory of relativity; but the 
Hubble expansion of space itself can separate celestial objects at faster-than-
light speeds, thereby making it impossible for these objects ever to communicate 
causally. This is the "horizon problem" discussed earlier. According to Hub-
ble's Law, each time the distance doubles, the speed doubles. Without violating 
relativity, some galaxies are moving away from local observers at speeds that 
exceed 186,000 miles per second, the approximate speed of light. Objects 
moving away from us faster than light are forever beyond our horizon of visibil-
ity. Their light will never reach us. This is one good reason why we cannot 
identify the observable universe with the total universe that originated with the 
Big Bang. Though his estimate is admittedly only approximate, Alan H. Guth 
surmises that " ... The entire universe is expected to be at least I 023 times larger 
than the observed universe; ... the observed universe is only a minute speck in 
a universe that is many orders of magnitude larger."82 This largeness should not 
be confused with infinity, however. 
Astronomers look back in time as they see further away in space, but Big 
Bang Cosmologists do not expect to see the Big Bang itself, or anything beyond 
and before the Big Bang. No optical telescope will ever see through the fog of 
cosmic radiation that lasted for the first 700,000 years. Since the microwave 
background dates back to the onset of this age of radiation around 300,000 years 
after the Bang, radioscopes already see at least that far back in time. Milton 
Munitz speculates that if we could develop telescopic instruments capable of 
detecting neutrinos, gravitons, magnetic monopoles, or free relic quarks, we 
could access information coming from the earliest fraction of a second after the 
Bang. 83 Unfortunately, at present we are far from having such instruments. 
Commenting on the Ligo and Lisa observatories now being constructed to detect 
gravity waves, Gary H. Sanders and David Beckett observe, 
As early as 1043 second after the Big Bang, space and time became differ-
entiated and gravitational radiation was able to stream freely in all direc-
tions. In principle, LIGO could detect these primordial waves, enabling us 
to hear at last the hush of the universe's birth.84 
From this also we are infinitely far removed in practice. We do not know much 
about our universe, but everything that we do know favors Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy. 
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To summarize, Eric Lerner avidly repudiates the Big Bang theory of 
cosmic origins. He contends that the Big Bang's ten to twenty billion year age 
for the universe is far too small to accommodate recently mapped supergalaxies 
that are a hundred and fifty billion years old. Without massive quantities of dark 
matter, there is too little gravity for the Big Bang cosmos to form stars, galaxies, 
and supergalaxies; and no good evidence indicates that any cold dark matter 
exists. Big Bang theory is oblivious to the power of electromagnetism to form 
heterogeneous astronomical structures. Electromagnetism accounts for the 
microwave background without a Big Bang, and the COBE satellite found no 
evidence of galaxy-producing fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation. 
Defenders of the Big Bang can offer intelligent responses to these doubts. 
4. Critique of Plasma Cosmology 
Plasma Cosmology has its own grave defects, some concerning its physics, and 
some its metaphysics. 
Lerner's contention that the universe is infinite in space and time sounds 
remarkably like old fashioned naturalistic metaphysics. Is he a Naturalist? Many 
Theists, he notes, also believe that the universe is unbounded in space and time, 
and they regard an infinite world as an expression of God's infinite creative 
power. Merely believing in infinite spacetime does not make one a Naturalist. 
Other Theists believe that the universe is finite in time and space, even though 
a finite universe implies no more than finite Divine power and creativity.85 
Lerner avows that Plasma Cosmology is neutral with respect to atheism 
and theism, that it "does not demand a creative God and is perfectly compatible 
without one. But nor does it preclude a creative deity."86 This cunning evasion 
does not successfully conceal Lerner's commitment to a Humanistic Naturalistic 
worldview. He contends that scientific method alone yields truth, and he rejects 
all "mythological" explanations.87 He develops an optimistic, futuristic, and 
humanistic understanding of mankind and human values. 88 He makes no appeal 
to God, and twice he expresses a decided preference for a naturalistic theory of 
origins.89 He vehemently defends the principle that all events have (natural) 
causes against what he regards as irrationalism, occultism, mythology, and 
mysticism. He even finds antiscientific perspectives, which he opposes, in 
fashionable but fanciful metaphysical interpretations of quantum physics.90 
But Lerner's naturalistic Plasma Cosmology has its own serious problems. 
A. A Universe Infinite in Space and Time 
Unlike Big Bang Cosmology, Plasma Cosmology affirms that the universe is 
infinite in both space and time. Is it reasonable, is it scientific, to adopt these 
features of Lerner's Naturalism? If scientific method alone yields truth, what 
scientific evidence proves that we live in an infinite universe? None at all, even 
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if we do! Early in his book, Lerner proclaims that "Philosophers such as Nicho-
las of Cusa and Giordano Bruno had advocated the idea of a universe unlimited 
in time and space, eternal and without beginning. But no scientist had justified 
these notions with hard data."91 These words tacitly promise to provide hard 
data later to prove that space and time are infinite; but Lerner never fulfills this 
promise. Later he reaffirms that the finitude or infinitude of the universe "is a 
scientific question that must be answered by observation;" but almost immedi-
ately he concedes in a footnote that "Strictly speaking, it is not possible to prove 
scientifically that the universe is infinite. But it is quite possible to claim that we 
have no observational evidence that it is finite."92 Thus, he argues, lack of 
evidence for finitude counts as evidence for infinity. Are his claims plausible? 
First, we observe only finitude, so all our observations count only for 
finitude. More importantly, we really cannot show that the universe is infinite 
merely because we have no evidence for its finitude, or against its infinitude. 
All appeals to lack of evidence are fallacious arguments from ignorance, and 
they establish nothing. 
The naturalist Sidney Hook wrote, 
The existence of God, immortality, disembodied souls or spirits, cosmic 
purpose or design, as these have been interpreted by the great institutional 
religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they 
deny the existence of fairies, elves, leprechauns, and an invisible satellite 
revolving between the earth and the moon.93 
So, why should we disbelieve in the existence of such fanciful entities? We 
could argue that God, disembodied souls, cosmic purpose, pixies, elves, and 
invisible satellites between us and the moon really exist just because there is no 
observational evidence against them. No one with any knowledge of logic 
would accept such an argument from ignorance. Yet, Lerner's central argument 
for the infinity of nature is no better. Neither logic nor scientific method entitle 
us to believe something simply because no evidence disproves it. We would 
surely have to accept the reality of every occult entity imaginable if having no 
observational evidence against their existence counts decisively as evidence in 
their favor. Yet, this is all that Lerner or any other naturalist can say for their 
infinite and self-sufficient universe-there is no evidence against it (which 
ignores the Big Bang). Lerner's Naturalistic metaphysics hangs on an argumen-
tum ad ignorantium. 
We really should disbelieve in pixies, elves, and invisible satellites be-
cause, after a thorough search, we find no observational evidence for their 
existence. Their existence is excluded by the presence of other things that we 
know to exist. Thorough searches yield knowledge, not ignorance, and justify 
many negative conclusions. Negative propositions like "There is no butter in the 
refrigerator," "Unicorns don't exist," and "No stars are composed of antimatter" 
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can be confinned by observation to a very high degree of probability. Ifwe are 
in no position to make a thorough search, we may not know some things for 
certain; but we can still know many negative truths within limits of high proba-
bility. Still, complete lack of evidence for one theory does not establish its 
opposite. 
So what does the available evidence actually show about our universe? 
Our most thorough searches disclose only finitude. Empirically or scientifically 
we can only know finitude, even ifthe universe is actually infinite. Further, all 
the positive empirical evidence for the Big Bang (given in Chapter One) counts 
decisively against the infinity of space and time. Many allegedly scientific 
cosmologies covered in later chapters accept the Big Bang; but they postulate 
other universes in ways that leave all accessible evidence and all natural science 
far behind. For them and for Plasma Cosmology this is a great weakness. 
Another subtle but unsound argument for infinite space and time runs 
through Lerner's book, one from historical association. He says that historical 
figures like Anaxagoras, Nicholas ofCusa, and Giordano Bruno, who captured 
the spirit of science and scientific method also believed in an infinite universe. 
He insinuates that these historical facts somehow imply that the universe really 
is infinite; but this does not follow. How did Lerner's historical heroes know 
that the world is infinite? What empirical evidence for it did they adduce? 
None! 
The truth about how Naturalists like Lerner arrive at an infinite universe 
surfaces when he writes, "Plasma cosmology assumes that, because we now see 
an evolving, changing universe, the universe has always existed and always 
evolved, and will exist and evolve for an infinite time to come."94 The key word 
here is "assumes"; but his opponents can just as easily assume the contrary, if 
that is all that there is to it. Lerner's Infinite-world Metaphysics is merely an 
unjustified assumption, merely an expression of groundless metaphysical faith. 
No logic warrants reasoning from finite observational premises to conclusions 
that affinn infinity, and all the positive evidence for the Big Bang weighs 
heavily against Lerner's position. 
B. Hydrogen and An Infinitely Old Universe 
Plasma Cosmology confronts scientific as well as metaphysical obstacles. Our 
universe is around seventy five percent hydrogen, as spectrographic scans of the 
heavens repeatedly confinn. If the universe were infinitely old, as Plasma 
Cosmology maintains, no hydrogen would exist in it today, given the laws of 
physics as we know them. Hydrogen is constantly being synthesized into helium 
and heavier elements in the stars; and this hydrogen cycle is irreversible. If 
nucleosynthesis of hydrogen into helium and the heavy elements has occurred 
throughout infinite space for an infinite amount of time, every hydrogen atom 
in the infinite universe would have passed through an infinite number of explod-
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ing supernovas, each of which would have converted some hydrogen into heav-
ier elements. If this has been transpiring for an infinite amount of time, no 
hydrogen would remain in the universe today. Yet, the hydrogen is there. It 
makes up nearly seventy five percent of the universe as we know it, and its 
existence is overwhelming evidence against an infinitely old universe. 
Fred Hoyle raised the foregoing objection against his own Steady State 
Cosmology.95 To avoid the difficulty, he resorted to the implausible continuous 
creation of hydrogen atoms. Can Plasma Cosmology provide an alternative 
hydrogen-renewing mechanism? Electromagnetism cannot save the theory, for 
it does not reverse the process ofnucleosynthesis. Could Lerner's Mini-Bang 
solve the problem for Plasma Cosmology? Can hydrogen be renewed periodi-
cally in the infinite universe by matter/antimatter annihilations that create 
infinitely many Hubble-expanding metagalaxies like our own? Lerner has not 
worked out the physics for this; and the physics that we know is decidedly 
against it. Matter/antimatter explosions always produce gamma rays, never 
hydrogen or helium atoms, the dominant elements in our universe. 
Besides, no convincing evidence indicates that antimatter exists in suffi-
cient quantities to produce metagalactic Mini-Bangs.96 Lerner concedes that 
evidence for the existence of massive quantities of antimatter is inadequate, and 
he pleads for "more observation."97 Plasma Cosmology replaces the open uni-
verse's enigma of the cold dark matter that is not there with that of the antimat-
ter that is not there! 
Observation actually shows that very little antimatter exists in the universe, 
as far as we can tell. If some far away galaxies are composed of antimatter, it 
might seem difficult at first to know this, according to I. L. Rozental, because 
"Antimatter emits photons in absolutely the san1e way as matter does."98 To us, 
light from antimatter galaxies would look exactly like light from galaxies com-
posed of matter. However, Rozental adds, galaxies emit particles as well as 
photons; and antimatter galaxies would emit antiprotons and positrons. If vast 
quantities of each exist, then somewhere in space antiparticles would be collid-
ing constantly with material protons and electrons. Significant and detectable 
matter/antimatter annihilations would result; but none have been discovered 
after extensive searches; so the existence of antimatter galaxies is extremely 
doubtful. 99 
Lerner might reply that although no discernible antimatter exists now, it 
might still have existed at the time of the Mini-Bang. According to the Big Bang 
theory itself, the initial universe-creating thermonuclear explosion was driven 
primarily by stupendous matter/antimatter collisions; so it too must reconcile the 
past existence of antimatter with its virtual non-existence at present. 
Which theory offers the most plausible account of the origin and presence 
of the antimatter that fueled its Bang? In Big Bang theory, either a surplus of 
matter prevailed from the outset as a given initial condition of creation, or else 
both antimatter and matter emerged from X bosons (derived, in tum, from pure 
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energy during the first few pre-matter minutes of creation) that decayed irregu-
larly into a material world. How does Plasma Cosmology explain the origin of 
the massive quantity of antimatter involved in its Mini-Bang? How was it 
separated from matter? How did it survive annihilation by matter prior to its 
collision with a material world undergoing metagalactic gravitational collapse? 
Lerner recognizes that antimatter is produced on earth whenever matter is 
derived from energy, so it would be an immense puzzle, he suggests, if this did 
not happen throughout the universe. 100 Yet, whenever this happens on earth, 
matter and antimatter immediately annihilate one another, so it would also be 
a great enigma if this too does not happen throughout the universe; but it does-
n't. Lerner claims that antimatter can be separated from matter if both pass 
through a magnetic field containing a current that squirts matter out in one 
direction and antimatter out the opposite way. Clouds of matter and antimatter 
would then form and be pushed apart by the Hubble expansion. Multiple 
metagalactic gravitational collapses might later bring them together again to 
produce a Mini-Bang. 101 
This explanation cannot be verified directly, Lerner admits. 102 Neither can 
the standard Big Bang explanation of why we live in a material world, we must 
concede. The true test of a scientific theory, Lerner contends, is the correspon-
dence of its predictions with observation. Apparently, he regards his cosmology 
as an explanatory hypothesis that is justified by its fruits; but Plasma Cosmol-
ogy's explanation of why we do not live in an antimatter world flunks this test. 
Big Bang Cosmology, with all the supporting evidence presented in Chapter 
One, passes. 
C. The Vastness of the Universe 
Lerner proclaims that the visible universe is too vast to have been produced 
within Big Bang's paltry ten to twenty billion year-old universe. Recall his 
claim that astronomers have now mapped supergalaxies that are at least one 
hundred to one hundred and fifty billion years old. This would make them at 
least five times older than the Big Bang's entire universe. Something has to 
give! 
In astronomy, ages are related to velocities, distances, magnitudes, and 
masses; and our estimates of age depend on what we know about such things. 
Lerner's predicament may appear at first to arise because estimates of galactic 
and supergalactic ages, velocities, distances, sizes, and masses are notoriously 
inexact. Methods available to astronomers do not yield very precise measure-
ments; but improved methods, enhanced by the power of the Hubble Space 
Telescope and the Hipparcos Satellite have already given us a much more 
accurate perspective on the age and composition of the stars and of the cosmos. 
Astronomical distances are judged by such methods as the parallax, which 
indicates the displacement of celestial objects when observed at the same 
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moment by two different observers in two different places, by the intrinsic 
brightness of certain stars like the Cepheid variables that function as standard 
candles, and by spectral analyses of redshifts. 103 The Hubble Space Telescope 
now views galaxies so far removed from us that Cepheids are not detectable; so 
today's astronomers are using the intrinsic brightness of exploding supernovae 
as standard candles for measuring vast cosmic distances. 
Hubble's law of uniform expansion affirms that celestial distances in-
crease uniformly in proportion to velocity, and the Hubble constant sets the 
scale of the universe as the ratio of distances to velocities. Much more detailed 
and exact measurements of cosmic distances and ages made by the repaired and 
upgraded Hubble Telescope and by the Hipparcos Satellite104 have already 
produced more evident and precise estimates of the age of the stars and of the 
universe; and it will continue to do so. 
Still, the inexactness of measurement on an astronomical scale does not 
procure more than an eight to twenty billion year variance for the age of the 
universe. It fails to supply the hundreds ofbillions of years required by Lerner's 
"ancient structures." Lerner does not say where he gets his figures. He seems 
to do his own calculations, but most astronomers simply do not accept them. 
Discrepancies between dates and data may be dismissed as only a "temporary 
difficulty," but not a "permanent breakdown of the Big Bang itself." 105 In 1993, 
George Smoot concluded from his research team's momentous study of the 
cosmic background radiation by the COBE satellite that doubters about the Big 
Bang are now proved wrong because 
The existence of the wrinkles in time as we see them tell us that big bang 
theory, incorporating the effect of gravity, can explain not only the early 
formation of galaxies but also the aggregation within 15 billion years of 
the massive structures we know to be present in today's universe. This is 
a triumph for theory and observation. 106 
Today, most astronomers would agree, not without justification, that Lerner and 
others of like mind plainly miscalculate the age and the vastness of the most 
ancient structures in the visible universe. The best available numbers clearly 
support the "Standard Big Bang" model of the origin of the universe. 107 
D. Mini-Bangs and the Age of the Universe 
If the visible universe is really too vast to have been produced in a mere ten to 
twenty billion years, as Lerner maintains, then neither Big Bang nor Plasma 
Cosmology can accommodate the discrepancy. Plasma Cosmology resorts to 
one or more Mini-Bangs to explain the Hubble expansion, so it has exactly the 
same problem. If the Big Bang cannot account for the age and expanse of the 
visible universe, how could Plasma Cosmology's Mini-Bang do any better? In 
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describing what followed the Mini-Bang, or the series of them, that allegedly 
produced our visible world, Lerner fumbles to avoid this difficulty. 
Trapped in magnetic fields, these particles drove the plasma apart over 
hundreds of millions of years. The explosions were small enough not to 
disrupt previously formed filaments of plasma, so these far more ancient 
objects still exist today, in expanded form-just as designs printed on a 
balloon persist while it is inflated. 108 
Exactly what Lerner is getting at here is obscure. Are his "ancient objects" 
within the visible universe, or do they exist only in some theoretically con-
structed but unexperienced universe? Assuming the first, Lerner may have 
something like this in mind: The most distant parts of the visible universe 
contain galaxies and supergalaxies that are a hundred to a hundred and fifty 
billion years old, he claims. These did not participate in and were not affected 
by the Mini-Bangs that created the Hubble expansion. Thus, one hundred and 
fifty billion-year-old structures can exist within a metagalaxy that is only ten to 
twenty billion years old. The force of the Mini-Bangs that created our visible 
universe bypassed these structures, but somehow they were swept into our 
visible universe. How did this happen? Why did the Mini-Bangs not destroy 
them? 
Because vast cosmic structures that antedate our Mini-Bang(s) (which 
other astronomers cannot find) would defy Hubble's law of uniform expansion, 
Lerner's explanation does not work. Except for gravity-bound galaxies like the 
Andromeda Galaxy and our own Milky Way, all structures in the visible uni-
verse, no matter how vast, participate uniformly in the Hubble expansion on a 
cosmic scale. None proceed through the heavens at a pace that drastically defies 
Hubble's law. Beyond gravitationally bound local groups, all galactic and 
supergalactic structures take part uniformly in the Hubble process. According 
to Sky and Telescope, "that hundreds of galaxies, including our own, are 
collectively swarming toward a super-massive entity dubbed the Great Attrac-
tor ... describe(s) a subtle distortion in the universe's otherwise stately expansion, 
not its wholesale reversal." 109 Only a single Bang with cosmic-wide effects can 
account for such ubiquitous cosmic homogeneity. No vast visible plasma fila-
ments exist that are exempt from the effects of a single initial blast. 
Lerner concedes that his "ancient objects" exist today "in expanded form"; 
but what caused their expansion if they were not brought into being, affected by, 
or disrupted by his own initial Mini-Bang? A matter-antimatter explosion 
powerful enough to initiate our expanding observable universe would either 
destroy all nearby pre-existing structures or push them forever beyond our 
horizon of visibility. Lerner himself cannot account for structures that are 
hundreds of billions of years old within a metagalaxy he concedes to be only ten 
to twenty billion years of age. 
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E. Electromagnetism and the Age of the Universe 
Gravity is too weak, Lerner insists, to concentrate mass/energy into galaxies and 
supergalaxies in only ten to twenty billion years. However, if, as Lerner main-
tains, electromagnetic forces can concentrate matter and energy much more 
effectively and rapidly than gravity, and both gravity and electromagnetism are 
available to concentrate mass, then his own plasma physics should help to 
explain how the stars, nebulae, and large scale structures of the universe came 
into being within Big Bang time. Plasma physics itself seems to make Plasma 
Cosmology's infinite and eternal universe unnecessary and comes to the support 
of the Big Bang. Calculations involving causal processes that can concentrate 
mass into galactic structures and help close the universe must encompass both 
electromagnetic and gravitational attraction, ifLerner is right. Perhaps electro-
magnetism and gravity conjointly determine large-scale cosmic structures; and 
together they determine whether our universe is open-to expand forever, or 
closed-to slip some day into reverse. Astrophysicists must do the computations; 
but the recent discovery that the rate of Hubble expansion is increasing, not 
decreasing, clearly indicates that the combined force of gravity and electromag-
netic pinching is insufficient to reverse the course of cosmic enlargement. 
F. Background Radiation 
Lerner holds that the microwave background can be explained adequately 
without any appeal to the Big Bang. Ifhe is right, his own metagalaxy-creating 
Mini-Bang would produce background radiation equal to that produced by a 
cosmos-creating Big Bang. Yet, all observable background radiation, he main-
tains, was produced by intergalactic electromagnetic fields. He takes no notice 
of all this extra background radiation. How much background radiation should 
astronomers expect to find if Plasma Cosmology is correct? If the radiation 
Lerner believes to be produced by intergalactic electromagnetic fields is added 
to the radiation residue of his Mini-Bang, the total would far exceed all the 
measurable background radiation in the universe. One Bang, whether Mini or 
Maxi, accounts quite sufficiently for all detected cosmic background radiation. 
Lerner's Mini-Bang is incompatible with his electrodynamic solution to the 
background radiation problem. If intergalactic electromagnetic fields could 
generate all observable background radiation, and if his Mini-bang would do 
exactly the same, there should be twice as much background radiation as there 
actually is. But there isn't. 
G. The Smoothness of the Universe 
With new instruments of exploration like the Cosmic Background Explorer 
(COBE) Satellite, astronomers can now "see" back to within 300,000 years after 
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the Big Bang. In the preliminary COBE report cited by Lerner, the universe 
appeared to be too smooth to support the Big Bang account of the origin of 
heterogeneous structures in the universe like supergalaxies, galaxies, and stars. 
Originally, as Lerner suggests, COBE investigators found no evidence of 
fluctuations in the microwave background radiation. 110 After he published The 
Big Bang Never Happened in 1991, another more definitive report on COBE 
data based on much more detailed analysis was presented to the American 
Physical Society meeting in Washington, D. C. on 23 April 1992 by George 
Smoot, who headed the team ofCOBE researchers. 111 Members of the Society 
were electrified by the announcement that "ripples" were indeed detected in the 
cosmic background radiation. 
Variations in temperature thirty millionths of a degree warmer or cooler 
than average were discovered on a scale of five hundred million light years 
across. These were originally very tiny, probably no greater than quantum level 
fluctuations; but over time minute differences become vastly expanded. The 
astrophysicist Michael Turner remarked that "The Holy Grail has been found. 
It's that important. If this evidence holds up to scrutiny, it is what we've been 
looking for 20 years. It confirms our ideas of how structures form." 112 Stephen 
Hawking, exaggerating a bit, called the COBE findings "the discovery of the 
century, ifnot ofall time." 113 COBE Satellite data also provided evidence for the 
existence of dark matter, though still far from enough to close the universe. 
Thus, a primary source of information about the cosmos cited by Lerner to 
support his position now counts decisively against it. 
To summarize, like Steady State Cosmology, Plasma Cosmology affirms 
the infinity of space and time. Naturalistic atheists like Lerner assume that an 
infinite universe has always been here, is totally self-sufficient, and requires no 
Big Bang and no God for its creation. Yet, empirical knowledge reaches its 
limits long before we arrive at spatiotemporal infinity, so Lerner's avowedly 
scientific metaphysics is scientifically baseless. 
Lerner tries to refute Big Bang Cosmology and offers Plasma Cosmology 
in its place. He emphasizes the dominance of gaseous plasmas in cosmic struc-
tures and the enormous cosmic effects of electromagnetism; but Plasma Cos-
mology comes to grief over the redshift and the Hubble expansion. Lerner 
reluctantly postulates a Mini-Bang resulting from the gravitational collapse and 
collision of antecedently existing regions of matter and antimatter to explain the 
creation of our observable expanding metagalaxy. He affirms that the universe 
beyond our metagalaxy is infinite and implies that it is not involved in our 
Hubble expansion. He cannot confirm this, and we should doubt it for many 
good reasons. If the universe is infinitely old, no hydrogen would remain in it 
today; but it is almost seventy-five percent hydrogen. Plasma Cosmology offers 
no mechanism to reverse the process of nucleosynthesis of hydrogen into 
heavier elements in the stars. No matter-antimatter Mini-Bang could reverse the 
hydrogen cycle. 
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Lerner's visible universe was itself supposedly caused by a Bang ten to 
twenty billion years ago, so his own theory has the same (unsolved?) problems 
of scale that he attributes to the Big Bang. If some structures in the visible 
universe really are a hundred and fifty billion years old but nevertheless partici-
pate uniformly in the Hubble expansion, Lerner's own twenty billion-year-old 
visible universe cannot accommodate them. Most cosmologists do not accept 
the exaggerated age and size that he assigns to anomalous cosmic structures. If 
electromagnetism concentrates energy more rapidly than or in addition to 
gravity, this mechanism actually supports the contention that all visible struc-
tures in the universe came into being within Big Bang time. 
Lerner's Mini-Bang would also produce a microwave background, so there 
would be far too much cosmic radiation if, as he contends, intergalactic electro-
magnetism generates all discernible background radiation. The latest results 
from the COBE Satellite actually confirm the reality of diversifying structural 
fluctuations in the microwave background. They also confirm that our universe 
is exceptionally fine-tuned for life. Calculations by Max Tegmark and Martin 
J. Rees "show that ifthe CMB's (Cosmic Microwave Background's) tempera-
ture variations were as little as ten times greater or smaller, life as we know it 
would not exist today." 114 
Lerner cannot establish an infinite spatiotemporal metaphysical back-
ground for his Mini-Bang. On the whole, his case against the Big Bang is very 
weak. The Big Bang theory of cosmic origins is still without a serious rival. But 
how did the Big Bang itself originate? What caused the Big Bang? At this point, 
we still have no plausible answer; but other possibilities remain to be explored. 

Four 
ANTECEDENT UNIVERSE COSMOLOGIES 
The Standard Model of the Big Bang assumes that the universe was created all 
at once out of nothing, and the question of what caused its creation is left 
unanswered. It does not affinn that the universe was created by nothing, only 
that it was created out of nothing or from a singularity, which empirically is 
nothing. In Steady State Cosmology, the universe as a whole is uncreated, 
everlasting, and spatially infinite; but individual hydrogen atoms are constantly 
being created out of absolutely nothing by pre-existing matter through some 
totally mysterious and unverified process. In Plasma Cosmology also the uni-
verse as a whole is uncreated and infinite in both time and space, but the Hubble 
expansion of our visible universe or metagalaxy was caused by the explosion 
of massive quantities of pre-existing matter and antimatter that were brought 
together by chance in a limited region of infinite spacetime. Assuming that the 
Big Bang really happened, many causal explanations of it are available in 
contemporary scientific cosmology. 
Antecedent Universe Cosmologies affinn thatthe Big Bang was a rebound 
from the collapse (Big Crunch) of an antecedently existing universe; it was 
caused by an influx of energy from a preexisting world. This naturalistic ac-
count of origins was given by George Gamow's Infinite Contraction/Squeeze/ 
Bang/Rebound Cosmology which allows for only one contraction, one terminal 
squeeze, one Bang, and one rebound, and by Oscillation Cosmologies that 
postulate up to an infinite number of successive crunch/bang/rebounds. These 
two theories agree that our universe was brought into being, not by God, but by 
the collapse of an antecedently existing universe. In the next chapter we will 
explore a theory which claims that our universe was caused by indeterministic 
spontaneity within a pre-existing infinite Superspacetime. 
Antecedent Universe theorists usually try to avoid the question of absolute 
origins by presupposing a naturalistic metaphysics that affinns the eternity and 
self-sufficiency of a system of nature that requires no God for its being, struc-
ture, or explanation. This metaphysics is not science, even if it is disguised as 
science. Without pretending to do natural science, throughout this chapter 
serious philosophical problems of intelligibility about prominent Antecedent 
Universe Cosmologies will be raised. If good philosophical or physical reasons 
are available for rejecting Antecedent Universe Metaphysics, one of many major 
obstacles to theistic belief has been removed. 
Most Antecedent Universe Cosmologists intensely dislike creation ex 
nihilo and wish to avoid it because it seems to call for a Divine creation of the 
universe. Alan M. MacRobert, a regular contributor to Sky and Telescope, 
suggested in 1983 that "The idea of an oscillating universe, in which the Big 
Bang resulted from the recollapse of a previous phase of the universe, gained 
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currency merely because it avoided the issue of creation-not because there was 
the slightest evidence in favor of it." 1 As I. L. Rozental said, "The only way to 
account for all these facts in the framework of physical concepts, without 
invoking a metaphysical power, is to admit the existence of an (infinitely large?) 
number ofuniverses."2 It looks as if, having made a prior decision that there is 
no God, Oscillationists just postulate an infinite series of antecedent universes 
as a way to avoid metaphysical appeals to Divinity. Unfortunately, Antecedent 
Universe Cosmologies are just as metaphysical, non-empirical, unsimple, 
unsupported, and unscientific as Theism, if not more so. It really is more so, as 
discussions to follow will show. Atheistic cosmologists seem to assume that the 
world's existence without God is totally unproblematic, and that only God's 
existence is problematic. Not so! 
1. Gamow's Infinite Squeeze/Bang/Rebound Universe 
George Gamow thought that prior to the Big Bang an antecedent universe had 
been collapsing from an infinitely expanded state throughout an infinite past; 
our universe came into being as a rebound from the minimal-size contraction 
state of this antecedent universe. In 194 7, Gamow wrote, 
The universe is now expanding because in some previous period of its 
history (of which, of course, no record has been left), it contracted from 
infinity into a very dense state and then rebounded, as it were, propelled 
by the strong elastic forces inherent in compressed matter.3 
Gamow never explained adequately what caused the rebound, or how to convert 
his concept of "elastic forces" into the formulas of physics; but he was con-
vinced that the quantity of matter in our universe is insufficient to permit gravity 
to close it and bring about a second Big Squeeze. He predicted that "The dis-
tances between the neighboring galaxies are bound to increase beyond any limit, 
and there is no chance that the present expansion will ever stop or turn into a 
collapse. "4 Thus, his theory of origins makes a place for only one Bang, pre-
ceded by a single but infinitely prolonged collapse, and followed by an unprece-
dented but infinite expansion. The expansion phase of the universe in which we 
happen to live will proceed forever toward an infinite fizzle. It will end with a 
whimper, not a Bang. About that, Gamow was probably right. 
2. Critique of Gamow's Cosmology 
George Gamow's cosmology does not survive serious critical examination for 
many reasons, two in particular. A. It cannot reconcile scientific knowledge 
with its postulate of an infinite past, and B. it cannot explain why gravity and/or 
mass were so different before the Big Squeeze. 
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A. Science and an Infinite Past 
The central problem of Infinite Contraction/Squeeze/Bang/Rebound Universe 
is common to all Antecedent Universe Cosmologies. It affirms, presumably on 
"scientific" grounds, that our universe existed in some form throughout an 
infinite past; but this claim cannot be confirmed scientifically. According to 
Gamow, "Our Universe has existed for an eternity of time."5 He conjectured 
that the antecedent phase "contracted from infinity," but he hesitated to specu-
late about the preceding stage of the universe. He cautioned that "There is 
nothing that can be said about the pre-squeeze era of the universe,"6 because 
"the maximum compression of the universe, which squeezed all matter into a 
uniform nuclear fluid, must have completely obliterated all the records of the 
earlier compressive stages. m But our universe, the most impressive record of all 
if an antecedent crunch does indeed explain it, was not obliterated. 
Gamow actually said a great deal about the Squeeze Era, despite his 
misleading warning that absolutely nothing can be said about it. He claimed that 
it existed, that it was of infinite duration, that it underwent gravitational col-
lapse, that it was composed of matter not antimatter, that this matter was gradu-
ally compressed, that in its maximal compaction state it was 30 times larger than 
our sun, that this state contained "elastic forces," that it rebounded or exploded, 
and that our phase of the universe was created from this rebound. That is quite 
a Jot to know to be nothing! 
How did Gamow know all of these things that he was not supposed to 
know? If all scientific or empirical evidence was destroyed, as he conceded, 
then nothing that he tells us about the antecedent universe, including its exis-
tence and infinite duration, can be regarded as scientific knowledge. Good 
natural science must be grounded in experience as well as theory; but we experi-
ence only finite time and only one phase of the universe. We have no direct 
experience of infinite time, other cosmic phases, or other universes. We cannot 
inductively infer infinite time from finite time or many universes from one that 
is experientially unique. We may postulate the existence of an infinitely pro-
longed antecedent physical state, but no human experience could ever confirm 
the hypothesis directly or inductively. Belief in an infinite past is uncorrobo-
rated naturalistic metaphysics, not natural science. Naturalists complain that 
Theists believe in things that science cannot verify, but Naturalism suffers from 
exactly the same defect. 
All Antecedent Universe Cosmologies are unscientific metaphysical 
guesses because they are totally unconfirmable. This failure is disastrous for 
theories offered in the name of science. Antecedent Universe Cosmologies 
presuppose that some universe in some form has endured perpetually through 
an infinite past. Yet, no empirical evidence for the infinity of space or time is 
available to us. Even if space and time really are infinite, we can have no scien-
tific or empirical knowledge of it. No set of finitely enduring human scientists, 
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no matter how large, can directly observe infinite space or time; and inductive 
logic forbids us to infer infinity from finite samples, just as it forbids us to infer 
white from samples of black or gold from instances of dross. As explanatory 
hypotheses, Antecedent Universe Cosmologies imply no observations that 
would confinn an Infinite World Metaphysics or that would falsify the hypothe-
sis that space and time are immense but finite and created ex nihilo. Naturalists 
are welcome to their faith, but they cannot call it scientific knowledge. In fact, 
as we shall see, much of what we know scientifically and philosophically counts 
heavily against an infinite chain of successive universes. 
B. Gravity and Mass/Energy in the Squeeze Era 
Why does our present infinitely expanding phase of the universe lack sufficient 
mass/energy for gravity to shut it down, as Gamow believed, ifthe antecedent 
Squeeze Era contained enough mass/energy to contract and close it? How could 
the Squeeze Era include enough mass/energy to be closed by gravity if our 
present era does not have enough to shut it down eventually? Two possibilities 
suggest themselves. First, perhaps there actually was enough mass/energy in the 
Squeeze Era to close it, but much of it was destroyed in the Big Squeeze 
through some gross but unexplained violation of the law of the Conservation of 
Energy. Second, perhaps gravity was a much more powerful force during the 
Squeeze Era than it is now. 
Neither option is very attractive for much the same reason. Both require 
radical changes in fundamental constituents of the universe during the Big 
Squeeze, and Gamow did not explain how gravity or mass/energy could make 
such fundamental changes. He did not even recognize the problem, but ifhe had 
it is doubtful that he could have solved it. In discussing Oscillation Cosmology, 
we will soon see that if Big Squeezes result in singularities, there can be no 
spatiotemporal or causal continuity from era to era. If Big Squeezes do not 
result in singularities, there is no good reason to think that basic laws, forces, 
and masses change dramatically from era to era, which creates additional prob-
lems. 
In sum, by its own logic, the Infinite Contraction/Squeeze/Bang/Rebound 
Universe of George Gamow lies beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. 
Throughout an infinite past, supposedly, an antecedent universe contracted to 
a point of maximal compression and minimal size thirty times larger than our 
sun, then exploded in a Big Bang to create our open and infinitely expanding 
universe; but, Gamow conceded, we can know absolutely nothing about the 
antecedent universe. Even if one existed, all evidence for and about it would 
have been destroyed in the primordial fireball. Gamow clearly affinned scien-
tific agnosticism but inconsistently practiced unscientific gnosticism. Science 
cannot establish that there was an antecedent universe, much less that it col-
lapsed throughout an infinite past. Gamow conceded that many things cannot 
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be known, then pretended to know them. He did not identify the physical forces 
and laws that initiated the rebound; and he did not explain why the present 
infinitely expanding phase of the universe lacks sufficient mass/energy for 
gravity to close it, despite the antecedent Squeeze Era's containing enough to 
shut it down. No cosmologists today defend a temporally infinite universe with 
only one Squeeze/Bang/Rebound; but other versions of Antecedent Universe 
Cosmology are vigorously affinned. 
3. Oscillation Cosmology 
According to Oscillation Cosmology, an antecedent collapsing universe ending 
with a Big Squeeze or a Big Crunch preceded our Big Bang. Our Big Bang was 
caused by a massive influx of energy from this earlier era. Did only one uni-
verse precede our own, or did an infinite number of collapsing/exploding/ 
expanding universes antedate us? Conceivably, only a few Bangs preceded the 
one that initiated our universe. If so, the question of absolute origin arises with 
respect to the first member of this finite series. What caused the first Bang? 
God, chance, or what? What selected just those few closed and oscillating 
universes for actualization out of an infinite number of different possible uni-
verses? Many cosmologists are convinced that some energy would be used up 
and lost with each oscillation, so in a finite number of rebounds, all mass/energy 
whatsoever would be lost. Nothing would exist today; yet, here we are! 
An ancient myth explains what holds up the earth-it rests on the back of 
a turtle! And what holds up the turtle?-another turtle; and another; and an-
other .... If prying minds persist, the final answer is, "The turtles go all the way 
down!" As does this myth, Oscillation Universe Cosmologists mistakenly 
believe that they can avoid the question of ultimate origins if our universe was 
preceded by universes that go all the way back (to infinity), each of which 
commenced with a Bang and ended with a Crunch. All these supposed anteced-
ent universes start with Bangs, then expand, halt, contract, collapse, and finally 
explode to create new universes ad infinitum. 
Oscillation Cosmologists are reluctant to calculate the duration of a com-
plete cosmic cycle from start to finish; but a few make educated guesses. A. 
Karel Velan maintains that our universe is presently about 18 billion years old, 
that it will continue to expand for another 17 .5 billion years, after which it will 
contract again to a point of maximal compression, bounce back, and start all 
over again. The whole process, he claims, takes 71 billion years from start to 
finish. 8 Mark Israel it and Nathan Rosen calculate that "The period of oscillation 
of the universe is -1.2 x l 012 yr,"9 (1.2 trillion years). The difference in these 
two estimates is quite remarkable! 
If our own cosmos was generated by another cosmos that antedated it, and 
it by another, and so on endlessly into the past, what were they like? Laws of 
nature, physical constants, and initial conditions could have varied immensely, 
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perhaps infinitely, in antecedent universes; but one commonality is certain. All 
of them had to be closed universes, no matter how different they were other-
wise. All of them had to collapse to create succeeding universes. The Oscilla-
tionist requirement of universal closure permanently excludes an infinite num-
ber of possible laws of nature, physical constants, and initial conditions, specifi-
cally, all that would yield an open universe. Oscillationists must deny that all 
possible universes (open universes, for example) are actualized by and within 
infinity. Once they admit this, they are in deep trouble! 
Let us call a single universe falling within an extended oscillating series 
of successive worlds a "cosmic epoch." Alfred North Whitehead used this 
terminology, though he was not very specific about its scope. Under the influ-
ence of early quantum theory in the I 920s, 10 Whitehead thought that our own 
cosmic epoch is dominated by electromagnetic energy existing only in discrete 
quanta, and he defined a "cosmic epoch" as "the widest society of actual entities 
whose immediate relevance to ourselves is traceable."11 Our present cosmic 
epoch can be traced "to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our 
ideals,"12 Whitehead believed; but there are other cosmic epochs "far beyond 
our immediate cosmic epoch" that are ordered very differently from our own. 13 
He did not know anything about Big Bang Cosmology, which was still in its 
infancy when these words appeared in Process and Reality in I 929; and he did 
not explain whether his "beyond" is to be construed spatially, temporally, or 
both. Mainstream Process Theology has interpreted Whitehead's wording 
temporally; but "widest" and "beyond" are actually spatial words, not temporal 
words; he did not say "oldest" or "before." 
A. Singularities 
Significantly, Oscillation Cosmologists disagree about whether a singularity 
begins and ends each cosmic epoch. This notion, very unfamiliar to most philos-
ophers and to common sense, is very familiar to astrophysicists. A singularity 
is a physical state resulting from total gravitational collapse that is infinitely 
dense, infinitely compressed, infinitely hot, infinitely small, infinitely curved. 
Exactly how cosmologists interpret the reality of singularities depends upon the 
metaphysics they presuppose. 
Would an initial singularity contain no energy at all, or would it contain 
a finite, or an infinite, amount of infinitely condensed energy? Exactly what 
cosmologists believe about the presence or absence of energy in an initial 
singularity varies according to whether they presuppose Oscillationism or 
Quantum Big Accident Cosmology (developed in Chapter Seven), which af-
firms that the universe arises spontaneously from absolutely nothing, not even 
a singularity. On the simplest interpretation of the Big Accident view, and in 
theistic creation ex nihilo (a world created out of nothing by God), an initial 
singularity is construed to be an infinitely small state of nothingness containing 
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no mass, energy, space, or time at all. Many Oscillationists, by contrast, think 
that an initial singularity would contain all the mass/energy of an antecedent 
universe in an infinitely condensed state. On either view, a singularity is empiri-
cal nothingness. No one, not even God, could perceive or empirically verify 
claims about an entity that is infinitely small. Yet, many Oscillationists hold, a 
singularity is still a physically real something. Others submit that a singularity 
is just nothing at all, and that physical realities emerge only as a universe erupts 
from nothingness. 
A complex view of the nature of original nothingness is defended by 
Quentin Smith in his debate with William L. Craig in their book titled Theism, 
Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, 1993. According to Craig, who is a creation 
ex nihilo Theist, the initial singularity out of which our universe erupted was 
just a state of physical nothingness; a singularity is an unreal and merely theo-
retical idealization or fiction. 14 The words "infinite density" suggest the pres-
ence of something physically real; but, says Craig, "a condition of 'infinite 
density' is precisely equivalent to 'nothing'. There can be no object in the real 
world that possesses infinite density, for if it had any size at all, it would not be 
infinitely dense."15 
By contrast, Smith, a Big Accident Atheist, contends that "Big Bang 
cosmology represents the singularity as a unique sort of reality, a physical 
reality, but it is represented as real none the less. " 16 The initial singularity 
somehow contained matter or mass, Smith insists, "not ordinary mass, three-
dimensional mass, but infinitely compressed mass."17 Smith does not succeed 
in giving empirical meaning to the notion of something that is physically real 
but totally devoid of physical, spatiotemporal properties. 
Says Smith, the physical reality of an initial singularity means three things. 
First, if we extrapolate the physical quantities of our universe backwards in 
time, we reach a point "arbitrarily close" to the singularity in which these 
physical quantities "have arbitrarily high finite values". 18 Second, "When the 
singularity is reached the values become infinite."19 Third, the initial singularity 
has the topology of a dimensionless point, but "It assumes, at a subsequent time, 
the topology of a finite three-dimensional space."20 
Smith's first two points show only that the concept of "singularity" is 
equivalent to the notion of the ultimate limits of measurable physical quantities, 
but not that a singularity actually contains or consists of some mysterious, 
immeasurable, imperceptible, and non-extended physical mass. By definition, 
nothing could be a body, something physical, without being spatially or 
spatiotemporally extended. Smith never explains how his third state could be 
achieved, how an infinitely small singularity could be transformed into a finite 
spatiality, how a timeless state could do or become anything at a later time, or 
exactly what the difference is between a dimensionless point's becoming dimen-
sioned and something's being created out of nothing. Oscillation Cosmology 
shares all of these problems. 
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In Oscillation Cosmology, cosmic epochs are worlds that fall between 
Bangs in an infinite temporal series. Does each cosmic epoch begin with a 
dimensionless singularity of infinitely condensed mass, then expand to a maxi-
mum at which gravity overcomes the residual kinetic energy of the initial explo-
sion, and finally recontract into another infinitely condensed singularity? Astro-
physical cosmologists frequently discuss singularities that supposedly separate 
successive universes; but finding cosmologists who actually believe in them is 
very difficult. The notion that oscillating universes could be separated by singu-
larities was first introduced and discussed by Richard C. Tolman in 1934; but 
it is not at all clear that Tolman himself actually believed this. 21 John A. 
Wheeler once accepted a form of Oscillation Cosmology in which cosmic 
epochs are divided by intervening singularities, 22 and John Gribbin23 still affirms 
this in combination with a wider quantum World-ensemble Metaphysics. 24 In 
1970, Roger Penrose and Stephen W. Hawking published a definitive proof that 
the theory of relativity, applied to closed universes, necessitates that they begin 
and end with singularities. 25 Now Hawking26 seems (to some interpreters) to 
champion oscillating universes that avoid intermediate singularities through 
quantum effects that reverse cosmic contractions before universes totally col-
lapse into nothingness. His view, which has other interpretations, will be ex-
plained later in more detail. 
B. Quantum Effects and Singularities 
For many reasons, a defensible Oscillation Cosmology must circumvent singu-
larities. The existence of an antecedent universe cannot be inferred from known 
laws of nature if these laws break down completely at or in singularities; nor can 
they explain what causes an initial singularity to explode into a Big Bang. Roger 
Penrose says that, "A space-time singularity is, almost by definition, 'a place 
where the known laws of physics break down. "'27 
Can quantum theory rescue Oscillation Cosmology from singularities? 
Quantum theory embraces many oddities called "quantum effects." Two of 
them, quantum indefiniteness and quantum discreteness, may help Oscillation-
ists evade initial singularities. 28 
Oscillationism can make a place for spatiotemporal and causal continuity 
between cosmic epochs if no singularities intervene, if earlier collapsing uni-
verses round off and undergo Big Bounces before they totally collapse. Quan-
tum theory will support Oscillation Cosmologies if it can ( l) eliminate initial 
singularities and (2) explain how all entropy or memory of preceding disorder 
can be lost between epochs. Two quantum effects, indefiniteness and discrete-
ness, seem to be incompatible with initial singularities; but entropy, persisting 
from epoch to epoch, is a stubborn problem. 
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i. Quantum Indefiniteness 
According to Werner Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, quantum-size atomic 
and sub-atomic entities do not have definite simultaneous positions and veloci-
ties. It is not simply that we cannot find them together; they just never exist 
together. Real uncertainty, indeterminateness, and unpredictability obtain at the 
quantum level of physical reality, but not merely as expressions of human 
ignorance or of the limits of experimental investigation. Einstein defended 
"hidden variables" that would reconcile quantum with classical physics; but 
most quantum physicists agree with Heisenberg's repudiation of absolutely 
inaccessible physical unknowns; and many experiments in quantum mechanics 
now count decisively against hidden variables. Sub-microscopic quantum 
realities are very different in many respects from the macroscopic realities of 
ordinary perceptual experience. 
In quantum theory, sub-atomic particles are thought to be more like waves 
than like billiard balls. Their existence is spread out indefinitely over a fuzzy 
region of spacetime, and they lack what Alfred North Whitehead called "simple 
location." As Stephen Hawking put it, "Particles do not have precisely defined 
positions and velocities but are 'smeared out' over a small region by the uncer-
tainty principle of quantum mechanics."29 Existing sub-atomic particles are so 
peculiar that we really cannot envision them. But we can try! 
Applied to the universe as a whole, quantum indefiniteness implies that 
when a cosmic epoch contracts to the size of a quantum particle or wavicle, it 
cannot be squeezed down any further into a singularity because this would 
require it to have a definiteness that entities of that magnitude cannot and do not 
have. If collapse could progress indefinitely with uninterrupted continuity 
toward a singularity, at some point no room would be left for indefiniteness. 
Yet, indefiniteness is inescapable in a quantum universe. Stephen Hawking has 
something like quantum indefiniteness in mind when he asks, "Does time really 
have a beginning and, possibly, an end, as predicted by classical general relativ-
ity, or are the singularities in the big bang and the Big Crunch smeared out in 
some ways by quantum effects?"30 
In several ways, quantum effects might prevent a contracting cosmic epoch 
from coalescing into a singularity. 
First, if a universe expands asymmetrically due to quantum fluctuations 
and gravitationally retarded expansions in the loci of galaxies and superclusters, 
it will also contract asymmetrically; if riddled with black holes, some might 
explode or radiate themselves back into expansion while others are still con-
tracting. Not all parts of a non-synchronous universe could ever meet again at 
a singularity. Its parts would not contract synchronously; some parts would 
bypass others; some would go in one direction and some in another; some would 
contract while others expand; and some might contract at one rate and others at 
other rates. It is like, "You are never going to get it all back in there again!" 
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Technically, this is called "differential collapse."31 Such an uneven collapse 
would make impossible the collapse of an entire universe to either a singularity 
or to Planck dimensions. 
Second, even if all parts of a given universe do contract concurrently, they 
could never coalesce into a singularity because of quantum indefiniteness. If 
singularities are impossible or unintelligible, Oscillation Cosmologists must 
endorse Big Bounce universes that avoid singularities through quantum effects. 
A Big Bounce is a rebound from a state of minimal size and maximal compres-
sion that is larger than a singularity. Through Big Bounce strategies, Oscillation 
Cosmologists can avoid singularities and all their concomitant difficulties, but 
Oscillationism may still have other serious problems. 
ii. Quantum Discreteness 
Quantum theory affirms that mass/energy can exist and can be transferred only 
in discrete, discontinuous, minimal units or quanta. Quantum theory began in 
1900 when Max Planck realized that blackbody objects, those saturated with 
radiant energy, release so little high frequency radiation only because energy is 
emitted in discrete atomistic packets or quanta, not in infinitely divisible contin-
uous gradations. Actually existing mass/energy is not infinitely divisible into 
smaller and smaller real units, although it may be so divisible in our imagina-
tions. In the twentieth century, quantum physicists learned many amazing but 
now well-established things about the domain of very small physical particles. 
Electrons can assume some orbits around atomic nuclei but not others because 
some potential orbits or orbital shells are forbidden by nature. The spin of 
quantum particles takes only certain discrete values but not others. The physical 
world is not an infinitely divisible continuum, except in our imaginations. 
Physical units are required to have definite, finite, minimal magnitudes in order 
to exist at all, and in order to be transferred and absorbed. Mother Nature does 
not permit intermediate degrees between discrete quantities. 32 
Quantum physics clearly excludes the actualization of all possibilities. 
Mother Nature tolerates only discrete quantities in multiples of Planck dimen-
sions. Planck numbers are invariant physical constants. Many numbers that are 
logically possible are forbidden in physics and chemistry; others are privileged, 
not just in quantum theory, but presumably also within the underlying reality 
that the science of physics reflects. 
Cosmologists who combine Oscillation ism with quantum theory think that 
Planck spacetime ( l 0-43 of a second in age and l 0-33 centimeters in diameter) is 
the ultimate minimal unit for anything physical to be at all. (See endnote 74.) If 
they are right, no mass/energy, and no space or time can exist that is smaller or 
earlier than Planck dimensions. Quantum physicists are not perfectly consistent 
in eschewing dimensionless entities, for quarks, electrons, and other sub-atomic 
particles are sometimes said to be the size of Euclidean points, which is no size 
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at all;33 but this embarrassment is avoided if small physical particles are re-
garded as tiny blotches of mass/energy or as vibrating strings with definite 
Planck length and magnitude.34 
Quantum theory discloses that spacetime and mass/energy exist only in 
atomized quanta and are not physically or metaphysically divisible into infinites-
imally small real units, though they are thus divisible by mathematical imagina-
tion. If they were infinitely divisible in reality, something real, something inter-
mediate, could exist between Planck dimensions and the zero dimensions of a 
singularity; and a collapsing quantum universe could gradually and continuously 
shrink to nothing. In a quantum universe, a physical continuum is forbidden; 
and gravitational collapse to a singularity existing below Planck dimensions is 
physically impossible. 
Additionally, quantum gravity may prevent a contracting universe from 
collapsing to a singularity. According to some theories, gravity becomes a 
negative or repulsive force under certain pressure conditions; and if this hap-
pens in the final stages of gravitational collapse, a universe could shrink just so 
far but no further before negative gravity sets in and terminates its contraction. 
Negative gravity may (or may not) be operable at Planck dimensions, for the 
theory has not been tested and confirmed. Better established is that the degener-
acy pressure of compacted electrons and neutrons will prevent a universe from 
shrinking to a singularity, but only if, unlike our own, that universe has less than 
one and a half times the mass of our sun. 35 Another possibility is that if the Big 
Crunch is a vortex spinning all the matter in the universe at unimaginably great 
speeds, the powerful centrifugal force of the spin itself may forestall an ultimate 
collapse into a singularity.36 
Quantum theory applied to the origin of the universe says that nothing can 
exist earlier than Planck time or with a volume smaller than Planck space. Thus, 
the universe was 10-43 of a second old and 10-33 centimeters in diameter when 
it was anything physical at all. No laws of physics could apply antecedently 
since nothing could exist to which physical laws apply. Planck dimensions are 
called "Planck's Wall," the beginning and end of all scientific knowledge, in 
Quantum Cosmology. 
An initial singularity is inferred in non-quantum Oscillationism by extrap-
olating from the observed universe back to T = 0 in accord with non-quantum 
laws of physics. From quantum laws we cannot extrapolate back to an initial 
singularity because these and all other physical laws become inapplicable below 
Planck dimensions. Some Quantum Cosmologists disagree and suggest that the 
laws of quantum physics do not breakdown at or below Planck dimensions, but 
if they do we obviously cannot use these laws to extrapolate back either to an 
initial singularity, or to an antecedent universe. 
Stephen Hawking does not specify exactly which quantum effects are 
relevant, but he may have had quantum indefiniteness and discreteness in mind 
in 1988 when he announced that he had changed his mind about singularities 
100 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
and was trying to persuade other physicists that "There was in fact no singular-
ity at the beginning of the universe," that "It can disappear once quantum effects 
are taken into account. "37 Hawking seems to think that, like the surface of the 
earth at the North Pole, our universe began in a rounded-off, smeared-out, 
quantum state that precluded an initial singularity. 
So what lies at the bottom of a black hole? Not an infinitely compressed 
singularity, we would expect Hawking and other Quantum Cosmologists to say, 
merely a great mass compressed to finite Planck dimensions. But Hawking and 
others are not consistent about this. 
The preceding arguments from quantum effects against singularities are 
exceptionally powerful, but cosmologists like Hawking who rely upon them 
really do not consistently believe them! Hawking frequently changes his mind 
on many issues and is very difficult to pin down. First, considering only relativ-
ity theory apart from quantum theory, he and Roger Penrose proved that closed 
universes must begin with initial singularities. Then in A Brief History of Time, 
Hawking repudiated initial singularities by appealing to quantum effects, pre-
sumably indefiniteness and discreteness, and to quantum gravity. In his very 
recent debate with Penrose in The Nature of Space and Time, l 996, Hawking 
switched again; expressly repudiating quantum discreteness, Hawking says that 
he sees "no reason to abandon the continuum theories that have been so success-
ful; "38 and he affirms again that the Big Bang emerged from a singularity.39 
Hawking and Penrose both believe that black holes, collapsing neutron 
stars, and collapsing universes regularly coalesce into real singularities below 
Planck dimensions. They agree that "cosmic censorship" hides the singularities 
in black holes and neutron stars from our view because they are cloaked to 
outside observers by their surrounding event horizon;40 but the singularity of the 
Big Bang is "naked" and exposed to us. In The Nature of Space and Time, 
Hawking says that "Cosmic censorship may shield us from black hole singulari-
ties but we see the big bang in full frontal nakedness."41 
One of Hawking's hands does not seem to know what the other hand is 
doing! Hawking appears to accept arguments from quantum effects against 
singularities when convenient, and to reject them when convenient! But we must 
allow him to change his mind. Penrose, by contrast, has never ruled out an 
initial singularity or appealed to quantum effects like discreteness and indefi-
niteness to exclude it. Penrose persuaded Hawking that the distinctness of an 
initial Big Bang involves a different kind of quantum effect, a peculiar sort of 
spatial curvature, based ultimately on quantum gravity.42 
As Penrose explains, there is a fundamental difference between an initial 
world-creating singularity and the terminal singularities that appear in black 
holes or a collapsed universe, but it does not involve such quantum effects as 
indefiniteness and discreteness. The difference is in the kind of spatial curvature 
that each requires and manifests. Astrophysics distinguishes two fundamental 
kinds of spatial curvature, first, that involved in the increasing volume of a small 
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sphere being influenced by gravity (called "Ricci curvature"), next, that in-
volved in tidal distortions of this sphere (called "Wey! curvature").43 In the 
initial world-making singularity, "The Wey! tensor was exactly zero at the big 
bang itself, while the Ricci curvature diverged to infinity."44 By contrast, in the 
singularity of a terminal black hole or collapsed universe, the reverse is true: 
Wey! curvature is infinite and dominates over Ricci curvature. This explains 
why entropy or disorder is low in an initial Big Bang singularity and high in a 
Big Crunch singularity, and why time and the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
would not be reversed in a closed collapsing universe. 45 An initial singularity is 
infinitely ordered, completely free from quantum distortions or irregularities in 
space-time geometry with respect to Wey! curvature; and a terminal singularity 
is infinitely disordered in this respect, if Penrose is right. 
Both Penrose and Hawking now believe that ripples that would tear every-
thing apart would pervade the contracting phase of a collapsing universe. This 
is how its entropy would continue to increase. Quantum effects like indefinite-
ness and discreteness begin only when an initial singularity expands to Planck 
dimensions.46 Despite quantum effects, our universe, the only one we know to 
exist, really could have begun in an initial singularity ofnothingness. If Penrose 
is right, an initial singularity is different, improbable, but not impossible; but it 
could not be the product of an antecedent collapsing universe with ever-increas-
ing entropy. Singularities still have serious shortcomings. 
Quantum effects like discreteness and indefiniteness together with Wey! 
curvature should rule out singularities in collapsed universes ifnot also in black 
holes and dimensionless particles. Hawking, who affirms them, assumes at 
times that they do not rule out singularities as such. The Hawking who thinks 
that quantum effects would rule out an initial singularity still affirms singulari-
ties in gravitationally collapsed black holes and collapsed neutron stars. In them, 
presumably, mass/energy could retain sufficient definiteness, continuity, and 
freedom from distortion to collapse to zero size, despite any and all quantum 
effects. In them, mass/energy could gradually shrink continuously below Planck 
dimensions. In them, singularities are physically attainable, so the laws of both 
classical and quantum physics could apply all the way back to T = 0. 
Why, then, are initial singularities impossible? Large exceptions should 
make one suspicious. Singularities may be impossible only when some cosmolo-
gists do not want to find them! If black holes and gravitationally collapsing 
neutron stars can shrink smaller and smaller to singularities, then quantum 
effects like indefiniteness and discreteness do not rule out singularities as such. 
According to Penrose, the absence of Wey! curvature from an initial singularity 
is what makes it infinitely ordered and free from entropy; its presence in a 
terminal singularity makes it infinitely disordered and riddled with entropy. But 
this should rule out Oscillationism, for antecedent universes all end with 
overwhelming entropy. 
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Hawking's arbitrariness in rejecting initial singularities, at least for a time, 
may be seen in his best selling book, A Brief History of Time. In explaining his 
position, Hawking makes the following contradictory claims about singularities. 
l. "There was in fact no singularity at the beginning of the universe. "47 
2. "Only if we could picture the universe in terms of imaginary time would 
there be no singularities."48 
3. "When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there 
will still appear to be singularities. The poor astronaut who falls into a black 
hole will still come to a sticky end; only ifhe lived in imaginary time would he 
encounter no singularities."49 
Since l. is presumably about the real time in which we live, it contradicts 
3. Hawking's discussions often fail to clarify the role of quantum mechanics in 
permitting or excluding singularities, whether initial or terminal. His occasional 
retreat into an instrumentalist position, according to which physical theories are 
merely mathematical models that exist only in our minds but tell us nothing 
about reality,so also contributes nothing to the clarity of his views. His renewed 
discussion of real versus imaginary time in his 1993 book Black Holes and Baby 
Universes and Other Essays did little to elucidate his position.s 1 
A boundary condition is a state out of which another state arises, normally, 
a cause. Hawking's peculiar brand of Quantum Cosmology affirms that the 
ultimate boundary condition for the universe is that there is no ultimate bound-
ary condition; but the meaning of this is extremely obscure.s2 Carl Sagan took 
it to mean that the universe has no cause, hence there is nothing for a Creator 
God to do.s3 Neither Sagan nor anyone else noticed, but this also means that 
there is nothing for an antecedent universe to do! In one place, writing of a 
universe "without boundaries or singularities,"s4 Hawking seems to regard the 
terms as synonymns. So regarded, a universe without boundaries is just a uni-
verse that does not begin with a singularity, which is perfectly compatible with 
that variety of quantum oscillationism that dispenses with singularities but not 
with antecedent universes. Thus, our universe could be bounded by a collapsing 
temporally antecedent universe from which it bounced, one that crunched only 
to finite quantum dimensions but not to infinite singularity dimensions, while 
not being bounded by a singularity. It could be singularity unbounded but 
temporally bounded-in an extended sense of time that transcends our cosmic 
epoch. 
Robert Jastrow interprets Hawking's no boundary condition to be just 
another version of Oscillation Cosmology. Any quantum Big Bounce Oscilla-
tion Cosmology with an infinite number of cosmic epochs not separated by 
singularities lacks ultimate boundary conditions (singularities) while having 
ultimate boundary conditions (causally efficacious antecedent universes). 
According to Jastrow, Hawking's "universe without a boundary means a 
'closed' universe-one which oscillates between expansion and contraction, 
instead of expanding forever."ss Jastrow's interpretation of Hawking is not 
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entirely baseless. In comparing the Big Bang to a black hole in his Black Holes 
and Baby Universes and Other Essays, Hawking says that "It may be that there 
was an earlier phase of the universe in which matter collapsed, to be re-created 
in the big bang;"56 and many things that Hawking says in 1996 in his and Pen-
rose' s The Nature of Space and Time about the Big Crunch and a closed uni-
verse sound very much like Oscillationism. 57 An important analogy between 
black holes and the Big Bang is that black holes might sometimes explode! They 
don't always just radiate and slowly fade away.58 However, as caution warns, 
in no instance has anyone ever observed the explosion of a singularity; and if 
no laws of physics apply to them, we cannot appeal to the physical laws we 
know to explain how singularities ever could explode. 
In developing his own view that the universe has no ultimate boundary, 
Stephen Hawking compares spacetime to the spherical surface of the earth, but 
the analogy is not very illuminating. In this comparison, spacetime begins at the 
North Pole, expands to its maximum at the equator, and then shrinks toward the 
South Pole.59 There, presumably, the process reverses and is repeated over and 
over again, though this is not perfectly clear. Hawking says that he agrees with 
St. Augustine that time begins with the creation of the universe, and that it 
makes no sense to ask what happened before that. 60 
Yet, ifthe North to South-South to North-phases repeat themselves, the 
whole of time cannot be contained entirely within a single North to South 
sweep, unless North represents the absolute boundary condition of the creation 
of the universe ex nihilo, as it did for St. Augustine. This would rule out not just 
singularities but also temporally antecedent universes. Without an absolute 
temporal boundary, a South to North sweep could come before a North to South 
sweep; and the indefinitely large South Pole of one sweep could be identical 
with the North Pole of its successor; if so, time as such cannot begin absolutely 
at any given North Pole, and Hawking is an Oscillationist, as Jastrow claims. No 
ultimate temporal boundary condition is real if time already existed before our 
time, our sweep, began. Thus, ifthere was no time before our time began-which 
Hawking sometimes affirms, there was a time before our time began-which he 
also sometimes affirms; and an ultimate boundary condition exists after all! 
Hawking's position is puzzling if not riddled with flip-flops and contradictions. 
Like Hawking, many cosmologists cannot make up their minds, equivocate on 
the meaning of basic concepts ("singularity" versus "temporality" as the mean-
ing of"boundary condition"), often change their minds, and occasionally argue 
for incompatible positions. Given the complexity of their subject matter, this is 
easily understandable. 
Hawking may or may not be a real Oscillationist. Perhaps his universe 
without boundary conditions does not oscillate because time is unreal. At times, 
Hawking seriously doubts the reality of time, something that a true Oscillationist 
cannot do. Perhaps he confuses the absence of a singularity boundary with the 
absence of a temporal boundary; but perhaps he wishes to deny the reality of 
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time altogether. Imaginary time, favored by Hawking, is really a spatialization 
of time which, by a mathematical trick, converts time to a fourth spatial dimen-
sion. Just what this means is extremely obscure. Hawking explains that imagi-
nary time is "at right angles" to real time; but it is difficult to see how something 
that is not spatial could be "at right angles" to anything, or how there can be a 
singularity at the beginning of real time but no singularity in the imaginary time 
that is also somehow real and at right angles to it. Also, a fourth spatial dimen-
sion gets lost in Hawking's analogy with an expanding and contracting globe 
because these expansions and their cosmic evolutions are temporal. 
In purely spatial terms, the North Pole, no matter how inexact, definitely 
represents a boundary between the earth and its atmosphere; so Hawking's 
analogy does not adequately illustrate the notion of finite but unbounded time; 
perhaps no analogy could succeed. If time really can be spatialized, Hawking's 
initial temporal singularity is avoided by eliminating time altogether. Once time 
is abolished, the whole universe is timeless; and our experience of time is an 
illusion. But why isn't space also an illusion? A purely spatial but timeless 
Hawking universe is no longer our universe, no longer a quantum universe in 
which time and space are inseparable but not identical. Hawking pays a very 
high price for avoiding an initial singularity. His theory becomes irrelevant to 
our world. As Benjamin Franklin said, "Time is the stuff life is made of." The 
real world of nature is temporal through and through. Contemporary physics 
does not spatialize time; it temporalizes space, despite many claims to the 
contrary.61 
4. Critique of Oscillation Cosmology 
Oscillation Cosmologies have troublesome defects. Their most serious flaws 
must be identified and considered. The greatest difficulties for all Antecedent 
Universe Cosmologies, including Oscillation Cosmology, are that we do not and 
cannot directly experience antecedent worlds; we have no inductive empirical 
access to them because inductive logic is inapplicable where we know only one 
of a kind; and the laws used to reason back to antecedent worlds break down 
before they take us that far. Science cannot establish their existence or know 
their essence. Other difficulties for Oscillation Cosmologies center upon A. 
their affirmation that space is finite with sufficient mass/energy to open and 
close it an infinite number of times, B. their treatment of singularities, C. their 
affirmation of universal causation, D. their appeal to quantum effects, and E. 
their approach to thermodynamics. 
A. An Infinite Number of Closed Universes 
Oscillation Cosmologists do not agree with Plasma Cosmology that space is 
infinite, but they share its view that time is infinite. Only a finite quantity of 
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spatially extended stuff expands and contracts forever in oscillating universes. 
If singularities are rejected, oscillating universes have a finite mass/energy 
density and both a minimum and a maximum magnitude that are finite. When 
maximum allowable magnitude is reached, expansion ceases; and a Big Squeeze 
commences. When the allowed minimum is reached, contraction ceases, and 
another Big Bang begins. And this goes on forever. 
Unlike Gamow's One-Bang theory, Oscillation Cosmologies assume that 
enough mass/energy existed in an infinite number of spatially finite consecutive 
universes to close them all and prevent them from expanding forever, no matter 
how much they differ otherwise with respect to laws, physical constants, and 
initial conditions. The requirement that all antecedent universes be closed places 
severe limits on admissible laws, constants, and initial conditions for all oscillat-
ing universes. It excludes an immense number of possible laws, constants, and 
initial conditions-all those that would engender flatness or openness. If only one 
universe in an oscillating series is flat or open, the series breaks and absolutely 
tenninates. Oscillationists cannot explain why an immense number oflogically 
possible open or flat universes are metaphysically impossible, or why an infinite 
number of only closed universes can or must exist. 
Open and flat universes never collapse and can have no Big Crunch 
successors. If a prior universe in our own presumed series had been open or flat, 
our world would have been impossible. For Oscillationism, necessary condi-
tions for the origin and existence of our universe are fulfilled only if all earlier 
cosmic epochs were closed. 
Consider this very forceful argument against an infinite series of oscillat-
ing universes. Many cosmologists are convinced that a Big Crunch will so 
diversify initial conditions for its successor that eventually, given enough time, 
an open universe or epoch having no successors will inevitably occur. John 
Barrow and M. P. Dabrowski think that they understand the mechanism by 
which some if not all series of oscillating universes will eventually end in 
openness: the maximum size of each epoch increases with increasing entropy; 
and eventually they become so large that oscillations cease and expansion 
continues forever. 62 If this is possible at all, then no oscillating set of universes 
could be eternal, especially if, as some hold, all possibilities are actual. 
By definition, no open or flat universe ends with a Big Crunch; thus, no 
open or flat universe can have a successor universe that rebounds from its Big 
Crunch. Mechanisms may exist by which any and every infinite set of universes 
will eventually produce and thus tenninate with an open or flat universe. This 
would definitely happen if every temporally ordered infinite set of worlds 
diversifies to actualize every possible universe, as Atheistic and Finalistic 
Anthropic Cosmologists propose. 
If an open or flat universe will come along eventually by accident in an 
infinite set of cosmic epochs actualizing all possible worlds, then every world 
in such a set must be open, for every member has an infinite number ofprede-
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cessors. The predecessors of every universe in an infinitely prolonged set 
collectively endure for an infinite amount of time, which is quite long enough 
to engender openness, given the presumption of infinite diversification within 
infinite time. Thus every infinite oscillating series of universes must end with 
an open or flat universe; indeed, every individual universe will be open or flat 
because in an infinite series each would have an infinite number of predeces-
sors; so the very idea of oscillationism is nonsense! 
Closed universes must be finite in space and mass/energy. Robert J. 
Russell suggests that an open universe is actually infinite in size and mass/ 
energy,63 but in an important sense this is not true. If spatially infinite when 
maximally expanded, an oscillating universe that contracts at a finite temporal 
rate would never totally collapse because finitude cannot use up infinity. Simi-
larly, and for the same basic reason, a universe that is initially finite and ex-
pands at a finite rate could never achieve spatial infinity. 
Both closed and open universes must be actually finite, but open universes 
have an indefinitely large potential for expansion. In this sense they are finite 
but unbounded; their actuality is finite, but they are unbounded with respect to 
their potentiality for expansion. If an open universe begins with finite space/ 
energy and expands at a finite rate, it will still be finite after fifteen billion 
years-and after fifteen billion billion years; only its potential for future expan-
sion is infinite, never its actuality. 
Oscillation Cosmologists must insist that in an infinite number of actual 
universes, including our own, Omega (total density) is greater than I (perfect 
balance, or critical density). Obviously, this cannot be verified; and our universe 
with an increasing rate of Hubble expansion, and with total density of from . l 
to .3 or .4 at most, appears to be open. Even a flat universe with an Omega 
density of exactly l is incompatible with Oscillationism because, like open 
universes, flat universes never collapse and never have successors. 
Recall that the case against the existence of an enormous quantity of dark 
or hidden cosmic mass that cannot be located is very strong. Astronomers can 
find only ten to thirty percent or so of the mass/energy required to close the 
universe, despite their best efforts. After devoting much of his book on The 
Dark Side of the Universe to examining the case for and against dark matter, 
James Trefel concluded: 
It used to be customary in discussions of this sort to entertain the idea that 
the universe was cyclical-that the Big Bang would be followed by a 
collapse (the Big Crunch) and another expansion (the Big Bounce). But 
if our current ideas are true, this will not happen. The Universe has one 
shot at existence-one explosion followed by an expansion that slows 
down for an infinite length oftime.64 
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Yes, some dramatic discovery tomorrow might reveal the existence of the 
missing mass; scientists are constantly stumbling upon the unexpected, espe-
cially with the aid of the Hubble Space Telescope. New sources of both lumi-
nous and cold dark matter are regularly identified; but will we ever locate 
seventy to ninety percent more? Will astronomers or particle physicist ever find 
enough ordinary matter or previously undetected cold dark matter to close the 
universe? Maybe so. Maybe not. The existence of enough mass to close the 
universe is merely a "Philosophical Maybe," an abstruse possibility lacking 
probability, given our vantage point in history. To every "Philosophical May-
be," corresponds a "Maybe Not." In the realm of pure possibilities, "possibly 
so" is always checkmated by "possibly not." We should not be intimidated by 
mere possibilities, and we should never confuse possibilities with probabilities. 
Given the present state of human knowledge, it is reasonable to think that 
enough mass/energy probably does not exist to close the universe even once, 
much less an infinite number of previous times. From seventy to ninety percent 
is missing; the odds against finding enough are just too great; and the expanding 
rate of cosmic expansion seems to rule it out definitively. 
As explained in Chapter Three, the recent discovery that the rate of cosmic 
expansion is increasing, not slowing, as earlier assumed (for example, by Trefel 
above), counts overwhelmingly against a closed universe. Too little mass exists 
in the universe to slow down its expansion rate, much less to stop it. Yet, oscil-
lating universes must be closed and reopened an infinite number of times, no 
matter how different other epochs are from our own. For exceptionally good 
reasons, we should reject the oscillation hypothesis. We really do not know that 
an antecedent Big Crunch happened even once, much less an infinite number 
of times. What we do know suggests that it never happened at all. We will 
return later to the problem of the missing mass. 
B. Singularities vs. Finite Size Maximal Compression States 
A few Oscillation Cosmologists like a younger John A. Wheeler and a contem-
porary John Gribbin maintain that each cosmic epoch begins and ends with a 
singularity, a state of infinite compression, infinite density, infinite heat, infini-
tesimal size, and infinite curvature. Other Oscillation Cosmologists like Mark 
Israelit and Nathan Rosen65 repudiate infinitesimally small initial singularities 
and contend that the maximal compression state of the antecedent universe was 
finite in size or volume. Let us further considers rebounds with and without 
singularities. 
i. Rebounds from Singularities? 
The reality of an initial singularity from which an oscillating universe could 
rebound may be doubted for a variety of reasons. For one thing, there are 
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serious problems about its empirical status. I. L. Rozental says that "The singu-
larity situation in cosmology is in contradiction to all accumulated physical 
experience.''66 According to Rozental, singularities cannot be created in the 
laboratory because "under terrestrial conditions" a phase transition always 
occurs as pressure approaches infinity, and "the singular state is not achieved. "67 
The idea that all sensory experience counts against singularities can be further 
expanded. It is absolutely impossible for our physical senses to perceive directly 
anything that has no size or spatial magnitude whatsoever. Conceptually con-
structed Euclidean points and spatiotemporal singularities are so small that they 
are indeed empirically nothing, and the claim that our universe was created out 
of an initial singularity is empirically indistinguishable from the claim that it 
was created ex nihilo. 
An initial singularity for our universe could not have been perceived 
directly if we had been there, but confidence in an initial singularity may be 
inductively grounded in some other way. Ignoring quantum effects for the 
moment, perhaps an initial singularity can be extrapolated mathematically from 
observable processes such as increasing entropy, the redshift, and the Hubble 
expansion. If these processes are reversed and traced far enough into the past, 
in ten to twenty billion years, the results equal 0. This assumes that the laws and 
basic structures of nature do not break down before zero diameter or magnitude 
is reached, that abstract calculations can accurately reflect physical processes 
that contract all the way down to zero and not just up to the edge of it, and that 
quantum physics does not block the descent to nothingness. 
If, as most quantum physicists believe, the laws of nature do not break 
down at Planck spacetime but nevertheless become inapplicable below Planck 
dimensions, it would definitely not be rational to believe that our universe began 
in a singularity at T = 0. Quantum Cosmology indicates that the laws and the 
most basic concepts that we apply to nature do become inapplicable to space-
time below Planck's Wall because nothing physical whatsoever can exist on its 
other side. Scientifically, we can trace origins back no further than when the 
universe was 10-43 (l/1043) of a second old and its size was 10-33 (1/1033) of a 
centimeter in diameter. Quantum Cosmologists like I. L. Rozental and Stephen 
Hawking (at times) are convinced that quantum effects make collapses to initial 
singularities impossible (despite the fact that Hawking still believes in black 
holes with singularities at their core). We will soon see that Quantum Cosmolo-
gies have serious problems of their own. 
Because they suggest creation ex nihilo, singularities create an interesting 
philosophical problem for Oscillationism and all other naturalistic Antecedent 
Universe Cosmologies. Theistic creation ex nihilo affirms the known existence 
of only one universe and is not vulnerable to this difficulty. Its proponents 
would be quite happy if modem science discovers that the universe was created 
out of nothing in the finite past! 
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The philosophical difficulty is this. Naturalistic metaphysics maintains that 
our universe has existed throughout an infinite past; but the notion of "our 
universe" is not easily stretched to infinity, despite Oscillation Cosmology. The 
problem of personal identity through time has as its counterpart the problem of 
cosmic identity through time. Our cosmic epoch, which began around fifteen 
billion years ago, could not belong to the same universe as its predecessors if 
it is separated from them by even one singularity, much less by an infinite 
number of them. Conceptually, singularities involve the total eradication of 
space, time, physical causation, continuity, and all laws of nature; so no uni-
verse derived from a singularity, including our own, could have any temporal 
predecessors or physical causal progenitors. 
If antecedent Cosmic Epoch A and subsequent Cosmic Epoch B are 
spatiotemporally and causally linked through a singularity, that is, by causal and 
spatiotemporal nothingness, then they are not linked at all. Two regions belong 
to the same universe only if they belong to the same spacetime system, that is, 
if it is at least theoretically possible to get from one to the other by traveling 
through space or time; all members of the spacetime system have physical 
causal relations with-are either the physical cause or effect of-some other 
members of that system; and all members function statistically in accord with 
an all-pervasive set of physical laws. "Sameness of universe" thus involves 
continuity of (1) space, (2) time, (3) physical causation, and (4) natural laws. 
Our universe is the totality of the spacetime system to which we belong, includ-
ing all the laws, mass/energy, and cones of physical causation within it. To 
belong to the same spacetime system, any two things must be bound together 
lawfully by spatiotemporal continuities, contiguities, and causal processes. 
Entities belong to our system of spacetime only if spatiotemporal continuities 
and physical causal bonds link them lawfully to us directly or indirectly. 
No lawful spatiotemporal and causal continuities whatsoever obtain 
between universes separated by singularities, where all of the above break down 
and disappear. Without something physical ( spatiotemporal) there is no physical 
causation. Since physical causation and the laws of nature break down in a 
singularity, no universe separated from another by a singularity could be its 
physical cause or project its mass/energy and its laws into its successor. An 
antecedent universe that crunched to a singularity could not be the cause of our 
Big Bang. 
In fact, it could not even be antecedent! Our world could not be part of an 
eternal universe, as Naturalists hold, if it began fifteen billion years ago and is 
separated from its antecedents by singularities. Singularities eliminate temporal 
as well as causal continuity and succession, so speaking of antecedent universes 
separated by singularities makes no sense. No temporal relations can exist 
between two cosmic epochs separated by utter nontemporality. 
Nothing can be earlier than the first moment of time. If our universe begins 
and ends with a singularity, nothing could precede it or follow it. The Big Bang 
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would be the beginning of time itself; nothing could antedate it. One universe 
can precede another only if they belong to the same spatiotemporal series. If 
singularities separate them, the spatiotemporal series is unconditionally inter-
rupted; and the notion of "antecedent universes" becomes inapplicable and 
unintelligible. Antecedent Universe Cosmologies that affirm singularities are 
logically incoherent, and Oscillation Cosmologists must avoid them. 
A naturalistic metaphysics that accepts singularities between cosmic 
epochs is itself incoherent. Our universe cannot be separated from its predeces-
sor by a singularity because applying the concept of "predecessor" to such a 
relationship is unintelligible. Big Bang Cosmology shows that our universe is 
not eternal, contrary to the assumptions of Naturalism. If some universes are 
eternal, they can have no spatiotemporal or causal continuity with our own 
through singularities; and we can never know of their existence on lawful, 
inductive, or scientific grounds. 
On non-scientific grounds, many theologians postulate Heaven and Hell 
as completely independent spacetime systems, that is, as Other Worlds, that 
have no direct spatiotemporal or causal relations with our own. Naturalists who 
accept singularities incoherently embrace disconnected, transcendent, Other-
Worldly spacetime systems-the very things that they repudiate so vehement 
when quarreling with theologians about Heaven and Hell! Our world is not 
eternal and could not be connected to an everlasting series of worlds if it began 
fifteen billion years ago in a singularity of nothingness. 
If and when a singularity forms at the end ofa "Big Crunch," why doesn't 
it just stay there forever? We actually have neither empirical nor theoretical 
evidence that they ever explode, and this is absolutely devastating to any 
Oscillationism that separates universes by singularities or derives them from 
singularities. In no instance has a singularity ever been observed to explode. 
Even theoretically, no one knows what would cause a singularity to explode 
since no known laws of physics apply to them. According to Alan H. Guth, 
Oscillationism is now very unpopular with most scientific-minded cosmologists 
for this very reason. Guth indicates that what we know of gravity in relativity 
theory "does not allow a crunching universe to bounce into a big bang," but, he 
insists, 
This is not a fatal objection, however, since general relativity presumably 
breaks down at the extraordinarily high densities encountered in a big 
crunch. Nonetheless, since there is no reliable theory that describes how 
a universe might bounce, the basis of the oscillating universe theory relies 
solely on speculation.68 
Since all natural laws break down in singularities, no known or knowable 
laws of nature could permit them to explode. Something very similar is true with 
respect to big bounces from finite compaction states. Given our ignorance with 
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respect to high density physics, no known laws of physics could permit them to 
explode. As Martin Rees indicates, "Physical conditions in the 'bounce' would 
transcend the physics we understand, so that nothing could be said about the 
possibility of a rebound into a new cycle-still less about what memory would 
be preserved of what had gone before. "69 With or without singularities, quantum 
fluctuations really could not do the job, for we really know almost nothing about 
quantum fluctuations in high density physics. Inflation Cosmology does not 
derive its many worlds from exploding singularities or immensely compressed 
antecedent universes. Inflation, which does not appeal to explosions at all, 
requires just the right kind of diluted quantum-foamy "empty space"; and 
crunched-up antecedent universes just aren't the right stuffl 
ii. Big Bounces Without Singularities 
Singularities are not easily circumvented, but Oscillation Cosmology can be 
developed without them. If antecedent cosmic epochs are not infinitely com-
pacted into singularities as they crunch to an end, if they rebound from finite 
size maximal compression states, some of the foregoing difficulties can be 
avoided, but at a price. If the laws of nature as we know them apply to high 
density situations, corridors of no more than Planck dimensions might link 
universes causally, spatially, and temporally and provide for the continuation of 
natural laws from epoch to epoch. 
Some Antecedent Universe Cosmologists explicitly reject singularities and 
conjecture that antecedent universes rebound while still finite in diameter, 
curvature, density, and temperature, thus avoiding the embarrassing infinities 
and breakdowns of singularities. These minimal-size-maximal-compression 
states may be quite large. Georges Lemaitre initiated Oscillation Cosmology 
with his image of the Phoenix that dies a fiery death, then rises again from its 
own ashes. His "primeval atom" was two hundred million miles in diameter 
when it exploded. 70 George Gamow speculated that when the previous universe 
crunched to its maximal pre-expansion density, all of the matter within the reach 
of a 200-inch telescope "must have occupied a sphere only thirty times as large 
as the sun."71 Eric Lerner's Mini-Bang occurred when an antecedent metagalaxy 
collapsed to a hundred million light years across. 72 A. Karel Velan thinks that 
before a Big Bang explosion, a collapsed universe has a radius of l .17 x 10 14 
cm,73 that is, l .17 trillion centimeters. Most Antecedent Universe Cosmologists 
actually prefer sub-microscopic but still finite dimensions as minimal-size, 
maximal-compression states for collapsing/erupting universes, partly because 
they think that at lesser volumes and densities, thermonuclear reactions would 
not be sufficiently hot and compact to destroy heavy elements and replenish the 
universe's supplies ofhydrogen and helium. Defenders of large finite maximal-
compression rebounds may find it difficult to explain the physics of hydrogen 
renewal. 
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Tiny Planck spacetime is the most popular minimal-size-maximal-com-
pression dimension for contracting/rebounding universes, or for any physical 
realities at all. 74 Contracting universes may proceed almost to zero, but not quite, 
before a Big Bounce erupts to recreate another world. 
Oscillationists must answer this question: What initiates the explosion? 
What makes a contracting universe bounce? Quantum fluctuations might make 
Big Bounces inevitable, but only if the laws of quantum physics obtain in all 
antecedent universes and at the junctures between universes, and only if all 
logically possible non-quantum universes are inexplicably non-existent. With 
Big Bounces, Planck size threads could connect cosmic epochs; but these are 
so minute that one still wonders if anything is left of the notion of same uni-
verse. All ordinary sameness is left far behind long before we arrive at Planck's 
Wall. From a commonsense standpoint, a Big Bang universe would be a distinct 
universe whether or not it issues from a singularity or a Planck size quantum 
corridor. Yet, some Oscillationists submit, the connecting link might not be 
implausibly thin. 
C. Singularities and Universal Physical Causation 
Perhaps singularities are ruled out because they are incompatible with Natural-
ism's metaphysical causal principle: "All events have natural causes." In I 965, 
the year that the omnipresent background radiation was discovered, Milton 
Munitz rejected an initial singularity for our universe for this reason; but his 
arguments confused scientific methodology with Naturalism's principle of 
physical causation. 
Accounts of origins must transcend finite limits like those set by an initial 
singularity, according to Munitz, because scientific method presupposes that a// 
spatiotemporal events are caused by other spatiotemporal events. An original 
event proceeding from the nothingness of a singularity would violate this 
methodological rule, (which is really a metaphysical rule in disguise), so science 
itself is incompatible with an initial singularity. According to Munitz, it is 
always possible to find "some more refined theory, in which inferences would 
be made to events even earlier than the one identified as "the beginning" in the 
theory of coarser grain."75 As he expressed this argument in The Mystery of 
Existence, 
Science is grounded in the use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and, 
therefore, always leaves open the possibility of finding the explanation of 
any event. To say there is some unique event, marking the beginning of the 
universe for which no explanation can be given, is to say something 
contrary to the method of science. It is for this reason, I should argue, that 
any conception of the beginning of the universe, when defended under the 
aegis of some supposedly scientific cosmology, is an indefensible notion.76 
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Here Munitz clearly identifies the Principle of Sufficient Reason with the 
naturalistic metaphysical principle that" All natural events have natural causes;" 
otherwise. the door would be open for the Theist who thinks that God's original 
act of creation is the sufficient reason for the existence of the world. A natural 
cause belongs to the same system of spacetime as its natural effect; but God 
presumably transcends the spacetime of our world; and so do all antecedent 
universes. Munitz has natural causes in mind when he says that "All events 
investigated by science are ones for which it is relevant to inquire into their 
causal conditions" and that "On scientific grounds, one could never hope to 
establish that the universe had an absolute origin, or came into existence."77 
Here Munitz assumes that a scientific inquiry into natural causes will always 
find them-ad infinitum; for this reason, he assumes, science could never dis-
cover absolute origination. 
Munitz is mistaken in thinking that science could never discover an abso-
lute origin for the universe merely because it must always inquire about the 
natural causal conditions for everything that it investigates. Methodology is 
confused with metaphysics. Scientific methodology always inquires about 
natural causes, but only a non-empirical Naturalistic metaphysics guarantees 
that inquirers will always find that for which they are looking. Scientific meth-
odology needs only the imperative: "Look for natural causes!" It does not 
require an a priori metaphysical guarantee of success. 
When divorced from naturalistic metaphysics, science can conclude that 
scientific method reaches its iimits with an initial cosmic singularity, if this is 
indeed where time, space, natural laws, and physical causation commense, the 
point beyond which they can be traced and applied no further, the end of scien-
tific explanation. 
As Robert Jastrow indicated, "Science has its own religion. That religion 
is founded on faith in natural law and in cause and effect. Science has suc-
ceeded in posing, on its own terms, questions not answerable within the domain 
of science. "78 Jastrow could be wrong in thinking that scientific knowledge ends 
when it stumbles upon an initial singularity; but he correctly judges that any 
confusion of methodology with metaphysics, like Munitz's, is religiously 
grounded in a blind faith in absolute natural causation, a faith that empirical 
scientific methodology alone cannot substantiate. Even quantum physics calls 
universal causal absolutism into question, as we will see. That an initial singu-
larity would be incompatible with scientific method and universal physical 
causation is only a minor obstacle for Oscillation Cosmology, but other difficul-
ties are more serious. 
D. Quantum Effects Near Singularities 
We should be very cautious about accepting Quantum Cosmology's supposition 
that when the whole universe is squeezed down to the size of sub-atomic quan-
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tum objects, it will begin to obey the laws of quantum physics and manifest 
quantum effects like indefiniteness, discreteness, and spontaneity-if for no other 
reason than that Quantum Cosmologists seem to believe this only when it is 
convenient. Stephen Hawking suggests that size is the relevant consideration for 
appealing to quantum effects when he writes that "There must have been a time 
in the very early universe when the universe was so small, that one could no 
longer ignore the small-scale effects of quantum mechanics.m9 Other interpret-
ers also treat size as the only relevant consideration in applying quantum physics 
to the universe as a whole. 80 
The real difficulty is that quantum demeanor may depend on more than or 
something other than just size. It may depend heavily on degree and kind of 
curvature, compression, density, temperature, or quantity of energy involved. 
An entire universe compressed to the size of an electron or quark may be too 
curved, compressed, dense, or hot to obey quantum laws; or the quantity of 
energy may be too great. Roger Penrose, who doubts that size and distance mark 
the boundary between quantum level and classical level events, suggests that all 
quantum level events invo Ive "very tiny differences in energy. "81 If so, an entire 
universe of energy concentrated to the size of a photon just might be too much 
for quantum effects! 
Without agreeing with them completely, Heinz R. Pagels notes that ac-
cording to cautious critics, "Theorists exploring, on paper, the very early uni-
verse have gone too far. Extrapolating from theories that work in the relatively 
low-energy domain examined by terrestrial accelerators to such ultrahigh ener-
gies is a dubious enterprise. "82 Martin Rees recognizes that" ... Physics at ultra-
high energies ... is almost completely unknown."83 John Gribbin and Rees warn 
that "Because the physics of the ultracompressed, high-density stages is specu-
lative, we have no firm understanding of exactly where the fluctuations come 
from."84 This is precisely the difficulty. The physics ofultracompressed high-
density states is largely untested and unknown. As Mark lsraelit and Nathan 
Rosen affirm, "We lack any knowledge whatsoever of the constitution of matter 
under such extreme conditions";85 yet they make many assumptions about it. 
Jonathan J. Halliwell recognizes that "Quantum mechanics was developed to 
describe atomic-scale phenomena," and he recognizes the enormous conten-
tiousness of"the most extravagant extrapolation possible: that quantum mechan-
ics applies to the entire universe at all times and to everything in it."86 
None of the sub-atomic particles that we know to be affected by quantum 
indefiniteness, discreteness, and spontaneity are experienced and tested at 
anything close to what the curvature, compression, density, temperature, and 
energy quantity of the universe as a whole would be if compacted to the volume 
of an atom, electron, photon, quark, or something even smaller. The differences 
in proportions are truly astronomical, and these enormous differences could 
easily distort or even completely negate quantum effects. In the absence of 
experimental confirmation, there is room for serious doubt that the whole 
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universe obeys the laws of quantum physics when compressed to Planck (or 
smaller) dimensions. Every law of nature that takes us back to "the beginning" 
may be inapplicable sufficiently close to T = 0, which is why Scientific Cosmo-
logical Agnostics proclaim that we just can't know scientifically what caused 
the Big Bang. Neither caution nor radical skepticism about the applicability of 
the laws of quantum physics to conditions at or near the origin of the universe 
will be popular with many contemporary scientific cosmologists, but perhaps 
they should reconsider. 
Without quantum effects at the beginning of creation, Oscillation Cosmol-
ogies are indefensible because they cannot otherwise avoid singularities. With 
quantum effects, Oscillation Cosmologies are still on shaky ground for reasons 
already given and for others to follow. We must now examine some of the 
logical and philosophical implications of these options, even though we have 
serious doubts about the applicability of quantum laws to an ultracompressed 
universe. 
E. Oscillationism and Thermodynamics 
Oscillation Cosmologies presuppose the existence of sufficient mass/energy in 
all cosmic epochs to reverse their expansion and close them down, no matter 
how different their contents, laws, constants, and initial conditions might be. 
Our own cosmic epoch seems to be very much out of place within such an 
endless series of oscillating epochs. Our universe lacks seventy percent or more 
of the mass required for reversal. Oscillationists may have a strong faith that the 
missing mass is really there; but they cannot prove it, and it has now been 
decisively disproved by the discovery in 1998 that the pace of cosmic expansion 
is accelerating rather than slowing. This could not be true of a universe that will 
eventually cease expanding and gradually collapse into a Big Crunch. Oscilla-
tion Cosmologists cannot reconcile their robust Omega = l + requirement with 
the paltry Omega = .1 to .3 of our actual universe as we know it. 
They might resort to the desperate strategy of contending that either the 
First Law of Thermodynamics or the Law of Gravity were grossly violated at 
the beginning of our eccentric cosmic epoch, even though they held in all 
antecedent universes. They might argue that enough mass or gravity was present 
in an infinite number of antecedent universes to close them, but our exceptional 
universe is open because huge quantities of mass/energy or gravitational attrac-
tion just disappeared somehow at the beginning of our atypical cosmic epoch. 
Perhaps so. Perhaps not. If this happened, Oscillationists must explain how and 
why; but no explanation is readily forthcoming. In an infinite set of successive 
universes, why is ours an exception to the rules? 
If a singularity preceded our epoch, the notion of antecedent universes is 
meaningless; but without an initial singularity to reshuffle everything drasti-
cally, we have no good reason to believe that any physical fundamentals change 
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dramatically from epoch to epoch. Natural laws, including the First and Second 
Laws of Thermodynamics, would not break down between epochs that are not 
separated by singularities. Oscillationists have no adequate theory or mechanism 
to explain an enormous one-time extinction of mass or weakening of gravity. 
With no initial singularity, the First Law of Thermodynamics, the conservation 
of mass/energy, weighs heavily against significant extinctions of mass and 
gravitation between epochs. An implausible theory cannot be saved by appeal 
to an even more implausible theory. 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics, the law of increasing entropy or 
disorder, also makes serious trouble for Oscillation Cosmologies, even without 
singularities. Cosmologists like Paul DaviesB7 and Alan Lightman suggest that 
it does.BB Others like Alan MacRobert,B9 Steven Weinberg,90 Ya. B. Zel'Dovich 
and I. D. Novikov,91 James Peebles,92 and Alan Guth93 reject Oscillationism 
outright because they are convinced that the Second Law of increasing entropy 
or disorder excludes it. Endless oscillations and divisions are ruled out com-
pletely by increasing entropy. S. A. Bludman argued in 1984 that 
because of the huge entropy generated in our Universe, far from oscillat-
ing, a closed universe can go through one cycle of expansion and contrac-
tion. Whether closed or open, reversing or monotonically expanding, the 
severely irreversible phase transitions transpiring give the Universe a 
definite beginning, middle and end the ultimate crunch can never be 
reversed. Nor could it have bounced in the past if it began hot or devel-
oped a great deal of entropy in a first contraction.94 
Most scientific cosmologists believe that the law of increasing entropy 
holds not only during the initial expansion phase but also during the contraction 
phase of a universe undergoing gravitational collapse. They have no doubt that 
the law of increasing entropy would apply continuously through successive 
cosmic epochs, no matter how these are connected. They may or may not be 
right, but if they are, Oscillation Cosmology is dealt a deadly blow. 
Since disorder constantly increases, according to the Second Law, our 
present universe would be infinitely chaotic if it were preceded by an infinite 
number of cosmic epochs, as Oscillationism maintains. Because our universe 
is not infinitely chaotic, an infinite number of antecedent universes did not 
antedate it, and Oscillationism is dead. 
Unless Oscillationists can find a way around the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics, increasing entropy is a formidable obstacle, not only for them, but 
also for other Antecedent Universe Cosmologists. But the situation may not be 
completely hopeless. 
John A. Wheeler argued in 1973 that when a collapsing universe shrinks 
to a singularity, a drastic reprocessing of mass, charge, physical constants, 
natural laws, and all details of the system occurs; and the ensuing universe starts 
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out on a completely fresh dynamic cycle.95 Singularities might insure that a 
universe that ends in maximal entropy would be followed by another universe 
that begins in minimal entropy, but many unresolved problems are hidden in the 
obscure notion of "reprocessing." 
Quantum Cosmologists wanting to dispense with singularities also specu-
late that when a cosmic epoch shrinks to quantum size, quantum effects wash 
out all existing entropy, all information about what went before; and thus each 
new epoch starts afresh. As Andrei Linde recalls, M. A. Markov developed "a 
model of an eternal, oscillating universe, which at each cycle of its evolution 
forgets what occurred before."% In Markov's own words, "The state of maxi-
mum contraction would play a peculiar role of 'purgatory,' purifying the uni-
verse from 'excessive' mass and entropy acquired in a previous expansion and 
contraction.''97 Robert Dicke and P. J. E. Peebles, commenting on oscillating 
universes, say that "Experience would suggest the total entropy can only in-
crease, though it certainly is conceivable that in the new physics of the bounce, 
entropy is eliminated, perhaps lost in black holes left over after the big bang."98 
Notable authorities may be quoted on both sides of the question of whether 
entropy continues from epoch to epoch, but which view is most plausible? 
Many cosmologists are convinced that only an initial singularity, if any-
thing, could guarantee a scramble sufficiently thorough to insure the demise of 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics from epoch to epoch. Understandably, a 
cosmic epoch would have to forget its composition and structure if it collapses 
into a singularity, for at that point there is no space, time, physical causation, 
physical structures, or natural laws. In singularities, and only in them, the laws 
of nature are gone, and so are all physical causes, constants, fields, masses, 
particles, and components. Nothing remains to remember or carry forward the 
disorder inherited from a preceding epoch. Unfortunately, along with entropy, 
an initial singularity also obliterates all lawful spatial, temporal, and causal 
continuity between cosmic epochs In a singularity, both the First Law and 
Second Laws of Thermodynamics are gone, and nothing remains to insure that 
enough physical energy or orderliness will persist from epoch to epoch to keep 
the series going. 
Most cosmologists think that complete reprocessing would not occur if a 
universe collapses only to quantum (or larger) size, and the rest of us may just 
have to take their word for it. At finite dimensions of compaction, something 
spatial, temporal, causal, and lawful remains of a maximally compressed ante-
cedent universe; and, despite Markov's doubts, just enough probably remains 
to carry forward the entropy, the distorting Wey! curvature, of a preceding 
epoch into a later one. If quantum laws and processes are preserved through the 
passage from one epoch to another, so are the laws of thermodynamics. If 
cosmologists can't affirm continuing quantum laws without affirming the laws 
of thermodynamics, the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a major hurdle for 
Antecedent Universe Cosmologies that appeal to quantum effects to avoid an 
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initial singularity, for they can't avoid an increase of entropy from epoch to 
epoch. 
The strategy ofresorting to total reprocessing in singularities is extremely 
risky for Oscillation Cosmology. The physics of the Big Bounce without singu-
larities also requires that all antecedent worlds be closed quantum universes that 
cannot collapse into singularities because of quantum effects like indefiniteness 
and discreteness; but in an infinite number of diversifying tries, total reprocess-
ing will insure that at least one rescrambled antecedent universe would be open, 
flat, and/or non-quantum. Infinite diversification through reprocessing would 
bring about at least one open or flat universe that breaks the series, and/or one 
non-quantum universe that ends in a spaceless, timeless, lawless, and causeless 
singularity-with all its problems. 
In an infinite number of antecedent diversifying shuffles that actualize all 
possibilities, quantum laws and quantum effects themselves would be scrambled 
out of existence at some point, and so would sufficient mass to close an infinite 
number of antecedent cosmic epochs. From such antecedent universes, no Big 
Bounce could occur. The endless chain would be broken; and we would not be 
here; but here we are! Infinite reprocessing might unscramble entropy, but it 
would also terminate infinite reprocessing. The non-existence of our world is 
a very high price to pay for avoiding the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
Furthermore, since every epoch in an infinite series has an infinite number of 
predecessors, every universe must be nonexistent! The very idea of oscillating 
universes is unintelligible! 
i. Entropy Can't Apply to the Universe as a Whole 
Perhaps the Second Law of Thermodynamics does not apply legitimately to the 
universe as a whole. The philosopher Stephen Toulmin contends that it does 
not.99 The preceding argument against Oscillation Cosmologies based on in-
creasing entropy from epoch to epoch applies the Second Law to the universe 
as a whole. If Toulmin is right, this application is illegitimate and all objections 
to Oscillation Cosmologies based on thermodynamics are spurious. 
Toulmin's argument is complex, but let's try to go directly to the heart of 
it. He is concerned in part with the practical implications of the idea that the 
universe is running down; but his primary focus is on the shift of the Second 
Law away from applied mechanics, where it properly belongs, to cosmological 
speculation about the universe as a whole, where he thinks it is out of place. 
Toulmin believes that this shift is illegitimate because the question "Is the 
universe as a whole a thermally isolated system?" is senseless. The reason, 
Toulmin explains, is that 
the question how far a given physical system is isolated from its surround-
ings has a clear enough meaning when asked about any bounded part of 
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the universe-being equivalent to the question, to what extent heat ex-
changes are possible across the boundary-when asked about the universe-
as-a-whole, its meaning is completely obscure. 100 
We cannot talk intelligibly about heat exchanges across the boundary of 
the universe as a whole, Toulmin maintains, because nothing exists outside the 
boundary of the universe as a whole. The universe has no surroundings. 101 The 
Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us that disorder increases in thermally 
isolated systems; it applies intelligibly only when systems have boundaries and 
surroundings; it applies appropriately only within but not to the universe as a 
whole. According to Toulmin, we do not apply the law of gravity to the uni-
verse as a whole because we realize that nothing exists outside the universe to 
be attracted by it. Similarly, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should not be 
applied to the universe as a whole because it has no boundaries or surround-
ings.102 
ii. Entropy Can Apply to the Universe as a Whole 
Fortunately, scientists seldom pay much attention when philosophers tell them 
what they can and cannot do or think. Toulmin's argument is unconvincing. If 
nothing exists outside the boundaries of the universe as a whole, this means that 
it is the ultimate isolated system par excellence; as Victor Stenger says, "Only 
the universe is a completely closed system."103 If the universe as a whole has no 
surroundings, then it is clearly impossible for anything to affect the constancy 
of its supply of energy (First Law) or the internal dissipation of its energy and 
order as it expands (Second Law). 
Toulmin's reasons for thinking that the laws of thermodynamics do not 
apply to the universe as a whole really show that the universe is a perfect exam-
ple, perhaps the only really perfect example, of a system that can neither gain 
nor lose energy (once created). Thus, objections to Oscillation Cosmologies 
based on thermodynamics must be taken seriously after all. If disorder really 
increases constantly in closed systems, and the universe as a whole is the ulti-
mate closed system, then Oscillation Cosmologies are untenable because they 
project the entropic universe as a whole infinitely into the past. Our world is not 
one of infinite chaos; but it would be ifthe Second Law of Thermodynamics has 
been operating throughout an infinite past; so Oscillation Cosmologies must be 
false. 
Antecedent Universe Cosmologies clearly affirm that something exists 
outside a particular cosmic epoch like the one we inhabit, namely, a temporally 
infinite but imperceptible (to us) larger or older universe. Thus, even on Toul-
min' s terms, Oscillation Cosmology should have no difficulty applying laws of 
thermodynamics to our cosmic epoch, which, by hypothesis, is bounded and 
surrounded by an infinite series of prior cosmic epochs. The real problem is that 
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the surroundings of our epoch transmitted little or no entropy into our Big Bang; 
so they could not be temporally infinite. 
Oscillation Cosmologies are doubly cursed. Without singularities between 
cosmic epochs, the Second Law of Thermodynamics would not break down, and 
our world would be infinitely chaotic, which it is not. Our orderly cosmic epoch 
would be impossible if preceded by an infinite number of increasingly disor-
dered universes that dumped their disorder into our Big Bang. With singulari-
ties, ifthe First and Second Laws are periodically reprocessed out of existence, 
and so is everything else that would make oscillating universes go on forever. 
Even worse, antecedent universes could have no spatiotemporal or causal 
connections with later universes; no continuous and infinitely comprehensive 
temporal series could exist within which one universe could be earlier or later 
than another. 
So, what caused the Big Bang? Oscillation Cosmologies answer that it was 
caused by an influx of energy from a preceding universe or cosmic epoch. With 
or without singularities, this answer is incredible and indefensible. 
To summarize, Oscillation Cosmologies affirm that our universe, our 
cosmic epoch, was preceded by an infinite number of antecedent expand-
ing/collapsing universes; but this claim lies far beyond the limits of scientific 
knowledge. Science cannot establish that even one cosmic epoch preceded our 
own, much less an infinite number of them. Antecedent universes are supernatu-
ral beings that fall outside of our system of spacetime or nature, as Robert 
Jastrow correctly indicates. They are beings that, by hypothesis, exist before 
time and outside space, even if it is only our time and space. We know empiri-
cally of no universe other than our own; old fashioned Naturalists are right 
about that! Scientifically, with respect to supernatural spaces and times, we can 
only be agnostics or Positivists. 
Oscillation Cosmologies have additional flaws. They presuppose that our 
own cosmic epoch contains enough mass/energy to close it and reverse its 
expansion process, and that this was true of all antecedent universes, an infinite 
number of them. However, our own cosmic epoch does not seem to be closed. 
Its expansion rate is increasing, and seventy to ninety percent of the required 
mass is missing. Maybe we will find it someday; maybe not. We do not know 
that we will; and the chances are extremely high that we will not, especially now 
that we know that the Hubble expansion rate of our universe is increasing. 
Oscillation Cosmologies also presuppose that all antecedent universes 
were bouncing quantum universes, but no known laws of physics would cause 
or allow crunched-up universes to bounce. Oscillationists appeal to periodic 
reprocessing to eliminate entropy; but this insures that in an infinite number of 
antecedent diversifying tries, a prior open or flat universe, a non-quantum 
universe, or a terminal singularity would have resulted from an endless reshuf-
fling of laws and initial conditions; and we and our world would not exist. Yet, 
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here we are! Since this consideration applies to every epoch in an infinite series, 
no worlds at all would exist! 
Oscillation Cosmologies differ over whether antecedent collapsing epochs 
begin and end in singularities, but they are damned if they do and damned if 
they don't. With singularities, no lawful spatiotemporal or causal relations could 
link cosmic epochs because space, time, physical causation, and all the laws of 
nature break down in singularities. The Naturalistic claim that all spatiotemporal 
events are caused by other spatiotemporal events would be untrue. The very 
notion of an antecedent universe becomes incoherent and unintelligible. An 
antecedent universe is postulated as a physical cause of our universe, but physi-
cal causation begins after T = 0 and cannot be traced back any further. We 
cannot infer that the cause ofour universe was something physical. Singularities 
having no magnitude at all are empirically indistinguishable from nothingness. 
Without singularities, Planck-size or larger spatiotemporal and causal 
relations could connect successive epochs; but the laws of nature would not 
break down between epochs; and without a total meltdown, the law of increas-
ing entropy carries over from epoch to epoch. If our epoch was preceded by an 
infinite number of epochs, and if chaos increased in each and from one to the 
next, then our epoch would be infinitely chaotic. It is not; so Oscillation 
Cosmologies must be wrong. Furthermore, ifthe laws and initial conditions of 
each universe are totally reprocessed between epochs, an open or flat universe, 
a non-quantum universe, a terminal singularity, or the extinction of all energy 
whatsoever would occur in an infinite number of diversifying antecedent tries 
that actualize all possibilities; and our universe would not exist; but it does. 
Quantum effects rescue Oscillation Cosmologies only at the price of 
unjustifiable favoritism. Quantum indefiniteness and discreteness would ex-
clude all singularities, both initial and those in collapsing neutron stars and 
black holes. Initial singularities are excluded only in imaginary time, not in real 
time, if Hawking is right. Quantum effects support neither Oscillation Cosmolo-
gies nor even more eccentric Quantum Cosmologies yet to be examined, for we 
do not know that other worlds exist( ed) as quantum universes, or that atomic or 
sub-atomic size universes obey the laws of quantum physics when all the energy 
within them is drastically compacted in size, pressure, density, temperature, and 
curvature. With or without an initial singularity, our universe is flat or open, 
thus radically unlike the infinite number of universes that supposedly preceded 
it; but what happened to the missing gravity or mass? 
Oscillation Cosmologies are initially attractive, but their problems are 
insurmountable. Antecedent Universe Cosmologies are not serious obstacles to 
theistic belief. This does not establish the truth of theism, but it clears away 
much of the rubbish that stands in the way. 

Five 
BIG FIZZ AND BIG DIVIDE 
QUANTUM COSMOLOGIES 
Quantum Cosmologies add quantum theory to relativity theory and apply them 
to the universe as a whole. If, as previously indicated, the laws and concepts of 
quantum physics apply only to tiny, definite, and discrete quanta of energy, the 
whole enterprise of Quantum Cosmology is doomed from the start. When com-
pacted to the size of a quantum object like an electron, all the energy of an 
entire universe is just too great for quantum physics to apply; but for the sake 
of a lively debate, let us assume that it does apply. Even so, Quantum Cosmol-
ogy in its many forms still has far too many problems to be very plausible. 
From the vantage points of common sense and classical Newtonian phys-
ics, quantum theory involves many oddities. Two strange quantum effects, 
quantum indefiniteness and quantum discreteness, may be used as evidence 
against initial singularities, as previously explained. A third, quantum fluctua-
tions, is used in Big Fizz Cosmologies to account for the origin of bubble 
universes and for the bubbles within bubbles that give rise to galactic and 
supergalactic structures. A fourth, plenitude or the actualization of all possibili-
ties, spawns infinitely many universes. A fifth, Quantum Observership, results 
in an Idealistic Metaphysics according to which the universe exists only because 
we perceive it. 
Quantum Cosmologies modify Standard Big Bang Cosmology by introduc-
ing quantum oddities like indefiniteness, discreteness, fluctuations, plenitude, 
and observership and by applying these to the beginning of the universe. Pleni-
tude from quantum physics spills over into astrophysics, resulting in at least two 
distinct world-ensemble cosmologies: (I) the Big Fizz view of John A. Wheeler, 
Stephen Hawking, Alan Guth, and a number of Russian and other cosmologists 
who proclaim that primordial Superspacetime generates multiple inflationary 
universes by quantum fluctuations to create all possible worlds; and (2) the Big 
Divide view, originating with Hugh Everett, III in I 957, 1 which affirms that 
every universe branches every instant into multiple parallel universes to actual-
ize all possibilities. These world-ensemble cosmologies proliferate worlds to 
infinity through bizarre Big Fizz and Big Divide processes.2 
1. Big Fizz Quantum Cosmology 
Russian astrophysicists like A. A. Starobinsky,3 Andrei Linde,4 and M. A. 
Markov5 affirm and defend oscillating universes without singularities, as do 
other astrophysicists. They also envision other and more fundamental ways of 
generating universes without appealing to preceding oscillations. They locate 
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their imagined worlds within an infinite Superspacetime that endlessly ejects, 
then reabsorbs, and ejects again, an infinite number of co-present universes that 
may or may not oscillate. I shall call this multi-ejection Quantum Cosmology the 
"Big Fizz" theory of origins. Stephen Hawking and many others are strongly 
attracted to the Big Fizz position. What does it have to say about the origin of 
our universe? 
A. Mother Spacetime 
Big Fizz Cosmology affirms that an infinite number of universes are created by, 
and co-exist within, infinite Superspacetime, which includes but infinitely 
transcends the finite spacetime of our own universe. Oscillation and Quantum 
Cosmologies are not mutually exclusive. Once co-existent universes originate 
in infinite S uperspace through spontaneous fluctuations, they may then oscillate 
forever after within Supertime, say Big Fizz proponents. Even parallel universes 
with a finite past can have an infinite future. Oscillation variants are plagued by 
all the difficulties discussed in Chapter Four, but let us begin with the novel 
element that Quantum Cosmologies introduce-Superspacetime. Both Oscillation 
and Big Fizz theories are Antecedent Universe Cosmologies. Universes expand 
into nothingness in pure Oscillation Cosmologies, but they expand into pre-
existing Superspacetime in Big Fizz Cosmologies. Superspacetime, not a singu-
larity or an antecedent cosmic epoch, is the ultimate Antecedent Universe in 
these theories; it produces all Big Bangs, including our own. Maternal Super-
spacetime is the space beyond our space and the time before, during, and after 
our time. 
According to I. L. Rozental, for whom "metagalaxies" are independent, 
co-existing universes, including ours, "A multidimensional background space 
exists, filled with a physical vacuum subject to perturbations. These perturba-
tions give rise to the evolution of objects like the Metagalaxy. "6 Rozental says 
that "The Universe-eternal and infinite-lives a stormy life reminiscent (meta-
phorically, of course) of a pot of boiling liquid. Like vapor bubbles, metagal-
axies arise, expand, and finally die, giving birth to new metagalaxies. "7 In 
discussing many worlds cosmologies, John Gribbin calls this infinite multidi-
mensional background spacetime "'super' spacetime."8 Katsuhiko Sato and his 
co-authors call it "the original 'mother' universe.''9 Willem B. Drees called it 
"Mother Spacetime."'° This maternalistic metaphor is illuminating. Mother or 
Super spacetime is the primordial progenitor of all particular spatiotemporal 
universes, an infinite number of them, so Quantum Cosmologists claim. 
Pure Oscillation Cosmologies postulate a single infinitely long strand of 
consecutive universes, each of which gives rises to its successor after it col-
lapses. In Big Fizz world-ensemble cosmologies, Mother Spacetime spontane-
ously generates an infinite number of co-existing universes, some of which may 
also oscillate once initiated. Mother Spacetime is infinitely creative in both 
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space and time, but of what is she composed? Rozental likens her to a pot of 
boiling water. In more technical terms, how is she depicted? Infinitely transcen-
dent Superspacetime is composed of: the physical vacuum or minimal mass/ 
density of"empty space" as an actualized energy field having a bubbly or fizzy 
structure that results from spontaneous quantum fluctuations. 
John Hick thinks that Big Fizz Cosmology is religiously ambiguous with 
respect to Theism and Naturalism because "It remains no less conceivable that 
the super-universe, with ours as one component, is itself the ultimate uncreated 
reality. " 11 However, if the super-universe consists entirely of contingent uni-
verses, contingent Superspacetime, a contingent physical vacuum, contingent 
quantum fluctuations, and contingent laws of quantum mechanics, it is defi-
nitely not a necessary being, or what Hick calls "the ultimate uncreated reality." 
As explained in depth in Chapter Twelve, as far as experience takes us, which 
is all that we have to go on, any whole composed entirely of contingent parts is 
a contingent whole, not an ultimate necessary being. This means that as contin-
gent wholes, our universe and any transcendent Superuniverse do not exist self-
sufficiently and indestructibly. Certainly, no self-contradiction is involved in 
denying their existence. Our own universe was definitely created by something 
and is not everlasting. Contingent wholes exist dependently; their non-existence 
is possible, so their existence is not self-explanatory. As a contingent whole, 
Superspacetime itselfrequires an explanation, one that ultimately comes to rest 
in a transcendent Necessary Being; but the case for this is yet to be made. 
B. The Physical Vacuum and Pure ~nergy 
Mother Spacetime includes or is a physical vacuum. 12 Do not read too much 
common sense into this notion. As quantum physicists understand the concept, 
a physical vacuum is not a state of complete nothingness or emptiness. If it 
were, it would be indistinguishable from a singularity, understood as empirical 
emptiness; and the creation of the universe from it would be identical with 
creation ex nihilo. 
Big Fizz proponents clearly repudiate both creation ex nihilo and the 
identification ofSuperspacetime with absolute nothingness. A physical vacuum 
has ephemeral but still real ingredients. Alan Guth writes that "To the particle 
theorist, the word 'vacuum' is defined as the state of lowest possible energy 
density."13 The physical vacuum is "empty space"; but empty space is not 
empty! It contains no enduring particles like electrons and protons, but it does 
contain the actualized mass/energy/density of space as space14 which has not yet 
been converted to enduring particles; and it contains virtual particles15 that 
become actual particles for only a tiny fraction of a second before being annihi-
lated by their antiparticles. It also may contain the "Higgs field" that interacts 
with electrons to give them mass. 16 Charles Misner, Kip Thome, and John A. 
Wheeler thus describe the vacuum state: 
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No point is more central than this, that empty space is not empty. It is the 
seat of the most violent physics. The electromagnetic field fluctuates. 
Virtual pairs of positive and negative electrons, in effect, are continually 
being created and annihilated, and likewise pairs of mu mesons, pairs of 
baryons, and pairs of other particles. All these fluctuations coexist with the 
quantum fluctuations in the geometry and topology of space. 17 
The physical vacuum of "empty" space is not just vacuous nothingness. 
"Empty" space itself is not empty; it has a fine-grained bubbly structure. It 
seethes with particles waiting to be born. It even has its own physical mass/ 
density. 18 Its measurable effects can push two metal plates together after all 
physical particles have been siphoned away. 
The Uncertainty Principle permits very short-lived suspensions of the 
Principle of the Conservation of Energy, so in "empty space" actual particles 
and antiparticles are constantly being born. Usually, they immediately lapse 
back into pure potentiality, or mutually annihilate one another. Occasionally, 
however, a particle gets away, Big Fizz theorists claim, though this has never 
been confirmed. Now and then, they say, one of these newly escaped particles 
or bubbles inflates spontaneously into an entire universe. This, too, has never 
been confirmed. These metaphysical claims are unabashed conjectures. 
C. Forever Blowing Bubbles 
Mother Spacetime also consists of bubbles or froth. 19 She spawns a really big 
fizz, an infinite number ofbubbles, interminable primordial foam. At its deepest 
level, spacetime itself is foamy or granular rather than smooth; but theorists are 
not clear about whether the bubbles are composed merely of space, or consist 
in the transient virtual/actual matter/antimatter particles that constantly arise. 
Big Fizz Cosmologists recognize that most bubbles do not inflate into 
entire universes; but, randomly, innumerable bubbles do inflate at the speed of 
light into self-contained worlds, some of which are mini and some maxi uni-
verses. Andrei Linde calls this "chaotic inflation." According to this theory, 
each mini-universe may subdivide into innumerable distinct mini-universes. As 
Linde puts it, "Instead of one single big bang producing a single-bubble Uni-
verse, we are speaking now about inflationary bubbles producing new bubbles, 
producing new bubbles, ad infinitum."20 In one way or another, Mother Space-
time gives birth to an infinite number of"child universes," as they are called by 
Alan Guth21 and Andrei Linde.22 
Progeny universes pinch off and become detached from one another, 
though in some instances wormhole tubes might link them, some speculate. 23 
Child universes are so far apart in Mother Spacetime that they cannot act caus-
ally on one another, even at the speed of light-except possibly through worm-
holes.24 In infinite Superspacetime, an infinite number of co-existent universes 
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could all be infinitely far apart. After birth, most child universes exist in com-
plete causal independence. Relativity theory defines simultaneous co-existence 
as mutual causal independence. Co-existing postnatal offspring universes live 
and move and have their being within the womb of Mother Spacetime, the 
Infinite Universe in the largest possible sense, without influencing one another. 
Within all-encompassing Mother Spacetime, they have spatiotemporal but not 
causal relations with one another. Only the Infinite Mother herself, if She is 
omniscient, can know their relative times and positions within infinite Super-
spacetime. 
Just be aware that all of this is wild, unconfirmed, and unconfirmable 
conjecture! Our universe is one such bubble-child, says the theory. Offspring 
universes begin with their own Bang. According to Andrei Linde, "If one 
wishes to reserve this name [big bang] for the first 'big bang' (if there was one), 
one may think about such names as a 'small bang' or 'pretty big bang. "'25 
Viewed from within, each child universe seems to be everything, for it cannot 
contact its brothers and sisters and is not at all sure that they even exist. After 
its spontaneous generation by Mother Spacetime, a child universe may expand, 
contract, expand, contract, forever. Linde describes such an oscillating universe 
as "an infinite chain reaction of creation and self-reproduction which has no end 
and which may have no beginning."26 Linde emphasizes closed oscillating 
universes, but if Mother Spacetime actualizes all possible universes, she must 
also include all possible open, flat, and non-oscillating universes. 
D. Spontaneous Fluctuations 
Supposedly, spontaneous fluctuation is Mother Spacetime's mechanism for 
world-making. The Uncertainty Principle in quantum theory says that the behav-
ior of entities at the atomic and sub-atomic quantum level is random, indetermi-
nate, and unpredictable. Quantum-size entities (sub-atomic particles or wav-
icles) cannot simultaneously exemplify velocity and locus and are not bound by 
rigid causal bonds. Even "empty space" has a tenacious case of the jitters. 
Unpredictable spontaneous deviations are the rule, not the exception. No hidden 
variables exist to restore classical causal determinism and reduce physical 
indeterminacy to mere human ignorance or to uncertainties in the experimental 
situation. Quantum fields and particles in themselves are not fully determinate 
in position and velocity; they are not fully determined causally by conditions 
that we cannot find. Quantum entities fluctuate spontaneously and unpredict-
ably. No one can make accurate predictions about when individual molecules 
of radioactive elements will spontaneously disintegrate, or when particular 
electrons will jump orbits without passing through the intervening space, though 
en masse vast numbers of individually unpredictable events give rise to statisti-
cal regularities. 
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Big Fizz Cosmology avows that tiny bubbles form in the supercosmic 
physical vacuum through spontaneous fluctuations. Most bubbles in the primor-
dial fizz are stillborn. Others inflate into child universes, but not all at the same 
time, as Mother Spacetime might apprehend sameness and time. Universe-
producing bubble inflation is creative, spontaneous, random, unpredictable, a-
causal, and accidental. 
Child universes are almost, but not quite, created by nothing as well as 
from nothing in moderate Big Fizz Quantum Cosmologies. More extreme Big 
Accident Quantum Cosmologies, later considered, will take this final step; but 
moderate Big Fizz Cosmologists like Linde, Rozental, and Guth do not go this 
far. They hold that Mother Spacetime, the ephemeral energy of the physical 
vacuum of empty space, spontaneous energy fluctuations, and the laws of 
quantum physics, are necessary causal conditions for all Big Bangs. 
Causes are either necessary or sufficient conditions, or both together. In 
the absence of necessary conditions, effects cannot come to be; in the presence 
of sufficient conditions, effects must come to be. In Big Fizz theory, Mother 
Spacetime, quantum laws, quantum fluctuations, and the pure energy of the 
physical vacuum are necessary causal conditions for the spontaneous generation 
of all universes, including our own. In their absence, neither our universe nor 
any other would exist. Since its birth was in part spontaneous, our universe did 
not have a sufficient cause (unless it was the abstract Principle of Plenitude); no 
antecedent physical conditions were perfectly adequate for its emergence. Given 
Mother Spacetime, our universe is the ultimate manifestation of spontaneous 
creativity; but getting an enormous and magnificent universe like ours from 
nearly nothing may not be quite so easy. 
A. Karel V elan indicates that no actual particles or universes ever emerge 
spontaneously from a physical vacuum alone. Particle accelerators disclose that 
virtual particles become actual only in the presence of an actualized electromag-
netic energy field. lfhe is right, contingent actualities require additional external 
actualities for their being, even in a quantum multiuniverse. V elan indicates that 
an actualized primordial electronic radiation field must exist within the physical 
vacuum of Superspacetime itself if it is to spawn any universes, including our 
own. 27 This cosmic energy field, he thinks, is "the fundamental tool of divine 
power."28 
After next explaining and exploring Big Divide Cosmology, we will see 
that it and the Big Fizz suffer from common defects. 
2. Big Divide Many Worlds Cosmology 
Under the direction of John A. Wheeler, Hugh Everett, III wrote a doctoral 
dissertation in 1957 titled The Theory of the Universal Wave Function in which 
he developed the Big Divide many worlds interpretation of Quantum Cosmol-
ogy. This position was later expanded and defended in several of Everett's 
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published articles, and by Bryce De Witt and others. 29 More recent defenses and 
critiques are also available.30 
According to quantum physics, indefiniteness, discreteness, and spontane-
ity permeate entities at the atomic and sub-atomic levels. In many interpreta-
tions, quantum-size entities exist only in an indefinite, indeterminate wave-
function state; and they achieve definiteness only if something happens to 
collapse their wave-function. Prior to this collapse, all possibilities are on an 
equal footing. If and when its wave-function collapses, a quantum object then 
acquires definiteness and determination. In the theory of Quantum Observer-
ship, presented in a later chapter, wave functions collapse only when physical 
process are observed and measured; but in the Everett\DeWitt Big Divide 
theory, wave-functions never collapse. 
If wave-functions never collapse, why do we experience a definite and 
determinate world? Everett and DeWitt gave a peculiar answer. A wave-func-
tion is merely an infinite set of potentials or possibilities; and everything, large 
and small, including the universe, has one. Also, potentiality is identical with 
actuality in this perspective; so everything' sand everyone's infinite possibilities 
are somehow actualized. How can all the potentialities of every conceivable 
particle, person, life-fonn, thing, and cosmos be actualized? Actualization of 
infinite possibilities is a time-asymmetrical process; any universe divides into 
an infinite number of additional universes at every moment of time and every 
point of space. Once created, branch universes sprout branches, which also 
sprout branches-to infinity. Big Divide theorists do not call attention to them, 
but divisions must contain dead end branches that go nowhere, since these too 
are logically possible. 
We conscious observers experience a definite world every time we have 
a sensation or make a measurement or an observation. Conscious observers as 
!>Uch also divide endlessly at every moment into multiple copies, and these too 
actualize all possibilities. Everett focused primarily on infinite divisions of 
minds in a "many minds theory," but DeWitt emphasized infinite divisions of 
both minds and worlds. Every time we conscious subjects divide, the entire 
universe divides with us. For a fleeting moment, we observe a fleeting determi-
nate universe; but this does not mean that the infinite potentialities of our wave-
function have collapsed into one concrete actuality within one determinate 
universe. Instead, it means that we have suddenly and imperceptibly sub-divided 
or branched into an infinite number of observing subjects in an infinite number 
of new universes. Definiteness emerges from infinite potentiality because 
infinite partitions into endless branching universes actualize all possibilities for 
everything, from quarks to Quakers. 
Because "universe" may have more than one meaning, says Frank J. 
Tipler, Everett's Big Divide interpretation of quantum physics is often misun-
derstood. "Universe" may mean "all spatiotemporal reality;" but Everett's 
cosmology does not assert that all spatiotemporal reality constantly branches 
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into infinitely many worlds, Tipler says. In Everett's theory, "universe" refers 
only to the limited domain of observer and observed; and the theory affirms that 
"Only the observed/observer system splits; only that restricted portion of the 
universe acted on by the Measurement operation M splitg";31 but the unobserved 
portion of the universe does not split. 
Tipler's efforts to make an infinitely counter-intuitive theory less so do not 
succeed, however. Suppose that an observer tries to measure or observe the 
universe as a whole, the totality of spacetime, instead of just a restricted part of 
it. Then DeWitt's more extreme interpretation of the Big Divide becomes 
operational. Tipler himself concedes that "ifit is the radius of the Universe that 
is being measured, the first measurement of the universal radius will split the 
Universe into universes, which collectively have all possible radii."32 To avoid 
initial conditions, Tipler affirms that "The Universe consists of al/ logically 
possible universes";33 but that is just what the more extreme view espoused by 
Bryce DeWitt, and occasionally by Paul Davies, affirms all along. 
Quantum theorists disagree sharply about whether the indeterminateness 
found at microscopic atomic and sub-atomic levels carries over to macroscopic 
perceptible objects like rocks, houses, cats, and people. De Witt's variety of Big 
Divide Cosmology offers a peculiar solution to this problem. Schrodinger's cat 
illustrates both the problem and the weird solution that Big Divide many worlds 
cosmology adopts to account for relationships between microscopic and macro-
scopic worlds. 
A. Schrodinger's Cat 
Erwin Schrodinger proposed a notorious experiment in 1935 to demonstrate 
how imperceptible sub-atomic quantum events could have perceptible macro-
scopic effects. First, put a live cat and a bit ofradioactive material into a small 
box with a vial of cyanide that will be broken by a hammer if a Geiger counter 
detects the radioactive decay of just one atom. Assuming classical physics and 
a bit of common sense, if an atom decays before the cat in the chamber is 
examined a short time later, the experimenter will find a dead cat; but if an atom 
does not decay, the cat will be alive. So far, so good. 
However, the indeterminateness of quantum physics creates a profound 
paradox. Quantum theory, as some interpret it, says that an unobserved atom 
like the one detected by the Geiger counter is nothing in itself except a superpo-
sition or collection of all its potentialities. If we know the sum of its possibili-
ties, we can calculate the probability that an observer will find it in a particular 
determinate state; but, unobserved, it is largely, perhaps completely, nothing 
more than an indeterminate set of possibilities. 
So, what does quantum indeterminacy predict for Schrodinger's cat? The 
unobserved decaying atoms to be detected by the Geiger counter are nothing 
more than the sum of all their possibilities. A negative possibility corresponds 
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to every positive possibility. Possibly, any particular atom decays; possibly not. 
So, is the cat dead or alive? From the perspective of quantum physics, the 
macroscopic cat itself is also nothing more than a wave-function superposition 
of dead and alive states, both before and after the chamber is opened. Is the cat 
both dead and alive? Has quantum physics disproved the logical principle of 
non-contradiction, according to which a proposition cannot be both true and 
false? Has it shown, as some muddled mystics suggest, that Schrodinger's cat 
is both dead and not dead? Has quantum theory proved the truth of illogical 
irrationalism? 
B. Schrodinger's Cat in Many Worlds 
DeWitt's version of Big Divide Cosmology renounces illogicality for its own 
brand of logically consistent occultism. The Big Divide answer is that the cat 
is both alive and dead-in at least two different universes. When a trunk universe 
confronts alternatives, it branches into parallel universes to actualize all of them; 
so SchrOdinger's cat is alive in one universe and dead in another. The dead cat 
is in an infinite number of states of decay in an additional infinity ofuniverses, 
and the live cat is instantiated in an infinite number of life-states in yet another 
infinity of universes. This avoids contradiction, but the price of saving logic is 
very high! An infinite violation of the principles of parsimony and of the con-
servation of energy is required to produce an infinity of entirely new universes 
at every worldly impasse. Needless to say, De Witt's Big Divide Cosmology is 
not popular with most physicists. Richard A. Healey understates the situation: 
"Few working physicists take it seriously."34 
The paradox of Schrodinger' scat may have less drastic but still perplexing 
solutions. Less radical interpretations of quantum mechanics say that definite-
ness is achieved for microscopic events because their wave function collapses 
into determinateness when perceived or measured by an observer using a macro-
scopic measuring instrument. More radical DeWitt Big Divide Cosmology 
affirms that definiteness is achieved because world-division into infinitely many 
universes actualizes every possibility. The Quantum Observership option says 
that conscious measurement creates all definiteness; but before turning to it, we 
must consider problems that are common to both Big Fizz and Big Divide 
cosmological perspectives. 
3. Critique of World-Ensemble Cosmologies 
Difficulties for Big Fizz and Big Divide world-ensemble cosmologies focus 
around A. their lack of empirical foundations and B. their plenitudinal equating 
of actuality with possibility. These cosmologies are much more other-worldly 
than traditional theology. Their affirmation of other worlds and the Principle of 
Plenitude has no empirical basis whatsoever. 
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A. Lack of Empirical Foundations and Meaning 
In many respects, world-ensemble Quantum Cosmology is speculative theoreti-
cal science gone absolutely mad. Experience without theory is blind, but theory 
without experience is vacuous. We human beings have no direct experience of 
other antecedent or contemporary universes of any kind, including transcendent 
Mother Spacetime, the infinite froth or fizz in her womb, the co-existent uni-
verses she supposedly spawns, or the endless branches that each allegedly 
sprouts. No matter how ingenious they are, human scientists cannot experience 
infinitely extended time and space. This much is patently obvious. 
Big Fizz Cosmology's physical vacuum in pre-existing infinite Super-
spacetime is a product of pure theory and brazen speculation, but it is not 
delivered or confirmed by experience. Blau and Guth concede that "A false 
vacuum has never been observed. "35 Then they confidently proceed to give a 
theoretical account of it, as do other Big Fizz Cosmologists. Rozental concedes 
that it is not possible to check the validity of the Big Fizz creation scenario: "As 
far as a direct experimental verification is concerned, no approach is in sight";36 
but he anticipates that the development of theory alone will eventually solve the 
problem of the birth of our metagalaxy. 
This is precisely the difficulty. Big Fizz Quantum Cosmology is spun 
solely out of thin air, ponderous theory, intricate calculations, and audacious 
speculation. It touches base with experience much too infrequently, and on the 
most crucial issues, not at all. Theologians conjure up non-empirical cosmolo-
gies, and pure mathematicians do abstract calculations, but where is the empiri-
cal science in this Big Fizz version of Quantum Cosmology? 
When considering contingently existing things, entities that might or might 
not exist, experience alone can distinguish between actuality and abstruse 
possibility. Only highly dubious theoretical conjectures support many worlds 
Quantum Cosmologies. Michael White and John Gribbin say that Stephen 
Hawking, one influential sponsor of Quantum Cosmology, has never won the 
Nobel Prize because candidates for the award are considered 
only if a discovery can be supported by verifiable experimental or observa-
tional evidence. Hawking's work is, of course, unproved. Although the 
mathematics of his theories is considered beautiful and elegant, science is 
still unable even to prove the existence of black holes, let alone verify 
Hawking Radiation or any of his other theoretical proposals. 37 
Since this was written, the Hubble Space Telescope has located black holes, but 
no parallel universes. This shows the critical importance, not the unimportance, 
of balancing theory with experience, for both truth and meaningfulness. 
"Meaningful" has many meanings; and empirical meaningfulness is just 
one of many kinds. Meaninglessness logically correlates with meaningfulness. 
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No matter what we think of Logical Positivism, some beliefs really are empiri-
cally meaningless to us because no human experiences whatsoever could ever 
verify or falsify them. But claims may be empirically unverifiable or unfalsifi-
able in at least two ways. 
First, the possible referent of a proposition can be inaccessible in principle 
because we cannot imagine experiences in our world or elsewhere that would 
count for or against it. For Positivism, only sensory experiences count-not 
religious, moral, or aesthetic experiences. We can imagine sense experiences 
that would count for or against life in the Andromeda Galaxy, or even in other 
universes, though we have no practical way to get there; but we cannot imagine 
how to verify or falsify the proposition that nothing at all exists, because some-
one must exist to think the thought and make the relevant observation. We also 
can't imagine observing a thing that both is and is not itself; logic forbids it. No 
sensory images, the very stuff of positivistic science, correspond with many 
concepts widely employed in contemporary cosmology; we cannot imagine 
nothingness fluctuating, or what a singularity would look like. By positivistic 
standards, much of contemporary cosmology is utterly meaningless. The ulti-
mate limits of imagination are not fixed, however. 
Second, claims cannot be verified or falsified if the objects to which they 
refer are physically inaccessible to us because they allegedly belong to some 
other world or universe. We might be able to imagine what they would look like 
if they were accessible, if we were there; but since other worlds do not belong 
to our spacetime system, they are physically unavailable to us; no lawful causal 
or spatiotemporal relations link them to us. In this second sense, all propositions 
about other worlds, whether religious or quantum-cosmological, are unverifi-
able, unfalsifiable, and thus empirically meaningless to us. This second type of 
empirical meaninglessness is based mainly upon causal inaccessibility. No 
matter what we do or what experiments we perform while alive in this world, 
totally other worlds are inaccessible to us. This is true even if we could time 
travel back to the beginning or our own universe. We can imagine how state-
ments about Heaven, Hell, other worlds, antecedent universes, co-existing 
world-ensembles, and Mother Spacetime could be verified or falsified if we 
could only take an all-inclusive God's-eye view that encompasses them all; but 
we mortals just cannot get there from here (alive) to take a look. We cannot go 
to transcendent worlds, and entities and messages from them cannot get to here 
from there. Statements about other worlds are not accompanied by instructions 
on what to observe in this world to make them either plausible or implausible. 
In this second sense of verifiability, Big Fizz and Big Divide world-ensem-
ble cosmologies are perfect examples of vacuous or meaningless metaphysics 
gone mad. Empirically, we cannot know whether they are true or false. They 
literally make no sense to us. Alternate spacetime systems and their contents are 
physically inaccessible to us no matter what we do because they do not belong 
to our system of space, time, and causation; and they predict nothing about our 
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world that cannot be explained in much simpler and more obvious ways. We can 
perform no operations, make no observations, that would give us empirical 
access to what goes on in other worlds. 
A sturdy streak of Logical Positivism runs through most interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, but it is often applied with a highly selective bias. In 
quantum mechanics, statements about things that cannot be observed or mea-
sured no matter what we do-like hidden variables, photons spinning unob-
served, and electrons having definite position and velocity-are consistently 
dismissed as meaningless. Yet, by their own admission, Big Fizz and Big Divide 
metaphysicians posit the reality of innumerable entities belonging to other 
worlds that are totally inaccessible to us no matter what. 
Reflecting on Big Divide parallel universes, Hugh Everett, III wrote that 
the "total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that no observer 
will ever be aware of any "splitting" process,"38 and Bryce DeWitt claims that 
multiple worlds are "mutually unobservable but equally real."39 By positivistic 
quantum logic, however, unobservable multiple worlds should be just as unreal 
or nonsensical as all other states that are totally inaccessible physically, like 
simultaneous position and velocity for sub-atomic particles; and statements 
about them really should be regarded not as lies but as gibberish. 
Does purely theoretical system-building count as good natural science 
simply because brilliant scientists are doing it? Not so, suggests Eric Lerner, 
who correctly affirms that "The ultimate test of scientific theories is observa-
tion," and that legitimate scientists use an empirical method. By contrast, "The 
other method, advocated by mainstream cosmologists and particle theorists, is 
the deductive method, mathematically deducing how the universe must be."40 
Theory and experience are indeed mutually supporting in good science, but 
many versions of Quantum Cosmology go too far beyond anything experiential. 
Illustrative of Lerner's point, Heinz R. Pagels says that scientists once tried to 
deduce the laws of nature from experiment and observation, but "Today this 
method has been abandoned and physicists do not directly deduce the laws from 
experiment. Instead they try to intuit the basic laws from mathematical reason-
ing. "41 Sadly, theory and intuition alone cannot construct a true and meaningful 
account of contingently existing empirical actuality. Quantum Cosmologists 
easily confuse eccentric theory with empirical reality, variable private intuitions 
with public truth, and abstruse possibilities with determinate actualities. 
Not only is infinite world-ensemble metaphysics unverifiable and unfalsi-
fiable, but it also flagrantly violates the rational, scientific (albeit aesthetic) 
criterion of simplicity. As Abner Shimony says, "The continuous evolution of 
the total quantum state is obtained by Everett at the price of an extreme violation 
ofOckham's principle, the entities being entire universes."42 Richard A. Healey 
argues that the theory of many spacetime systems in Big Divide Cosmology 
"offers no interpretative advantages" over a theory which affirms that "all but 
one of the many worlds which emerge from a quantum measurement are merely 
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possible worlds." According to Healey, "The intuition behind the argument is 
just Ockham's razor: the many-spaces version postulates a proliferation of extra 
entities (spaces, "copy" quantum systems) with no corresponding gain in ex-
planatory power or conceptual clarity."43 Victor J. Stenger doubts that the 
"luminaries" who affirm the existence of infinitely many unexperienced coexist-
ing parallel universes actually believe it.44 He brands the many worlds parallel 
universe hypothesis as a "bizarre, nontestable notion"45 and pronounces it to be 
"uneconomical speculation."46 The claim that all possibilities are actual, when 
only one set will do for experience, is empirically untested, untestable, unneces-
sary, unintelligible, incoherent, and an inexcusable violation of parsimony. 
B. Possibility= Actuality, and World-Ensembles 
Many Quantum Cosmologists thoroughly confuse mental constructs with reality 
by identifying possibility with actuality. They catapult conceptually from mere 
possibilities to the actual existence of infinitely many worlds. Both Big Divide 
and Big Fizz world-ensemble cosmologists declare that all possibilities are 
actualized somewhere. Philosophical theologians, influenced by Plato's Princi-
ple of Plenitude, once regularly vaulted from possibility to actuality. Today, 
world-ensemble cosmologists make the same jump with wild abandon. 
As Arthur Lovejoy indicated, Plato believed that God would be imperfect 
if He actually created anything less than everything that He possibly could 
create.47 Equating possibility with actuality was a prominent feature of Greek 
and Medieval theology, and somehow it found its way into today's Quantum 
Cosmology. As Dennis W. Sciama expressed it in 1993, "All logically possible 
universes exist in an ensemble of disjoint universes,"48 and "Everything which 
is not forbidden is compulsory."49 Stephen Hawking agrees: "In quantum theory, 
anything that is not actually forbidden can and will happen."50 Many serious 
philosophical questions must be raised about such claims. How do these specu-
lative cosmologists know all possibilities are actualized? What is their observa-
tional evidence? Even if microscopic quantum-level events actualize all possi-
bilities, can Plenitude then be generalized to entire macroscopic universes? 
Where does the energy come from to actualize infinite universes? Is this really 
natural science? Or is it just sloppy reasoning, wishful thinking? 
Quantum physics unearthed a tenuous connection between possibility and 
actuality at the sub-atomic quantum level with the discovery that individual 
photons traveling through two nearby pinholes or slits seem to pass through 
both of them. From this finding, some physicists hastily concluded that physical 
particles do not move continuously along single paths. Instead, they take every 
route possible, that is, an infinite number ofroutes, to reach their objective.51 Of 
course, if a third slit is added to the two slit experiment, the photon will not go 
through all three of them, so there are very strict limits after all, even at the level 
of quantum events;52 and Quantum Plenitude cannot be reconciled with the well 
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established quantum truths that electrons can not take every orbit possible, that 
particles can not take every spin possible, and thus that everything possible can 
not be actual! 
Furthermore, equating actuality with possibility greatly exaggerates and 
distorts the "sum over histories" account of quantum processes, according to 
which most possibilitie~ simply cancel one another out, and only a finite number 
of paths are actually open to moving particles. But why don't all possibilities 
cancel out one another since for every "possibly so" there is always a corre-
sponding "possibly not"? Possibilities cannot be perfectly identical with proba-
bilities or with actualities. If they were, every coherent contingent possibility 
would be canceled out by its own negation-which is also logically possible. For 
every possible p, not p is also possible; for every live cat, a dead cat is also 
possible. For every live you, a dead you is possible. Clearly, not everything 
possible is actual in our world, so Quantum Plenitude has to postulate an actual 
infinity of worlds to make a place for the actualization of all possibilities. For 
many good reasons, we should repudiate Quantum Plenitude! 
Big Fizz and Big Divide Quantum Cosmologists really do take seriously 
the rule that everything actually occurs that is not logically forbidden. They 
extend this sweeping, hasty, and erroneous generalization from the sub-micro-
scopic level to the macroscopic level of everyday experience, ordinary sense 
objects, and entire universes. Rozental rejects the leap from the microscopic to 
the macroscopic,s3 but he still affirms the existence of infinitely many worlds. 
Leaping hastily from a sub-microscopic to a macroscopic identity of possibility 
with actuality, Quantum Cosmologists reason that since sub-atomic quantum 
level entities realize all possibilities (which is false to begin with, as just noted), 
then everything realizes all possibilities. All things that are logically possible are 
also actual, including universes. From a dubious interpretation of the mysterious 
behavior of photons, unbridled speculation conjures up infinitely many worlds! 
Theologians are left in the dust by such preposterous hasty generalizations and 
spectacular leaps of faith! 
According to Andrei Linde, 
The evolution of the inflationary universe has no end and may have no 
beginning. As a result, the universe becomes divided into many different 
domains (mini-universes) of exponentially large size, inside of which all 
possible (metastable) vacuum states are realized. One may say therefore 
that not only could God create the universe differently, but in His wisdom 
He created a universe which has been unceasingly producing different 
universes of all possible types. s4 
How many universes does it take to cover "all possible types"? Obviously, 
an infinite number.ss Since possibility equals actuality, an infinite number of 
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physically and qualitatively diverse universes really exist, according to Big Fizz 
and Big Divide infinite world-ensemble metaphysics. 
C. You and I in Many Worlds 
You may be thinking: "If possibility is identical with actuality, why ain't I 
rich?" You are, but only in another "parallel" universe, if that's any consolation. 
In many worlds Quantum Cosmology, new universes are spawned not only in 
the primordial fizz, but at every turn of events within every cosmos. The Big 
Divide version implies that when your past self confronted the possibility of 
being either rich or poor, the whole universe, yourself included, branched. The 
rich you entered at least one universe, and the poor you entered at least one 
other. If you are poor, there is a rich you, and if you are rich, there is a poor you, 
somewhere in another cosmos. Ain't that grand! Mother Spacetime knows! 
Serious problems about personal and cosmic identity abound here. If all 
possible universes exist that are not logically prohibited, then a real universe 
exists in which England won the Revolutionary War, the South won the Civil 
War, and Germany won both World Wars. A universe exists somewhere in 
which fundamentalistic creationism is true in every detail, and another universe 
exists in which it is false in every detail. In some universe, Hitler was a saintly 
born-again religious believer, and Jesus was the Devil incarnate! Surely anyone 
who believes this sort of thing has been sipping too much bubbly! 
Don't just take my word for it. In explaining the Big Divide outlook, Bryce 
S. DeWitt concedes that 
The idea of I 0 1oo+ slightly imperfect copies of oneself all constantly split-
ting into further copies, which ultimately become unrecognizable, is not 
easy to reconcile with common sense. Here is schizophrenia with a ven-
geance. 56 
Yet, DeWitt does not repudiate this multiple-world multiple-personality mad-
ness! He affirms it! Quantum Cosmology is quantum mechanics gone absolutely 
nuts! Eric Lerner ridicules and disavows what I call Big Fizz and Big Divide 
Quantum Cosmologies with these words: 
Some cosmologists, such as Hawking, answer with even weirder ideas: 
perhaps, they speculate, tiny pulsations in the space around us, even within 
us, are at every instant giving birth to submicroscopic universes, tiny 
bubbles of space-time, that then pinch off from our universe to form 
another universe. From every point, even the tip of one's nose, quadril-
lions of universes are forming every second. Ours is only one among them, 
formed presumably from the tip of someone's nose in another, more 
ancient universe.57 
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Quantum Cosmologists may not comprehend fully the absurd implications 
of their revitalized Principle of Plenitude that equates possibility with actuality. 
World-ensemble theorists repeatedly emphasize that even though an infinite 
number of universes exist, most are unsuitable for life of any form, especially 
intelligent life. The other side of this coin also needs to be emphasized. Though 
improbable, many logically consistent and thus possible worlds would be 
suitable for forms of life that far surpass the excellencies of any life-form on 
earth. Indeed, some such worlds would approximate, indeed achieve, perfection, 
no matter how conceived. World-ensemble metaphysics predicts that everyone 's 
concept of Heaven is actualized somewhere! So, by the way, is everyone's Hell! 
And every possible condition in between! And we (or copies ofus) are in all of 
them! We are also in none of them, since that too is logically possible. Does all 
of this make good sense to you? 
The small problem of getting from here to there, from earth to Heaven (or 
Hell) is really no difficulty at all if everything possible is also actual. Possibly, 
souls could be transported through wormholes to proper Big Fizz Beyonds. Or, 
as John Hick suggested, when we die in this world, God could simply recreate 
us instantly in another world-like being beamed up by Scotty! Or, as Frank 
Tipler maintains, the immensely complex computers of the future could just 
emulate our virtual reality, along with that of all other logically possible entities 
and events. If actualities and possibilities are identical, all of the foregoing 
possibilities would be actual in some universe: Because possible, therefore 
actual! Even God( s) and the Devil( s) must exist in all worlds if all possibilities 
are actual! Yet, if they are contingent beings, they may not exist in many or even 
in any worlds, for that too is possible! Patrons of cosmic plenitude really have 
not thought it through very carefully! 
Just how ridiculous can plenitude get? In his 1994 book, The Physics of 
Immortality, Frank Tipler contends that billions of years from now, the complex 
computers of the future will raise us (or our ciberspacetime virtual emulations) 
from the dead, once computer technology becomes sufficiently complex to 
create the virtual reality of all logically possible universes, individuals, and their 
relations. 58 Yet, because he accepts quantum many worlds metaphysics,59 Tipler 
need not wait even a second for what he calls immortality. In Big Divide Cos-
mology, Heavenly and Hellacious universes, with natural Jaws and empirical 
conditions sufficiently different to make them truly heavenly and hellacious, are 
created for each of us every instant! Is this not a fitting reductio ad absurdum 
of all varieties of infinite world-ensemble metaphysics? 
In sum, Quantum Cosmologies modify Standard Big Bang theory by 
postulating cosmic or supercosmic-level quantum conditions like indefiniteness, 
discreteness, fluctuations, the physical vacuum, and Superspacetime. Our 
universe was preceded by, and is included within, Infinite Superspacetime; and 
through quantum fluctuations in the primordial physical vacuum, the womb of 
infinitely many worlds, Motherspacetime endlessly proliferates bubbles and/or 
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branches that inflate or divide into full fledged co-existent child universes. 
These child universes themselves bubble or branch indefinitely to produce 
infinitely many additional universes that actualize all possible worlds with and 
without living things. 
Do Big Fizz and Big Divide Quantum Cosmologists really know what they 
are talking about? This is very doubtful. No one really knows that collapsed 
universes will exemplify quantum laws or conditions, or that tiny bubbles in 
transcendent Superspacetime inflate into real universes. What we do know 
indicates that these things are mere figments of human imagination gone wild. 
Other problems are also quite serious. Quantum Cosmologists confuse 
conceptual constructs and theories with reality. The Principle of Plenitude 
applied metaphysically affirms that all possibilities are actualized in an infinite 
number of universes; but this is scientifically groundless and logically incoher-
ent. No empirical evidence whatsoever discloses other universes constantly 
being created out of a primordial supercosmic fizz, or at every tum of events 
within or without our own cosmos. You and I could never see it happen. Frank 
Tipler correctly concedes that "We cannot see the other worlds of the Many 
Worlds Interpretation."60 This explicitly acknowledges that other worlds exist 
only in theory, and that there is no scientific, that is, empirical, evidence for 
them. So why mess around with them? 
We experience no antecedent or co-existing universes, no prior oscillating 
cosmic epochs, no contemporary worlds in transcendent Mother Spacetime, and 
no parallel universes branching from our own world at every instant. Timothy 
Ferris correctly acknowledges that "We have but a single universe to 
examine. "61 Like the Santa Claus fable, Quantum Plenitude explains nothing for 
which better, simpler, more empirical, more scientific explanations are not 
readily available. God might be able to collect empirical evidence for or against 
infinite worlds metaphysics, but we cannot. Empirically, we can only be Positiv-
ists or agnostics about the other-worldly ramifications of Big Fizz and Big 
Divide Quantum Cosmologies. Even so, we have not come to the end of it. 
Additional serious difficulties for many worlds metaphysics will be discussed 
in later chapters, especially in connection with Anthropic Cosmology. 

Six 
QUANTUM OBSERVERSHIP COSMOLOGY 
Conventional non-Everett quantum theoiy assumes that definiteness in and of 
the world results from wave-function collapse, and many Quantum Cosmolo-
gists tiy to apply such notions to the universe as a whole. Some Quantum 
Cosmologists affirm a veiy intimate relationship between physics and physi-
cists, between observers and things observed. This intimacy is much clearer at 
the level of microscopic quantum events than at the cosmological level of 
accounting for the origin of the universe. 
Quantum Observership says that if and when a physicist measures for the 
position of an electron, it then takes a position; if and when a physicist measures 
for its momentum, it then assumes momentum; since no observer can measure 
for both simultaneously, it cannot have both together. Sometimes sub-atomic 
entities behave like particles, sometimes like waves, depending on how observ-
ers perceive them. In themselves, apart from being observed, physical entities 
are nothing; the veiy concept is meaningless. They have no actuality in them-
selves; they are only bundles of possibilities. 
In Europe, Niels Bohr's "Copenhagen interpretation" of quantum mechan-
ics closely linked observer and observed. In the United States, John A. Wheeler 
and Eugene Wigner endorsed Strong Anthropic theories of Quantum Observer-
ship that emphasize the role of observers in resolving quantum uncertainty and 
indefiniteness. 1 Many experiments in quantum physics suggest that unobserved 
sub-atomic particles in themselves do not exist in a single definite state and that 
the process of being observed somehow affects what they are. 2 The two slit 
experiment indicates that individual photons seem to pass through two (but not 
three) separate slits at once. Other experiments indicate that the act of observa-
tion significantly affects the physical state being observed. 
As the stoiy goes, when two spinning particles are generated together, if 
one is observed to be spinning in one direction, the other instantly acquires the 
opposite spin, no matter how far away from the first it might be, or how Jong it 
has traveled to get there, or even if the decision about how to measure it is made 
after its departure. If widely separated particles that originated together are 
observed simultaneously (a difficult if not impossible feat), they do not have 
time to communicate; but they still have opposite spins. Quantum mechanics 
rejects as empirically meaningless the realistic position favored by Einstein that 
particles that originate together have opposite spins from the veiy outset and 
continue to have them while unobserved; whenever they are observed the 
viewer merely sees what has been there objectively all along. Instead, the 
correct spin supposedly comes into being because it is being observed; observa-
tion itself fixes the direction of spin of the second particle.3 In Quantum 
Observership, observation fixes all definiteness. 
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In John A. Wheeler's theory of Quantum Observership, physical particles 
in themselves are nothing more than indefinite probabilistic wave function 
superpositions of all possible states all at once. According to Quantum 
Observership, quantum systems take on definiteness or "collapse" only when 
they are observed. Only measurement by an observer using a macroscopic 
measuring instrument causes collapse. Wheeler illustrates the essential role of 
measuring observers in quantum mechanics with this anecdote. 
I like the story of the three baseball umpires relaxing over beer one after-
noon and comparing notes. One umpire says, "I calls 'em as I sees 'em." 
The next umpire says: "I calls 'em as they really are." The third one says, 
"They ain't nothin until I calls 'em."4 
According to Wheeler, in quantum mechanics "The observer is elevated from 
'observer' to 'participator. "'5 He calls the necessity forobservers in the universe 
the "Participatory Anthropic Principle." According to it, observers are essential 
for the very existence of the universe and all things within it. 
1. Observers Create the Universe 
Metaphysical Idealism asserts that only minds and their experiences and activi-
ties exist; it denies the objective existence of matter, claiming that material 
things exist only in being perceived. They do not exist in themselves but only 
in and as the experiences of observers. 
Most physics is realistic and assumes that observers have nothing to do 
with the objective existence of the physical world. By contrast, Quantum 
Observership is idealistic and presumes that observers have everything to do 
with the existence of the physical world. According to this theory, unobserved 
atomic and sub-atomic entities in themselves bear no resemblance to tiny bil-
liard balls. In themselves, they simply cannot be pictured. They are individuated 
and determinate only when observed. An unobserved world is nothing more 
than a set of sum-over potentials for all possible worlds and simply does not 
exist at all as a definite actuality. Eugene Wigner, who stresses the role of 
consciousness, claims that a definite world is brought into being only when its 
potentials are observed and measured by conscious beings. 6 Quantum mechanics 
thus appears to vindicate John Stuart Mill's dictum that the physical world in 
itself is nothing more than a set of "permanent possibilities for perception." 
In quantum theory as Wheeler and Wigner interpret it, the being of physi-
cal entities consists in their being perceived. Wheeler explicitly links quantum 
mechanics with Bishop Berkeley's "To be is to be perceived"7 and says that in 
quantum mechanics "The universe would be nothing without observership as 
surely as a motor would be dead without electricity. "1 All empirical evidence for 
the Big Bang is created by observership, and so is the Big Bang itself. 9 
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Observers create the world by experiencing it and reflecting upon it. 
Wheeler says that "The observer is participator in genesis,"IO and "Observership 
brings the universe into being." 11 Thus, the world must be compatible with the 
existence of observers, for without observers there is no world. By extrapolating 
backwards from what we perceive to be happening now, we (and not God) 
create the past, the entire natural history of the universe from the very begin-
ning. So, what caused the Big Bang? We did, says Quantum Observership! 
2. Critique of Quantum Observership 
Quantum Observership, as just described, has serious problems that make it 
extremely implausible as an ultimate explanatory hypothesis. 
A. Incompatibility With Cosmic and Biological Evolution 
The main problem is that Quantum Observership requires our conscious exis-
tence long before we actually exist. Conscious observers like us create the Big 
Bang, but the Big Bang creates all conscious observers! Fred Hallberg rightly 
indicates that the theory is logically incompatible with plausible scientific 
accounts of cosmic and biological evolution, including human origins. Hallberg 
explains: 
Wheeler emphasizes that life and consciousness entails both biological 
evolution, and prebiological physical and chemical evolution ["Genesis 
and Observership," pp. 3, 5]. Yet all these fonns of evolution involve very 
specific interactions among highly individuated molecules. So his story 
seems to require specific, individuated events and entities before con-
sciousness is present to individuate them. 12 
A more plausible and realistic account says that innumerable physical 
structures and processes, including our galaxy, solar system, and planet existed 
for billions of years before we or any other conscious observers came into 
being. Just because observation affects the definiteness of quantum-level events, 
it does not follow that they have no definiteness at all when not being observed. 
Throughout fifteen billion years of cosmic evolution, the unobserved physical 
world in itself was sufficiently definite to do all the things that Big Bang Cos-
mology says that it did. The unobserved world evolved either from an initial 
singularity of nothingness or from minimal Planck dimensions through expo-
nential inflation (perhaps) to an astronomically vast cosmos, unpopulated for 
eons by any conscious observers. Definite physical forces like gravity, the 
strong nuclear force, the electromagnetic force, and the weak force, emerged 
from the original Grand Unification. As the universe expanded and cooled, a 
primordial soup of radiant energy and sub-atomic particles gave way to discrete 
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atoms, at first mainly of hydrogen and helium. Under the influence of gravity 
clouds of these gaseous atoms consolidated to form definite galaxies, stars, and 
planets. Unobserved atoms ofheavier elements, manufactured by nucleosynthe-
sis in supernovas, were sufficiently determinate to produce planets. On at least 
one planet, earth, definite molecules of carbon dioxide, water, ammonia, meth-
ane, and so, on eventually combined to produce DNA in living cells. Unob-
served living cells increased in complexity and definiteness and united with 
other cells to form complex multicellular organisms. After billions of years of 
evolution, some complex organisms became conscious observers. A few even 
became quantum physicists and cosmologists! 
Yet, according to Quantum Observership, only with the advent of con-
scious observers and measurers does nature in itself acquire any definiteness at 
all, even with respect to the instant of its origin in the Big Bang. Without a 
definite world, no conscious observers exist; but without conscious observers, 
no definite world exists! The idealistic interpretation of quantum physics found-
ers on this contradiction. John Wheeler recognized the problem, but he did not 
solve it. 13 He only perpetuates the contradiction when he writes, "Beginning 
with the big bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic 
development it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy in tum 
give tangible "reality" to the universe not only now but back to the beginning. " 14 
Richard Rorty says that realism, with its concerns for objective truth and 
objective existence, makes no practical difference, 15 but it does. Unless a highly 
definite universe existed objectively on its own back to the beginning, we would 
not be here; our being here cannot give the universe and our biochemical envi-
ronment a reality that our own existence presupposes. Quantum physics is still 
in its infancy, but one way or another it must overcome the paradoxical anti-
realism of Quantum Observership. 
Quantum physicists disagree on whether the physical world is completely 
indeterminate in itself, or only partly so. The complete indefiniteness of the 
Quantum Observership interpretation is extreme. In a less radical Critical 
Realism, the physical indefiniteness ofnature is only partial; the sensory modal-
ities of conscious observers add some kinds and degrees of definiteness to 
things perceived, but not all of it. 
Critical Realism can resolve the paradoxes and puzzles of Quantum 
Observership and still preserve the genuine advances of quantum physics, 
severed from the pretentious Idealistic Metaphysics with which it is too often 
associated. If physical things in themselves are individuated and definite to a 
high degree, but not completely so, conscious observers would not be required 
to structure the physical world. The sensory modalities and mechanisms of 
conscious observers may add something, but not everything, to what is given 
perceptually; observers do not create what exists in itself. A partly realistic 
position must try to tell us which is which-which properties are objective, and 
which are mind-dependent. 
Quantum Observership 145 
Realism says that a largely detenninate physical world exists in itself apart 
from conscious observation; we perceive certain sensory properties because 
physical things actually have them and cause us to perceive them. True percep-
tions accurately reflect objective properties, but illusions and false ones do not. 
True beliefs accurately describe objective realities, but false beliefs characterize 
them incorrectly. Realism comes in many varieties. For Naive Realism, objec-
tively existing things have all of the properties that we perceive them to have; 
but a long tradition of Critical Realism dating back to the Greek Atomists, and 
resurrected by the originators of modem natural science in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, takes a less extreme view. Critical Realism has many 
contemporary defenders. 16 It traditionally asserted that "secondary" properties 
of perceived objects like their color, taste, odor, sound, and perceived tempera-
ture are "subjective" or mind dependent; they are added to our percepts by our 
own creative perceptual modalities and do not exist objectively in nature itself. 
However, the "primary" physical, spatial, or spatiotemporal properties of things 
like their size, shape, weight, position, resistance, and motion exist both in our 
perceptions and objectively in things perceived. Primary properties are the 
metric or mathematically measurable and quantifiable characteristics of physical 
things, both in themselves, and as perceived. Our attempts to observe o'r "mea-
sure" quantum-level occurrences always changes their properties, but this does 
not imply that they have no properties at all when we are not observing them. 
In idealistic Quantum Observership, primary qualities are just as mind-
dependent as secondary qualities. Idealistic interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics may even border on Positivism, arguing that it is meaningless to postulate 
the objective existence of any unobserved physical entities and processes in 
themselves, even their primary properties, because, obviously, we can never 
observe or even imagine observing such things. As Werner Heisenberg indi-
cated in his Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics, 
In modem physics, atoms possess geometrical qualities in no higher de-
gree than color, taste, etc. The atom of modem physics can only be sym-
bolized by a partial differential equation in an abstract multidimensional 
space. Only the experiment of an observer forces the atom to indicate a 
position, a color and a quantity of heat. All the qualities of the atom of 
modem physics are derived, it has no immediate and direct physical 
properties at all, i.e. every type of visual conception we might wish to 
design is eo ipso faulty. Quantum theory made the atom into something 
inaccessible to our senses or our imagination, unlike objects within our 
daily experience. An atom or, more correctly, an electron no longer dis-
plays 'in itself' ('an sich') even the simplest geometrical and mechanical 
properties but it shows them only to the extent to which they can be made 
accessible to observation by external interference. 17 
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In 1954, Wolfgang Pauli attacked the "hidden variables" of Einstein's 
physical realism by saying that "One should no more rack one's brain about the 
problem of whether something one cannot know anything about exists all the 
same than about the ancient question of how many angels are able to sit on the 
point of a needle." 18 Quantum Positivism regards all speculation about what 
things are when we cannot observe or know them as meaningless. 
Actually, we should rack our brains about whether the physical stuff of the 
world existed objectively in relatively detenninate physical states for billions of 
years before conscious observers evolved. This must be so, or we physical, 
biological, and embodied observers would not exist! Quantum Observership's 
metaphysical dogma that atomic and sub-atomic physical entities are nothing 
more than infinite sets of indetenninate possibilities until they are consciously 
observed must be renounced, along with Idealistic Metaphysics, if we are to 
have a plausible scientific account of cosmic and biological evolution. 
The obvious solution is that quantum entities in themselves are not just 
infinite sets of potentialities for definiteness. Quantum Critical Realism holds 
that they contain within themselves a high degree of definiteness inherited from 
the past, combined with a finite set of potentials or possibilities for further self-
detennination. Real wavicles are both relatively detenninate particles as well as 
waves, not just totally indetenninate "wave functions" alone. 
B. Idealism vs. Realism 
Idealistic interpretations of quantum physics must answer this fundamental 
question: What causes observers to have sensory experiences? For the realistic 
dualist or materialist, matter does the job. For Bishop Berkeley, God, not matter, 
produces all our sensations. For Kant, totally unknowable things or realities in 
themselves (which are not supposed to cause anything because only appearances 
can be causes) cause our sensory experiences. For the skeptic David Hume, our 
sensations are of"unknown origin." 
Quantum Observership cannot explain how infinitely complex sets of pure 
possibilities, totally lacking the power of actual beings, can act upon the sensory 
organs, nerve cells, and brains of living biological observers like us and cause 
us to perceive one definite and common world. In fact, it cannot account for the 
objective existence of sense organs, much less cells, and brains! How can the 
absolutely indetenninate bring about the partly or completely detenninate? How 
can pure possibilities be efficient causes? How can living biological observers 
have definite sensory organs, nerve cells, and brains ifthe unobserved physical 
world has no definiteness in itself? Quantum Observership has no good an-
swers. In Idealistic Metaphysics, nerve cells and brains exist only as relatively 
infrequent objects of perception, but not in themselves. In light of what contem-
porary physics has revealed, how should we conceive of the physical or material 
world? 
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i. Critical Realism and Quantum/Relativity Matter 
Quantum Observership aspires to be anti-metaphysical; but it is both epistem-
ologically anti-realistic and metaphysically idealistic. Thoughts and macroscopic 
sensory experiences are everything. No actual determinate world in itself exists 
below the level of macroscopic observables, not even one of primary properties; 
and there are no objective answers or scientific truths because there are no 
independently existing objects. In Quantum Observership, no objectively exist-
ing world of space/time/mass/energy exists; no atoms, protons, electrons, or 
other particles or wavicles exist objectively in and of themselves. Since they 
don't exist at all in themselves, they do not have even partly definite size, shape, 
position, weight, resistance, velocity, and momentum (which is mass multiplied 
by velocity). Thus, our questions about independent realities have no correct 
answers. Correspondence theories of truth and perception are rejected. Con-
cepts, propositions, and sensations have no objective referents; they merely 
cohere with other concepts, beliefs, and experiences over time; or they fail to 
do so. Being consists in being perceived, nothing more. Truth consists in coher-
ence with other beliefs, not with correspondence to reality. 
Critical Realists, by contrast, think that a real world exists beyond our 
perceptions, and that it closely resembles the spatially extended and mathemati-
cally measurable qualities of our sensations. Scientific and cosmological beliefs 
refer to this real world. True empirical beliefs describe correctly an objectively 
existing world of space/time/mass/energy; false beliefs misdescribe it. In mod-
ern chemistry, electrons and protons in themselves are often said to lack second-
ary qualities of color, taste, odor, and sound; but they still have primary proper-
ties of size, shape, weight, resistance, velocity, and momentum. Yet, in critically 
realistic quantum physics, the objective reality of these properties cannot be 
exactly what they were conceived to be in pre-quantum classical physics. 
Before quantum theory, classical particle physics was Newtonian in spirit. 
The primary properties of subatomic particles were thought to be exactly like 
those of billiard balls, only smaller. All the way down to the smallest particles, 
Newtonian matter in itself possessed primary qualities in a fully definite and 
determinate manner. By contrast, in Quantum Critical Realism, some of the 
primary properties of quantum matter exist only indefinitely, indeterminately, 
by degrees, and relative to prehenders or measurers (who need not be conscious 
beings). 
The Whiteheadian concept of"prehension" is fruitful and illuminating in 
understanding quantum matter. Prehending is the temporal process of grasping 
something or taking it in experientially. Prehenders are temporally experiencing 
or prehending subjects or momentary occasions of experience that take data 
from past events into themselves and actively process this received information 
in a variety of ways. Perishing past events causally transmit or imbue what they 
can of themselves into their successors, which actively receive, integrate, and 
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thus prehend that data into themselves. They make their own fleeting creative 
contribution to ongoing reality and perish themselves, to be pretended in turn 
by their own temporal successors. 
Consider ten important contrasts between classical and quantum matter. 
They differ significantly with respect to ( 1) definiteness/indefiniteness of spatial 
extension, (2) definiteness/indefiniteness of position and motion, (3) definite-
ness/indefiniteness of location, (4) continuity/discontinuity of existence, (5) 
causal determinateness/indeterminateness, ( 6) internal vacuousness/sensitivity, 
(7) local/non-local causation, (8) absolute/relative spatial properties, (9) abso-
lute/relative temporal properties, and (lO)organic holistic unrelatedness/inter-
relatedness. 
( l) Definiteness/indefiniteness of Spatial &tension. Classical electrons, 
protons, and other particles had fully definite spatial extension, that is, size, 
shape, and position, at all times; but quantum particles have merely a fairly 
definite size, shape, and position-but only when they lack definite momentum 
and velocity, and only when some measurement or prehension (which need not 
be conscious) somehow takes account of just those properties. When we know 
a particle's pace of passage, we cannot know its place. When it has a definite 
place, it cannot have a definite pace. Data about pace and place cannot be 
prehended simultaneously. Realistically construed, they cannot exist simulta-
neously. How we or other non-conscious prehenders try to "measure" for them 
partly determines what they can be. 
(2) Definiteness/indefiniteness of Position and Motion. Classical physical 
particles had a fully definite and discoverable velocity and momentum at all 
times, but quantum particles have merely a fairly definite velocity and momen-
tum at best-but only when they lack full definiteness in size, shape, and posi-
tion, and only when something prehends, takes account of, or experiences just 
those aspects of their motion. When we prehend a particle's place, we cannot 
know its pace; particles cannot be, or be prehended as, simultaneously definite 
in both ways. The idea is odd, but physical reality just is odd. Things are what 
they are only interrelationally; but these interrelations exist objectively, not 
merely within consciousness, says Quantum Critical Realism 
(3) Definiteness/indefiniteness of Location. Classical physical particles had 
what Alfred North Whitehead called "simple location," a fully definite, determi-
nate, and independent spatial position or locus at all times, but quantum physical 
particles behave like ''wavicles," being spread or smeared out over small but 
indefinite regions of space at any given time and at different times. Particle 
aspects of quantum-level entities that constitute societies of successive events 
are always accompanied and guided by wave aspects. In two-slit experiments, 
the waves go through both slits, even though the particles go through only one. 
String theorists speculate that the smallest and most basic constituents of matter 
are very short and small looped (in most versions) strings of energy. Every 
string, qua string, in every kind of particle is exactly like every other; and 
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differences between kinds of particles result from differences in the vibrational 
frequencies and amplitudes of the tiny strings in their cores. 19 String theory, 
currently unverified, says that all the observed properties of the physical world 
can be explained if under different conditions these too-small-to-be-observed 
strings undulate, ball up, tie knots, disappear and reappear, resonate harmoni-
ously (or disharmoniously) with other strings, and are otherwise sensitive to 
their environments. These issues need not be settled here; at present, string 
theory is little more than an intricate mathematical game with little or no empiri-
cal grounding. For the moment, we note simply that rapidly and constantly 
vibrating strings, or smeared out particles and wavicles, could never have the 
definite independent locus of substantively enduring pointlike classical parti-
cles. They may essentially lack other kinds of definiteness as well. 
( 4) Continuity/discontinuity of &istence. Classical physical particles were 
thought to exist without interruption and to move continuously through the 
infinitely divisible continua ofNewtonian space and time. Electrons, for exam-
ple, moved smoothly through the infinite number of points into which their 
supposedly perfect circular orbits are divisible. By contrast, quantum particles 
exist and move only discontinuously from place to place without passing 
through the intervening spaces, and the orbits to which they are restricted are 
broad shells, not perfect circles. When a photon is added to an orbiting electron, 
the "excited" electron prehends this addition, then jumps up to the next allow-
able orbit-like region without traversing the quantum-forbidden space that 
separates allowable orbits. Then, almost immediately, but we can't predict 
exactly when, it may throw off the photon and jump back down without passing 
continuously through the intervening space between orbit-like-shells. Something 
similar happens when an electron or any other particle moves forward within its 
own orbital shell or quantum-permitted region. Its particle features move for-
ward as so many periodic and discontinuous pulsations of energy, unpredictably 
here, unpredictably there, somewhere within the tiny region of its orbit-like 
shell, but never in an exactly circular or linear path. Whitehead, who neglected 
its wave-like features, compared an electron's orbit to the travels of an automo-
bile that appears only at milestones but nowhere in between! 20 Sten Oldenwald 
says that physical particles play "a hop-scotch game to avoid gaps where space-
time doesn't exist."21 Physical particles endure through time only as so many 
successively pulsating repetitions and ongoing prehensions of their particular 
kind of particle/wave/string patterns-electron forms, proton forms, photon 
forms, and the like. 
(5) Causal Determinateness/indeterminateness. Causal determinism was 
believed to be complete for classical physical particles. In rigid conformity to 
exact and efficacious physical laws, all motions and changes made by classical 
physical particles followed exactly from necessary and sufficient antecedent 
formal and physical conditions and were in principle susceptible to absolutely 
precise mathematical measurement. If the positions and velocities of all particles 
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were known, everything could be predicted. By contrast, quantum particles, 
lacking absolute positions and velocities, are not fully and predictably deter-
mined by and knowable from quantum laws and antecedent physical conditions. 
Every mathematically measurable quantity of physical entities is susceptible to 
unpredictable fluctuations or perturbations. Neither we nor an ace predictor like 
God can tell or predict when individual particles will change orbits, exactly 
where they will appear next within broad-band orbital shells, which slits they 
will go through, the directions in which they will fly when scattered, or exactly 
which ones will decay and produce atomic radiation. Quantum uncertainty, 
indeterminateness, and spontaneity pervade all physical reality. By their erratic 
behavior, vast numbers of individuated quantum-size entity/events create quan-
tum laws, which merely summarize formally and probabilistically both their 
collective regularities and their individual eccentricities. Formal laws as such 
exert no efficient causality of their own. The laws ofnature are epistemologic-
ally useful but ontologically powerless. 
(6) Internal Vacuousness/sensitivity. Classical physical particles were 
internally inert, solid, vacuous, and fully actual; but quantum wave/particles are 
at best only partly determinate internally, and they are environmentally sensitive 
and reactive. In part, they are indeterminate sets of possibilities in process of 
becoming fully actual. Each ofa wavicle's fleeting pulsations of energy in some 
unconscious way takes on or prehends a determinate form (electron, photon, and 
so on) inherited from immediately past pulsations, and each projects this form 
into the future as it perishes in time. Wave/particles are not internally inert, 
solid, impenetrable, and vacuous; they take their own immediate constitutions 
and past and future environments into account in deciding what to do or what 
to become next. All physical wave/particles experience and are internally 
sensitive to their external environments, at least unconsciously. They know what 
kind of wave/particles they have been in the past. As they confront the future, 
they internally take into account not only their own past but that of their wider 
environment. What wavicles are and what they do is largely constituted by their 
relations. Protons, neutrons, electrons, and other particles know when they are 
and when they are not located within atoms; they know one another's natures 
and whereabouts; and they behave themselves accordingly. Photons, electrons, 
and other wave/ particles seem to know whether or not they are surrounded by 
and partly composed of waves; they respond actively when photon quanta are 
attached to themselves; they are aware of how their twin particles are spinning. 
When they are confronted by the environmental prospect of going through either 
one slit or two, they know the difference in advance and behave accordingly. 
Based on earlier work by Louis de Broglie and David Bohrn, John S. Bell 
offers a highly plausible realistic but relational solution to the particle-wave 
dualism inherent in the two slit experiment: 
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A particle passing through just one of two holes in a screen could be 
influenced by waves propagating through both holes. And so influenced 
that the particle does not go where the waves cancel out, but is attracted 
to where they cooperate. This idea seems to me so natural and simple, to 
resolve the wave-particle dilemma in such a clear and ordinary way, that 
it is a great mystery to me that it was so generally ignored. 22 
The idea that all elemental particles are accompanied and perhaps even guided 
by waves is now widely accepted in quantum physics, as expressed in the very 
concept of "wavicle." Realistic objectivists like David Bohm and B. J. Hiley 
completely repudiate the wave-function-collapse account of quantum-level 
definiteness. They contend, probably correctly, that most of the dither about 
definiteness resulting only from collapsing wave functions just ignores the fact 
that wavicles are particles as well as waves. Wave collapse conundrums assume 
incorrectly that in themselves wavicles are nothing more than indeterminate 
waves and forget that they are also particles bearing their own definiteness. 23 
Bohm and Hiley contend that in a two slit experiment, the particle definitely 
goes through one slit, we know not which, while the accompanying wave goes 
through both slits. 24 
(7) Local/non-local Causation. Classical Newtonian material particles 
were also externally inert, naturally at rest, utterly incapable of self-initiated 
motion or of being moved by distant entities. They could be moved only me-
chanically by other external physical entities with which they were in direct 
physical contact. Both Newton and Einstein were horrified by the thought of 
what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance." 
But isn't gravity action at a distance? Not for Newton! Gravity, for New-
ton, was not a physical force; it was a divine force. It was a manifestation of 
God's direct activity in moving non-contiguous objects lawfully in relation to 
one another. Through gravity, God moves otherwise immovable material objects 
that are separated from one another by distance. 25 Later atheistic Newtonians 
conveniently ignored this feature of classical Newtonian matter/gravity. Ein-
steinian gravity also involves no action at a distance; it consists of curvature of 
space emanating directly and with continuity from mutually attracting entities. 
In contemporary quantum physics, wavicles are neither externally inert nor 
internally vacuous. They never exist in inert independence. Action at a distance 
is allowed, indeed required. Wavicles are definitely not internally vacuous. 
Information is integral to their internal existence, for they can somehow antici-
pate the presence of two slits before they get there. They are aware of open 
alternatives and in some primitive way can choose among them. In quantum 
non-locality (explained more later), information about what happens to one 
wavicle is instantaneously transmitted to and registers with another, perhaps at 
great distances. 
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(8) Absolute/relative Spatial Properties. Classical particles existed in 
absolute Newtonian space and time, which were supposed to be uniformly the 
same throughout the whole universe. By contrast, when combined with relativity 
theory, quantum particles have only a relativistic locus in Einsteinian spacetime. 
They are constituted by their spatiotemporality. Their primary spatial properties 
of size, shape, resistance to change, position, and momentum vary immensely, 
depending on how other events prehend them and on the speed with which they 
and their accompanying spacetime frames are being accelerated through the 
universe. A spaceship accelerated to the speed of light would flatten out; its 
mass would increase to infinity; and it would offer infinite resistance to further 
increases in speed, which is why acceleration to or beyond the speed of light is 
so implausible. Approximations to the speed of light would be approximations 
to infinity. No matter what its speed, a Newtonian spaceship, by contrast, 
would always have exactly the same size, shape, mass, and inertia; but over-
whelming evidence now indicates that ours is not a Newtonian world. 
Aristotle defined change or motion as "transition from potentiality to 
actuality," but this idea never gave rise to a single mathematical formula that 
empowers human beings, scientists in particular, for prediction and control. 
Modem mathematical physics began when Galileo replaced Aristotle's qualita-
tive definition with a quantitative definition. Motion or velocity equals the space 
or distance traveled divided by the time required for the trek: v =sit. Thus, if we 
travel a hundred miles in two hours, our speed or velocity is fifty miles per hour; 
and if we travel sixty miles in three hours, our velocity is twenty miles per hour. 
This formula, in which velocity varies with differences in time or distance, 
works perfectly well with everything except the speed of light. The speed of 
light in an invariant absolute in an otherwise relativistic universe. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, physicists James Clerk Maxwell 
and Albert A. Michelson considered the speed of light and made some remark-
able discoveries that paved the way for Einstein's insight that light is a universal 
constant and does not vary in speed with variations in distance and time. Be-
cause the speed of light is constant, space and time cannot be Newtonian abso-
lutes, so Einstein proclaimed in his "Special Theory of Relativity" in 1905. 
Time and temporal processes would proceed at the same pace everywhere 
and at every speed if Newton had been right. In fact, however, one earthbom 
twin traveling for an interval on a spaceship at close-to-light speed would be 
much younger when she returned than the twin who remained on earth. The 
physical clocks in her spaceship and her own biological clocks would slow 
down in proportion to accelerated speed. The speed of light can be constant at 
all speeds only if primary properties of size, shape, mass, resistance, mass, and 
time itself vary with speed. Classical matter possessed primary properties 
absolutely; but collectively if not individually, quantum matter possesses them 
only relative to acceleration. Time slows down and mass increases as velocity 
increases, and its pace is faster as mass and velocity decrease. 
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Since the pace of time itself is affected by the speed with which a space-
time frame flows through the universe, are our cosmological calculations con-
cerning the age of the universe affected? Would other observers at other speeds 
get more than, or less than, fifteen billion years for the age of the universe? 
Does the universe have this age only from our own relative vantage point? 
Probably so, in answer to all of these questions; but the world of nature 
manifests much more uniformity than popularizes of relativity often lead us to 
believe. We have learned in recent years that a uniform microwave background 
is universally accessible; and its constancy could function as a uniform frame 
of temporal reference for all space travelers. 26 Light is not the only form of 
energy with the constancy of the speed of light; all electromagnetic radiation 
travels at that speed. Quantum non-locality, which we haven't learned to put to 
practical use, instantly connects distant parts of the universe. The basic struc-
tures and laws of nature are the same no matter how fast anyone is going. 
Any observers moving at any speed anywhere in the universe should be 
able to view the overall structure of the universe and determine that it came into 
being at some point in the finite past. Without being able to correlate their 
watches and their calculations perfectly, all intelligent beings within the uni-
verse should be able to discover the Big Bang and conclude that our universe 
was created a finite while ago. 
The universe-wide instantaneous action at a distance of quantum non-
locality restores additional physical meaning to cosmic simultaneity, despite our 
inability to use non-locality to send instant messages to observers elsewhere in 
the universe. Still, all intelligent observers scattered throughout the universe 
should be able to discover that the Big Bang happened, though if they could 
communicate they might not be able to agree about precisely when it happened. 
(9) Absolute/relative Temporal Properties. Classical matter possessed its 
spatial properties in complete independence of time. Newtonian space and time 
were completely independent of one another and of the material masses within 
them. If the temporal duration of an electron were cut infinitesimally thin, it 
would still fully possess its definiteness of spatial size, shape, motion, mass, and 
so forth. But the complete independence of time, space, and mass do not apply 
to quantum/relativity matter. Minimal finite temporal durations, what Whitehead 
called "specious presents," are required for the existence of any spatial proper-
ties at all, and minimal spatiality is required for the existence of any temporality 
at all. Spaces and times can be sliced infinitely thin by imagination or calcula-
tion, but no infinitesimals can actually exist. Nothing can really exist for less 
time than Planck time (I 0-43 second) or in less than Planck space (I 0·33 centime-
ters). To exist spatially as matter, as extended stuff, entities must also have some 
temporal or durational properties. In contemporary physics, time and space are 
inescapably interdependent, not totally independent as they were in classical 
physics. 
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10. Organic Holistic Unre/atedness/interrelatedness. Classical physical 
particles are what they are quite independently of all else. Since they exist 
contingently, they require causes; but they do not require anything else to be 
what they are. They can be isolated and studied quite independently of their 
relations with other things. By contrast, in quantum world-views, both micro-
scopic and macroscopic realities are what they are by virtue of their internal 
relatedness with other things with which they form interdependent wholes. 
Nothing requires only itself to be what it is. All properties are relational proper-
ties; holistic relations to other things are internal to the constitutions of all 
realities. All previously identified traits of matter involve organic relational 
wholes in which they parts are what they are by virtue of the measuring or 
pretending wholes within which they exist. Smeared out quantum-level entities 
have only relative but not absolute definiteness of spatial extension. When 
measured or pretended for definiteness of position and motion they have them 
separately but not together. Their precise location is relationally definite by 
degrees. They exist discontinuously in relational spurts. They are partly caused 
by the externalities that they internalize and are partly self-caused. They are 
internally sensitive and responsive to their surroundings. They are partly what 
they are by virtue of local and partly by non-local causation. They are consti-
tuted by their spatial and temporal relations, and these condition all their other 
properties. 
Thus, even matter is not what it used to be anymore! Commenting on 
Gilbert Ryle's characterization of mind/matter dualism as "the ghost in the 
machine," Paul Davies and John Gribbin tell us that "Today, on the brink of the 
twenty-first century, we can see that Ryle was right to dismiss the notion of the 
ghost in the machine-not because there is no ghost, but because there is no 
machine. "27 Today we see clearly that matter in the classical sense just does not 
exist at all. A critically realistic theory of perceptual correspondence to objec-
tive reality must be adjusted to take account of quantum/relativity physics. It 
must emphasize both the definiteness within holistic interrelatedness of, and the 
partial but not total spontaneity, indefiniteness, indeterminateness, and unpre-
dictability of, the depths of nature that physics has unearthed. 
Once proper adjustments have been made, matter still exists objectively 
and retains a great deal of definiteness in and of itself alongside its unpredict-
able self-creativity. Despite relativity physics and quantum measurement prob-
lems, as Victor J. Stenger notes, 
Many properties of matter are fixed and, for practical purposes permanent. 
They can be determined without their respective measurements interfering 
with one another. These include rest mass, electric charge, magnetic 
momentum, and spin. Material bodies possess many unambiguous features 
that are not the slightest bit ephemeral. 28 
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In a similar vein, Holmes Rolston, III indicates, 
We must not be overwhelmed with this relativity of everything, for many 
things are not observer-dependent. The equations, the basic laws are 
invariant. Some of the physical constants ofnature-the speed oflight, the 
charge on an electron, or the number of atomic shells, the atomic table, 
chemical reactions, and so on-will presumably be the same for all observ-
ers, as will ordinarily be the order of succession of causally related events. 
Thus, there is considerable objectivity in relativity theory. 29 
A partly or critically realistic interpretation of the physical world is possi-
ble if the primary properties of unobserved sub-atomic entities and processes are 
to some degree interrelatedly determinate apart from consciousness and transmit 
that determinateness to their successors, including our conscious sensory experi-
ences. In response to those quantum experiments indicating that observation of 
one photon affects the spin of another photon, Roger Penrose, who declares 
himself to be a realist,30 says, 
The best suggestion that I can make at this stage would be for a picture 
involving some sort of partially formed, partly bifurcating spacetime, 
where the nature of the spacetime has not been adequately resolved until 
the second photon observation has taken place.31 
If the contents of spacetime are partly formed apart from conscious observation, 
and if they correlate to that extent with conscious perception or prehension, 
partial or Critical Realism is correct. Quantum Critical Realism, adapted to 
quantum/relativity physics, still allows enough definiteness in objectively 
existing nature to account for cosmic and biological evolution. This is probably 
the best available argument for the truth of Critical Realism. 
Most physicists have not abandoned realism for an idealistic metaphysics, 
despite the advances and challenges of quantum mechanics. Most cosmological 
theories are to some degree realistic. The Standard Model of Big Bang Cosmol-
ogy assumes that an objectively existing universe of space/time/mass/energy 
came into being between ten and twenty billion years ago. The Inflation modifi-
cation makes the same assumption but tries (successfully?) to make it more 
plausible. Infinite universe theories like Steady State and Plasma Cosmology 
affirm that an objectively existing universe of space/time/mass/energy is literally 
infinite-in itself-not just in our perceptions, thoughts, and theories. Antecedent 
Universe Cosmologies postulate objectively existing universes that preceded 
and caused our own. World-ensemble theories postulate an objectively existing 
Superspacetime that gives birth to many objectively co-existing universes, some 
perhaps erupting or branching from others. Most quantum and relativity physi-
cists and scientific cosmologists agree that space/time/mass/energy are insepara-
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hie; but they do not believe that they exist only in our experiences, thoughts, and 
theories. Quantum Observership contends that this quasi-realistic approach is 
all wrong; but for many reasons like those given in the preceding discussion, 
most physicists think that Quantwn Observership is all wrong. 
A few dissenting scientists and philosophers of science have subjectivist 
leanings, at least in their weaker moments. In 1983, a younger Paul Davies 
expressed antirealism when he wrote that "The commonsense view of the world, 
in terms of objects that really exist 'out there' independently of our observa-
tions, totally collapses in the face of the quantwn factor."32 In some of his 
moods, the early Albert Einstein surmised that space and time are ultimately 
unreal and exist only as human illusions. He came to this conclusion, not on 
scientific grounds, but because he subscribed to a Spinozistic metaphysics. 
Kantian idealism would give the same results. Later, Einstein vehemently 
opposed the idealistic, anti-realistic implications of Quantwn Observership. 33 
Quantwn Observership gives quantwn mechanics a robustly anti-realistic 
flavor, but most masters of quantwn mechanics are realists. To the suggestion 
that we should just follow the rules of quantum physics pragmatically without 
asking questions about reality or trying to form a picture ofreality, Roger Pen-
rose responds: "This seems to me to be wholly unreasonable. Physics, after all, 
constitutes our best way of groping for the true nature of the real world in which 
we find ourselves."34 Bernard d'Espagnat defines Realism as "the doctrine that 
regularities in observed phenomena are caused by some physical reality whose 
existence is independent of human observers."35 After thoroughly examining 
quantum experiments that intimate anti-realism, d'Espagnat concludes that 
abandoning realism 
trivializes the entire scientific enterprise. Science is reduced to a set of 
recipes for predicting future observations from a knowledge of past ones. 
Any notion of science as "the study of nature" is a phantom. One can 
imagine a physics grounded on positivistic principles that would predict 
all possible correlations of events and still leave the world totally incom-
prehensible. Given the extreme consequences of abolishing realism, one 
is inclined to cling to this premise. 36 
Reconciling Critical Realism with quantwn mechanics generates an odd 
picture of physical reality, as we saw in contrasting Newtonian with Quantwn 
concepts of matter; but Realists are willing to pay the price. Physical reality just 
is odd, says quantum/relativity theory. 
In 1964, John S. Bell demonstrated a fundamental incompatibility between 
the natural order of things disclosed by quantwn mechanics and Einstein's 
insistence on "locality,"-the belief that there can be no faster-than-light causal-
ity. Einstein called faster-than-light causality "spooky action at a distance." Bell 
insists, contra Einstein, that "Events at one place propagate to other places faster 
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than light. This happens in a way that we cannot use for signaling. Nevertheless 
it is a gross violation of relativistic causality."37 Many quantum theorists believe 
that non-local causality is the key to reconciling quantum theory with scientific 
Realism. Bernard d'Espagnat insists that messages really can travel faster than 
the speed of light. 38 Roger Penrose affirms both that there are faster-than-light 
correlations between entangled events and that photons really can be (partly) in 
two places at once.39 David Bohm and Basil Hiley4° defend realistic and deter-
ministic interpretations of quantum mechanics that allow for non-local faster-
than-light connections between events. Just before sending the final version of 
this book to my publisher, J discovered that John A. Jungerman explains non-
locality clearly and affirms it unequivocally on the basis of now abundant 
experimental evidence.41 
Not all realists accept non-locality. In his very thorough but somewhat 
technical defense of quantum realism, Henry Krips rejects non-locality in favor 
of hidden variables.42 In his very readable discussions of the topic, a skeptical 
Victor J. Stenger contends. "Now, after a series of precise experiments, the 
issue has been decided: hidden variables that are both local and real are ruled 
out" and "nonlocality exists only in theory" and cannot be confirmed experi-
mentally.43 The question of non-local causation does not have to be decided 
here, but the case for it is much stronger than Stenger suggests. There is proba-
bly something to it, and it must be considered carefully by anyone who wishes 
to understand the interconnectedness of things. 
Realistic quantum theory emphasizes the objective reality of fields as well 
as of waves and particles. Fields are objectively existing, invisible, colorless, 
regional sets of physical habits or dispositions with ill-defined borders; they 
require no medium of actualized waves or particles for their causal efficacy and 
reality; but they bear both information and energy; and these influence the 
wavicles within them. They inform, give form to, their components. Specialized 
regions, perhaps all regions, of space itself-some more than others-bear physi-
cal and formal properties that structure particle/wave events within themselves. 
Finally, a rigid causal determinism appears to reign supreme at the level 
of macroscopic entities encountered in everyday experience to which Newtonian 
physics applies; but at the level of quantum systems. both indeterminateness and 
indeterminism are the rules. Quantum events in themselves and in our percep-
tion of them are neither fully determinate nor fully indeterminate with respect 
to their primary spatial and temporal properties. They are neither fully deter-
mined by nor left completely undetermined by their causal antecedents. Quan-
tum Critical Realists are convinced that spontaneity is objectively real, not just 
an expression of human ignorance. Einstein was wrong when he decreed that 
"God does not play dice with the universe!" The universe plays dice both with 
itself, and with God. 
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ii. Observership and Causation 
A plausible scientific account of human origins must affirm that relatively 
definite physical processes existed objectively for billions of years before 
conscious observers evolved; yet, according to Quantum Observership, con-
scious observers contribute all definiteness to what is observed, and nothing 
unobserved exists at all. Quantum Observership must avoid this logical predica-
ment, which it cannot do; it must also explain the magical causal process by 
which conscious observation affects or creates physical entities and processes. 
Is all seemingly physical causation just another example of spooky action at a 
distance without a physical medium? Is energy really exchanged between 
observer and observed? Do conscious observers as such project photons or 
radiant energy onto other photons and particles to collapse their infinite poten-
cies into definite actualities of position or momentum? If so, could the projected 
photons or radiation be detected? Would this energy have enough definiteness 
of its own when not being observed to do its work? Or, as idealist Jonathan 
Edwards held, does God cause everything directly, while events and beings 
within the world, including human observers, cause nothing? Or do human 
observers without God simply create photons, electrons, other particles, and the 
universe itself ex nihilo in the very acts of looking for and finding them? How 
does this happen? Do conscious observers create the Big Bang in the very act 
of perceiving or conceiving the evidence for it, in something like the way in 
which God, in some versions of fundamentalistic "Creation Science" directly 
creates the fossilized bones of dinosaurs that never existed? If so, is Quantum 
Observership any more plausible than magical Creationism? 
iii. Ambiguities Involving "Observer" and "Measurement" 
In Quantum Cosmology, the meanings of "observer" and "measurement" are 
unclear. Quantum physics appears to divide the universe decisively into (I) 
observers (2) measuring instruments, and (3) observed or measured quantum 
events; but these are not sharp distinctions. What is an observer? Must all 
observers be conscious entities? Are observers themselves composed of quan-
tum events? Are their instruments composed of quantum events? 
In Quantum Observership, observers must be conscious-like human 
beings. Perhaps a conscious animal, a dog, or even Schrodinger's cat would do, 
but this is not always clear. What if a person instead of a cat had been in 
SchrOdinger' s box? Why couldn't the observer be an omni-observant God who, 
presumably, would always confer as much definiteness upon the world as it 
needs? Most physicists prefer not to appeal to God's existence or to conscious-
ness to solve physical problems. God might provide a perfect solution to the 
puzzles of Quantum Observership if most quantum physicists were not biased 
against Theism. Yet, conscious divine, human, or animal observers may not be 
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necessary at all for conferring definiteness upon quantum events. We cannot 
simply equate "observer" with "consciousness." 
In realistic interpretations of quantum theory, observers need not be 
conscious beings. Anything responsive to its environment will do. According 
to Werner Heisenberg, "It does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus 
or a human being."44 John S. Bell affirms that "The only 'observer' which is 
essential in orthodox practical quantum theory is the inanimate apparatus which 
amplifies microscopic events to macroscopic consequences."45 Observers may 
be unconscious measuring machines like Geiger counters or photographic 
plates. 
Definiteness-conferring observations need be nothing more than uncon-
scious physical processes taking account of or interacting causally and prehens-
ively with others. Scientific instruments functioning as unconscious observers 
are themselves composed of quantum-level physical processes. No sharp line 
separates microscopic and macroscopic processes and observers, even though 
our senses are generally responsive only to quantum-level events en masse. 
Victor J. Stenger indicates that detectors "need not be limited to the sensory 
apparatus of human beings or their scientific instruments. The term 'detector' 
can also encompass the particles in the environment surrounding the system."46 
Thus, one physical process pretending or interacting responsively with another 
is all that is required to confer physical definiteness. If all physical processes 
interact sensitively with other physical processes, the universe in itself, quite 
apart from conscious observers, would have all of the exactitude that Critical 
Quantum Realism attributes to it. As Abner Shimony puts it: 
When a physical variable which initially is merely potential acquires a 
definite value, it can be said to be actualized. So far, the only processes we 
have mentioned in which potentialities are actualized are measurements, 
but in a non-anthropocentric view of physical theory the measurement 
process is only a special case of the interaction of systems, of special 
interest to scientists because knowledge is thereby obtained, but not funda-
mental from the standpoint of physical theory itself.47 
Heisenberg, Bell, Stenger, Shimony, and other Quantum Critical Realists think 
that there is nothing special about either conscious observers or measurements. 
Popularizers of quantum mechanics like Paul Davies48 contend that definiteness 
is achieved at the level of microscopic wave-function events only as they col-
lapse when measured by conscious observers using macroscopic measuring and 
recording instruments. Schrodinger's cat really is in a dual alive-dead wave-
function state until a human observer reads the Geiger counter. John Bell, by 
contrast, maintains that notions like "observer" and "measurement" are so 
obscure that they cannot be fundamental for physics, and that there is no sharp 
line of demarcation between the microscopic and the macroscopic.49 Elemental 
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reflection will show that Bell is right. John Wheeler himself eventually came 
around: 
Let us not invoke either "consciousness" or "observer" as prerequisite for 
what in quantum mechanics we call the elementary act of observation. 
What counts as "observation" for the purposes of quantum mechanics is 
the irreversible act of amplification. It may not be clear how much amplifi-
cation is required.50 
The quantum-level domain seems to confer degrees of definiteness upon 
itself merely through causal interactions between quantum events, occasionally 
at speeds as fast as light, but usually not. Physical causation is always temporal-
istic and prehensive, but it is not rigidly deterministic. 
A significant degree of both definiteness and indefiniteness could exist in 
quantum events if, as Process Philosophy affirms, partly indeterminate events 
in their present moment of immediacy prehend, take account of, and in that 
sense measure, immediately past events that become fully definite only as they 
perish and are prehended by their successors. Demarcations between event-
durations need not be as sharp as process thinkers previously assumed, as 
explained later. The present occasion in any causal cone of spatiotemporal 
events possesses a high degree of internal freedom, self-creativity, and indeter-
minateness, mixed with degrees of definiteness or data inherited from the past. 
Events acquire their fullest definiteness as they complete themselves, perish into 
the past, and are perceived or prehended (usually unconsciously) by their partly-
self-creating successors. In physical terms, wavicles are always highly definite 
in themselves; but they acquire a more complete but still very similar definite-
ness as they perish in time and are succeeded and "observed" by their immediate 
temporal successors. 
Quantum theorists recognize that a measurer must be something spatially 
distinct from the object measured, but temporal distinctness must also be em-
phasized. All causation from space to space is temporally ordered. Also, accord-
ing to Process Philosophy, all mentality is spatially ordered and extended; and 
no totally disembodied mentality exists anywhere. All events at every level of 
existence have both mental and physical poles, but physical poles are both 
spatially extended as well as causally responsive and efficacious. Even God is 
embodied in the world, or some world, and is not a purely incorporeal disem-
bodied spirit. 
If all immediately successive events are observers or prehenders of their 
predecessors and receive forms and data from them, the unconscious world of 
nature in itself has sufficient definiteness to exist in itself and to evolve complex 
conscious observers like us; and each relatively independent and partly self-
creative present moment at every level of complexity has sufficient indefinite-
ness to allow for ubiquitous freedom and creativity. 
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In Process Philosophy, the partial indeterminateness of present events 
extends to all levels of reality, no matter what their degree of organization and 
complexity. Atomic and sub-atomic uncertainty is not the same thing as free will 
and creativity in immensely complex human subjects, but both are manifesta-
tions of a universal principle of creativity; and human creativity supervenes 
upon physical indefiniteness. Newtonian mechanistic determinism excluded 
human freedom, but quantum level uncertainty makes room for it without being 
identical with it. Natural processes become more and more fully determinate as 
decisions are made and information is synthesized in the present, as events 
perish into the past, and as their successors perceive or prehend them. Tempo-
ralistic entities receive as much as they can from their predecessors and transmit 
what they can of themselves into their successors. These transmitted forms and 
data give continuity, memory, and relative self-identity through time to chains 
or temporally ordered societies of consecutive spatiotemporal events, ranging 
from quark-pulsations to streams of human consciousness. 
Our own conscious present moments ofreceptivity, partial self-creativity, 
relative independence, subjective immediacy, and self-enjoyment are partly 
indefinite, but not infinitely indefinite. Degrees of definiteness and indefinite-
ness are equally real at all levels of natural complexity. Photon wavicles defi-
nitely cannot collapse into electrons; electron pulsations cannot collapse into 
proton or neutron pulsations; and streams of human consciousness cannot 
degenerate directly into streams of canine or bovine consciousness. Each partly 
determinate particle/wave includes a very limited set ofunactualized possibili-
ties. Where will it jump to next? Where exactly will it go when scattered? 
Through which slit will it pass? When will it "decay" into a free particle? 
Events become determinate partly by inheritance, partly by decisions of the 
moment among open possibilities, and partly by perishing in time to be pre-
hended by their successors. Quantum indefiniteness versus measurement is 
nothing more mysterious than causation between immediately past and present 
spatiotemporal occasions. That in itself is mysterious enough! 
To summarize, Quantum Observership argues from unusual interpretations 
of perplexing experiments in quantum physics to an Idealistic Metaphysics that 
denies the objective existence of space/time/mass/energy. No physical objects 
exist without conscious physicists or observers of some sort, says Idealism. In 
itself, the physical world is merely an infinite set of indeterminate possibilities 
for perception; and the determinateness of the physical world consists in and is 
caused or created by its being perceived or observed. 
Quantum Observership is incompatible with cosmic and biological evolu-
tion. It generates the unresolved paradox that observers create the Big Bang and 
the evolutionary process, but the evolutionary process and the Big Bang create 
all observers. It cannot explain the magical causal procedure by which observers 
confer determinateness on physical entities and processes, including those in the 
distant past. As in Kantian Idealism, Quantum Observership reduces space, 
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time, energy, and causation to forms of experience that have nothing to do with 
things in themselves or objective realities. Most modem scientists reject Quan-
tum Observership and its insistence that space/time/mass/energy exist only in 
human consciousness; they strongly prefer, with good reason, the partly realistic 
theory that the physical world exists objectively, independently, but relationally. 
Yet, the relations need not be with conscious observers. 
Finally, the notions of"observer," "instrument," and "measurement" cloak 
serious ambiguities. The referents of all of these concepts are partly composed 
of quantum-level events. If observers are allowed to be unconscious physical 
objects, including measuring instruments, and if no sharp divisions exist be-
tween the macroscopic and the microscopic or between minds and matter, and 
if measuring is merely causal interaction, the mutual interconnectedness of 
effects and causes, then in the absence of conscious observers, the physical 
world can prehend, observe, measure, and confer sufficient determinateness 
upon itself to account for the objective reality of the Big Bang and for the 
evolution of nature prior to the emergence of consciousness. 
A Kantian/Copernican idealistic revolution in epistemology is just as 
anthropocentric as the geocentric theory that placed humankind at the geograph-
ical center of the universe. A realistic nonanthropomorphic natural science 
affirms that we have our being and our becoming within and as a part of a vast, 
natural, objectively existing, vibrant universe of interdependent, partly determi-
nate, partly indeterminate pulsations of space/time/mass/energy. For billions of 
years, this independently existing system of nature possessed a high degree of 
definiteness in itself; ·unconscious prehensive relational responsiveness is 
ubiquitous. In our part of the Milky Way, no conscious observers existed before 
animals, including our own most primitive evolutionary ancestors, emerged 
from the primordial terrestrial slime. We exist within and as a part of the totality 
of objective spacetime. Nature does not exist merely within us as mind-depend-
ent conscious perceptions to which nothing objective and determinate corre-
sponds. The objective existence of highly (but not totally) determinate space/ 
time/mass/energy makes a very practical difference. Without it, we would not 
be here at all. With it, Quantum Observership is wrong. 
Seven 
BIG ACCIDENT QUANTUM COSMOLOGY 
Big Accident Cosmologists grant the objective existence of space/time/mass/ 
energy; but, they contend, it all adds up to nothing. All opposing forces within 
our closed universe balance out perfectly; and the net result is zero. If a per-
fectly balanced universe is closed, the net energy in that universe is nil. As Alan 
Guth puts it, "The Universe is the ultimate free lunch."' According to the "free 
lunch" interpretation of quantum physics, our universe is a delicate but acciden-
tal balance of negative and positive forces that sums up to nothing. This perfect 
balance is called "perfect symmetry." 
1. The Universe as a Big Accident 
If symmetry is perfect on a cosmic scale, the total amount of energy in the 
universe is actually zero. Does this mean that nothing caused the universe? If 
our universe is an absolute zero, absolutely nothing seems required to cause it! 
Is our universe such an ultimate absolute accident? Is it a nothing that is caused 
by nothing for no reason or purpose at all? Extreme Big Accident Cosmology 
answers affirmatively. This cosmology is advocated by Quantum Cosmologists 
like Edward P. Tryon,2 Peter Atkins,3 A. Vilenkin,4 Victor J. Stenger,5 Quentin 
Smith,6 and a few others7 for whom the origin of our universe was indeed a 
stupendous accident, having no cause whatsoever. 
Cosmologists who take this final step are not Antecedent Universe Cos-
mologists because they acknowledge no antecedents at all, no oscillating prede-
cessors, not even Mother Spacetime and the unstable energy situation of the 
physical vacuum, not even really empty space itself. They view our world as an 
absolute accident, requiring neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for its 
existence. They believe that our universe was created not only from nothing but 
by nothing. As Edward P. Tryon put it, "Our universe is simply one of those 
things which happen from time to time."8 Tryon was only a forerunner of Big 
Accident Cosmology who suggested that our universe may be produced by a 
quantum fluctuation of "the vacuum of some larger space in which our Universe 
is imbedded,"9 so he actually presupposed the pre-existence of something after 
all. Renunciation of all antecedent conditions by real Accidentalists like Peter 
Atkins and Victor J. Stenger is much more complete. As Atkins expressed it, 
In the beginning was nothing. Absolute void, not merely empty space. 
There was no space; nor was there time, for this was before time. The 
Universe was without form and void. 
By chance was a fluctuation, and a set of points, emerging from nothing 
and taking their existence from the pattern they formed, defined a time. 
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The chance formation of a pattern resulted in the emergence of time from 
coalesced opposites, its emergence from nothing. From absolutely nothing, 
absolutely without intervention, there came into being rudimentary exis-
tence.10 
And as Stenger put it, 
I picture the origin of the universe as follows: in the beginning there was 
a void more empty than a perfect vacuum, empty not only of particles and 
fields but of space and time as well. It had perfect symmetry and zero 
energy. It was as much nothing as nothing can be. A fluctuation in that 
void then occurred, generating our universe and perhaps countless others 
very different from ours. I I 
Quentin Smith, another Big Accident Cosmologist, rejects Tryon's "vac-
uum fluctuation in empty space" account of the origin of the universe, Ii along 
with the principle of universal causation. He affirms that "The most reasonable 
belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing, and for nothing."13 That is Big 
Accident Cosmology in a nutshell! 
Extreme quantum Big Accident Cosmology proposes that the creation of 
our universe is the ultimate chance happening, a totally spontaneous quantum 
fluctuation in, from, of, and by pure nothingness. How plausible is the view that 
nothing caused the Big Bang? 
2. Critique of Big Accident Quantum Cosmology 
The fundamental affirmations and presuppositions of Big Accident quantum 
cosmology are empirically vacuous and should be dismissed as utterly meaning-
less by empiricist standards. "Absolutely nothing caused the Big Bang" presup-
poses that "Absolutely nothing once existed," but no conceivable experience 
could ever directly verify this affirmation. Any confirming or disconfirming 
experience would exist and would thus falsify the claim. No examples of abso-
lute non-existence, or of causation by non-existence, could ever be given di-
rectly in any conceivable experience. Also, we cannot reason inductively about 
such things since we have no instances with which to start. 
Aside from being utterly unintelligible experientially and inductively, Big 
Accident quantum cosmology is troubled by three extreme affirmations that 
make it utterly implausible as an explanatory hypothesis. Big Accident theorists 
are committed to the preposterous claims that: A. The universe exists in such 
perfect symmetry that its net energy equals zero. B. Natural quantum laws exist 
and function in a state of absolute nothingness. C. Causality must be totally 
abandoned at the point ofultimate origins. But why are these claims so prepos-
terous? 
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A. Perfect Symmetry and Zero Energy 
Our universe was created out of nothing by nothing.for nothing, and is nothing, 
according to extreme Big Accident quantum cosmologists. All the forces operat-
ing in the universe exist in such perfect balance or symmetry that the net energy 
of the universe is absolutely zero. Supposedly, the kinetic energy of the initial 
explosion is perfectly balanced by the counter-tug of gravity; positive and 
negative electrical charges of material particles all ultimately cancel one another 
out, as do matter and antimatter. Everything in the universe is so arranged that 
absolutely everything adds up to absolutely nothing. 
Victor J. Stenger explicitly links zero energy with creation by nothing, 
arguing that "Since the universe has zero total energy, no energy was required 
in its production."14 This extreme "caused by nothing" hypothesis would be 
false, however, if the universe contains the slightest bit of positive energy, if 
symmetry is in any way imperfect. Does the empirical evidence support perfect 
symmetry? The average density of all positive and negative electrical charges 
may be zero, but assuredly we have not totaled them all. Even so, at least three 
important facts about our world count heavily against the theory that all mani-
festations of energy are so equally balanced that they sum up to zero: i. We live 
in an open universe; ii. Matter decisively triumphs over antimatter; and iii. The 
kinetic energy of the initial bang is more powerful than gravity. 
i. We Live in an Open Universe 
First, only a closed universe can have zero energy, but overwhelming evidence, 
given in Chapter Three, indicates that our universe is open. Andrei Linde refers 
to "The well-known fact that the total energy of a closed Universe is zero, being 
a sum of the positive energy of matter and the negative energy of the scale 
factor a."15 But Linde's "well-known fact" is not really a fact about our uni-
verse. Free-lunchers do a lot of wishful thinking! 
At this stage in the development of science, the most reasonable view is 
that our universe is open. Entities involved in the Hubble expansion have 
enough escape velocity to keep expanding forever; the Hubble rate of cosmic 
expansion is increasing, not decreasing; and gravitational and kinetic energy are 
decisively out of balance. After all identifiable dark matter is counted, seventy 
to ninety percent of the mass/energy required to close the universe is missing. 
Recall earlier discussions of the claim that sufficient mass exists to counterbal-
ance the expansion of the universe. The missing mass just isn't there. 
Many prominent scientific cosmologists believe that the universe is open 
and will expand forever, precisely because not enough matter or mass exists to 
close it, balance it, or even slow it down. 16 Some cold dark matter exists; but 
prospects are dim that sufficient missing mass will ever be located to close 
down the expansion of the universe. 17 This is especially obvious now that we 
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know that the rate of Hubble expansion is increasing, not decreasing. Oddly, in 
his most recent book, Victor J. Stenger insists that we live in an open universe, 
one lacking enough mass to close it; 18 but he inconsistently affirms that enough 
invisible dark matter exists to balance exactly the kinetic and rest energies of the 
mass of the universe. 19 Stenger concedes, significantly, that what he means by 
"zero energy" actually contains a small positive amount of energy!2° So, where 
did that tiny bit come from? Stenger offers no answer. 
If enough mass/energy exists to register at .99999 instead of a measly . I 
to .3 of Omega at l, the universe would still be open. Exactly at Omega, expan-
sion would proceed very slowly forever; but the universe would never contract; 
a spent world would endure forever. Omega plus an additional scrap of mass/ 
energy is required for reversal. In the extremely unlikely event that our measure-
ments might some day approximate these near-closure figures, margins of error 
would always prevent us from knowing for sure that the universe is closed. 
Without sufficient mass/energy, gravity loses; kinetic energy wins; and the 
average net results are greater than zero. Victor J. Stenger claimed in his 1988 
book that the universe is balanced between open and closed;21 yet, an impressive 
seventy to ninety percent of the evidence cannot be found. Stenger concedes this 
in his 1995 book where he announces that the universe is open, 22 but he does not 
acknowledge that only a closed universe could be a Big Accident. Believing in 
a closed universe, or even a delicately balanced one, is too much like believing 
in Santa Claus and Ptolemaic epicycles. Abdus Salam concedes that "At the 
present time, measurements do not appear to sustain" the claim that "the mass 
of the universe adds up to zero;" and without this, "We shall discard the whole 
notion of the universe arising as a quantum fluctuation."23 Yes indeed! 
ii. Matter Prevails over Antimatter 
Second, our material universe exists precisely because matter and antimatter do 
not exist in perfect symmetry. We live in a material world because matter 
triumphed over antimatter near the very beginning, or because our universe was 
created from the outset with a massive imbalance of matter over antimatter. 
Stenger defends a hidden symmetry of matter and antimatter, despite the com-
plete absence of evidence for it and substantial evidence against it. His only 
evidence is the non-empirical Principle of Plenitude. All possible states are 
actual, he insists. Symmetry is broken and matter prevails in our domain, he 
concedes, but in other domains (other universes, presumably composed of 
antimatter) in infinite Superspacetime, things balance out.24 But how does he 
know that? We have no empirical access to any Superspacetime containing 
antimatter universes, much less an infinitude of it! And Superspacetime, if it 
exists, is not sheer nothingness. 
We do not know that any, much less that all, possibilities are actualized in 
other domains or universes somewhere in Superspacetime. This a priori meta-
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physics cannot be verified or falsified. Empirically, the claim is utterly meaning-
less, permanently without experiential content for us. An implausible hypothe-
sis-creation of, by, out of, and for absolutely nothing-cannot be defended 
successfully by appeal to theories that are utterly senseless. 
In this world, the only one that we know to exist, mass/energy is definitely 
not zero. As A. Zee wrote in 1986, 
Ever since Dirac's ideas about antimatter were experimentally confirmed, 
people have speculated that the Universe has an equal amount of matter 
and antimatter, segregated into domains. More precisely, it was asserted 
that all conserved quantum numbers of the Universe should be zero. In 
particular, since electric charge Q is known to be zero to a high degree of 
accuracy, it seems "aesthetically appealing" that baryon number B and 
lepton number L should also be zero. Unfortunately, the weight of the 
observational evidence is against this supposition. 25 
After thoroughly reviewing the empirical evidence, Gary Steigman con-
cluded as early as 1979 that "The Universe is not symmetric and contains little, 
if any, antimatter."26 In 1991, John D. Barrow concurred: 
Although particle accelerators produce matter and antimatter in equal 
abundances quite routinely and there is a democratic relationship between 
the two, we see no antiplanets, no antistars, no antigalaxies, and there is 
no evidence of any antimatter in the cosmic rays that come from outside 
our solar system. Nor do we see any evidence of the wholesale annihila-
tion of matter and antimatter, which would erupt anywhere in the Uni-
verse, where the two came into contact. Thus, for some mysterious reason, 
there exists a form of cosmic favoritism. 27 
In 1993, after describing his research team's extensive probing during the 
1970s for antimatter particles with sensitive instruments carried by high altitude 
balloons, George Smoot wrote that "During all the years, we found not a single 
convincing sign of cosmic antimatter. 2R 
Perhaps, however, a perfect symmetry of matter and antimatter existed "in 
the beginning," even though little or no antimatter exists today. As Heinz R. 
Pagels suggests, "The present matter-antimatter asymmetry of the universe does 
not reflect the original state of the primal fireball, which could have perfect 
symmetry."29 Even so, free-lunchers must explain how the original perfect 
symmetry of matter was broken and overcome, how enough matter to comprise 
our universe survived an initial perfect balance of matter and antimatter, why 
so little antimatter survived, and how this all adds up to nothing. 
A widely accepted explanation is that a surplus of matter over antimatter 
resulted because the earliest physical particles decayed at an irregular pace, as 
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permitted by the weak force. 30 This answer is very problematic. Why did the 
weak force permit asymmetrical decay into matter instead of antimatter? Why 
didn't the weak force exemplify perfect symmetry? Emerging from perfect 
symmetry, why were these primitive particles asymmetrically inclined? Why 
weren't they all annihilated by their own perfectly symmetrical antiparticles? 
This widely accepted explanation pushes the asymmetry back one step but 
does not account for it. No one has ever observed the primitive particles that 
supposedly decayed into a surplus of matter; they are purely hypothetical ex-
planatory constructs with no empirical status whatsoever. Most seriously, if 
symmetry was so perfect originally, all of the original primitive particles should 
have been annihilated by their own primitive anti-particles. The conventional 
explanation of why asymmetry exists in a perfectly symmetrical universe is 
unverified, incoherent, and unintelligible. 
In 1998, A. G. Cohen, A. De RUJula, and S. L. Glashow indicated that 
primordial matter/antimatter symmetry would elevate the gamma ray back-
ground and distort the cosmic microwave background far above observable 
quantities. They argue that although small pockets of antimatter might exist here 
and there, empirical evidence excludes a patchwork universe composed of 
widely separated regions of matter and antimatter. After reviewing the evidence, 
they conclude that "A matter-antimatter symmetric universe is empirically 
excluded. " 31 
Even if equal quantities of matter and antimatter existed originally, this 
would still not prove zero net energy for the universe as a whole. When material 
and antimaterial particles collide and explode, they do not leave behind zero 
energy or absolute nothingness, as the "free lunch" Big Accident theory predicts 
and requires. Instead, they leave a residue of gamma radiation, which is a 
definite and positive form of mass/energy.32 In fact, residues of primordial 
gamma radiation may now have been found;33 but the early mutual extinction of 
matter and antimatter did not result in zero mass/energy. Clearly, the primordial 
annihilation was asymmetrical, a fact that perfect symmetry cannot explain. 
iii. The Bang Overpowers Gravity 
Before concluding that the universe is really not a free lunch after all, let us 
consider another argument for this conclusion. If matter/antimatter symmetry 
does not add up to zero, perhaps matter-gravity symmetry does. In explaining 
Stephen Hawking's commitment to the zero-energy free lunch theory, Michael 
White and John Gribbin declare that "If all the matter in the Universe could be 
collected together at a single point, its negative gravitational energy (- mc2) 
would exactly cancel out all the positive mass energy ( + mc2) of all the 
matter."34 This argument for a zero energy universe completely ignores the 
stupendous kinetic energy of the Big Bang itself, against which gravity is 
fighting a losing battle. It was written before we discovered that the rate of 
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Hubble expansion is increasing. It assumes incorrectly, as Hawking does (at 
times), that the universe contains enough mass/energy to close it. 
Surprisingly, Hawking himself says in his 1988 A Brief History of Time 
that "The present evidence suggests that the universe will probably expand 
forever"; 35 but his no boundary model of the universe as a globe that begins at 
the North Pole, expands to the Equator, then shrinks to the South Pole, implies 
that the universe will not expand forever because an open universe that expands 
forever would have no South Pole. Which is the real Hawking? 
In Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time: A Reader's Companion, 
published in 1992, Hawking says, "I predict that the universe in time will come 
to an end at the big crunch. "36 In his 1993 book, Black Holes and Baby Uni-
verses and Other Essays, Hawking defends both the openness and the closed-
ness of the universe and concludes that he is hedging his bets "by predicting 
both ways. "37 He concedes that observation discloses only ten percent of the 
mass required for closing the universe. 38 His argument for a closed universe is 
purely conjectural, theoretical, and a priori. 
Peter Coles and George Ellis wrote in 1994 that "The primary reasons for 
the widespread belief in a critical density of matter are theoretical." They 
emphasize that 
this is indeed an experimental question, where theory-no matter how dear 
it may be to us-will eventually have to bow to the experimental evidence. 
It may be that the theoretical prejudice in favor of the high-density models 
will one day be confirmed; if so that will be a great triumph for theory. 
However, at present the weight of evidence if anything favors a low-
density universe. 39 
After examining both theoretical and empirical evidence for a closed 
universe, Coles and Ellis affirm that "The amount of dark matter for which there 
is compelling direct evidence is a long way short of closing the Universe, "40 and 
that "No strongly convincing case can be made for a critical-density Universe, 
and on the balance of the evidence, an open Universe should be preferred." 
They conclude that "Those cosmologists who take it for granted that we live in 
a high-density Universe and there seem to be many may turn out to be pro-
foundly mistaken."41 
Consider also this argument against critical density symmetry. If ours is a 
critical density closed universe, it must be no older than eight billion years, 
some astrophysicists indicate. Yet, many galactic structures in the visible uni-
verse are older than an eight billion-year-old universe itself! Thus, if critical-
density cosmologists are right, they must be wrong! Only an open universe 
allows enough time to account for the age of all its structures.42 
Trusting experience, the most reasonable thing to believe, though not 
absolutely certain, is that we live in an open universe. For the net energy of the 
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universe to equal zero, all forms of energy, not just a few, must cancel out, 
including the cosmic contests between matter and antimatter and between 
gravity and the residual kinetic energy of the Big Bang. They do not balance 
out. The universe is really something after all! Perhaps it also has a real cause, 
more than zero existence, and a real purpose! 
B. Quantum Natural Laws Operating in Nothingness 
Without realizing or admitting it, Big Accident Cosmologists actually presup-
pose the existence of something when they imagine the creation of the universe 
out of and by absolutely nothing. They presuppose the existence of definite laws 
of nature, specifically those of quantum mechanics, operating on absolutely 
nothing in a state of absolute nothingness. Our Big Bang and the resulting 
universe were created, they claim, by quantum fluctuations within nothingness 
in accord with the laws of quantum physics. According to Stephen Hawking, "It 
is possible in the quantum theory for the ordinary laws of science to hold every-
where, including at the beginning oftime."43 Quentin Smith concedes that the 
Godless quantum cosmology to which he subscribes, 
represents the universe as beginning about 15 billion years ago in accor-
dance with a physical law. The universe is described as beginning from 
nothing in accordance with some law. Here 'nothing' does not mean the 
quantum-mechanical vacuum (which it often means in quantum cosmolo-
gies, such as Tryon's), but literally nothing, i.e., the absence of all con-
crete objects (mass, energy, spacetime).44 
Nothing existed. Yet quantum laws were there. So were quantum fluctu-
ations allowed by these laws. Nothing to fluctuate existed, yet nothingness 
lawfully fluctuated! Quantum laws existed and produce spontaneous fluctua-
tions within absolute nothingness, says Big Accident cosmology; and this 
supposedly accounts for the origin of our universe! 45 But none of this makes 
good sense, for something (laws and fluctuations) cannot exist in or as abso-
lutely nothing; and no physical laws exist when no physical entities exist. The 
position is logically incoherent, and it confuses formal with efficient causes. It 
confuses laws with efficacious energy. 
i. The Incoherence of Something in Nothing 
Big Accident Quantum Cosmology cannot be formulated coherently. The 
difficulties are partly with the fluctuations, partly with the laws. Supposedly, 
fluctuations in nothingness make bubbles of nothingness that inflate into entire 
universes of nothingness, one of which is ours. But how can absolutely nothing 
fluctuate? What could be the difference in meaning or reference between 
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"Nothing fluctuated" and "There were no fluctuations"? How could nothing 
fluctuate at all? How could it fluctuate lawfully? How could "Nothing fluctu-
ated" explain the origin of the universe, especially when the fluctuations them-
selves were nothing? 
Recall that less extreme inflationary theorists derive our universe from the 
pre-existing "empty space" ofSuperspacetime, and that this "empty space" has 
its own physical density and mass/energy. Particles and antiparticles are sponta-
neously generated by unpredictable fluctuations in a primitive actualized energy 
field, and an occasional particle that escapes annihilation supposedly inflates 
into a full-fledged universe. Although primeval inflation within transcendent 
Superspacetime is very far removed from experience, the quantum-fizzy nature 
of empty spacetime within our system of nature is well established; and it is not 
pure nothingness. 
As for quantum laws in absolute non-being, Heinz Pagels acknowledged 
the incoherence of the idea of"laws in nothingness." He wrote, 
The nothingness "before" the creation of the universe is the most complete 
void that we can imagine-no space, time or matter existed. It is a world 
without place, without duration or eternity, without number-it is what the 
mathematicians call "the empty set." Yet this unthinkable void converts 
itself into the plenum of existence-a necessary consequence of physical 
laws. Where are these laws written into that void? What "tells" the void 
that it is pregnant with a possible universe? It would seem that even the 
void is subject to law, a logic that exists prior to space and time.46 
Iflaws are there in nothingness, it is not pure nothingness! 
ii. Laws Are Only Formal Causes 
Most seriously, in contemporary natural science, physical laws merely describe 
the statistically average habituated behaviors of actual physical entities, and they 
change if and when these habits change. Laws are merely formal causes, not 
efficient causes imposing external limits on what natural entities can do. No 
abstract laws can exist when nothing else exists for them to describe. Where 
nothing exists in spacetime, there are no physical laws. No formal causes can 
operate when nothing has no form, where no habituated energy-laden actualities 
exist. The actualized energy field of"empty space" has a habitual case of jitters, 
and so do all the particles that emerge lawfully from it; but it is not sheer noth-
ingness. Quantum laws are finitely probabilistic and predictive, but no finite 
predictive probabilities exist to be calculate in a state of absolute nothingness. 
Either primitive physical actualities with habits existed within Big Accident's 
alleged nothingness, or no quantum laws were there to permit or describe 
accidental probabilistic world-creating quantum fluctuations of energy-laden 
172 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
realities. If quantum laws and primitive physical actualities existed in primeval 
nothingness, it was not absolute nothingness. 
Additional important questions remain unanswered. Do the adduced pre-
world quantum laws and primitive physical actualities come from somewhere 
and thus depend on something else for their existence, or are they self-existent, 
eternal, and necessary beings? If so, by virtue of what do they have this meta-
physical status? Why do the laws of quantum physics obtain in nothingness 
when so many other physical laws-like those of Newtonian mechanics, or of 
relativity physics alone-are logically possible? Who or what selects the relevant 
laws? How meaningful is the presumption that totally disembodied laws exist 
anywhere, much less in absolute nothingness? Big Accident Cosmology has no 
good answers. It is too much ado about nothingness! 
C. Total Abandonment of Causation 
Some cosmologists admit it, some do not; but the spontaneous creation of our 
universe occurred only because necessary causal conditions for its creation were 
met. In that sense, our universe definitely had a cause. Most Quantum Cosmolo-
gists are convinced that these necessary conditions include transcendent Mother 
Spacetime, the physical vacuum, the primordial fizz, an actualized primordial 
field of energy, and the laws of quantum mechanics. 
Extreme Quantum Accidentalists repudiate all of this; they conjecture that 
our universe is an absolute accident that just popped into being out of pure 
nothingness devoid of all causal conditions whatsoever. An absolute accident 
has no causal conditions at all. Accidentalists deny both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of our universe. As Stenger says, "The simplest 
hypothesis that so far seems to explain the data is that the universe is an acci-
dent. "47 What caused the Big Bang? "Nothing!" answers extreme Quantum 
Accidentalism. 
If the Big Bang that created our world was an absolute accident requiring 
no causal conditions at all, it was the most stupendous accident that ever hap-
pened, the greatest miracle of all time, but without a Divine miracle worker. 
And to think that some people have trouble with God as a miracle worker! Big 
Accident Cosmologists insist that their creation-by-nothing scenario is all very 
plausible; but upon closer examination, we see that this is not so. 
i. Necessary but Not Sufficient Causal Conditions 
Paul Davies claimed in 1983 that quantum physics abandons causality com-
pletely and "permits events to occur without causes in the quantum world. "48 An 
element of truth is in this, but not the whole truth. Spontaneous fluctuations do 
occur in the quantum world; sufficient causal conditions for spontaneity do not 
exist. Nevertheless, quantum fluctuations always presuppose and require nee es-
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sary causal conditions. Davies concedes as much: "Recent discoveries in parti-
cle physics have suggested mechanisms whereby matter can be created in empty 
space by the cosmic gravitational field, which only leaves the origin of 
spacetime itself as a mystery. "49 So both spacetime and a gravitational (or some 
kind of) energy field are necessary causal conditions for the creation of matter; 
but how can gravity exist without physical mass? Davies finally concluded that 
quantum gravity "would allow spacetime to be created and destroyed spon-
taneously and uncaused in the same way that particles are created and destroyed 
spontaneously and uncaused. "50 Still, this presupposes quantum gravity, not pure 
nothingness; but what would quantum gravity attract (or repel) in absolute 
nothingness? How could it operate in and on nothing? As Einstein insisted, no 
gravity exists without mass/energy and spacetime. One thing leads to another! 
Currently, gravity is best treated within classical relativity physics, which 
allows for definiteness and continuity in gravitational effects; but no workable 
theory of quantum gravity is available.51 In addition to quantum laws, quantum 
gravity has its own necessary conditions like gravitational particles-as yet 
undiscovered gravitons and gravitinos that presently exist in theory only. It also 
requires mass and spacetime, for gravity is identical with spatiotemporal mass 
and curvature, according to relativity theory. 
Also, in a quantum universe, gravitational particles should display their 
own quirky quantum effects-indefiniteness, discreteness, spontaneity, scatter-
ing, and so forth; but in well-established domains of particle physics, these 
quantum effects always presuppose their own conditions. When an adequate 
theory is developed, quantum gravity cannot and will not exclude necessary 
causal conditions. It will not abandon causation absolutely. 
ii. Freedom Has Necessary Conditions 
To turn to another problem, perhaps experience discloses occasional exceptions 
to the principle of universal causation-like human freedom; and maybe the 
origin of the universe falls under one of the exceptions. 
Freedom and creativity exemplify self-originated spontaneity. This means 
that things can and do happen without sufficient causes, but not that anything 
ever happens without necessary causes. This is clearly at odds with the supposi-
tions of extreme Quantum Accidentalists. Contingent realities-things that might 
or might not be-never come into being when causal grounds, necessary causal 
conditions, are completely absent. A very decisive empirical consideration 
supports this: All experience illustrates it. Experience universally confirms that 
necessary conditions are required for the existence of every contingent entity 
that comes into being, everything whose non-existence is logically possible, 
including creativity and acts of free will. 
An experienced-based philosophical perspective can make a place for 
freedom and spontaneity. Both at macroscopic human and microscopic quantum 
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levels, creative freedom is incompatible only with sufficient but not with neces-
sary causal conditions. Quantum theory does not dispense with necessary causal 
conditions, and neither does human freedom. All experience confirms that 
contingently existing things always have causes, including quantum effects and 
free choices. Spontaneous quantum fluctuations cannot and do not occur in the 
absence of necessary causal conditions like Mother Spacetime, or our space-
time, the physical vacuum, an actualized energy field, and quantum laws. Freely 
made human choices do not occur in the absence of necessary conditions like 
desires, interests, and some awareness of open possibilities. Without the pres-
ence of something, free choices cannot be made. So freedom is no exception to 
the rule that everything has a cause. Some causal conditions are necessary for 
the occurrence of everything that happens. Quantum physics and human free-
dom presuppose only that things can happen in the absence of totally sufficient 
causal conditions. 
iii. Applying Causation to World-Origins 
"Everything that comes into being has a cause" was often defended by rational-
istic philosophers like Descartes and Jonathan Edwards as an intuitively certain 
a priori or self-evident truth. Quite recently, our knowing this principle a priori, 
without appeal to experience, was vigorously defended by William L. Craig52 
and attacked (successfully in my view) by Quentin Smith.53 To be sure, I, too, 
find it intuitively obvious that everything that comes into being has a cause; but 
I cannot rule out the possibility that this powerful intuition is psychological or 
empirical, not a priori, that it results from (is caused by) its universal confirma-
tion in experience, the last court of appeal in factual matters. 
Quentin Smith presents powerful critiques of the empirical argument for 
the principle of causation and of its application to the creation of the world out 
of nothing around fifteen billion years ago. The origin of the universe was 
caused by absolutely nothing, he thinks, because this causal principle is not self-
evident and does not apply to the origin of the universe. "Every thing that comes 
to be has a cause" is well confirmed by experiences of happenings within the 
world, he admits; but it has no relevant application to the origin of the world 
itself.54 We have no experience of world-causation as such; all relevant experi-
ences pertain only to causation within the world, Smith insists. His view resem-
bles Kant's contention that we have no experience of causation by things in 
themselves; all relevant experiences pertain only to causation between appear-
ances. Yet, Kant had to explain the existence of appearances causally. 
Actually, we have no direct experiences of world-origins from singulari-
ties, from "empty space," from quantum tunneling, from God, or from absolute 
nothingness. So Smith's argument cuts decisively against his own solution to 
the problem of world-origins. Admittedly, uncertainty creeps into any theistic 
or non-theistic account of world-creation by God or by any other transcendent 
Big Accident Quantum Cosmology 175 
entities like antecedent universes or Superspacetime. Smith's a-causal Acci-
dentalism is as fatal to Antecedent Universe and Big Fizz Cosmologies as it is 
to Theism. Uncertainty pervades all of science and philosophy. We are never 
absolutely sure of the truth of the premises from which we argue; but some 
premises are still much more plausible than others. Without reiterating Craig's 
astute responses to Smith, I will offer two important objections of my own to 
Smith's atheistic account of world-creation from, by, and for absolutely nothing. 
First, even Smith does not really believe it. He definitely presupposes the 
existence and operation of quantum laws, spontaneous fluctuations, quantum 
tunneling, and a singularity composed of infinitely compressed physical mass-
all in alleged nothingness. Instead of a disembodied God, Smith appeals at rock 
bottom to the ultimate reality and causal efficacy of disembodied conceptual 
constructs-quantum laws, fluctuations, tunneling, and a sizeless, timeless, and 
imperceptible "physical" singularity. Without them, Smith has no explanation 
of the origin of the universe from and by nothingness. Even without his singu-
larity, Big Accident Quantum Cosmologists always presuppose the antecedent 
reality of quantum laws, perturbations, tunneling, or something within absolute 
non-being; but they pronounce their theory only at the price of incoherence. 
Their nothingness is not real nothingness; it is really something after all! 
Second, recall Smith's argument that our knowledge of causation, drawn 
from within the world, cannot be applied to the origin of the world because we 
have never experienced world-origins. But Smith's Accidentalist account of 
origins is vulnerable to exactly the same objection. In quantum physics, he 
claims, particles can come into existence spontaneously under conditions of 
quantum uncertainty, and the law of energy conservation does not apply to these 
circumstances. Once, such a particle inflated into our universe. But note care-
fully that Smith's theory of world-origins depends entirely upon an analogy with 
experienced quantum fields and processes within our world. As he puts it, 
"There is observational evidence, albeit indirect, that this uncaused emergence 
of energy or particles (notably virtual particles) frequently occurs. "55 This could 
be true only within our system of spacetime, if Smith is really serious about 
appealing to experience. We have no "observational evidence" of world-origins. 
Smith's position is implausible for many reasons. No one has ever seen a 
quantum particle inflate into an entire universe. All our empirical or observa-
tional knowledge of quantum effects is based upon experiences of quantum 
events within our world. If knowledge ofuniversal causation drawn from within 
the world cannot be applied to the origin of the world, then knowledge of 
quantum effects drawn from within the world cannot be so applied either. Also, 
physicists have proved that only a closed universe could arise through quantum 
tunneling,56 the process by which virtual particles become actual; but ours is not 
a closed universe, as earlier demonstrated. Thus, Smith cannot make his case for 
thinking that our world is a quantum-induced Big Accident. 
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We have no experience of world origins through spontaneous quantum 
fluctuations in absolute nothingness. All human experiences of quantum phe-
nomena pertain only to minute quantum events within our system of spacetime. 
Jfwe cannot extrapolate from the universality of causation within the world to 
world origins, neither can we extrapolate from quantum effects within the world 
to world origins. All experienced quantum effects, including those in virtually 
empty space, presuppose not only quantum laws but also our space, not tran-
scendent Superspace, and definitely not pure nothingness. Empirically, the 
spontaneous origin of actualized particles under conditions of Heisenberg 
uncertainty occurs only under vacuum conditions within our system of space-
time, never in absolute nothingness; and few if any such particles endure for 
more than a fraction of a second to violate the Principle of Conservation. 
Smith actually concedes that all known quantum tunneling, by which, in 
theory, particles momentarily break the barrier separating potentiality from 
actuality, takes place within our system of spacetime. 57 All known tunneling and 
quantum effects presuppose necessary causal conditions like our spacetime, 
vacuum (low energy) conditions, an actualized energy field, and perhaps even 
observers or prehenders (not necessarily conscious). From nothing, nothing 
comes, even in quantum physics. 
Smith's own account of world origins is incompatible with his argument 
against "Everything that comes to be has a cause." It presupposes and thus 
grants that we can extrapolate from what is known within our spacetime to the 
origin of the whole of it. But if we can apply what we know about quantum laws 
and effects to the origin of our universe, we can also apply the universally 
confirmed principle of causation to world origins. That rebuts Smith's No-cause 
Big Accident theory of the inception of the universe. Unless everything that 
comes into being, including the universe, has a cause (presupposes necessary 
conditions), no Quantum Cosmology ever gets off the ground. Big Accident's 
misunderstanding of quantum physics can be extended to the whole of nature 
only if explanatory principles drawn from the parts can be so extended; but that 
lets causation back in under the wire. Any account of the origin of our universe 
must draw upon analogies with what happens within our universe, for that is all 
that we know. 
Stephen Hawking maintains that "It is possible in the quantum theory for 
the ordinary laws of science to hold everywhere, including at the beginning of 
time."58 If, as Smith and Hawking suggest, the laws of quantum physics do not 
break down at the origin of the universe as a whole, then neither does the law 
of universal causation, nor the law of increasing entropy. If any explanatory 
principles can be extrapolated from parts to the whole, surely the universality 
of causation is one of them. Contra Smith, a quantum universe presupposes 
necessary causal conditions. But, deep down, Smith really believes that anyway. 
The ad hominem retort that "You do it too!" will not satisfy extreme 
skeptics. Still, anyone, whether an atheist or a theist, who attempts to answer the 
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question, "What caused the Big Bang?" must employ concepts and principles 
of explanation drawn from within the universe and extend them to the origin of 
the whole. We could just abstain or quit trying to find a cause for the Big Bang, 
but the inclination to try is almost irresistible. Anyone who decrees that it 
simply cannot be done merely blocks the path of inquiry. 
The causal principle that "Everything that comes to be has a cause," at 
least as necessary conditions, must be distinguished from what Victor J. Stenger 
calls the principle of"causal precedence," that "Cause always precedes effect." 
Stenger argues that at the elementary level of quantum interactions, "Cause and 
effect are not always distinguishable" because time is reversible. The irrevers-
ibility of time's arrow, he maintains, is an emergent property that exists only at 
the macroscopic level of everyday experience and common sense. 59 The solution 
to the two slit experiment problem, he holds, is that a particle goes "through one 
slit to the detector, then back in time to the source through the second slit and 
finally forward in time once more through either slit to the detector."60 He 
concedes that he is "in a minority" on the issue of the reversibility of time! 61 
That everything which comes into being has a cause would still be true 
even if we cannot always tell the difference between cause and effect, or if 
cause, effect, and time are reversed on the quantum level. Stenger, another Big 
Accident Cosmologist, also affirms that "everything can have come from noth-
ing" in the beginning62 through quantum fluctuations in the spacetime vacuum. 
We now know that this actually involves the antecedent reality of necessary 
causal conditions like Mother Spacetime, the physical vacuum, actualized 
energy, habituated actualities, quantum laws, and quantum effects. In their 
absence, spontaneous fluctuations cannot and do not occur. All contingencies 
have causes. 
D. No Contingency Without Causation 
By definition it is true that if something exists contingently, it is causally de-
rived from or dependent on something other than itself; but a mere definition 
cannot settle the substantive question of the causal dependence of the universe 
on God. Can a wedge be driven between the various elements that convention-
ally define the notion of contingent existence? Could an existing entity that 
endures for only a finite span of time have no cause at all even though it is 
possible for it not to exist? The most extreme Big Accident Cosmologists think 
so. They contend that the universe popped into being within the finite past as an 
absolute accident, requiring neither necessary nor sufficient causal conditions. 
If true, the universe could be contingent (having possible non-existence and 
finite duration), yet-in another sense-neither contingent (causally dependent) 
nornecessary (impossible non-existence, self-sufficient, everlasting, uncreated, 
and indestructible reality). 
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Big Accident Cosmologists appeal to quantum theory, which really does 
not support their position because quantum mechanics renounces only sufficient 
but not necessary causal conditions. Every quantum fluctuation has necessary 
prerequisites like the laws of quantum physics, spacetime or Superspacetime, 
the minimal pure energy of a physical vacuum, and the presence of an actualized 
energy field. They aspire to do so, but Big Accident Cosmologists cannot avoid 
these necessary conditions for quantum fluctuations, primordial or not; but 
primordially where and how did these conditions originate? They are not meta-
physically necessary beings because as wholes they are composed entirely of 
contingent, dependent parts. This point is well developed in Chapter Twelve, 
but let us now note that Big Accident Cosmology falls prey to the first two 
premises of the Cosmological Argument From Contingency there presented. All 
wholes composed of contingent beings are themselves contingent; and no 
necessary entities exist within our system of nature. 
To summarize, extreme Big Accident Cosmology takes quantum fluctua-
tions to their ultimate extreme and posits their reality where nothing exists to 
fluctuate. Our universe was created out of absolutely nothing, was caused by 
absolutely nothing, is absolutely nothing, and exists for absolutely no purpose. 
It is the Ultimate Accident. Extreme Accidentalism assumes that our universe 
is composed of zero energy, and that since the universe is nothing, nothing is 
required to create it. But a zero energy universe is very doubtful-especially 
ours. The kinetic energy of the primordial explosion that initiated our universe 
is not perfectly counterbalanced by gravity, and matter clearly prevails over 
antimatter in the only universe that we really know to exist. A zero-energy 
universe exists only in theory, but experience clearly shows that our universe is 
really something after all! 
Extreme Accidentalists always presuppose something as a necessary 
ground for the universe, even if nothing more than the laws of quantum physics 
and spontaneous fluctuations. They fail to distinguish adequately between 
necessary and sufficient causal conditions. If the Big Bang lacked a sufficient 
cause, it does not follow that it had no necessary cause. All experience, includ-
ing quantum physics, supports the causal principle that some causal conditions 
are necessary for everything that happens or comes to be, including the Big 
Bang. Scientific Cosmological Agnosticism correctly indicates that empirical 
science cannot identify the transcendent necessary cause of the Big Bang. 
Big Accident Cosmologists have wild imaginations, but their theory is 
logically incoherent and cannot be squared with the facts. Like all other atheistic 
Quantum Cosmologists, they are driven to preposterous extremes in order to 
avoid God. A contingent universe cannot exist in the absence of everything; but 
what is the something upon which it depends for its being? What caused the Big 
Bang? No atheistic cosmologies examined thus far, quantum or not, give an 
adequate answer; but a plausible answer is forthcoming! 
Eight 
ATHEISTIC ANTHROPIC COSMOLOGY 
We live in a remarkable universe. Among possible universes, the fact that our 
universe is compatible with and supports our existence makes it extraordinary. 
Any universe in which intelligent creatures like ourselves could exist would be 
a fabulous universe, for lifeless universes could be produced in an infinite 
number of ways, but only a few highly contrived ways can produce life-sustain-
ing ones. Some cosmologists claim that there is only one way to make a life-
sustaining universe. 1 
Except for the Greek and Roman Atomists, most pre-modem thinkers 
assumed that some kind of special relationship exists between humanity and the 
universe, that humankind is made for the universe and the universe for human-
kind. Teleology means purposiveness. Western philosophers and theologians 
traditionally believed that we live in a purposeful universe, that teleology is an 
important and conspicuous feature of nature. 
Because seventeenth and eighteenth century mechanistic materialists 
vigorously attacked cosmic teleology, non-teleology became a fundamental 
presumption of modem science. To exorcize Aristotelian final causes and all 
other purposes from nature, modem natural science aspires to explain every-
thing in terms of formal causes (natural laws), efficient causes (energy transfers) 
and material causes (spatially extended entities). Naturalism, as explained in 
Chapter Two, made anti-teleology a fundamental metaphysical principle. Hu-
manistic Naturalists think that we and similar organisms have purposes, but not 
the whole of nature, and not some purely fanciful supernatural ground or cause 
of nature. 
Teleology on a small scale inescapably reappears in natural and social 
sciences like biology and psychology, despite the domination of scientific 
orthodoxy by naturalistic metaphysics. Teleology also resurfaces on a larger 
scale in recent cosmology as the Anthropic Principle, so named by the physicist 
Brandon Carter in 1974. Carter was not the first to notice that the universe is 
fine-tuned for the emergence of human life, but he first christened this the 
"Anthropic Principle."2 
1. The Anthropic Principle and Cosmic Purpose Without God 
Cosmologists are again finding purpose in the universe, but we should not jump 
to the wrong conclusion. Most of them do not wish to revitalize and embrace a 
new version of the religious Argument from Design for the existence of God. 
In fact, most Anthropic Cosmologists are thoroughly atheistic and naturalistic 
and aspire to show how there can be cosmic teleology without God. Most of 
them make two fundamental claims: We live in a purposive universe that is 
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exquisitely fine-tuned for the production of intelligent life, and God is not 
required to explain such conspicuous cosmic purposiveness. 
In their 1988 book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, John D. 
Barrow and Frank J. Tipler thoroughly develop Anthropic Cosmology, explore 
its history, and defend it against many challenges. 3 Additional prominent contri-
butors to the development of Anthropic Cosmology include Brandon Carter, P. 
C. W. Davies,4 Robert H. Dicke,5 Freeman Dyson,6 Stephen Hawking,7 B. J. 
Carr and Martin Rees,8 John Leslie,9 and John A. Wheeler. 10 
Anthropic Cosmologists do not want to overturn the Copernican revolution 
and reposition mankind in some privileged position in the center of the universe. 
They believe that we can have a special place in the universe without being at 
its physical center. As Barrow and Tipler express it, "Although we do not 
regard our position in the Universe to be central or special in every way, this 
does not mean that it cannot be special in any way."11 Brandon Carter remarks 
that "Our location in the Universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of being 
compatible with our existence as observers."12 
The purpose of the universe, says Anthropic Cosmology, is to produce 
complex intelligent fonns oflife, like human life. The word "anthropic" is a bit 
misleading, suggesting that we human beings are the only complex, intelligent, 
living things in the universe, that the universe is designed to produce only us; 
but these intimations are not really intended. This would distance Anthropic 
Cosmology too far from what many astrophysicists misleadingly call "the 
Copernican revolution." Copernicus himself did not doubt that God created the 
universe for mankind, even if our earth orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 
Anthropic Cosmologists agree that other complex intelligent life fonns 
may exist on planets in other solar systems. After all, a hundred and fifty billion 
stars exist in our Milky Way; at least a hundred twenty-five billion other galax-
ies of equal or greater complexity exist in the observable universe; and intelli-
gent life is very likely to exist elsewhere. The basic chemistry for life is wide-
spread. At the moment, neither the existence oflife outside our solar system nor 
the degree of its prevalence elsewhere have been con finned; but many planets 
orbiting other suns have now been located, and many cosmologists are con-
vinced that life is prevalent throughout the universe. 13 
Anthropic Cosmology tends to be excessively anthropocentric only in the 
sense that it exhibits a definite bias toward intelligence. It assumes that other 
forms of life less intelligent than ourselves have little if any intrinsic worth, and 
that intelligence as a value epitomizes even if it doesn't exhaust our own worth. 
To avoid these errors, a broader Biopic Cosmology is needed, one that recog-
nizes the great intrinsic worth of an immense variety of terrestrial and possible 
extraterrestrial fonns of life, one that is not biased against the non-cognitive 
dimensions of human and non-human nature. Human life stands at the apex of 
complex, intelligent, affective, volitional life on earth. Yet, we differ from non-
human animals only in degree, not in kind. Degrees of intelligence and many 
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other traits that make life worth living for its own sake are shared with other 
terrestrial animals. 
According to the Biopic Cosmology advanced in this book, the purpose of 
the universe is to produce "an immense variety of forms of experience, love, 
loyalty, enjoyment, responsibility, initiative, creativity, achievement, and satis-
faction, even at the price of contlict."14 These desirable traits enrich and exist 
only in the lives of concrete conscious individuals, the proper locus of intrinsic 
worth. Valuable individual lives need be neither anthropic, that is, humanoid, 
nor carbon-based; but carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen have properties 
that greatly favor the origin and evolution of life. 15 These elements exist abun-
dantly throughout the universe. For all we know, the purpose of the universe 
may be fulfilled only on our earth; but this seems unlikely. 
Spectroscopic analysis discloses that the basic chemistry of the universe 
is the same throughout; and elements and compounds necessary for the forma-
tion of carbon-based lives are widely distributed throughout the universe. 
Carbon-based living things require hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, phosphorus, and 
traces of many other elements; but these too are found in ample quantities 
sufficient for life throughout our galaxy and in myriads of others. Many other 
special conditions may be necessary for life, so we are admittedly uncertain 
about the prevalence of life throughout the cosmos. Non-carbonaceous life-
forms are possible, even if carbon specially favors life. Complex non-carbona-
ceous life-forms are improbable; their existence has not yet been confirmed; but 
if any exist, the universe is even more suitable for the production of complex 
and valuable conscious living things than we commonly suspect. 
Considering mainly carbon-based life, our universe manifests a huge 
number of"extraordinarily finely tuned coincidences,"16 as Barrow and Tipler 
put it, that seem designed intentionally to create life as we know it. More details 
of this fine-tuning for life will be given in the next chapter; but we must first 
examine several meanings of the Anthropic Principle and note that most 
Anthropic Cosmologists favor only those meanings that exclude Divine fore-
sight, planning, and purpose. 
Barrow and Tipler say that the Anthropic Principle has at least three 
meanings, the first two of which were recognized by Brandon Carter: (I) The 
Weak Anthropic Principle says nothing more than that we would not be here 
unless the universe were compatible with our existence. (2) The Strong 
Anthropic Principle affirms that the universe must produce human or intelligent 
existence. This "must" generates Theistic, Quantum Observership, and Infinite 
World-Ensemble (Big Fizz and Big Divide) interpretations. (3) The Final 
Anthropic Principle says that we exist for the sake of a final Omega Point. Each 
version has its weaknesses, and the whole enterprise of Anthropic Cosmology 
is highly controversial. Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists accept either the 
Weak Principle, the second or third interpretations of the Strong Principle, or 
the Final Principle, according to which God's non-existence is only temporary. 
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They generally reject the theistic interpretation of the Strong Principle that is 
defended in this and following chapters. 
After the Weak Principle is given a metaphysical underpinning, it is 
indistinguishable from the world-ensemble interpretation of the Strong Princi-
ple. Because it adds nothing to it and subtracts nothing from it, the fatal flaws 
of the former are also ruinous to the latter. Only the Weak World-Ensemble 
Anthropic Principle, the Strong Quantum Observership Principle, and the Final 
Anthropic Principle are viable options for Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology; but 
do they hold up under critical analysis? 
2. The Weak and Strong Anthropic Principles 
The Weak Anthropic Principle affirms nothing more than that we would not be 
here ifthe universe were not compatible with and supportive of our existence. 17 
Brandon Carter's formulation of the Weak Anthropic Principle says that "What 
we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for our 
presence as observers."18 As Stephen Hawking put it, "We see the universe the 
way it is because we exist."19 The Weak Anthropic Principle is not exactly a 
tautology, though it is occasionally denounced as such. Nevertheless, it is 
singularly uninformative. It tells us nothing more than that we are here only 
because the universe is compatible with and supports our existence. It gives no 
reasons why. 
In its purest form, the Weak Anthropic Principle offers no reason for the 
compatibility between the universe and ourselves. Anthropic Cosmology be-
comes interesting and informative only when someone tries to explain why we 
live in a universe that is compatible with and supportive of our existence. Part 
of the answer is very obvious: if the universe were otherwise, we would not be 
here asking the question, and Anthropic Cosmologists would not be here con-
cocting the answers. This is so patently obvious and unilluminating that Weak 
Anthropic Cosmologists usually take further steps. They advance from Weak 
to Strong. They offer a metaphysical underpinning for the Weak Anthropic 
Principle-an infinite worlds metaphysics; but this converts the Weak Anthropic 
Principle into an infinite universe interpretation of the Strong Anthropic Princi-
ple. These two options, having become one, will shortly be evaluated together. 
As Brandon Carter formulated it, the Strong Anthropic Principle says that 
"The Universe must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at 
some stage."20 The emphasis here is on the word "must," but what Carter meant 
by this is unclear. It suggests that no universe can come into being that lacks 
intelligent observers altogether, that some observational selection principle 
excludes universes inhospitable to our kind of life. What could this selection 
principle be? Barrow and Tipler consider three possibilities.21 
First, the universe may have been designed deliberately by Divinity, by 
some "Supercalculating Intellect," as Fred Hoyle expressed it, who intended to 
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create and sustain finite, conscious, intelligent beings. Atheistic Anthropic 
Cosmologists like Barrow and Tipler reject this option in favor of the second or 
third. They are determined to give us teleology without Theism-at least until 
Omega comes in all its glory. 
Second, observers may be necessary to bring the world into being, as 
claimed by Niels Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and 
John A. Wheeler's theory of Quantum Observership (discussed and refuted 
already), and by the Participatory Anthropic Principle. 
Third, infinitely many worlds co-existing in Superspacetime would neces-
sitate our existence because they actualize all possibilities. Worlds containing 
intelligent life are possible worlds, so a few such worlds will be actual if all 
possibilities are actualized somewhere. We just happen to live in one of these. 
Some gloves will fit given an infinite number of gloves. No Supercosmic Intelli-
gence is required to explain why we live in a universe in which astonishing 
cosmic coincidences conspire to produce and support our existence. The Princi-
ple of Plenitude insures the existence of infinitely many worlds; supposedly it 
explains everything, although it really explains nothing. This atheistic infinitely 
many worlds metaphysics must now be examined carefully. After finding it 
wanting, the Final Anthropic Principle will be examined and dispose of in the 
next chapter. Theistic options will fill the concluding chapters 
Atheistic versions of the Strong Anthropic Principle usually appeal to the 
existence of infinitely many worlds to explain why, without God, we live a 
universe that is exquisitely designed to support conscious, intelligent, sensitive 
life. Given an infinite number of possible universes, most of which are doubt-
less incompatible with life, why do we live in one that supports life? According 
to the metaphysical Principle of Plenitude, all possible universes, an infinite 
number of them, must actually exist. Possibility is identical with actuality. Given 
an infinite number of diverse universes, at least a few of them will support life 
accidentally; and we just happen by chance to be in one that does. No God 
planned it. The shoe fits; but if an infinite number of different shoes exist, at 
least one is bound to fit. This is almost self-evident; but it is false! 
At least four infinite universe cosmologies would serve the metaphysical 
purposes of Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology. First, as in Plasma Cosmology, a 
single universe may be infinite in space and time and contain an infinite number 
ofrelatively isolated metagalaxies, most of which are hostile to life, but a few 
will be randomly life-supporting. We just happen by chance to live in a support-
ive metagalaxy. 
Relatively isolated metagalaxies belong to a single spatiotemporal universe 
presumably because they continue to have causal contact with other metagalax-
ies along their edges; but these edges may be so far removed from particular 
observers like us that we cannot detect them. The relative isolation of 
metagalaxies cannot be complete because, if complete, this option is indistin-
guishable from Big Fizz or Big Divide world-ensemble cosmology. John Leslie 
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points out that many worlds theorists disagree about whether many worlds 
interact causally.22 If worlds do interact causally in Big Fizz or Big Divide 
theories, they no longer differ from positions that affirm relatively but not 
completely isolated metagalaxies in a single universe. This is the old "same 
universe" quandary all over again. 
Second, as in Oscillation Cosmology, an infinite succession of consecutive 
universes with different laws and initial conditions might exist, being separated 
temporally rather than spatially from one another. In most cosmic epochs, laws 
and conditions would be hostile to life; but within an infinite number of diversi-
fied tries, a cosmic epoch will occasionally come along that supports life. 
Periodically, in an infinite number of diversified successive universes, one will 
be suitable for habitation by conscious, intelligent, living beings like us. We just 
happen by accident to live in such a one. No observers, astronomers, philoso-
phers, or ordinary people inhabit most of the others. 
Third, in Big Fizz world-ensemble cosmology, an infinite number of 
spatially co-existing universes with different laws and initial conditions are 
promiscuously spawned by Mother Spacetime. Some of these may then oscil-
late, so this metaphysics may be combined with the preceding. Infinitely many 
co-existing worlds are completely separated from and have no causal contact 
with one another in infinite Superspace. Given an infinite number of structurally 
diverse contemporary universes, most will be incompatible with life; but a few 
will support life. By chance, we just happen to exist in one of these. In most of 
the others, no observers, no scientists, and no inquirers wonder about the pur-
pose of the universe. 
Fourth, in Big Divide many worlds cosmology, every universe branches 
profusely and indiscriminately into new and otherwise causally isolated parallel 
universes at every turn of events. All possibilities for every reality are actual-
ized, and it takes an infinite number of universes to make it all happen. When 
parallel universes face a choice between life and no life, they divide; and at least 
one universe containing life is created. Given an infinite number of branches, 
some will be life-supporting. By pure chance we live in a life-supporting off-
shoot. Our own universe is constantly sprouting new universes that actualize 
every possibility open to every point of space and every instant of time, but most 
universes are uninhabited. 
By appealing to one or more versions of infinite worlds metaphysics, 
Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology tries to account for the life-supporting purpos-
iveness of our universe without resorting to an intelligent and purposive God. 
It offers teleology without theology, a universe fine-tuned for life purely by 
accident. But which is easier to swallow, an unseen transcendent infinite God, 
or an unseen transcendent infinity of worlds? Should an intelligent person 
affirm infinitely many worlds that don't know what they are doing, or an infinite 
God who knows what he is doing? The following considerations should facili-
tate a more informed decision. 
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3. Critique of Infinite World-Ensemble Teleology 
A. Non-Empirical Status 
Atheistic interpretations of the Weak and Strong Anthropic Principles do not 
explain purpose in the universe until they trot out an infinite worlds metaphys-
ics. Unfortunately, we have no direct experiential or legitimate inferential access 
to even one otherworld, much less an infinite number of them. Given an infinite 
number of universes, Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists claim, there can be 
cosmic purpose without God; but there is no good reason to give this, whether 
it be an infinite number of distant metagalaxies, antecedent universes, discon-
nected worlds co-existing in Superspacetime, or worlds branching from our 
existing universe. If quantum theory rejects as empirically meaningless the 
objective existence of unobservable quantum states, it should also refuse to 
proliferate unobserved and unobservable quantum and non-quantum worlds ad 
infinitum. 
Barrow and Tipler acknowledge the non-empirical status of an infinite 
number of metagalaxies and oscillating universes, but they seem blind to the 
non-empirical status of the infinite world-ensemble (Big Fizz) option that they 
embrace. Eric Lerner's Plasma Cosmology postulates an infinity of loosely 
connected metagalaxies. Barrow and Tipler find the same postulate in the 
publications of G. F. R. Ellis. 23 After briefly explaining his position, Barrow and 
Tipler say that "It is hard to evaluate this idea any further, but one thing is 
certain: if it is true then it is certainly not original."24 The theory is indeed hard 
to evaluate because it is nothing more than sheer fantasy! 
Barrow and Tipler are much clearer about the non-empirical status of 
Oscillation Cosmology, remarking that "It is far from being testable. "25 They fail 
somehow to see that this is true also of their own infinite world-ensemble 
metaphysics. If any version of an infinite worlds metaphysics is true, we merely 
human mortals could never know it; but we have no good reasons for thinking 
that it is true. 
Oscillation Cosmology is not testable, according to Barrow and Tipler. 
Inconsistently, they later suggest that it actually makes a testable prediction, one 
that they are unwilling to accept. Given an infinite number of oscillations, if the 
basic laws and constants of nature change with each bounce, 
Sooner or later the geometry would be exchanged for a noncompact struc-
ture bound to expand for all future time. The Universe should currently be 
'open' destined to expand forever since this state will always be reached 
after a finite series of oscillations. 26 
Barrow and Tipler do not realize that this concession is utterly devastating to 
Oscillation Cosmology. Every cosmic epoch in an infinite oscillating series is 
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preceded by an infinite number of antecedent universes persisting collectively 
through an infinite past. An infinite amount of time is quite long enough for 
"sooner or later," so every universe in such a series should be open. For this 
reason alone, the very idea of an infinite number of antecedent universes is 
completely untenable. 
Our universe's being open or closed is testable, in principle capable of 
being decided. All we have to do is find out how much mass/energy the entire 
universe contains. Unfortunately, this is no easy task; but, given what we now 
know, as explained earlier, the available evidence strongly indicates that we live 
in an open universe. Because of their theoretical biases, Barrow and Tipler opt 
for a closed universe. They recognize that an infinite series of oscillating diver-
sified universes eventually achieves a geometry that destines a tenninal member 
to expand forever; but they still insist that our universe is closed in order to 
secure their Final Anthropic Principle; only a closed universe can achieve what 
they think is its ultimate purpose-the Omega Point. 
A closed universe is implausible indeed if grounding the Final Anthropic 
Principle is the best reason that can be given for it, but more about that in the 
next chapter. 
B. The Principle of Plenitude 
Weak and Strong World-ensemble Anthropic Principles presuppose the validity 
of the Principle of Plenitude, or the Principle of Fecundity, as Robert Nozick 
calls it, 27 which says that all possible worlds are actual worlds. Here is the heart 
of the Atheistic Anthropic position on the cause of our life-producing Big Bang. 
The existence of our universe is required by the Principle of Plenitude-an 
abstract, non-empirical, disembodied, supercosmic nonnative principle which 
necessitates that all possible worlds must be actual worlds. But what grounds 
and drives this supercosmic compulsion to actualize all possibilities? What 
gives it the power to actualize its ideal? Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists have 
no clear answer except that it is not Divine, at least not yet! 
The ancestry of the Principle of Plenitude is unquestionably theological. 
Plenitude is definitely not an empirical principle or a verified discovery of 
empirical natural science. Arthur Lovejoy, who coined the phrase, classified it 
as "metaphysical theology."28 Lovejoy traced the principle back to Plato's 
conviction that the actual world copies every one of, and every possible combi-
nation of, the eternal fonns because the richer reality is, the better or more 
perfect it is, and because the Divine Demiurge would not be good, perfect, 
complete, and divine unless he actually is or creates everything that he possibly 
could be or create. 29 
As Lovejoy interpreted it, the Platonic Principle of Plenitude requires the 
existence not only of every possible grade or kind of being, but also of every 
possible individual at every level, since the fonns combine to constitute individ-
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uals. Plenitudists have wavered on the issue of whether plenitude requires 
merely that all possible kinds of things be actual, or whether all possible indi-
viduals of every kind are also required. 
The Greek Atomists hypothesized the existence of infinitely many worlds 
within the infinite void of space, but Plato and the Medieval theologians who 
followed him did not derive infinitely many distinct universes from the Principle 
of Plenitude. They maintained that for both God and the creation to be perfect, 
God only had to create representatives of all possible compatible kinds, degrees, 
or levels of being within this one world. So how many continuous grades of 
being are there? An infinite number, says Lovejoy, though he admits that neither 
the Greek philosophers who espoused plenitude nor the Medieval theologians 
who embedded it into Christian theology were always fully aware of its implica-
tions; they often combined it with incompatible qualifications. 
The levels of being that the Medieval theologians actually identified were 
very finite; and they, like Plato, subscribed to incompatible premises that pre-
vented infinite plenitude from really adding up to infinity. God in absolute self-
sufficiency needs nothing, not even to create, they held; and God's being and 
goodness are in no way enriched by creation. God creates only what He freely 
chooses to create, even though Plenitude requires Him to create absolutely 
everything. Further, a morally good God creates only a morally good world, 
even though plenitude necessitates the creation of every possible world, no 
matter how nasty. The good world that God created contains only those kinds 
of being and those individual beings that are at least roughly harmonious with 
one another on the whole, but plenitude requires that every possibility be actual, 
whether harmonious or discordant, whether good or bad. 
Traditional Christian theologians through the centuries so restricted the 
Principle of Plenitude that it did not readily translate into infinite creation. Only 
God is actually infinite, they held; the created universe, though in some vague 
sense complete and perfectly ordered from the beginning, is finite. God's 
plenitude is in himself-an absolute plenitude of being in which there are no 
unactualized possibilities; but Divine plenitude does not entail creating a truly 
infinite world or an infinite number of worlds. In himself, quite apart from any 
and all creation, God is pure being, everything that a perfect being could possi-
bly be, they thought; but God creates only what he wills to create; and he willed 
to create a finite world which, in the light of modem cosmological knowledge, 
seems rather paltry. 
Before Copernicus and the dawning of modem cosmology, the Christian 
theologians who espoused plenitude believed that God created a multi-storied 
finite universe with the earth at is center, surrounded by a finite number of 
concentric celestial spheres that separate us from God's Heaven. In the closest 
celestial sphere, a finite number of"wandering stars"-the planets, understood 
by many to be embodied angels-rotated around the earth. Our sun and moon 
were classified as planets. In the outermost spheres were the "fixed stars"-
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those we now know to have relatively fixed positions in our Milky Way. Many 
Medieval theologians thought the fixed stars to be either embodied angels or 
moved by angels who exist on a higher link in the chain of being. All heavenly 
bodies were mistakenly thought to rotate around the earth in perfect circular 
orbits. Non-circles are imperfect, and God created nothing imperfect. God sets 
the outermost celestial sphere into motion, and everything between there and the 
earth is moved by other motions in the next highest sphere. Despite plenitude, 
also affirmed, this great chain of being manifests no infinite regress (thus, God 
exists) and no infinite continuum of grades of being. 
From the beginning of Christian cosmology, and through the Middle Ages, 
the Principle of Plenitude applied most conspicuously to God in himself; it 
really did not apply to the created world-even when it did! Christian theologians 
primarily emphasized the infinite plenitude of Divine Being, not the infinite 
plenitude of creation. Plato thought that the supreme form of The Good required 
that all the forms be actualized or copied within creation; and his creative and 
beneficent Demiurge executed this requirement. 
For St. Thomas Aquinas, God in himself is pure being, pure actuality in 
whom there are no unactualized divine possibilities; but this did not translate 
into infinitely many created universes, partly because no created things made 
any internal difference to (had any real or internal relations with) God, and 
partly because a good God would create only a good world, not all possible evil 
worlds. Aquinas considered the hypothesis that God created infinitely many 
worlds because his infinite power3° or goodness31 seems to require infinite 
creativity, but he rejected it for reasons not always very clear or defensible. Still, 
something that superficially resembles infinite plenitude of creation does appear 
in Aquinas. He held that the perfection of the finite world requires God to create 
representatives of innumerably many species or grades of created beings; but 
Aquinas never says all or infinitely many species. Many things that might exist 
do not, he insisted, and only those species were created that harmonize on the 
whole with the existence of other species, especially humankind.32 
Still, we might wonder, as did Lovejoy, why an infinite God, who is 
everything that he could be, did not create everything that he could create, and 
why infinitely many degrees of created beings could not exist within one infinite 
universe. Why and how could God's creativity be limited when God himself is 
pure, infinite, limitless, actual being in whom there are no unactualized potenti-
alities at all? 
By affirming repeatedly that God wills to create only that which the divine 
intellect proposes under the form of goodness, Classical Theologians like St. 
Thomas Aquinas easily avoided the difficulty that some possible worlds would 
be so horrible that a morally virtuous God would never create them. The perfec-
tion of unqualified plenitude of creation is clearly incompatible with the perfec-
tion of moral goodness or righteousness. A benevolent God would not create all 
possible worlds. The problem of theodicy, addressed in more depth in Chapter 
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Eleven, says that whether a good and intelligent God could have created this 
world of woe is seriously doubtful; but much worse worlds are possible, thus 
actual somewhere, under the unqualified aegis of the Principle of Plenitude. 
Historically, the Principle of Plenitude did not originate with empirical 
natural science. It sprang from a very peculiar but highly influential ancient 
Greek way of conceiving of divine perfection. Amazingly, despite its lack of 
empirical origin or justification, the principle is alive and well today among 
scientific-minded cosmologists. To avoid God, many contemporary Anthropic 
Cosmologists affirm either a single infinite spatiotemporal universe or an 
infinite number of universes in time and/or space. Just what differentiates them 
depends upon how universes are distinguished, as articulated earlier. 
The infinite worlds metaphysics of today's Weak and Strong Anthropic 
Principles is nothing but metaphysical theology without God; yet, without God 
the whole rationale for it is lost. Unless Plato's ideal of divine perfection is first 
accepted, we have no good reason to affirm any version of the Principle of 
Plenitude or the infinity of this or any other universes. Also, many theists have 
very different concepts or ideals of divine perfection; and Chapter Ten will 
show how divine perfection may be conceived without Plenitude. 
Today's world-ensemble cosmologists presuppose that the disembodied 
Principle of Plenitude is the ultimate, final, and efficient cause of our life-
producing Big Bang, just as it is the ultimate cause of every other universe, an 
infinite number of them. What caused the Big Bang? The Principle of Plenitude! 
Yet, we have no good reasons to believe that disembodied, abstract princi-
ples are anything more than impotent Aristotelian formal or final causes. The 
main difference between Aristotelian and Platonic approaches to metaphysics 
is that Platonists think that universals, including abstract principles, can and do 
exist and exercise efficient causation without being located or embodied in 
actual entities. By contrast, Aristotelians are persuaded that universals exist only 
in actual individuals and that abstract principles can be causally effective only 
through embodied conscious individuals who understand and act upon them. On 
this issue, experience always favors the Aristotelian approach. Experience never 
supports Platonism. That is quite enough to make the Aristotelian view, but not 
the Platonic, rationally warranted. 
In his brilliant book, Universes, John Leslie gives a highly persuasive 
Anthropic Argument from Design for the existence of God; but by "God" Leslie 
does not mean an actual personal conscious mind who understands and acts 
knowingly and deliberately upon abstract principles. Instead, he defines "God" 
as nothing more than an abstract Neoplatonic principle. For him, God is 
the creatively effective ethical requirement that there be a good universe 
or universes. Or again he is the Principle that the ethical need for a uni-
verse or universes is itself responsible for the actual existence of that 
universe or those universes.33 
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But who or what has this need? Nothing; no one! 
If"there is," as Leslie says, an ethical need for infinitely many universes, 
his Neoplatonic God is nothing but the abstract Platonic Principle of Plenitude, 
except that unrestricted plenitude entails both bad and good universes, since it 
supposedly produces all possible universes. In response to the objection that his 
theology provides no mechanism by which ethical needs produce their effects, 
Leslie explains that "Neoplatonism is the view that ethical needs are themselves 
creatively effective, unaided by any mechanism. "34 
No Aristotelian or Whiteheadian metaphysician would be convinced! 
Alfred North Whitehead's "Ontological Principle" says that 
The reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of 
definite actual entities-in the nature of God for reasons of the highest 
absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for 
reasons which refer to a particular environment.35 
If Aristotle and Whitehead are right, disembodied normative principles cannot 
be efficient causes of anything, much less of universes. Only definite actual 
entities like human beings or an embodied personal God can understand and act 
knowingly on normative principles to make them efficacious. Principles them-
selves are only formal causes; they cannot act by themselves. Abstract principles 
have no needs at all, especially no ethical needs for life-supporting universes. 
This Aristotelian/Whiteheadian position is universally confirmed by experience. 
This is really all that needs to be said for it-and against Platonism. 
M.A. Corey protests that Process Theists cannot affirm that God unilater-
ally determined the initial conditions of the universe so that they would be 
suitable for the later evolution of complex forms of life because these initial 
conditions themselves would have been free to resist the divine will, and some 
would have done so.36 This spurious objection also treats abstractions-the laws 
of physics, the constants of nature, and the aggregate quantity of initially undif-
ferentiated mass/ energy in the nascent universe-as if they were concrete individ-
uals capable of making choices; but no process thinker would so regard them. 
In fact, since the reasons for things must always be traced back to individual 
entities, and since God is the only individual entity capable of determining the 
initial conditions that govern and limit all lesser individual entities, we could 
and should expect God to set the initial limits for all creation. Disembodied, 
unindividuated abstractions can neither resist the will of God nor actualize any 
possibilities, much less all of them. Impersonal aggregates like door knobs and 
just-created, pure, undifferentiated, grandly-unified energy have no conscious-
ness or freedom to resist God's will, just as impersonal principles have no 
power to accomplish anything by themselves. Ethical needs for good universes, 
or for all possible universes, must exist in some actual entity, if they exist at all; 
but these needs are not compatible with one another. 
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C. Infinity = All Possibilities 
Let us grant for the sake of the argument that the Principle of Plenitude might 
be the efficient cause of whole universes, either temporally as an infinite linear 
series of oscillating worlds, or spatially as an infinite number of co-existing 
worlds, or both. Fully deployed, this principle demands the existence of an 
infinite world or number of worlds in which every possible grade of reality, 
every possible individual entity, and all possible qualities and relations are 
actualized. In physical terms, this principle necessitates the realization of every 
possible quantity, quality, kind, and combination of mass/energy. Each tiny 
variation calls for a whole new universe in which everything else in the universe 
has a new relationship with that variation, no matter how minute. Oscillation 
Cosmologies express the temporal alternative; and co-existing universes in Big 
Fizz and Big Divide Cosmologies express the spatial option, which may be 
combined with the temporal. 
Logically, a single temporal series of oscillating universes can never 
absolutely fulfill Plenitude of Creation, for an infinite number of spatially co-
existing universes are also possible; but neither can Mother Spacetime's Big 
Fizz, for possibly only a single temporal strand of oscillating universes exists. 
Many possible worlds and combinations of them exclude other possible worlds 
and combinations. Absolute plenitude of creation is utterly unintelligible! 
We have no good reasons to believe in any other worlds, much less infi-
nitely many of them. More seriously, even if infinitely many universes exist, 
infinity as such does not explain why we live in a life-supporting universe, 
despite what most atheistic cosmologists assume. Why must an infinitely pro-
longed spatial or temporal series of worlds actualize all possibilities, or even all 
logically compatible possibilities? Plato's God and the God of classical western 
theology supposedly, but not always consistently, actualized all possibilities 
knowingly and deliberately; but would infinity alone do so in the absence of 
Divine Agency, as Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists contend? No, for infinite 
numbers alone do not necessitate or entail endless categorial, individual, qualita-
tive, and relational diversity, despite what most atheistic philosophers and 
astrophysicists think. We must take a careful look at this last great unchallenged 
dogma of unwarranted metaphysics. 
By assuming finite matter enduring for infinite time, David Hume tried to 
escape the theological implications of the Argument from Design by arguing: 
Instead of supposing matter infinite, as Epicurus did; let us suppose it 
finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible to finite transposi-
tions: and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order 
or position must be tried an infinite number of times. Innumerable revolu-
tions produce at last some forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted 
as to support the forms amidst a continued succession of matter.37 
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What insures that Hume's "innumerable revolutions" will all be different, 
instead of just being endless repetitions of lifeless sameness? Finite matter 
existing for infinite time cannot by itself insure infinite diversity. A universe 
composed of a single hydrogen atom enduring from everlasting to everlasting 
would fulfill Hume's suppositions. It is a logically possible world, but clearly 
it would never produce any diversity at all. Neither would a universe of two 
hydrogen atoms, or three, or four, or many more. All these are logically possible 
Humean universes. At exactly what point would the addition of finite materiality 
result in the actualization of infinite diversity? None! 
Suppose that infinite quantities of matter exists for infinite time and/or 
throughout infinite Superspace. Would this insure infinite diversity? Would it 
necessitate that every possible world, relationship, quality, and individual be 
actualized? For some theologians, God intentionally makes it so, as Lovejoy 
points out; Divine perfection deliberately diversifies universes and thereby 
insures the existence of every good kind and degree of being, but not all possi-
ble imperfections. Perhaps divine perfection, Pure Being for and in whom no 
unactualized possibilities exist, deliberately diversifies universes and guarantees 
an infinite variety of actual individuals, qualities, relationships, and degrees of 
being. Hume's disproof of the existence of a purposive God tacitly appeals to 
a metaphysical principle that requires God, who can supply diversity when sheer 
numbers cannot! 
For Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology, what insures that every possibility is 
actualized in infinite time and/or space? No one, including David Hume, really 
knows that time or space are infinite, but let us grant this groundless assumption 
for the sake of the argument. Infinite time and/or space alone would not insure 
that every finite combination of individuals and forms will inevitably be actual-
ized because: i. This presumption confuses two very different things-numerical 
spatiotemporal infinity, with an infinite variety of classes, individuals, qualities, 
and relationships. ii. It clearly lacks a Principle or Agent of Diversification. iii. 
It definitely confuses infinite possibilities with all possibilities. iv. It mistakenly 
assumes that infinity would eventually use up all lifeless universes. v. And the 
very idea of actualizing all possibilities is logically incoherent. 
i. Infinity Is Not Infinite Diversity 
The assumption that all possibilities must be actualized in infinite time or space 
may confuse different orders of infinity. Georg Cantor discovered different 
orders of infinity, some of which are richer than others. The members of a 
denumerably infinite set can be put in one to one correspondence with the set 
of whole numbers, but a nondenumerably infinite set is so rich that its members 
exceed the set of whole numbers. According to Cantor's theory oftransfinites, 
spatial or temporal infinities are denumerable sets. However, the set of all 
possible individuals, qualities, and relations is nondenumerably rich. 
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Denumerable sets cannot exhaust or use up nondenumerable sets. Denum-
erably infinite spacetime cannot actualize a non-denumerable infinity of poten-
tial individuals, qualities, and relationships. There are just too many of them; 
but even if this error is not committed, other more serious difficulties plague 
infinite worlds metaphysics. 
ii. An Agent of Diversification Is Needed 
Most seriously, infinity alone does not insure diversity. In infinite worlds meta-
physics, lifeless worlds could simply repeat themselves endlessly; and probabili-
ties insure that they would. An infinity of spacetime alone does not guarantee 
life, the rich environmental order required for its support, or its harmony and 
goodness on the whole. Endless accidents, or random spontaneous fluctuations 
alone can insure the actualization of nothing more than an infinite number of 
garbage universes. Mere infinity cannot guarantee that any universe would ever 
be life-supporting. For this, an infonned choice must be made between lifeless 
and life-supporting universes, and between good and bad ones; but nothing in 
the concept of sheer infinity insures any kind of diversity, goodness, or intelli-
gent selection. 
Perhaps many worlds metaphysics does not require an infinite number of 
universes. Some cosmologists suggest that finite but very large number of 
universes would be sufficient to make a life-supporting universe just happen 
occasionally. The trouble is that neither finite nor infinite numbers as such 
insure any diversity at all; if infinity can't do it, neither can finitude. Universes, 
finite or infinite in number, can be identically lifeless. This is possible and 
probable. Neither finite nor infinite numbers provide or insure diversification. 
For that, some additional cause, an agent who selects for diversity, is required. 
Life-supporting universes are infinitely improbable. Atheistic Anthropic 
Cosmologists regularly concede that for every single way to get a life-support-
ing universe right, there are infinitely many ways to get it wrong.38 Something 
more than mere spatiotemporal infinity is required if conditions essential for life 
are to converge in some actual universe. The Teleological Argument for the 
existence of God, developed in a following chapter, says that to get it right, this 
informed choice must be made by a Superintelligent Being who comprehends 
infinite errors and blind alleys and chooses against them. 
Alfred North Whitehead recognized the necessity for a Divine Principle 
or Agent of Limitation or Concretion who picks or selects desirable universes 
to be actualized from unfathomable numbers of undesirable possible worlds.39 
Nothing in the mere concept of infinity insures any diversity whatsoever, much 
less the right kind of diversity needed to support highly complex living beings 
who can live worthwhile lives. An individuated, actualized, and embodied 
intelligent principle or agent of qualitative selection and diversification of 
Divine proportions is necessary to make any numerical set of universes exem-
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plify the right kind of qualitative conditions to support worthwhile and complex 
forms of life. 
Neither David Hume nor today's Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists pro-
vide for an intelligent, or even for an unintelligent. agent of qualitative limita-
tion and diversification. Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists dismiss the Strong 
Theistic Anthropic Principle much too quickly. 
iii. Infinite Possibilities Are Not All Possibilities 
Infinite Worlds Metaphysics definitely confuses infinite possibilities with all 
possibilities. "All" includes "infinite," but "infinite" does not entail "all." God 
or Mother Spacetime could create an infinite number of good universes without 
creating a corresponding number of evil universes. Plenitude of creation re-
quires both; but plenitude as a perfection is radically different from and incom-
patible with the perfection of moral goodness, which adds responsible and 
purposive moral selectivity to the requirement to produce infinite actualities. 
As the ancient Stoics and nineteenth-century Friedrich Nietzsche con-
tended, infinite time (or space) could simply repeat an identical set of mass/ 
energy configurations, individuals, qualities, and relations an infinite number 
of times in an Eternal Recurrence of sameness. They supposed that life would 
participate in Eternal Recurrence, but what would guarantee this? An everlast-
ing or an eternally recurring universe composed of a single hydrogen atom 
would result in no life or meaningful diversity; neither would an eternally 
recurring universe composed of an infinite number of hydrogen atoms (and no 
others). Both are logically possible universes that could eternally recur. That all 
universes are merely hydrogen universes is logically possible. "All" does not 
translate into "infinite diversity"! 
Despite incessant claims to the contrary, a monkey banging on a typewriter 
for an infinite amount of time would not necessarily write the Bible or all the 
works of Shakespeare. Infinite time alone could not and would not prevent a 
secretarial monkey from banging on just one key-forever. Its doing so forever 
is logically possible, and if all possibilities are actual, it must be so! If the 
monkey is bored (teleology), it might strike a diversity of keys. At first, it would 
produce only trash. In an infinite amount of time, it would produce only an 
infinite amount of trash. Garbage in, garbage out-forever. 
The secretarial monkey universe actually raises more questions than it 
answers. Who or what created the monkey? Who created the typewriter? Does 
only one monkey exist? Did it have parents? Does it have a navel? What does 
it eat? Does it ever take a break? Why does it type rather than doing something 
else? How does it live forever? Has its universe been around forever? How so? 
Some things that sound possible in the abstract are not very plausible in the 
concrete. The example requires a cosmology, which requires a metaphysics, 
which requires a theology! 
Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology 195 
Those who assume that an infinitely diverse temporal or spatial series 
(which requires an Agent of Selection and Diversification) will exhaustively 
actualize all possibilities simply fail to understand the concept of infinity. 
Suppose that an infinite number of diverse individuals, qualities, and relation-
ships were or are actualized during an infinite past or in endless space. This 
would not mean that all possibilities are actualized; even infinity does not use 
up infinity; an infinite number of universes would still remain to be actualized! 
Infinity subtracted from infinity still leaves infinity, and "infinite" does not 
mean "different" or "all." 
If probability is to be our guide, without God, all past, present, and future 
worlds would probably be lifeless worlds. The existence of an infinite number 
of antecedent or contemporary universes does not explain why we live in a 
universe in which incomprehensibly complex and remarkable concurrences 
conspire to generate and support our existence and that of innumerable other 
inherently valuable forms of conscious life. An infinity of antecedent or co-
existing universes would likely be nothing more than endless variations on 
inexhaustible themes of lifelessness. Life-supporting worlds are infinitely 
improbable, and rationality rejects infinite improbability. 
iv. Infinity Would Not "Use Up" Lifeless Universes 
Those who think that life-supporting universes will inevitably occur in an 
infinite amount of time (or space) seem to assume that certain sub-sets of 
infinity like lifeless universes would eventually be used up, and then a life-
supporting universe would necessarily come along; but this is not true at all. 
This approach treats infinity as if it were finite. It assumes that infinite sets can 
be used up in infinite time or space; but infinity, especially nondenumerable 
infinity, cannot be actualized exhaustively in any amount of space and/or time. 
Neither qualitative infinity, nor sub-sets of it, can be totally depleted in numeri-
cally infinite time or space. Sub-sets of infinity-all possible lifeless universes-
containjust as many members as infinity itself, so they can never be exhausted 
or used up so that something else can come along. Even after an infinite amount 
of time, an infinite number of lifeless universes would remain to be created. 
Each one could and probably would be exactly like the last unless some infi-
nitely wise and intelligent Divine Agent of Limitation and Diversification 
knowingly and deliberately selects just the right conditions for life-affirming 
qualitative diversity. 
Those who think that an infinite number of universes will actualize all 
possible qualitative diversity may believe that universes will be randomized, and 
that infinite randomization will produce infinite qualitative diversity and eventu-
ally use up all possible lifeless universes. However, randomization itself needs 
explaining and has its own necessary conditions. What selects and causes these 
conditions? Why does infinite randomization not result in infinite repetition? 
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The concept of randomness makes sense only against an established background 
of law and order in an actually existing universe. As Alan Guth recognizes, 
'"randomness' is ill defined. The word 'random' does not become meaningful 
until the probability rules are stated. "40 But no established finitistic probability 
rules exist for pure sets of all possible universes. 
Given the orderly background of the actual finite laws of physics, cards in 
a deck can be randomly shuffled; but with no actual laws of physics, no actual 
cards, and no actual shufflers, no random shuffle can occur. Randomization of 
actualities makes no sense in a realm ofundifferentiated possibilities devoid of 
any and all background order; and randomization alone could not use up infinity 
to insure that randomly produced lifeless universes are not repeated endlessly. 
Given the orderly background of quantum Superspacetime and the laws of 
quantum physics, quantum spontaneity might generate randomness; but what 
guarantees the existence of Superspacetime, the ubiquity of quantum laws 
within it, and the exclusion of all possible non-quantum universes? Why does 
Superspacetime exemplify quantum instead ofnon-quantum laws? Alternatives 
are logically possible! Quantum-foamy Superspacetime cannot use up all possi-
bilities, for a uniformly featureless Newtonian/Kantian absolute Superspacetime 
is logically possible also. 
A teleological explanation for quantum universes is readily available and 
highly plausible. A creator God wanting to make free, responsible, and co-
creative creatures would choose quantum laws, not Newtonian laws, for created 
universes in order to make room for creaturely freedom, responsibility, and 
creativity. God would just make spontaneously creative creatures ranging from 
sub-atomic particles to conscious animals and human beings. Quantum laws 
actually presuppose their existence, for laws are products of the average behav-
ior of concrete entities, not efficient causes that antedate and constrain their 
behavior. This is also true of the laws of sociology and psychology. 
v. Actualizing All Possibilities Is Incoherent 
Finally, the very idea of actualizing all possibilities is logically incoherent. 
Possibilities are both negative and positive. Possibly, all universes are life-
supporting; possibly, none are. Possibly, the physics of every world is Newto-
nian; possibly the physics of every world is quantum/relativity; but these univer-
salized possibilities cannot both be actual. Possibly the epoch that preceded ours 
was Newtonian, or it was open or flat; but then quantum effects in an antecedent 
singularity or in antecedent nothingness would not account for our world. (They 
don't anyway.) If all possibilities were actual, we would not be here, for it is 
possible that neither we nor our world should exist. Yet, we would be here, for 
it is possible that we and our world might exist. Possibly, all worlds are good, 
possibly created by a benevolent God; possibly, all worlds are bad, possibly 
created by a malevolent demon. A negative possibility corresponds with every 
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positive possibility; and all possibilities include both! All possibilities just 
cancel out everything! 
The Principle of Plenitude of creation is logically unintelligible. If modi-
fied to say that all "consistently combinable" possibilities are actual, who or 
what does the selecting? Different combinations are possible in different uni-
verses and between universes. Contradictions indicate mutually exclusive 
alternatives, but they do not select one or the other to be actualized. To settle 
this, a choice must be made. Not an abstract Principle, but an Agent of Selection 
and Diversification is required for this because disembodied abstract principles 
are impotent. 
Postulating multiple universes does not account for our life-supporting 
universe, as it seemed to do for Schrodinger's cat that was alive in one universe 
but dead in another, for many possibilities that would apply to all universes are 
mutually exclusive. For example, it is possible that all universes are life-sup-
porting or that none are, that all are quantum or that none are, and so on. If the 
"consistently combinable" qualification is accepted to begin with, Schrodinger' s 
cat poses no problems. Unlike the Medieval theologians, Quantum Cosmolo-
gists seem to be very serious about the actualization of all possibilities-logic be 
damned. But logic says the same thing of Quantum Cosmologists! 
D. Infinitely Many Life-Sustaining Universes 
Suppose we knew that an infinite number of worlds exists, and all of them are 
good, interesting, and life-sustaining. This too is logically possible. Would this 
tell us anything about cosmic or supercosmic teleology? Anthropic Cosmolo-
gists themselves concede that life-supporting worlds are rare exceptions, not the 
rule, among possible universes. Low probabilities are possible but highly un-
likely. Possibility should not be confused with probability. That each member 
of an infinite series of oscillating or co-existing universes handsomely supports 
valuable life-forms is logically possible but not very probable. Yet, if all possi-
bilities are actual, this must be true; but it must also be false! 
If a large finite or even an infinite number of universes were life-support-
ing and none were lifeless, what would be the most plausible explanation? 
Atheistic interpretations of the Anthropic Principle explain the remarkable life-
supporting coincidences of our universe by postulating an infinite number of 
antecedent or contemporary worlds, and by equating numerical infinity with 
infinite diversity. Given an infinite number of qualitatively diverse shoes, at 
least one will fit accidentally, they say, even though it is logically possible that 
none will fit, or that all will be exactly alike-all size eight when you wear a ten, 
or all left feet. But suppose that an infinite number of shoes all fit! No mere 
chance depletion of infinite diversity could explain it, for there would be no 
relevant diversity; no lifeless universes would be used up. Why would each 
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world support life when endless lifeless worlds are logically possible? Only a 
Divine Agent of Limitation and Diversification could explain it. 
Abstract principles are not efficient causes; they are efficacious only when 
embodied in and acted out by concrete decision-making individuals. Only a 
concrete individual agent of Divine proportions could select the right conditions 
for worthwhile life even once, much less an infinite number of times. If life-
supporting universes are infinitely improbable subsets of a nondenumerable 
infinity of possible individuals, qualities, and relations, these subsets would be 
actualized only if a deliberate and informed choice is made between them and 
infinite subsets of lifeless universes. A following chapter on the Teleological 
Argument for the existence of God concludes that God made the choice. 
Just one life-supporting universe is infinitely improbable, and so are an 
infinite number of them. To be sure, we do not know that any other universes 
exist, much less an infinite number; but one interesting argument for the exis-
tence of an infinite number of life-supporting universes should be considered, 
even if it is finally rejected. 
If the constants, initial conditions, and laws ofnature did not break down 
in the final collapse of an infinite series of oscillating universes, they would 
presumably be the same in every successive universe. Conservation laws, along 
with all others, would carry over from epoch to epoch. The First Law of Ther-
modynamics would be in effect from one epoch to the next, and the amount of 
mass/energy in each cosmic epoch, no matter how many, would be identical; no 
mass/energy would be lost from epoch to epoch. Conservation of mass/energy 
would be metaphysically everlasting. 
Collectively, the harmoniously integrated laws, constants, initial condi-
tions, energy densities, and so on, of our own universe produce sufficient 
qualitative richness and diversity for complex living creatures to exist. If these 
do not break down at the end of any cosmic epochs, they would be the same in 
every previous and succeeding cosmic epoch. With identical laws, physical 
constants, quantities of energy, and initial conditions, each preceding universe 
would be generally life-supporting like ours (with a fly in the ointment to be 
explored shortly). 
An infinite series of exclusively life-supporting quantum universes would 
not destine every cosmic epoch to be a detailed rerun of its predecessors. This 
might be true of deterministic Newtonian universes, but not of indeterministic 
Heisenberg universes. If quantum laws always obtain, each ofus would not live 
our lives over and over again in an endless series of Eternal Recurrences. If, like 
ours, all previous cosmic epochs include the laws of quantum physics, then 
quantum indeterminacy, fluctuations, and free choices made by complex cre-
ative agents in each epoch would preclude detailed duplication. Only general 
life-supporting conditions could be replicated by the laws, constants, initial 
conditions, and quantity of mass/energy of all earlier and later relevantly similar 
universes. But if endless universes are as rich in life as our own, how, why, and 
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by whom were life-supporting conditions chosen for all, when infinitely improb-
able even for one, given all possible universes from which to choose? 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics is the fly in the ointment for an 
interminable string oflife-supporting universes. If entropy or disorder increases 
from one cosmic epoch to another, then chaos increases from epoch to epoch. 
Because more chaotic, no universe could be qualitatively similar to its predeces-
sor after all; each would have to be much less ordered than its immediate ante-
cedent. An infinite number of earlier increases in chaos would result in pure 
chaos today, and too much disorder is incompatible with complex valuable life. 
Since our present universe is not pure chaos, either the Second Law does not 
carry over from epoch to epoch, or there have not been an infinite number of 
prior cosmic epochs, or a Divine Being intervenes periodically to bring order 
out of chaos, or God just created our universe out of nothing. But which is it? 
E. Infinite Time and the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy 
Ian Hacking brilliantly argued in 1987 that Oscillation Cosmologists like John 
A. Wheeler commit the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy.41 The gambler makes a 
logical mistake that usually costs him dearly. He comes into a game of dice and 
asks how many previous rolls occurred before he arrived. If many previous rolls 
produced no double sixes, the gambler assumes that the chances for non-twelves 
have been used up; and he concludes that his chance of rolling a twelve are very 
high; he bets heavily on twelve-and loses. The problem is that no matter how 
many previous rolls, the gambler's chances are exactly the same when he starts 
to play as on the very first roll. Once the relevant statistics about habituated 
entities are available, the odds do not change. The odds are the same on every 
roll! This is what gamblers, both cosmic and non-cosmic, do not understand. 
Hacking's essential point is easier to grasp if we consider flipping a coin. 
With only two sides, the odds for flipping heads or tails are equally fifty/fifty. 
In a fluke situation, a gambler learns that tails have come up forty-nine times in 
a row and assumes that the odds favoring heads on the next flip are forty-nine 
to one; so he bets on heads-and loses. All along, the odds are just fifty/fifty. In 
the inverse situation, learning that heads just turned up, the gambler bets that 
tails appeared on the previous forty nine tosses. He bets on that-and loses. 
The inverse gambler's fallacy begins with the information that an improba-
ble double six was just rolled. From this, the gambler infers that it must have 
been preceded by a large number of rolls with no double sixes. If no dies were 
cast since he entered the room, he waits to see how the roll comes out. If it is a 
double six, he infers that many previous rolls must have produced different 
results. He then bets that many previous rolls resulted in no double sixes-and 
loses. In actuality, once the odds are established and known, the statistical 
chances of rolling a double six are just as good (or as bad) on the next as on the 
millionth roll. The number of rolls makes no difference to beating the odds, and 
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a single current roll makes no difference in estimating the number or kind of 
previous rolls.42 
Applied to Anthropic Cosmology, the inverse gambler's fallacy says that 
"The universe has been around for ever so long, so it is not in the least surpris-
ing that it should have got into its present orderly state. Given an old enough 
universe, we would expect our order to arrive eventually by mere chance. "43 
This Humean reasoning is fallacious, says Hacking, because "There would have 
been no ground for believing we have an old universe, except that it explains the 
present order. But it does not explain the present order. So there is no ground 
for believing in an old universe."44 
Thus, the supposition that our orderly life-supporting universe occurs late 
in an infinite sequence of non-life-supporting universes does nothing whatso-
ever to explain its existence. There is no such thing as "occurring late in" or 
"using up" an infinite temporal series. In an infinite series, every universe, no 
matter where positioned, is preceded by infinite time and an infinite number of 
antecedent universes. Cosmological gamblers cannot beat those odds! And if an 
open universe inevitably occurs after a finite or even an infinite number of 
oscillations, then every universe will be open, and the very notion of infinite 
oscillations is incoherent. 
All Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists commit the inverse gambler's fal-
lacy when they assume that infinitely many preceding worlds would account for 
our life-supporting universe. Gamblers should learn that the odds against win-
ning are the same on every throw of the dice; and cosmologists should learn that 
the odds against life-supporting universes are eternally the same-infinite-no 
matter how many a...'ttecedents. We lack absolute certainties, but rationality bets 
against infinite improbability. Rationality bets on a God who knows and cares. 
E. Infinite Space and the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy 
Does the spatial option for the Weak and Strong World-ensemble Anthropic 
Principle commit the inverse gambler's fallacy? Big Fizz Cosmologies affirm 
that if infinitely many worlds co-exist in infinite Superspace, as Carter, Linde, 
Barrow, Tipler, and others believe, then somewhere in that vast simultaneous 
infinity, some worlds would support life, not by Divine design, but just by 
beating the odds. Ian Hacking thinks that the infinitely many simultaneous 
worlds theory does not commit the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy, for time is not 
a factor; this theory just deduces its conclusion directly from the Principle of 
Plenitude. If all possible universes simultaneously co-exist, and if our ordered 
world is a possible universe, then our ordered world will exist. Here "Every-
thing in this reasoning is deductive. It has nothing to do with the inverse gam-
bler's fallacy."45 Our life-supporting world is just deduced from the truth of the 
Principle of Plenitude. But plenitude is not a truth! 
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Our well-founded doubts about the Principle of Plenitude are just as 
cogent when applied to infinitely many worlds co-existing in Superspace as to 
an infinite temporal succession of cosmic epochs in Supertime. Plenitude is not 
an empirical, scientific truth. It originated with a peculiar theological concept 
of Divine Perfection, and there is no other plausible rationale for it. It cannot be 
employed to avoid Theism. Applied to co-existing worlds, Plenitude confuses 
orders of infinity and is logically incoherent. The probability is infinite that 
lifeless worlds would occur endlessly in mindless Superspacetime. Without 
some intelligent and deliberately selective Divine Agent of Limitation or Diver-
sification, infinitely many co-existing worlds would probably all be lifeless. 
This is possible as well as highly probable, and if possibility equals actuality, 
it must be so-even ifit cannot be so! World-ensemble theories fail to provide 
an Agent of Selection and Diversification. Infinite Superspace cannot actualize 
all possibilities, for no matter how many contemporary lifeless universes exist, 
an infinite number of lifeless universes will remain to be actualized. 
G. Faith vs. Reason 
In discussing the relation between the Weak Anthropic Principle and world-
ensemble metaphysics, Fred W. Hallberg wrote: 
So all those "other" universes would exist unobserved (Gale 1981, 168). 
The existence of our special life-enhancing universe would be the inevita-
ble result of chance within this larger ensemble of universes. Of course, 
this entire supposition of an ensemble of universes is a purely speculative 
idea beyond any conceivable scientific determination. An equally valid 
alternative supposition, that our universe expresses an intention that life 
and consciousness be realized, also takes us beyond what could be con-
ceivably determined by scientific experimentation.46 
Hallberg thinks that very different attitudes toward the world would be appro-
priate, depending on which explanation oflife-supporting cosmic coincidences 
we accept. He concludes that "Neither choice is more factual, or realistic, than 
the other" and that "The weak anthropic principle limits reason in a way that 
leaves room for faith (Kant [I 787] 1958, 29)."47 
Hallberg is right about the limits of science, but perhaps he restricted 
reason (conceived more broadly as philosophy) prematurely. Theism has more 
than an equally valid claim with world-ensemble Atheism on our confidence. 
Hallberg does not challenge the assumption that infinite number equals infinite 
diversity. Consequently, he does not realize that life-affirming diversity within 
infinitely many worlds requires an Agent of Selection and Differentiation of 
Divine proportions. Chapters Ten through Twelve of this book will show that 
belief in God is rationally warranted. Theistic faith (confidence) need not be 
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blind or irrational. All rational beings, including cosmologists, should take the 
theistic option much more seriously. 
To summarize, Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology concedes that our universe 
is exceptionally fine tuned for intelligent life forms; but this can be explained, 
its adherents claim, without appeal to God. The universe is compatible with our 
existence because we would not be here if it were not, says the Weak Anthropic 
Principle. But why is the universe compatible with our existence? The Weak and 
non-theistic versions of the Strong Anthropic Principle explain our good fortune 
by appeal to infinite worlds metaphysics. Yet, no infinite worlds metaphysics 
is verifiable directly or inductively. As an explanatory hypothesis, it is derived 
historically from an unscientific theological Principle of Plenitude, which 
affirms that God would be less than perfect unless he actually creates everything 
that he possibly could create. The assumption that an infinite number of worlds 
in time and/or space would actualize all possible individuals, qualities, and 
relations is not true, partly because a lower is not equivalent to a higher order 
of infinity, partly because infinite sets cannot be used up, partly because infinite 
sets need contain no diversity at all, and partly because the notion of actualizing 
all possibilities is logically incoherent. Lifeless worlds could and most likely 
would be repeated infinitely, just as monkeys banging typewriters would most 
likely produce garbage infinitely. Infinite numbers do not translate automatically 
into the existence of infinite diversity. Only a super-calculating life-loving God 
could select conditions for one or more life-supporting universes. 
Infinite temporal oscillations do not improve the odds against a life-sup-
porting universe, according to the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy. An infinity of 
worlds, whether successive or co-existing, is deduced from the indefensible 
Principle of Plenitude. An infinite plenitude of universes does not make good 
sense and is supported by no good reasons because abstract, disembodied, 
normative principles are not efficient causes, and the notion of actualizing all 
possibilities for all conceivable universes is logically incoherent. Atheistic 
Anthropic Cosmology does not successfully account for what caused our Big 
Bang. 
Nine 
THE FINAL ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE 
According to another version of the Strong Anthropic Principle, the Final 
Anthropic Principle, our universe must exist. Why? Because it helps to create 
God. Our universe, together with infinitely many others, insures that God will 
one day come into being. This is its ultimate purpose and reason for being. 
1. The Omega Point as the Purpose of the Universe 
John Barrow and Frank Tipler develop and defend what they call the "Final 
Anthropic Principle," 1 according to which the purpose of our presently Godless 
universe is to bring about God or the Omega Point. Only gradually do they 
identify the two, but this is the end result of their reflections, especially Tipler' s. 
From the future, the Omega Point creates the world, but only after the world 
creates the Omega Point (if that makes any sense). God creates the world only 
after the world creates God. 
According to Tipler, who identifies himself as an atheist,2 God's non-
existence is true now, but it will be false at the end of time when Theism be-
comes true. Tipler thinks that a godless universe will one day create God. The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle culminates with the Omega Point. Tipler 
most fully develops the idea that the forthcoming Omega Point= God in his The 
Physics of Immortality, 1994, where he contends that the Omega Point will raise 
us (or virtual cyberspace computerized emulations ofus) from the dead billions 
of years from now and give our emulations eternal life.3 
Every step in the futuristic pseudo-scientific eschatology of Barrow and 
Tipler is highly conjectural, unverified, and improbable. Over billions of future 
years, they believe, biological human life will perish; but it will re-embody itself 
in computerized robots that will gradually spread throughout the cosmos. Some 
day computerized humanity will exit planet earth and our solar system in space 
ships. Self-replicating humanoid or android computers will come to inhabit all 
of the Milky Way, then move on from there to conquer all other galaxies. 
Barrow and Tipler remind us that eventually our solar system will cease 
to support biological life. Our sun has already burned half of its energy and has 
only five billion years to go. In four billion years, it will expand as a red giant 
to incinerate all its planets. Eventually, all stars/suns will exhaust their nuclear 
fuel, and all planets everywhere will become biologically uninhabitable in a 
cosmic heat death. 
After biological human life as we know it is extinct,4 intelligent life itself 
will not end, Barrow and Tipler claim. They define life as "information process-
ing,"5 which, by definitional fiat, makes computers both alive and intelligent. 
(Yet, we must note, so much of the fullness of human reality and value is 
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missing!) They insist that "Intelligent machines can be regarded as people. 
These machines may be our ultimate heirs."6 Eventually, we will construct 
complex robotic computers that can reproduce themselves and survive both the 
final cold of a closed universe's vast expansion and the final searing heat and 
pressure of its terminal contraction. In due time, all matter will decay, including 
protons and magnetic monopoles, so living computers will have to reembody 
themselves in radiant energy toward the end of the expansion phase. Toward the 
end of the contraction phase, they will be embodied in matter denser than iron 
and will endure long periods of hibernation with only fleeting moments of 
information-processing. Complex intelligent computers will still continue to 
communicate with one another and to gather information-until they take posses-
sion of, and make use of, all the mass/energy in the universe. Fat chance! 
Similar life or information-collecting processes that include all possible 
histories are going on in infinitely many co-existing worlds in an all-inclusive 
Superspacetime. The Final Anthropic Principle agrees that the Principle of 
Plenitude as objectified in infinite worlds metaphysics caused our Big Bang. As 
our universe approaches its final singularity, it will merge with infinitely many 
other worlds that include all possible histories. Collectively, they will possess 
an infinite amount of information. The final Supersingularity in which infinite 
worlds merge in Superspacetime is the Omega Point. The whole meaning and 
purpose of our universe, of every universe, is to generate the Omega Point. 
Objectively, when the Omega Point is reached, "This is the end;m but subjec-
tively it will not be the end. 
The Omega Point will be subjectively immortal because the pace of events 
will be slowed down so much that time will seem endless; (and presumably the 
then-Omniscient Omega will be too stupid to realize that it isn't). Barrow and 
Tipler tell us that "A modem-day theologian might wish to say that the totality 
oflife at the Omega Point is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient!"8 In The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle, they do not actually say that the Omega 
Point is God; but since it exemplifies the traditional defining attributes of God, 
it is not misleading to say that according to the Final Anthropic Principle the 
purpose of the universe is to make God. Tipler explicitly calls the Omega Point 
"God" in later writings. 9 Like Samuel Alexander, whose Space, Time, and Deity 
appeared in 1920, Barrow and Tipler predict that some day the universe will 
create God. Unlike Alexander, they also contend that God created the universe, 
since the future (God created by the universe) creates the past (God creating the 
universe). Anthropic Atheism results in Omega Point Theism in the very far 
distant future; Tipler's God "exists mainly at the end of time."10 
2. Critique of the Final Anthropic Principle 
The incredibly conjectural predictions proffered by Barrow and Tipler make 
their Final Anthropic Principle (F AP) highly problematic. Not inappropriately, 
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one critic, Marvin Gardner, renamed their principle the "Completely Ridiculous 
Anthropic Principle (CRAP)". 11 
A. Unfounded Assumptions 
Not one of the following claims made or presupposed by Barrow and Tipler are 
known to be true, and most of them arc either meaningless, blatantly false, 
immensely improbable, or logically incoherent. 
l. Human beings (or our robot computer descendants) will one day travel 
to all inhabitable planets in the Milky way and eventually to every galaxy in the 
universe. This presupposes that: 
a. Human minds and bodies can either survive the weightlessness and 
other adversities of very long-distance space-travel; or they can be perfectly 
encoded in lightweight computers that can survive such rigors. 
b. Human beings will invest heavily in space-research and travel in the 
future. 
c. Cheap and abundant sources of energy for space travel will be available 
in the future. 
d. We and our biological descendants will long survive the enormous 
genocidal propensities of our species, our unpredictable adventures and misad-
ventures with nuclear energy, our incredibly short-sighted environmental de-
structiveness, our dabbling with bioterrorism, and our propensity to overpopu-
late the earth. 
e. Many planets throughout the Milky Way and the rest of the cosmos are 
inhabitable and will provide suitable habitats for our computerized robot de-
scendants. 
f. If inhabited, the occupants of other planets will be receptive to comput-
erized humanoid aliens. 
g. The native bacterial, viral, chemical, physical, and social occupants of 
other inhabited planets will not be devastatingly hostile to and destructive of 
computerized humanoid aliens. 
The list could go on and on. 
2. Life is nothing but "information processing," which implies that auto-
mobiles and all other machines are alive. 12 
3. Machines (information processing computers) are people; they are (or 
will be) just as conscious, intelligent, and valuable intrinsically as biochemical, 
carbon-based hmnan beings. 
4. We and our biological descendants can be persuaded that 2. is true, will 
come to care about the long-term destiny of android computers, and will recog-
nize that the whole meaning of our existence depends on what happens to 
merged computerized robots billions of years from now. 
5. Our universe, and each member of the oscillating set to which it be-
longs, contains enough mass/energy to close it, so its expansion phase will halt, 
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and the tenninal Big Crunch will coalesce into the Omega Point. This is also 
true of infinitely many co-existing worlds and/or oscillating sets of worlds in 
Superspacetime. The Omega Point will result from the merger of an infinite 
number of universes that actualize all possibilities. 
6. Intelligent computers can survive and function in the extremely hostile 
physical conditions that will prevail toward the end of the universe's expansion 
and contraction phases. At the end of time, they and the infonnation they en-
code can survive the infinite density, timelessness, and spacelessness of the 
ultimate singularity, the Omega Point. 
7. Computers can and will eventually capture and make use of all the 
mass/energy in the universe and manipulate its evolution. 
8. Processes like 1-7 above are going on in infinitely many worlds co-
existing with ours in infinite Superspacetime. Infinitely many worlds actualize 
all possibilities. 
9. Near the final state of the Superuniverse, infinitely many computer-
captured universes will merge with ours to form the Omega Point. Their con-
traction phases will somehow coincide with that of our world or its ultimate 
oscillating successor. Infinitely many universes can and will find ways to 
contract and merge that preserve and are not destructive of infonnation about 
every detail of their existence. 
10. The duration of the Omega Point will be objectively finite, but it will 
be subjectively immortal-or too slow and stupid to know that it is mortal! 
11. At the end of all spacetime, the Omega Point, God, will become om-
nipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. 
The possible and the probable are not identical, and the logically incoher-
ent is not even possible. None of the above claims are known to be true, and 
most if not all of them are highly improbable, blatantly false, unintelligible, or 
otherwise implausible. No attempt will be made here to criticize these claims in 
depth, but many of these presumptions have been decisively refuted in earlier 
discussions. The absurdity of this position speaks for itself. 
Let us consider only two of many insuperable obstacles to the realization 
of Star Trek, Star Wars, and all fanciful futuristic human space-travel scenar-
ios-the time involved in space-travel, and the incredible quantities of energy 
required. As Timothy Ferris indicates, 
The stars are just too far away: A spacecraft capable of traveling a million 
miles per hour-and this would be a stunningly fast ship, one that could fly 
from Earth to Mars in less than an hour-would take nearly three thousand 
years to reach Alpha Centauri, the nearest star." 13 
Alpha Centauri is 4.3 light years from us; it actually consists of three stars 
closely encircling one another; it probably boasts no habitable planets, for any 
that try to form would be ground to bits by this encirclement. 
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In his 1994 book, Tipler concedes all of this, then opts for travel beyond 
Alpha Centauri to two stars resembling our sun that are 11.3 and 10.7 light 
years away as the first feasible extra-solar destination. Habitable asteroids might 
exist along the way, he hopes. Tiny microcomputers could be transported to 
these stars at 90 percent of the speed of light in only twelve years or so, he 
claims. 14 But how and when will we build spaceships that can travel at 90 
percent of the speed of light? Surely not in twelve years. Probably never. 
Building space ships to carry tiny microcomputers is one thing; building 
them to carry human beings is another. This is where the available energy 
problem gets serious. Physicist John A. Jungerman tries to bring Trekkies back 
to sober realism about this. Flying the starship Enterprise to the nearest star at 
only half the speed oflight (much faster than in Ferris's example above) would 
take eight years one way, but accelerating it to that speed would be absolutely 
prohibitive. At four million tons of mass, the energy (fuel) required to accelerate 
the Enterprise to half the speed oflight for the trip would be 
the energy equivalent of about 1016 tons of TNT, or ten thousand trillion 
tons! The nuclear arsenals of all countries contain about twenty billion 
tons of TNT equivalent. So to put this into perspective, the fuel required 
for the acceleration to half the speed of light would be the energy equival-
ent of about five hundred thousand times all the nuclear arsenals of the 
world. 15 
Jungerman further indicates that when the Enterprise gets to the nearest star, an 
equal amount of energy will be required to slow the ship down and land it. And 
this says nothing of fuel required for the return trip! Fictional space warps that 
allow for overcoming these obvious limitations of space-travel remain "a sci-
ence fiction dream," Jungerman cautions. 16 
Ferris, Tipler, and Jungerman discuss only space-travel within our galaxy. 
Intergalactic travel, the real stuff of science fiction, is conspicuously less feasi-
ble. The light we see from the "nearby" Andromeda Galaxy has been traveling 
(at the speed of light) for over two million years to reach us. If you plan to 
vacation some day in the Andromeda Galaxy, forget it! Even if you would not 
age much while traveling at almost the speed oflight, assuming you could attain 
that speed, you would still take over two million earth years to get there. We 
cannot conceive of the obstacles that are likely to arise or the fuel required for 
such a trip. The only intelligent space travelers likely to migrate to other solar 
systems or galaxies will be human-made computers; they won't be us or our 
biological descendants. Even if a chosen few elite specimens of biological 
humankind eventually travel to and survive in extraterrestrial environments, 
most ordinary people (the likes of you and me) will be left behind to suffer the 
fate of this fragile earth, whatever that fate may be. Ifwe don't make it here, we 
won't make it anywhere! 
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Some futurists paint a much rosier picture of our prospects for space 
travel. Whether it will ever happen or not is really quite irrelevant to the central 
issue, which is: Upon what does living a meaningful life depend? Are our lives 
meaningless if the ultimate destiny of our species is tied to our fragile planet 
earth, or to our solar system? Are our lives meaningless ifneither we nor our 
biological descendants will ever colonize other planets, first within and then 
beyond our solar system, and then beyond our galaxy? Is every person's life 
meaningless unless he or she makes some contribution to space travel and the 
"terraformation" and colonization of other planets? Some astrophysicists think 
so, as indicated next. 
Suppose, as seems likely, that neither we nor our biological descendants 
will ever get beyond our solar system, or that even if we do only a tiny number 
of human beings will ever colonize other planets. Does this mean that most of 
us live meaningless lives? Suppose that the earth ultimately dies a "heat death" 
and that this is true of all the other planets that a few elite human beings might 
ever inhabit. Will it all be for nothing? The answer is "yes" if the worth of our 
lives depends on endlessly perpetrating our species or contributing to some 
ultimate transspecies objective. The answer is "No" if our lives have intrinsic 
meaning and worth here and now. 
B. The Meaning and Value of Human Life 
Philosophers identify at least two types of value or goodness-intrinsic, and 
instrumental or extrinsic. An intrinsic good is an end in itself, valuable for its 
own sake. An extrinsic good is an efficient means to some other goal or value 
beyond itself. Extrinsic goods have desirable consequences. Systemic good-
ness-the value of concepts, ideas, and formalities of every description, was 
recently added to this traditional duality of goodness by Robert S. Hartman. 17 
In considering the value of individual human lives, we must decide whether we 
have intrinsic worth, extrinsic worth, systemic worth, or some combination of 
all three. 
The word "meaning" may have many different meanings, but it is some-
thing conceptual, something systemically good, as is "a meaningful life." Mean-
ingful lives and valuable lives are intimately related. All valuable lives are 
meaningful, but they are not merely conceptual. Let us specify that human life 
is meaningful if we can conceptually comprehend and wholeheartedly affirm its 
intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic worth and can understand how human values 
are supported by broad social, physical, psychological, cosmological, and meta-
physical structures and environments. Support makes little sense unless threats 
and dangers exist, so these too must be factored into any conceptual scheme that 
captures the meaning of human life. Metaphysical support for human life will 
be covered in following chapters. Valuable individual human lives are the 
concrete realities to which our concepts of"meaningful lives" make reference. 
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i. Human Existence as Merely a Means to Something Beyond 
Advocates of the Final Anthropic Principle make some commonplace but highly 
questionable assumptions about the value and meaning of human life; and they 
incorporate their flawed assumptions into their interpretation of the FAP. 
Barrow and Tipler suppose that the meaning and value of human life (of all 
kinds oflife, for that matter) lie entirely in its future consequences. This implies 
that human lives here and now are nothing more than instrumental goods, that 
our own lives have no inherent or intrinsic meaning and worth at all. The fol-
lowing excerpt expresses this key axiological assumption presupposed by the 
Final Anthropic Principle. According to Barrow and Tipler, 
We know space travel is possible. We argued that even interstellar travel 
is possible. Thus once space travel begins, there are, in principle, no 
further physical barriers to prevent Homo sapiens (or our descendants) 
from eventually expanding to colonize a substantial portion, if not all, of 
the visible Cosmos. Once this has occurred, it becomes quite reasonable 
to speculate that the operations of these intelligent beings could begin to 
affect the large scale evolution of the Universe. If this is true, it would be 
in this era-in the far future Near the Final State of the Universe-that the 
true significance oflife and intelligence would manifest itself. Present-day 
life would then have cosmic significance because of what future life may 
someday accomplish. 18 
If the "true significance" oflife and intelligence is manifested only in the 
very distant future, this means that it has no true significance here and now. If 
present-day lives have significance only then or as means to then, they have no 
significance now, except as extrinsic goods. The end to which we are mere 
means lies billions of years in the future, the Omega Point. But the promise of 
the Final Anthropic Principle is as hollow as the sign in the bar that says "Free 
Beer Tomorrow," for tomorrow never comes. Biological human life will be 
totally extinct for billions ifnot trillions of years before it has any "true signifi-
cance." 
Tipler makes the purely extrinsic or instrumental worth ofhuman life even 
clearer in a later essay where he asserts that ( 1) "Value is something connected 
with life, and thus if value is to remain in the universe, life must persist indef-
initely."19 (2) A universe "in which life (and hence intelligence) and all its works 
disappeared forever would in my judgment be ultimately meaningless."20 (3) 
The laws of physics ultimately doom the human species to extinction.21 (4) 
"Humankind's place in the scheme of things is that ofan intermediate link."22 
( 5) The future oflife belongs to computers, not to DNA (biological) based life. 23 
In his 1994 book, Tipler adds that the intelligent computers of the future will 
eventually raise us-or rather, computerized virtual cyberspace emulations of 
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us-from the dead; and we will be identical with these virtual emulations. 24 Do 
you see any problems about personal identity here? Does the Final Anthropic 
Principle make you feel exploited as a mere means to ends beyond yourself, 
ends that you do not embrace? 
ii. Enduring Grand Objectives 
Many science-minded cosmologists feel and express deep anxiety about the 
meaning and value of human life because, like Barrow and Tipler, they presume 
that our lives are utterly worthless unless they contribute significantly to the 
achievement of some Enduring Grand Objective located in the far, far distant 
future. Unlike Barrow and Tipler, many skeptical or pessimistic cosmologists 
are convinced that no Enduring Grand Objective like the Omega Point will ever 
exist. So they despair. 
Cosmological pessimists fully comprehend that humankind is destined to 
perish some day in a hostile cosmic environment, and they are obsessed by an 
awareness that our lives are extraordinarily tiny and brief within the vastness of 
cosmic spacetime. They conclude that human life has no value or meaning, and 
neither does the universe. This sort of cosmological pessimism was well ex-
pressed in an often-quoted excerpt from Steven Weinberg's book, The First 
Three Minutes. According to Weinberg, "Whichever cosmological model 
proves correct, there is not much comfort in any of this." Reflecting on the 
beautiful and supportive earthly environment in which we live, Weinberg 
comments, 
It is very hard to realize that all this is just a tiny part of an overwhelm-
ingly hostile universe. It is even harder to realize that this present universe 
has evolved from an unspeakably unfamiliar early condition, and faces a 
future extinction of endless cold or intolerable heat. The more the universe 
seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. 25 
All twenty seven contemporary cosmologists interviewed by Alan Lightman and 
Roberta Brawer for their Origins: The Lives and Worlds of Modern Cosmolo-
gists were asked to comment on this quotation from Weinberg. 26 Their responses 
are fascinating! Clearly, many contemporary cosmologists share Weinberg's 
cosmic pessimism, and he did not change his mind in his more recent Dreams 
of a Final Theory, 1992.27 
iii. Human Insignificance in the Grand Scheme of Things 
What should we make of all of this? The universe and our own existence are 
likely to seem pointless if we make any or all of the following assumptions: 
l. No Enduring Grand Objective will ever exist. 
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2. Genuine value and meaning correlate with enonnous physical size and 
immense temporal duration or pennanence. Little things have little worth! 
3. Compared to the universe, individual human lives are indeed small and 
brief, and all human (and nonhuman) life in this world will eventually be extin-
guished. 
Although 3. is true, 2. is not; and I. is irrelevant to the question of the 
meaning and value of human existence. 
Biological human life is indeed spatially tiny and temporally short when 
compared with the vastness of the spatiotemporal cosmos. Like Weinberg, 
Stephen Hawking also contrasted the immensity of the universe with "insignifi-
cant creatures like ourselves." 21 In the 1990 BBC television program Master 
of the Universe, Hawking said that 
We are such insignificant creatures on a minor planet of a very average 
star in the outer suburbs of one of a hundred thousand million galaxies. So 
it is difficult to believe in a God that should care about us or even notice 
our existence. 29 
Many individuals who reflect on our position in the universe seem to 
equate worth with size. Even the theologian John Hick proclaims that "a natu-
ralistic conclusion" is strongly supported by the "sheer size" of the universe and 
"humanity's correlatively minute place within its spatial and temporal immen-
sity."30 Victor J. Stenger acquiesces: "So small is humankind" and "So vast is 
the universe," he laments "The insignificance of humanity is almost impossible 
for most humans to accept."31 "Surely the universe does not care about human 
existence,"32 Stenger bemoans. Frank Tipler, who locates ultimate meaning in 
the Omega Point, argues that we humans live "at an exceedingly early time" in 
the history of the universe, that "Most of life is in the future," and that "It is our 
relative insignificance in time, not space, which is the real challenge posed by 
modern cosmology for traditional religion."33 Temporalistic versions of the 
insignificance argument focus on how little of the cosmic time line is occupied 
by living things.34 
Cosmologists with this pessimistic mind-set often assume that attributing 
great worth to individual human beings is merely a human judgment, therefore 
untrustworthy; but note carefully that the judgment that we do not have great 
worth is also merely a human judgment! The real problem is that the connection 
these pessimists assume between size, duration, and significance is all very 
wrong, both cosmologically ( spatiotemporally) and axiologically ( valuationally ). 
Cosmologically, Anthropic Cosmologists demonstrate, human life could never 
evolve in a universe very much smaller or younger than our own. Temporally, 
producing complex life requires billions of years for generations of supernovae 
to come and go and billions more for complex fonns of life to evolve locally. 
Spatially, a stable and hospitable solar/planetary system requires vast separa-
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tions between heavenly bodies iflife-budding, life-building planets are to avoid 
being tom out of their orbits by the gravitational effects of passing stars orother 
planets.35 Spatial versions of the insignificance argument center on how tiny our 
bodies are in relation to the vastness of space, temporal versions on how briefly 
we endure within the whole of time. 
Axiologically, our species and our individual lives are not insignificant 
simply because of our relatively limited physical size and duration. Value and 
meaning in and for our lives do not correlate with or depend upon great magni-
tude and/or permanence. Our species has existed for only a fraction of the age 
of the universe. As adults we typically live only seventy years or so, weigh 
between one and two hundred pounds, are only about six feet tall, and are less 
than two feet wide. There are exceptions! By comparison with the totality of 
time and space, we are tiny and trivial indeed; but that is the wrong comparison, 
a childish comparison, uninformed by the study of value theory. Philosophers 
tend to be scientifically naive; but scientists doing cosmology tend to be philo-
sophically naive! 
iv. The Intrinsic Worth of Human Existence 
Philosophers deeply ponder the question of whether anything has intrinsic 
worth, is valuable in and of itself; and after careful consideration they usually 
find immense intrinsic worth in human existence. Few philosophically astute 
value theorists would agree with pessimistic astrophysicists that our species-
typical spatiotemporal limits are incompatible with immense intrinsic worth, for 
they reject the premise that value depends on immense size and duration. We 
don't have little worth just because we occupy very little spacetime! 
If and when we are not blinded by cosmological magnitude, we can readily 
appreciate the great intrinsic worth of even small human infants, to say nothing 
of larger adults. When loving an infant, we realize that within broad limits 
smallness is no obstacle to great significance. Teilhard de Chardin was right (in 
part) in affirming that significance depends on the complexity of conscious-
ness. 36 It also depends on the uniqueness of that consciousness, and on proper-
ties experienced and actualized by and within that consciousness. Philosophers 
who reflect deeply on the question usually conclude that nothing has much 
intrinsic worth, if any, apart from consciousness; but more than mere, pure, or 
complex consciousness as such is required for life to have meaning and value. 
Physically we are tiny, and our lives are short compared to the cosmos as 
a whole. Yet. we complex, conscious, and unique human beings are immensely 
if not infinitely valuable or significant in and for ourselves. Our great inherent 
worth does not depend upon our size, our duration, or upon what we produce 
in the near or distant future. This is true also of all but the simplest animals, but 
that is another story, too long to tell at present. We are immensely complex 
conscious individuated creatures, despite our spatiotemporal limitations. We can 
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even comprehend the Big Bang and our place within the universe! Human 
consciousness and the physiological conditions that support it are incomprehen-
sibly complex. Nothing else in the world known to us matches the intricacy of 
the human brain. Intrinsic value depends heavily on the enormous complexity 
and activity of embodied consciousness; and all but the most unfortunate human 
individuals have it or eventually achieve it. Great intrinsic worth depends on 
complexity of individuated consciousness; it also requires just the right kinds 
of intricacy, activity, and contents. But intrinsic value is quite independent of 
vast physical size and endurance. Some size and endurance are essential for 
spatiotemporally embodied individuated consciousness, but not vastness. 
Intrinsic value is complex. Complex individuated consciousness as well 
as just the right activities and intensional objects of consciousness are required 
for great intrinsic worth. Intrinsic human goodness or worth is a synthesis of 
unrepeatable, unique, individuated consciousness with many additional repeat-
able concretized universals that are dynamic, conceptual, emotional, affective, 
and volitional. Many philosophers and other thoughtful persons realize that 
brain-grounded individuated consciousness can be enriched positively in many 
repeatable ways. Positive consciousness-enrichers or enhancers include the 
pursuit and attainment of happiness, knowledge, moral and religious virtues, 
love, interpersonal intimacy, beauty in art and nature, adventure, creativity in 
every constructive domain of human interest, and fulfillment of our beneficial 
or positive capacities, needs, desires, interests, and purposes. 
Our worth as conscious individuals does not consist merely in our being 
instrumental receptacles for the realization of these universal and repeatable 
abstractions, as many philosophers traditionally assumed. Individuated con-
sciousness is not just a worthless or merely useful bucket into which intrinsi-
cally valuable concrete universals may be poured. Individuated consciousness 
has its own inherent worth; and our fullest intrinsic worth consists of a synthesis 
of our individuated consciousness with the consciousness-enriching universals 
just mentioned. 
In the existing cosmos, with a bit of luck and many wise choices, 
consciousness-enriching activities and goods can be and are available to individ-
ual human beings in great abundance, despite our spatiotemporal finitude. 
Embellished by such repeatable good-making properties, complex individual 
embodied consciousness is immensely and inherently good. It is immensely 
significant, meaningful, and valuable in and of itself right here and now, even 
with all its obvious faults and limitations. 37 The universe has a magnificent point 
simply because we are here, no matter what comes later. For each of us, our 
being here is a valuable end in itself. Our worth does not depend entirely on our 
being means to ends beyond ourselves, grand or otherwise. 
Enduring Grand Objectives are hypothetical goods that arrive later and last 
for eons of time if not forever. If our universe and our individual lives have no 
Enduring Grand Objective, can we or our universe be anything but pointless, 
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given the inevitable eventual extinction of our individual lives and of human-
kind itself? According to pessimists like Weinberg and Hawking, no Enduring 
Grand Objective will ever arrive, and they despair. 
Barrow and Tipler, by contrast, situate the whole point of human existence 
in their own peculiar Enduring Grand Objective, the Omega Point. Omega will 
arrive (supposedly) at the end of our (supposedly) closed universe; and it will 
live happily and omnisciently ever after (subjectively). 
Barrow and Tipler are not alone in locating the meaning of human life in 
some enduring Grand Objective; but grandiose objectives may be conceived in 
many different ways. Freeman J. Dyson finds our existence to be ultimately 
meaningful only if and because the existence of intelligent life can be prolonged 
infinitely in an open universe through radical biological adaptations;38 but this 
just turns the infinite prolongation of intelligent biological life into another 
Enduring Grand Objective, another free beer tomorrow that never comes. 
For traditional Christianity, the endless survival of individuals after death 
in Heaven or the Kingdom of God, however conceived, is the Enduring Grand 
Objective. Most Christians, following St. Paul, assume that life here and now 
is completely meaningless, an utterly pointless pilgrimage to nowhere, unless 
there is a resurrection and a Heaven. Heavenly survival after death is the whole 
point of human existence, without which everything is in vain. Traditional 
Christianity assumed and taught that life in this world has value and meaning 
only as a necessary condition for or means to a Grand Existence Beyond this 
World. 
Suppose, however, that no Omega Point will ever arrive; our descendants 
will never space travel to far distant solar systems and galaxies; the existence 
of intelligent biological life will not be infinitely prolonged; and we as individu-
als will not survive after death. Would human life really be worthless, pointless? 
All Enduring Grand Objective theories mistakenly locate the meaning and 
value of human life only or primarily in some distant future Grand Objective 
that will last indefinitely; but what gives these Enduring Grand Objectives their 
significance? Nothing more than exactly the same conditions-perhaps intensi-
fied, amplified, and prolonged-that make active, individuated, and enriched 
consciousness so precious here and now! Grand Objectives themselves have 
value and meaning only to the extent that they epitomize things that are pres-
ently valuable and meaningful. If life now is a purely instrumental pilgrimage, 
life in some glorious future can be only an instrumental means to some even 
Grander Objective that never comes. If no inherent meaning and goodness now 
exist, no enduring and glorified future version of it will have any. 
Future meaning and goodness make no sense unless meaning and good-
ness are now available. Even without a "then," intrinsic worth exists now. 
Individuated conscious life is for living-for itself; and its intrinsic worth lies in 
living it. The meaning and value of our existence do not depend on some future 
Enduring Grand Objective, even if there is one. The significance of either 
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Heaven or the Final Anthropic Principle is greatly exaggerated, even if some-
thing like it is true. 
What makes the Omega Point so valuable according to Barrow and Tipler? 
Things like power, presence, and knowledge (omnipotence, omnipresence, and 
omniscience)! But we have these and many other excellences now, not in their 
"omni" form, but sufficiently to make conscious life in this world a great gift, 
an immense if not an infinite good in, of, to, and for itself. Why are other 
Enduring Grand Objectives like immensely prolonged intelligent, affective, 
volitional consciousness in this world or in the next valuable? Isn't it because 
they contain the very same good-making properties that make our lives here and 
now so precious-active individuated consciousness enriched by happiness, 
knowledge, adventure, and their pursuit, by moral and religious virtues of many 
descriptions, by love, friendship, and other manifestations of interpersonal 
intimacy, by beauty in nature, society, and the arts, by creativity in every con-
structive domain of human interest, and by fulfillment of our beneficial capaci-
ties, needs, desire, and purposes? Value and significance-making properties and 
predicates may not be available in the same degree here and now as they would 
be in those idealized Enduring Grand Objectives in which we continue to 
survive after death, but they can be and usually are quite sufficient to warrant 
cherishing our present lives for their own sakes-not just as a means, a pilgrim-
age, to something beyond themselves. 
v. The Meaning and Value oflnfinitely Prolonged Existence 
Hell would be infinitely prolonged individuated consciousness devoid of all 
value-enhancing enrichments including hope, together with the everlasting 
presence of their bad-making opposites. Its meaninglessness would consist 
largely in knowing that good-making properties are not and will never be sup-
ported by Hell's broad environment. Infinite duration (immortality or resurrec-
tion) and infinite complexity or richness in properties as such fail to differenti-
ate Heaven and Hell beyond this life from heaven and hell on earth. Quality of 
existence matters immensely here and hereafter, not just quantity. 
Both quality and quantity (intensity and duration) of consciousness-
enhancing properties are important; but individuated consciousness can be 
"enriched" numerically with bad-making properties like misery, authoritarian 
animosity to knowledge, cowardly adventure-avoidance, innumerable moral and 
religious vices like hatred, resentment, selfishness, interpersonal insensitivity, 
philistine revulsion to beauty and the arts, and fulfillment of welfare-destructive 
interests, desires, and purposes. Quantitative "enrichment" of complex individ-
ual consciousness with bad-making properties results in intrinsic disvalue, not 
intrinsic goodness. Since bad-making properties may in principle be indefinitely 
prolonged, neither property-richness nor temporal endurance suffice for intrin-
sic goodness and meaningful existence. Intrinsically good lives involve both 
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qualitative and quantitative enrichment of conscious experiences and activities 
with good-making properties, not bad-making properties; and meaningful lives 
involve conceptually understanding that the intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic 
goodness of our lives is supported by our broad environments. Kind as well as 
number and complexity of properties enter into the constitution of inherent 
worth and meaningful existence, but vast spatiality or temporality are irrelevant, 
as are far distant Grand Objectives. 
Sheer endurance is really not as valuable as supposed by those who com-
pare our brief lives with the duration of the universe, or who yearn for everlast-
ing survival after death. Sheer immortality or infinite endurance should not be 
confused with infinite goodness and meaning. According to traditional western 
religion, immortality-infinite endurance-could co-exist with and consist of 
nothing but endless evil and senselessness. Hell is forever. Nothing could be 
worse or more meaningless than everlasting survival, infinite duration, immor-
tality, in a traditional Christian Hell. 
Hell could be infinitely prolonged and infinitely complex or rich in proper-
ties, but Hell nonetheless! How so? As John Stuart Mill maintained, many 
different qualities of feeling are called "pleasure," and many others are called 
"pain." The agreeable feelings we derive from reading our favorite authors are 
qualitatively different from the pleasures of music, dining, sex, or sadism. 
Likewise, the disagreeable feelings that we get from reading Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche (I wanted to say Kant!) are quite distinct from the pains of grief, guilt, 
loneliness, boredom, emphysema, a bee sting, and/or a severe injury or burn.39 
Consider the relation between pains and endless duration. Mill gave little 
attention to the topic of qualitatively distinct pains, and he wasted no energy 
worrying about Hell. But, for the fun of it, let us ask how many different kinds 
or qualities of pain might exist and consider how a concept of Hell might be 
constructed from such information. The issues are partly empirical and partly 
logical. Logically, an infinite number of qualitatively distinct kinds of pain 
might exist. Hell, says traditional Christianity, is a place of infinite pain in 
multiple respects. First, Hell could be infinitely rich in distinct qualities of pain; 
next, each of these could be infinitely intense; finally, all of these combined 
could endure forever, unrelieved. Working out all the details would give us a 
modem version of Dante's Divine Comedy and John Milton's Paradise Lost! 
So conceived, would the existence of conscious persons enduring infi-
nitely complex and intense pain endlessly in Hell have any positive meaning or 
intrinsic worth? Surely not! Total extinction would be preferable by far, and part 
of Hell's misery supposedly lies in the realization, the conceptualization, that 
extinction is impossible. Hell would be so devoid of hope that it allows for no 
hope for extinction! A brief moment in such a Hell would be unthinkably 
horrible, and an infinite duration of it would be infinitely bad, endlessly mean-
ingless. Obviously, immense or endless endurance (immortality) does not 
necessarily correlate with positive worth and meaning! 
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Both Heaven and Hell are at least logically possible as parallel or co-
existing universes, but whether or not they actually exist we are not likely to 
know for sure in this life-unless we are confident that all possible universes are 
actualized. Still, nothing could be better, more meaningful, than infinite duration 
or immortality in a traditional Heaven, where individuated conscious existence 
is supposedly as rich in good-making properties as it can bear-within a totally 
supportive environment. Perhaps individuated consciousness and its excellen-
cies do not endure forever; but Heaven might be nice anyway, since more of a 
good thing is generally better than less. To those who say that we would become 
too bored to want to exist after a vast period of heavenly survival, the proper 
reply is that we would be happy to try it for a few million years just to find out! 
Love, kindness, joy, creativity, curiosity, learning, and growth seem to be 
inexhaustible forever. 
To return to the here and now, positive enrichments that make presently 
existing individuated consciousness so enormously valuable to, for, and in itself 
also make it instrumentally valuable to other persons (and to God, as explained 
in the next chapter). Our intrinsic and systemic worth here and now, and our 
extrinsic helpfulness and usefulness to others, are precious gifts that we contrib-
ute ultimately to God, who remembers and cherishes our intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
systemic worth forever. Others can recognize our intrinsic worth, as we can 
theirs, and relate respectfully to us as mutual members of a kingdom of ends, a 
kingdom of God. Our worth to others consists in what we mean to them here 
and now and the impact that we have on the quality and duration of their lives; 
but it has nothing to do with spatio temporal vastness, or with an ultimate Omega 
Point, or with the interminable survival of intelligent biological or cybernetic 
beings, or with any other Enduring Grand Objective. 
Conscious human existence here and now can become intrinsically 
disvaluable, something to be avoided or eliminated for its own nasty sake. For 
example, all of a terminally ill person's wakeful moments may be filled with 
overwhelming and unrelievable suffering, despite medicine's best efforts to 
provide pain relief, and he or she may beg for a merciful death. Along with 
many others, I believe that moral duty requires the expeditious and active 
elimination of such intolerable and immense intrinsic disvalue, especially when 
death is requested by hopelessly ill persons crushed by unrclievable bodily pain 
and/or mental distress. With good pain management, fortunately, most suffering 
is relievable today; but not all. Active voluntary mercy killing is sometimes a 
moral duty, although not yet legal in most countries. Intrinsic disvalue for 
individuated consciousness is not mere privation or deficiency in kind or num-
ber of properties. It involves the presence of properties that are undesirable and 
worth avoiding or eliminating for their own nasty sakes-like the excruciating 
and unrelievable sufferings that maliciously tortured victims, or terminally ill 
patients, themselves judge to be too horrible to endure. 
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If something is intrinsically good, its value does not depend on its conse-
quences, even if they, too, are desirable. Life for us here and now, properly 
enriched, is an immense intrinsic good; and its inherent meaning and goodness 
are completely independent of any and all Enduring Grand Objectives or spatio-
temporal amplitudes. With or without resettlement ofbiological or computerized 
human beings on other planets, or a traditional Heaven, or an Anthropic Omega 
Point, human and animal life can, and usually do, have immense and intrinsic 
significance and worth in themselves here and now. The goodness or worth of 
enriched, conscious, individual existence is inherent, in itself, and not merely 
instrumental. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "My life is for itself and not for 
a spectacle."40 
More of a good thing is generally better than less; but more goodness 
requires more time-for ourselves and/or for posterity. It would be nice to know 
that our descendants will happily inhabit this good and beautiful earth, rich in 
life-forms, for many generations. We really are capable of caring deeply about 
future generations and for non-human species; but do we actually care enough? 
We tend to be very short-sighted and to consume wantonly, wastefully, and 
conspicuously the natural resources that future generations, human and non-
human, will need for worthwhile lives; and we overpopulate the earth with other 
people who bear the same imperfections. We pollute our supportive environ-
ment so much with chemical and nuclear poisons that the earth may be uninhab-
itable in a few generations by almost everything except cockroaches. Stephen 
Hawking now believes that the greenhouse effect resulting from human endeav-
ors that spew excessive carbon dioxide into the atmosphere will make the earth 
uninhabitable in less than a thousand years; and he pushes space travel and 
colonizing other planets so that a few of us will survive.41 The trouble is, only 
a very few can survive this way; most human beings, most of our descendants, 
will perish with the dying earth. Does a species that befouls its own nest while 
knowing better really deserve to survive? Does our own species deserve to 
survive, given our enormous and largely unrestrained propensity to make the 
earth uninhabitable for our own kind and for all other forms of life? If we are 
stupid, greedy, and shortsighted enough to contaminate this fabulously beautiful 
planet earth to the point ofuninhabitability, Homo sapiens does not deserve to 
survive. We must yet prove that we do. 
To summarize, the Final Anthropic Principle affirms that infinitely many 
worlds, including our own, exist for the purpose of bringing about the Omega 
Point or God. Life and intelligence will gradually spread throughout our cosmos 
and all others. Biological life will be replaced eventually by computerized, 
robotized, android intelligence. In the far distant future, all universes, ours 
included, will merge into the Omega Point, an Ultimate Supercomputer that at 
the end becomes omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, and Divine. The Omega 
Point includes the full actuality of all possible histories, all possible universes, 
rolled up into one. Barrow and Tipler make many dubious assumptions concern-
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ing the survival and proliferation of intelligence. Most seriously, they are 
mistaken about the meaning and value of the lives we now enjoy. They presume 
that our lives have no immediate intrinsic meaning or worth, and that our true 
significance will arrive only with the Omega Point-trillions of years after our 
extinction. 
Enduring Grand Objectives are attractive only because they amplify and 
prolong all the good things that make life here and now meaningful and worth-
while. Because our lives here and now are ends in themselves and not mere 
means to ends beyond themselves, their true significance is here and now; and 
the vastness of the universe is irrelevant. The value of life is in living and 
enriching it-intrinsically, extrinsically, and systemically. The meaning or worth 
of our existence depends in no way on some remote Enduring Grand Objective, 
even if one will eventually come to be; but meaning is, or would be, enhanced 
significantly if and when we know that our worth is supported by our ultimate 
metaphysical environment, God, in ways explained in the following chapters. 

Ten 
CONCEPTS OF GOD'S NATURE 
AND EXISTENCE 
Theism is belief in God. Theistic Cosmology says that God caused the Big Bang, 
that God created the world. To understand and evaluate Theistic Cosmology, 
many questions must be considered: What does "God" mean? What does it mean 
to say that God caused the Big Bang? What evidences support Theistic Cosmol-
ogy? Can Theism be defended against profound objections to it? Does order and 
design in the universe as disclosed by Anthropic Astrophysics indicate that God 
exists. Does cosmic contingency or dependence provide strong evidence for the 
reality of God? 
Before examining the evidence, we must first consider the concept of God. 
Debating the existence or non-existence of flying warthogs would be inane until 
we first know what "flying warthogs" means. (They are the US Air Force's AIO 
fighter-bombers.) Debating the existence or non-existence of God is equally 
foolish unless we first know what "God" means. Most theists are also atheists; 
they are convinced that God, in many meanings of the term, does not exist. Early 
Christians, for example, were branded as atheists and persecuted by the Romans 
because they denied the existence of the finite, fickle, immoral, anthropomorphic 
gods of the Greco-Roman pantheon. 
1. Two Concepts of God's Nature: Classical and Process Theology 
"God" has innumerable meanings. We cannot discuss them all, but we will 
consider at least two very different but cosmologically relevant concepts of the 
nature of God-Classical Supernaturalism and a modified version of Process 
Theism. These concepts presently contend for acceptance by thoughtful theistic 
believers, and we must choose between them as intelligently as possible. All 
Theists believe that God exists, but not all Theists believe in the same God. Who 
is God? What is God like? How is God related to the world? Classical Theism 
offers one answer and Process Theism another. Prior to the twentieth century, 
Classical Theism was the dominant view of God among professional theologians 
in traditional Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic monotheism. 
Process Theism was anticipated by earlier thinkers, but it was developed 
primarily in the twentieth century by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Harts-
horne. Henri Bergson also made important contributions. Numerous philoso-
phers and theologians such as Robert L. Calhoun, Nels F. S. Ferre, John B. 
Cobb, Jr., Daniel Day Williams, Schubert M. Ogden, David R. Griffin, John A. 
T. Robinson, Robert C. Neville, Marjorie H. Suchocki, Lewis S. Ford, Bowman 
L. Clarke, Sally McFague, Holmes Rolston, III, Arthur Peacocke, John 
Polkinghorn, Ian Barbour, Rem B. Edwards, and many others were deeply 
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influenced by Whitehead and Hartshorne and made, or are still making, their 
own significant contributions to this theological perspective, even when they 
disagree with or about some of its features. Many contemporary religious think-
ers who accept the essential point that God is in process do not consider them-
selves to be Process Theologians because they reject certain emphases of main-
stream process thinkers like Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, John 
B. Cobb, Jr., and David R. Griffin. In this book, "Process Theology" is broadly 
understood to include all who ascribe to God a temporalistic or processing 
nature, and much room is allowed for honest disagreement on details among 
Process Theologians themselves. The version of Process Theism defended here 
is significantly modified to allow for God's ability to create our universe out of 
nothing, God's voluntary self-limitation in creating co-creative creatures, God's 
ability to experience passively the present self-creativity of temporal occasions, 
and God ability to influence events as they occur in time. 
Process Theology is a rational or philosophical theology. As such, it 
aspires to satisfy credible criteria for a plausible rational theology. ( l) It must be 
logically consistent, a chronic shortcoming of Classical Theology, say Process 
Theologians; and it must satisfy other criteria of rational explanatory adequacy 
like coherence, simplicity, comprehensiveness, clarity, and conformity with 
experience. The concept of "experience" is broadly construed; it includes sen-
sory experience as well as religious experience, aesthetic experience, and moral, 
logical, religious, and mathematical intuitive experience. 
(2) It must explicate the ideal of perfect excellence or supreme worshipful-
ness expressed in St. Anselm's concept of"that being than whom none greater 
can be conceived." "Divine perfection" is a valuational or axiological concept 
as well as a metaphysical notion. Developing a concept of God as a perfect being 
is not an empirical project. Rational theology allows plenty ofroom for honest 
intellectual doubt, disagreement, and growth; but a start must be made some-
where. Until thoughtful religious people reach agreement about what is ulti-
mately admirable, they must simply agree to disagree about some, but not all, 
attributes of divine perfection. Faithfulness to the originators of Process Theol-
ogy like Whitehead and Hartshorne must often yield to our most profound 
sensitivities about supreme worshipfulness. 
(3) A rational theology must also be compatible with, that is, it must not be 
falsified 6y, the structure and contents of the world that natural science discloses. 
Science does not dictate rational theology, but it rules out many familiar reli-
gious beliefs, especially cosmological convictions, as unviable and untenable. 
For example, rational persons cannot accept a literal six days of creation in the 
face of astronomy and paleontology, cannot reject evolution in the face of 
biology, and cannot affirm rigid and universal determinism in the face of quan-
tum physics. A rational theology cannot affirm that Adam and Eve once existed 
in an idyllic Garden of Eden, or that anything of any theological importance 
depends upon their having so existed. It cannot affirm that death originated as 
a consequence of human misbehavior, since organisms were dying for eons of 
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time before human beings evolved. Being compatible with natural science is not 
the same as being proved by natural science. Philosophical theology aspires to 
proof by reason or philosophy in a very broad sense, but not by empirical or 
sensory inquiry alone. 
( 4) A rational theology must also provide a plausible and coherent account 
of the immediate and the ultimate meaning and value of human life, indeed of 
all life. This account also must be firmly grounded in and compatible with 
scientific knowledge and critical rational reflection, as well as with our most 
profound religious, moral, and aesthetic sensitivities. 
Classical and Process Theologians usually agree that they are trying their 
best to conceive of divine perfection and to answer the question of the meaning 
of human existence. Let us begin with divine perfection. What would God have 
to be like to be supremely worthy of human worship, love, service, and devo-
tion? St. Anselm characterized God as "That Being than whom none greater can 
be conceived." By "greater" he meant "better." This understanding of divine 
perfection is at the heart of the Ontological Argument, through which Anselm 
hoped to persuade all rational persons of God's existence. Anselm argued that 
if we truly understand the meaning of the concept of God, we cannot deny God's 
existence without contradicting ourselves, that is, without affirming that a Divine 
Being who could not not exist might nevertheless not exist.' Both Classical and 
Process Theologians try to conceive of a God who exemplifies all desirable 
attributes or perfections, including necessary existence, and who is truly worthy 
of being loved with all our hearts, souls, minds and strength. To show that this 
can be done, we must do it; and doing it shows that it can be done! 
Classical Theism began with Philo, a Jewish theologian living in Alexan-
dria, Egypt in the first century A.O. The second through fifth-century Christian 
church fathers were profoundly influenced by Philo's project of combining the 
Greek philosophers' ideal of divine perfection with that of Biblical authors. 
From the time of the Eleatics, Greek philosophers conceived of God as simple, 
undifferentiated, unitary, passionless, and timeless Being. The attribute of 
rationality was often thrown into the bargain. Biblical writers, by contrast, 
conceived of God as both transcendent and immanent, as unitary but complex, 
as having real feelings and volitions as well as rationality, knowledge, or wis-
dom, as acting temporally and historically upon and within the world and its 
inhabitants, and as responding in time to events within nature and human his-
tory. Classical Theists fused Hellenic with Hebraic ideals of Divine perfection, 
thereby producing an unstable theological synthesis riddled with paradox and 
unintelligibility. 
The Classical synthesis of incompatible ideals of Divine perfection lasted 
for almost two thousand years and is still going strong. Classical Theism is not 
identical with popular Judaism or Christianity, which are usually much closer 
to Biblical religion than to "big name" Classical Theologians like Augustine, 
Anselm, Aquinas, Moses Maimonides, Martin Luther, and John Calvin.2 
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The Classical understanding of God dominated early Christian and Medi-
eval theology, and it still prevails in Roman Catholicism. It has been almost as 
influential among Protestants. To illustrate, consider the following contrast 
between Process Theology and Classical Theism as it was expressed by re-
formed Protestants in the highly influential "Westminster Confession" of 164 7. 3 
Though it is rational rather than revealed theology, Process Theism is actually 
much closer in many respects to Biblical and popular religion than is Classical 
Theism. "The Westminster Confession ofFaith" identified the following central 
metaphysical attributes of God. 
There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and 
perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, 
immutable, immense, etemal, ... almighty .... 4 
Let us reflect upon this lists of divine attributes, though not exactly in this order. 
A. Infinite in Being and Perfection 
Plato's Principle of Plenitude dominated Classical Theology's ideal of divine 
perfection, but the fullness was in God, not in creation, as previously noted. 
God's perfection consists in infinite being, in knowing, but not necessarily in 
creating or actualizing all possibilities, an infinite number of them. In himself, 
God is pure being, pure actuality, an actus purus, in whom there is no becom-
ing, and no unactualized potentialities. Just why this did not translate into the 
belief that God has actually created all possible worlds is unclear. Plenitude of 
Divine Being merged with plenitude of creation would imply that everything 
that God could possibly create was actually created from eternity, including all 
possible universes. Classical Theologians believed only that every mutually 
compatible niche in the great chain of being was filled in God's one universe. 
God's fullness and self-sufficiency in himself, not in creation, makes God 
perfect and supremely worthy of worship, service, and devotion, according to 
Classical Theology. 
For many good reasons, Process Theology does not accept the Principle 
of Plenitude, either in God's Being or in God's Creating. The process under-
standing of divine perfection includes both Divine Being and Divine Becoming. 
It recognizes that choices must be made between things that could be created 
separately but not together, that infinity cannot be exhausted, used up, or fully 
actualized either timelessly all at once, or successively, and that divine creativity 
is interminable. It acknowledges that some possible worlds are too horrible, 
trivial, or boring to be created by a loving, morally upstanding, and aesthetically 
sensitive God. All Divine attributes in their integrated wholeness and together-
ness are integral to God's perfection. 
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Process Theology completely rethinks all the old problems of theology in 
light of the hypothesis that aspects of both process or change and permanence 
or constancy are in God. Divinity includes both an unchanging timeless dimen-
sion, God's Primordial Nature, and a changing temporal dimension, God's 
Consequent Nature. In Classical Theology, God is only being; but in Process 
Theology, God is both being and becoming. 
God's everlasting and changeless Primordial Nature includes God's 
necessary existence and God's eternal vision of possibilities for creation. Plato's 
ideal forms are relocated in the mind of God. Whitehead called them "eternal 
objects." Possibilities as such are empty systemic abstractions that have no 
definiteness and significance to and for themselves and are deficient in definite-
ness even for others. Eternal objects are not the ultimate, independently existing, 
causally productive, concrete realities that Plato thought them to be. They lack 
the definiteness, concreteness, and power of existing actualities in physical 
space and time; and they are devoid of intrinsic subjectivity-the immediacy of 
self-awareness, self-creation, and self-enjoyment possessed by concretely 
existing individual centers of conscious experience, activity, and valuation like 
God, ourselves, and most if not all non-human animals and living things. Pro-
cess thinkers disagree about the full extent of God's knowledge of possibilities; 
but we need not settle that question here. 
Whitehead probably included little more than God's envisionment of 
possibilities, eternal objects, and their relevance to possible worlds, in God's 
Primordial Nature; but for many good reasons other process thinkers, Harts-
horne and Cobb especially, have considerably enriched the notion. The Primor-
dial Nature also includes God's necessary existence, necessary creativity, and 
God's enduring and essential general capacities for knowing everything that 
actually exists and that might possibly exist (omniscience), for loving all con-
crete actualities ( omniloving), and for creatively influencing (omnipotence) and 
being influenced by (omnipresence and omnisensitivity) eve1y actual entity. 
God's unchanging and ever dependable love, compassion, and all-around moral 
virtue or righteousness belong to the Primordial Nature. The abstract essence of 
God, the Primordial Nature, is deficient in actuality; but the fullness of God 
includes both a Primordial and a Consequent nature. The two are separable in 
thought, but not in reality. 
The Primordial Nature of God transcends every particular cosmic epoch 
or created universe while existing necessarily in relation to all particular epochs 
and universes and what transpires within them. Critics of Process Theology like 
Mark W. Worthing5 who regard the God of Process Theology as completely 
immanent in our finite cosmos totally ignore the everlasting, necessary, and 
transcendent Primordial Nature of God. Without a Primordial Nature, a contin-
gent and purely immanent God would die either the heat death or the Big 
Crunch death of our universe;6 but Process Theology affirms that God's Primor-
dial essence transcends and endures before, through, and after all created 
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worlds. So does God's Consequent Nature as such if God has been infinitely 
creative in innumerable worlds. 
In the Consequent Nature, God's transcendent and everlasting abstract 
capacities are concretized in relation to actual worlds. The Consequent Nature 
is God's actual creation of and interaction with individuals in space, time, and 
history. God comes to know, love, influence, and be influenced by all actual 
entities as they concretely exist and become within spacetime. God's experi-
ences of successive events in time are themselves successive and thus temporal. 
God's experience of value is enriched by every concrete value realized in 
all actual worlds; all values created by and within all creatures are taken into 
God's Consequent Nature and saved there forever. God is the supreme valuer 
of every intrinsic value actualized within every world, including our own. God 
experiences all values (and disvalues) realized by concretely existing spatio-
temporal individuals; and after they have perished to themselves, God remem-
bers and profoundly cherishes (or deplores) them forever. Existing events 
possess their own present moment of relative independence and immediacy of 
self-enjoyment and self-creativity. As temporal occasions perish to themselves, 
they achieve permanent being or "objective immortality" in God's infallible 
memory. God's Consequent Nature continuously assimilates and treasures the 
ongoing order and concreteness of all spatiotemporal actualities. 
God is constantly being created, says Process Theology, but not the neces-
sary existence or the abstract essence of God, both of which belong to the 
Primordial Nature. The Consequent Nature consists of the full actuality of 
God's decisions about, experiences of, interactions with, and responses to con-
cretely existing creatures as they are constantly being created. God exists neces-
sarily, but the full actuality of Divinity is contingent, depending in part upon 
God's own freely creative acts and in part upon free decisions made by God's 
creatures. God affects the world, but the world also affects God, for better or for 
worse. God is affected by values and disvalues realized in all of creation. 
An unsolved problem remains after we realize that our lives are intrinsic 
ends and that their significance does not depend upon their contributions to 
some far distant future Grand Enduring Objective. The problem is that all 
temporal goods, including those that are intrinsic, are transient, fleeting, and 
ephemeral. We ourselves, and the very best moments of our lives, perish in 
time. Through memory, we can recover traces of our most precious moments; 
but eventually we die, and our memories die with us. Traces of the concrete 
values realized in our lives may remain in the memories and even in the genes 
of others; but eventually they also die with their memories and their genetic 
endowment. Some day the human race will perish-after thousands of years 
perhaps if we are lucky and are good stewards of the earth, which we do not 
seem to be. Will no trace of our worth ultimately remain? Bertrand Russell 
thought not, and the idea filled him with profound pessimism. In "A Free Man's 
Worship," he wrote: 
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All the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-
day brightness of human genius is destined to extinction in the vast death 
of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must 
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins-all these 
things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philos-
ophy which rejects them can hope to stand.7 
Process Theology offers an attractive solution to the problem of the tran-
sience of all created goods-the Doctrine of Contributionism. All created values 
are ultimately contributed to God, who remembers and cherishes them everlast-
ingly. All created events and values become objectively immortal in God.8 
Some, but not all, Process Theologians also affirm subjective immortality-the 
survival after death of individual subjects in the alternate spacetime system of 
Heaven. 
Many theologians assume otherwise, but a traditional Christian Heaven 
does not solve the problem of the transience of created values. As my friend 
Tom Dicken indicates, "Immortality offers a continuing creation of value, not 
a conservation of value. "9 We can make little or no sense of an utterly space less 
and timeless Heaven where everyone is disembodied and nothing ever happens; 
but if spatiotemporal events transpire in Heaven, they too perish to themselves. 
Time, whether Heavenly or worldly, is indeed a perpetual creation and 
rebirth of events; but it is also a "perpetual perishing," as John Locke put it. 
Unless the concrete values realized in both worldly and Heavenly events are 
known fully and preserved forever by God, ultimately they are lost forever; but 
in God's Consequent Nature there is no ultimate loss. God gives the intrinsic 
worth of all creatures objective immortality and intrinsically valuates them 
without end. God is the supreme intrinsic valuer of all intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
systemic values in all actual worlds. 
The objective immortality of all creatures and created values in God are 
not just additional remote Enduring Grand Objectives. Enduring Grand Objec-
tives are ends in themselves and have intrinsic worth, supposedly; but the means 
to them do not; and we are the intrinsically worthless means! But, says Process 
Theology, God values creatures like us as ends, not merely as means. According 
to the Final Anthropic Principle, the Omega Point has intrinsic worth; and we 
are significant only as means to that terminal condition. In traditional Christian 
theology, this life is but a miserable pilgrimage to what is truly worthwhile-pie 
in the sky by and by. Enduring Grand Objective theories degrade our lives here 
and now into extrinsic or systemic goods; but Process Theology affirms that the 
intrinsic worth of our lives here and now is ultimately contributed to God, who 
cherishes us and every living creature forever. 
God's love is not limited to humanity; it extends to every experiencing 
subject that ever exists. All animals, not just human ones, and not just members 
of contemporary species, are included. Panexperientialism or panpsychism, to 
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which some process thinkers subscribe, says that all existing individuals includ-
ing sub-atomic particles (but not aggregates like rocks) are experiencing sub-
jects having some degree of intrinsic worth. We do not have to decide that issue 
here. The essential thing is that intrinsic values actualized in all presently living 
creatures, in our hominid ancestors, and in every extinct individual and species 
that ever lived, are not lost. They exist forever in God. Past values are lost to 
themselves and to our present selves for the most part, but no achieved good-
ness is ever lost to God. 
God does not timelessly actualize all possibilities, that is, all possible 
individuals, their qualities, and relations, according to Process Theology. God 
alone could know it, but an infinite number of possibilities may have been 
actualized in an infinite number of universes within God's supercosmic past or 
present if God is infinitely creative. Superspacetime may be an attribute of God! 
Yet, infinite possibilities for further creativity always remain for the supercos-
mic future of an infinitely creative God. Neither God nor man can use up infin-
ity, not even in an infinite amount of time. 
B. A Most Pure Spirit, Invisible, Without Body 
Erroneously, Classical Theologians often identified the biblical notion of 
"spirit" with the Platonic/Neoplatonic/Cartesian notion of an immaterial and 
potentially disembodied mind or soul. According to Plato, immaterial, non-
spatial human minds are temporary prisoners in their spatially extended bodies. 
Platonic immortality encompassed both existence before birth and survival after 
death for disembodied, nonspatial, immaterial souls. 
By contrast, in the Biblical tradition, body and spirit are inseparably 
unified; and survival after death takes the fonn of the resurrection of a dramati-
cally transfonned body, relocated ultimately in an alternate spacetime system, 
but never completely non-spatial or immaterial. In the earliest centuries of the 
Christian era, Platonic mind/matter dualism spilled over into Classical Theol-
ogy. God himself was understood to be incorporeal or "without body" as the 
"Westminster Confession" put it. Since incorporeal things are imperceptible, 
God's invisibility indicated incorporeality to Classical Theologians. 
In Biblical, creedal, and popular religion, God, the invisible spirit, is 
embodied, at least metaphorically. God has hands, feet, a face, right and left 
sides, a backside, and such. God is pictured as a large, humanoid, white or 
tawny skinned, blue-eyed, gray-bearded male who sits on a white throne, wears 
a jeweled crown, and has a string of lieutenants on each hand, the right hand 
(where Jesus sits) being most favored. 
Neither Classical Theology nor Process Theology takes this physical 
humanoid imagery literally, however, and even this has a Biblical basis. The 
Second Commandment in the Old Testament prohibits making graven images 
or likenesses for religious purposes of anything (including humankind) that is 
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in heaven above, the earth beneattth, or the water under the earth (Exodus 20:4). 
Implicit in the Second Commandnment is a profound metaphysical insight: God's 
form, whether physical or not, «cannot be represented by any familiar finite 
physical forms. God is infinite be::ing, not physically finite and humanoid being. 
Judaism and Islam allow no rel!Presentative art as aids to worship and thus 
generally take the Second Commuandment much more seriously than Christian-
ity, except for the early Christiann iconoclasts. 
For Classical Theologians, llhuman beings are made in the spiritual, not the 
physical, image of God because an incorporeal being has no physical image. 
Process Theologians repudiate nmind/matter dualism and insist that the mental 
and spiritual aspects of all actual "entities, including God, are always embodied. 
God does not literally have huml11llloid hands, feet, eyes, face, and so forth; but, 
contrary to Classical Theology, Jl»rocess Theologians think that God has a body 
and is not totally incorporeal. Goad's body is the universe, or at least some world 
or worlds, perhaps even infinite ::Superspacetime itself. God may be embodied 
in infinitely many actual worlds fffor all we know. God's body or bodies belong 
to the Consequent Nature; but Gand's Primordial Nature transcends and persists 
through all embodiments in all snpatiotemporal phases of all the worlds God's 
"hands" have made. 
God's spirituality and ment:ality are related to the world as our own spiri-
tual and mental dimensions are nrelated to our bodies. If we really understood 
that, the analogy would be much more illuminating! In our universe, organic 
wholes have both an internal annd an external unity plus properties that are 
influenced by but not reducible ttto the sums of their component parts. Protons 
are influenced by but not reducil:mle to their constituent quarks; and the same is 
true of atoms in relation to their m>rotons, neutrons, and electrons, of molecules 
in relation to their component atttoms, of living cells in relation to their mole-
cules, of brain-consciousness as nrelated to brain cells, and of Divine conscious-
ness as related to the whole of ucreation. In some mysterious way, our cells, 
organs, and bodily processes aff!fect our conscious experiences and activities. 
Our conscious experiences and a11ctivities as embodied in our brains also affect 
our other bodily processes, organus, and eel Is without violating any natural Jaws. 
We are to God as our cells ;;are to us, and God is to the world as our con-
sciousness is to our bodies, but vwith important differences as well as similari-
ties. The well-or-ill-being of owr cells, especially our brain cells and brain 
waves, affect and are affected b)W our consciousness; '0 and God affects and is 
affected by the well or ill being oftf our conscious experiences and activities. The 
important differences are: ( l) humnan consciousness has only a limited sensitiv-
ity to bodily events, but God is conmpletely attuned and responsive to all worldly 
events, and (2) we are largely unnaware of events external to ourselves, but 
everything is internal to God, who misses nothing. Both we and God are embod-
ied; and just as our stream of connsciousness, the dominant society of events in 
our bodies, can affect the rest of uour bodies without violating any natural laws, 
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so can God affect the world. No actual beings are purely spiritual, invisible, 
incorporeal, and disembodied. God is literally the all-inclusive spatiotemporal 
reality in whom we live and move and have our being-and our becoming. 
Religiously, God's ability to affect the world, to influence and communi-
cate with us creatures without overwhelming our freedom, is just as important 
as God's ability to be affected by the world. Just how, in technical metaphysical 
terms, this is possible may be and is debated extensively; 11 but that it is so is 
indispensable to our concept of that being than whom none greater can be 
conceived. The details of just how this is possible need not be resolved here. 
C. Immense 
To have a body is to be spatially extended. As Descartes noted, all bodies are 
extended; this is what being a body or being physical means. Spatiality is the 
defining characteristic of embodiment. Paradoxically, despite its claim that God 
is without body, Classical Theology affirmed that God is immense or omnipres-
ent. These words intimate spatiality in a Being who supposedly exemplifies no 
spatiality or corporeality at all. "The Westminster Confession" affirms the 
immensity of God based on I. Kings 8:27, which says that Heaven and the 
highest Heaven cannot hold God, and on Jeremiah 23:23-24, which says that 
God is not far off but fills Heaven and earth. Other Biblical passages also affirm 
the omnipresence of God. Psalms 139:7-10 presents God as an inescapable 
presence who cannot be evaded in Heaven, Hell, or the uttermost parts of the 
sea; and St. Paul affirmed, according to Acts 17:28, that God is the being in 
whom we live and move and have our being. 
Classical Theology embraced the paradox of God's spatiality with one 
breath (immense, omnipresent) and denied it with the next (pure spirit, incorpo-
real); but how can a being who is nowhere be everywhere? How can a being 
who is everywhere be nowhere? With no evasiveness, Process Theology attrib-
utes both spatiality and temporality to God. God's Consequent Nature is that 
most inclusive spatiotemporal reality within which or whom we live and move 
and have our becoming. Localized moral agents like ourselves are only finite 
parts of our local spacetime system; but God is the all-inclusive ultimate reality. 
A temporally ordered looseness of fit obtains between God, the whole of 
all inclusive Superspacetime, and our spacetime. This looseness allows room for 
creaturely freedom and creativity. Individual events within the whole of God's 
reality, for example, those composing human streams of consciousness, enjoy 
a fleeting moment of relative independence, originality, and creative self-synthe-
sis (to which God is passively sensitive) before they perish to themselves and 
gain objective immortality within God. This slight departure from process 
orthodoxy will be better explained in what follows. 
God always and necessarily has a body, some body, because God is always 
and necessarily a creative, loving, social being who creates others to love. 
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If God is embodied, can we see God? Yes, in a sense; but we cannot see 
all of God's body, the whole of our spacetime, or the whole of God's 
Superspacetime; and we cannot see the transcendent Divine Primordial Nature 
or the privacy of God's own consciousness. But every time we look into another 
persons eyes, or behold the good earth, or gaze at the wondrous starry Heavens 
above, we see some of the components of God's immanent Consequent Nature. 
All things are divine, even the mundane, though most ofus do not realize this. 
Appropriately qualified, as in the preceding discussion, God is all in all. 
D. Without...Parts 
Classical Theology affirms that in himself God is pure, undifferentiated unity 
and simplicity, or ''without...parts," as the "Westminster Confession" put it. In 
our thinking about God there is complexity, says the classical theory; but no 
counterpart for this complexity exists in God himself. We think of God as 
having a plurality of desirable attributes or predicates; and we have many names 
for God's diverse parts-omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, omnicom-
passion, and so on; but in God's own nature, these multiple attributes are so 
thoroughly integrated that the many are simply one. We think that God performs 
many acts, knows many things, is present with many individuals, causes many 
events, loves and is compassionate toward many creatures; but in God's own 
reality, all this apparent diversity exists as pure and undifferentiated Parmeni-
dean unity and simplicity of Being. God is the simplest of all beings, Being 
Itself, though we think of God as the most complex. 
By contrast, Process Theology rejects the classical unbridgeable gap 
between the way we think about God and the way God really is. As the simplest 
possible being, God could only be that being than whom none poorer in proper-
ties can be conceived. Process Theology conceives of God as the supreme, self-
conscious, unitary individual who is richest, not poorest, in good-making prop-
erties, and who is capable of endless further enrichment through infinite creativ-
ity. No other being surpasses God in complexity or any other desirable attribute, 
but an endlessly creative God is constantly self-surpassing. God's experience 
of value is enriched continuously through ongoing interactions with created 
worlds. Instead of being without parts, an infinite number of real parts exist, not 
just in our thoughts, but in God's own concrete actuality. In the final chapter of 
this book, we will return to the topic of God's simplicity and complexity. 
E. Without...Passions 
The most dramatic difference is that Classical Theology refuses to attribute any 
feelings to God; whereas Process Theology sees feelings as the very essence of 
God's love, mercy, and compassion. Most Greek philosophers depreciated the 
affective, appetitive parts of the human soul; feelings and desires were deemed 
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greatly inferior to rationality, thus altogether unworthy of Divinity. Aristotle's 
Unmoved Mover was "impassible," meaning "without any feelings whatso-
ever-totally devoid of all affections and desires." His God is emotionally as 
well as physically unmoved and thinks only about thinking, never about our 
world and its denizens. Neither omniscient nor omnicompassionate, Aristotle's 
Unmoved Mover knows and values only logic, thinks without feeling about 
thinking-nothing else, and does not know or care about us or anything in our 
world. 
Regrettably, the earliest Christian theologians accepted Greek philosophi-
cal prejudices against feelings. The lavish emotional, affective, and appetitive 
language applied to God in Biblical religion was then regularly dismissed as 
woefully inadequate metaphorical speech; and all spatial and temporal imagery 
was branded as totally misleading and impious metaphor. In Classical Theology, 
human beings were made in the rational, not the affective, emotional, or physi-
cal image of God, who is literally impassive, empty of all feelings whatsoever, 
thus not literally loving, merciful, or compassionate. 
The God of Classical Theology is not literally or physically male because 
he has no body at all; yet, psychologically and behaviorally, this God is stereo-
typically masculine. Like big boys who don't cry, the classical God has abso-
lutely no feelings, emotions, or desires whatsoever about anything. Reflecting 
a tradition that dates back at least to St. Athanasius, St. Anselm emphatically 
denied that the Divine part of Jesus suffered on the cross; only his human nature 
suffered because "The Divine nature is beyond doubt impassible."12 In Classical 
Theology, God entirely lacks not just undesirable feelings but all feelings 
whatsoever. St. Themas Aquinas said that God "loves without passion" and that 
"Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, provided it be considered in its 
effect, but not as an affection of passion. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery 
of others does not belong to God."13 
Anselm, Aquinas, and other Classical Theologians held that we experience 
God as ifhe has feelings, but in God himself no feelings exist. This appalling 
compromise came about when Classical Theologians, led by Philo in the first 
century A.D., combined two fundamentally incompatible ideals of divine 
perfection-that of the Greek philosophers, and that of Biblical religion. When 
forced to choose which religious language to take literally and which to construe 
metaphorically, the Greek philosophers always won. Their outlook was literal 
truth, so most of the language of the Bible and of ordinary believers was dis-
missed as impious and misleading metaphor. Nowhere is the conflict between 
these two incompatible ideals of divine perfection more obvious than in St. 
Anselm's description of God as compassionate in terms of our experience, but 
not in His own being and experience. 
Truly thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not so in terms 
of thine own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experi-
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ence the effect of compassiiion, but thou dost not experience the feeling. 
Therefore, thou art both compassionate, because thou dost save the 
wretched, and spare those \\Who sin against thee; and not compassionate 
because thou art affected b)W no sympathy for wretchedness. 14 
Thus, in Classical Theology, God is literally impassive, only metaphorically and 
inaccurately compassionate; and wreek ideals of Divine perfection always trump 
Biblical values and ideals. 
Ministers dare not talk like ttthat to their congregations! They could not get 
away with it! Ordinary believers;; are led, or misled, to believe that God is in 
himself all the good things that "We experience him to be. The "Westminster 
Confession" says that God is "rnnost loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffer-
ing ... ,"15 then takes it all away witllh the qualification "without passions." Classi-
cal Theologians drive an infinite mvedge between the reality and the appearance 
of God. God is really not lovin.11g but appears to be, not compassionate but 
appears to be, not merciful but anppears to be. Divine appearance corresponds 
in no way with divine reality! 
Process Theologians rejecttt such duplicity and hold that God is quite 
literally all of these immensely ggood things. They think that the Greeks were 
totally wrong in devaluing all fee::lings and affections and in regarding them as 
greatly inferior to reason if not ucompletely worthless. Yes, love, mercy, and 
compassion always involve cogwiitive elements; but without their affective 
components, their intrinsic signifiiicance is lost. Yes, many desires and emotions 
are bad and unworthy of God; buttt, Process Theology insists, many feelings and 
desires are exceptionally good annd very worthy of Divinity. The good ones 
belong to God. 
Impassivity, total incapacitmtion for every feeling, is an imperfection, not 
a perfection. Feelings are stereocywpically feminine not masculine attributes, but 
having just the right feelings and desires is one of the most majestic features of 
both human and Divine persons, male or female. God literally suffers with us 
in our sufferings and rejoices wi1ith us in our joys. God literally preserves and 
cherishes forever the goodness ottf our unique lives, activities, experiences, and 
values. The created goodness of tithe world is ultimately contributed to God, who 
does not respond to it ''without pnassion." 
The authors of the "Westmiiinster Confession" asserted that the chief end 
of"man" is to "Glorify God and enjoy him forever," 16 but the classical notion 
of divine impassivity implies thattt nothing in the universe contributes anything 
whatsoever to God. What then is;; the point of loving and glorifying God, asks 
Charles Hartshorne, if God's exBPerience and happiness are not enriched one 
tiny bit by our glorification, lov«e, adoration, and devotion? We benefit from 
religious devotion, we are told; b»ut we and our world mean nothing to God. 17 
In Classical Theology, sinc::e there is no passivity or receptivity in God, 
nothing that happens within the \\World ever affects God. God is pure act, pure 
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causation; the world is totally passive, pure effect. God is in no way passive, 
sensitive, or receptive in relation to the world; in no way is the world active in 
relation to God. In no conceivable way is God the effect of anything that hap-
pens in our spacetime. The "Westminster Confession" affirms, 
God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself; and is 
alone in and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need of any crea-
tures which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only 
manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them: he is the alone 
fountain of all being, of whom, through whom, and to whom, are all 
things .... 18 
Process Theology replaces divine impassivity with the Doctrine of 
Contributionism, according to which all created value is ultimately contributed 
to God, who is enriched by it. feels deeply about it, and preserves and cherishes 
it forever. God's happiness is enhanced by our happiness, and God's sadness 
is increased by our sadness and woe. All the good we create is ultimately cre-
ated for God; all the evil we inflict on any sentient creature is also ultimately 
inflicted on God. God literally rejoices with all who rejoice, and suffers with all 
who suffer. 
F. Immutable ... Eternal 
Negatively, "eternity" means "having no beginning or end." The biblical God 
exists from everlasting to everlasting. When Classical Theologians accommo-
dated biblical everlastingness to Greek ideas of timelessness, they redefined 
"eternity" positively (without a negation) to mean "all time all at once." In 
Classical Theology, eternity is the simultaneity in God of the past, present, and 
future ofall creation-a totum simul. For God, everything happens timelessly, all 
at once. God comprehends all change and mutability in a changeless and immu-
table way. In no conceivable respect does God change. God is so "perfect" that 
any change would be for the worse, as Plato and Aristotle, but not the Bible, 
decreed. 
In Process Theology, God has both an immutable Primordial Nature and 
a changing or developing Consequent Nature. Change with respect to God's 
necessary existence or desirable ethical attributes like love, compassion, and 
moral goodness would indeed be for the worse and would make God unworthy 
of supreme devotion, service, and adoration. But many kinds of change and 
many feelings are extremely desirable and valuable, despite what the Greek 
philosophers believed. Not every change is for the worse; not every change 
alters fundamental goodness. Some types of change are undesirable but others 
are desirable. God's experiences and choices change as the Divine Individual 
constantly creates and interacts with living creatures in spacetime; and this type 
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of change is not undesirable at all. In fact, it is just what we would expect of a 
perfect being if our religious ideals and intuitions have not been perverted by 
Greek philosophers! 
Introducing temporality into the concept of God requires a small modifica-
tion of the classical notion of divine omniscience. Classically, God knows 
absolutely everything, the past, present, and future of the entire universe, 
changelessly, immutably, simultaneously, and infallibly. In Process Theology, 
God infallibly knows the past and present of any actual universe, plus all gen-
eral tendencies toward the future. But God can not know future free decisions 
that have not yet been made because they simply are not there to be known. 
Both theologies agree that God knows everything that is there to be 
known. Unlike Classical Theologians, Process Theologians deny that future free 
decisions already exist somehow to be known before they are made. God may 
(or may not) know all possible decisions as possibilities, depending on just how 
detailed a knowledge of possibilities can be; but God learns which free and 
creative decisions the creatures actually make only when they are made, not 
timelessly in advance. God cannot know things as actual until they become 
actual. God knows all things according to their appropriate modes of being-
actualities as actualities, and possibilities as possibilities. All ofhistory-natural, 
human, and Divine-is a partly unpredictable adventure in creativity for both 
God and God's creatures. 
G. Almighty 
Classical Theology followed Plato's suggestion that God could not be changed 
or affected either by himself or by anything other than himself, and it regarded 
causal relations between God and the world as completely one-sided. God is 
almighty or omnipotent, the sole originative causal agent in all ofreality, who 
detennines everything. Indeed, in thinking that anything might exist, God there-
by creates its existence; so all possibilities are actual if God knows all possibili-
ties. Through programmed or predestined chains of secondary or worldly 
causation as we experience them, God ultimately causes everything that happens 
within the universe; but nothing that occurs within the world affects God or 
brings about effects within God. 
Divine omnipotence, understood classically as ultimate and total causality, 
implies that no freedom or originative causality exists within the universe or 
even in God, if all Divine decisions follow inevitably from the Divine Nature. 
Clearly, creatures have no free will and are not co-creators with God. 
Christendom accepted predestination with relatively little protest up to the 
twentieth century, and those who dissented were condemned as Pelagian here-
tics. Many Christians now realize that Biblical predestination can be interpreted 
as applying only to classes of individuals (for example, all who come to believe 
or to love) that were chosen by God from eternity, but not to specific individuals 
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elected eternally. Each individual must freely decide whether to become a 
member of such classes. In our era, free will is popular in the churches, includ-
ing those that once championed predestination. 
Many religious people now acknowledge the obvious-that without free 
and genuinely creative creatures, God is responsible just as much for all sin and 
evil as for all righteousness and goodness within the world. Something essential 
to human dignity would be lacking if we merely act out a pre-existing script and 
contribute nothing original and personal to the drama of creation. Classical 
Theologians squirmed and double-talked endlessly but unsuccessfully to avoid 
these implications. 
In Process Theology, God influences all worldly events, including all 
occasions of human consciousness; but God does not absolutely determine 
them. God presents us with possibilities for creative self-development and 
endeavors gently to persuade us to make the right choices; but there is no 
compelling, no omni-causation. We are co-creators with God. We originate our 
own free and creative choices for better or for worse. We are responsible, not 
God, for our choices of good or evil. Hitler and his cronies and collaborators, 
not God, caused the Holocaust. Process Theologians refuse to "pass the buck." 
With Harry Truman, they affirm that "The buck stops here!" 
In many ways, Process Theology is much more intelligible and attractive 
than Classical Theology, so we will hereafter construe the question of God's 
existence in process terms. The Primordial Nature of God is the locus of tran-
scendence, of necessary existence, and of all other desirable general Divine 
attributes; so we really want to know if we can and do have good reasons for 
thinking that God's Primordial Nature and the full actuality of God's conscious-
ness are real. The content of God's Consequent Nature is the world, which 
undoubtedly exists, so its reality is not in question. What we want to know is 
this: Is the observable world all that there is, or does it have an enduring holy 
mind of its own? Does a Divine, Holy World-Soul really exist? 
2. Conceiving of God's Existence 
Does God exist? What do we want to know when we ask? Aristotle said that 
"There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be," or as President Bill 
Clinton might put it, "It all depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." 
For Aristotle, possibilities do not exist in the same way as actualities; forms do 
not exist in the same way as matter; substances do not exist in the same way as 
attributes. Does God exist in the same way that things ordinarily exist? 
A. Ordinary Existence 
Theologians usually insist that the being of God is very different from the being 
of ordinary everyday things. How does Divine existence differ from ordinary 
Concepts of God's Nature and Existence 237 
existence? Ordinarily, we think that something exists if it (I) is entirely located 
within our familiar public world of spacetime, as opposed to the spacetime of 
dreams or hallucinations, (2) occupies a finite region of the everyday public 
world of spacetime, (3) can be publicly detected in spacetime through sensory 
perception (directly, or with the aid of magnifying instruments), ( 4) is the effect 
of perceptible causes located in common spacetime, (5) is the efficient cause of 
perceptible effects that exist in common spacetime, and (6) the denial of its 
existence is not logically self-contradictory. This list applies in past, present, 
and future tenses. To this list, Charles Hartshorne would add that (7) contingent 
existence is always competitive and excludes other contingent existence. 
Degenerate or marginal senses of "exist" also function in ordinary lan-
guage. Ideas and fictional entities may be said to exist in our minds, thoughts, 
imaginations, dreams, or in myths or stories, even though they fulfill only the 
6th criterion: Denying their existence is not self-contradictory. Santa Claus, 
elves, fairies, the present King of France, numbers, logical self-contradictions, 
and Captains James Kirk, Jean Luc Picard, Kathryn Janeway, and Benjamin 
Sisko exist only in this degenerate "intramental" or "intrafictional" sense. 
Fictional roles exclude no other actual beings from the domain of existence, 
even though the actors playing the roles do. If pressed to say whether they 
"really" exist, our usual answer is appropriately negative. They are too far 
removed from our paradigms of ordinary existence. Of course, we can always 
change our minds if and when convinced that some suspect item really fulfills 
our most essential criteria. 
Many entities in the annals of contemporary science-minded cosmology 
exist only marginally by ordinary standards. Did an initial singularity exist? 
Obviously not by the first four criteria. It was not located within our spacetime 
and did not occupy a finite region of it. Because it was infinitely small, it was 
not perceivable; and its cause (a collapsing antecedent universe?) was not 
located within our system of spacetime. Perhaps it did not exist by the fifth 
criterion: if it is only a theoretical fiction or construct, it had no effects within 
common spacetime; but if it actually initiated our universe, everything observ-
able is its effect. No self-contradiction results from denying its existence; but 
since it occupied no spacetime, it is difficult to see how it could exclude the 
existence of anything else. 
Do antecedent, co-existent, or parallel universes exist? Not by the first five 
criteria, so far as we really know: they are not located within our spacetime, do 
not occupy a finite region of it, cannot be perceived, are not effects of percepti-
ble (to us) causes, and have no perceptible effects as far as we really know. 
Perhaps they exist in an expanded, marginal, or metaphorical sense: although 
they are not in ours, they and their components may exist in some system of 
spacetime or Superspacetime, as may also the Heaven and Hell of traditional 
theology, or the many worlds of Big Fizz Cosmology. Denying their existence 
is logically possible (criterion 6), but mere possibilities are not actualities or 
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even probabilities. They do not compete for existence with anything else that we 
really know to exist, but they may compete for locus in Superspacetime with 
other worlds. 
Does our universe as a whole exist? Not by criteria one, two, four, and 
five, and only partly by three. It is not located within itself, not a mere part of 
itself, can be perceived only in part, and is not the effect of causes within itself. 
Naturalists, who contend that the universe as a whole is eternal. uncreated, and 
uncaused, deny that it exists in sense four. Because it is not the effect of any-
thing, the whole universe did not result from causes within itself, even if all of 
its parts are effects of perceptible causes in common spacetime. Theists, 
Oscillationists, and Big Fizz and Big Divide plenitudists deny the application 
of criterion four to our universe as a whole because its cause is not a perceptible 
object within our system of spacetime. Can we deny its existence without self-
contradiction? This may be something like denying our own existence without 
self-contradiction. At any rate, since it includes everything whose existence we 
could ever verify, it does not compete for existence with anything verifiable. 
Did inflation exist? We do not know, but its partisans affirm that it some-
how "in principle" existed in senses four, five, and six: its in principle percepti-
ble causes were there in the earliest fractions of a second of our spacetime 
system; cosmic isotropy and the distribution of galaxies and stars are its percep-
tible effects; but denying inflation is not self-contradictory. Inflation would 
compete with a more leisurely pace of cosmic expansion during the fraction of 
a second that it supposedly existed. 
Do the infinitely condensed singularities at the cores of black holes exist? 
Perhaps, at least in senses one and three through six. These singularities have 
a position in our spacetime, but since they have no magnitude (like Cartesian 
minds) they do not occupy a finite region ofit. With powerful telescopes we can 
look toward their black cores, determine that they are caused by gravitational 
collapse, and see some of the stuff they consume. Their effects are perceptible, 
even though they are not. We can think consistently about their possible non-
existence; and since they have a definite locus, their existence might exclude the 
presence of other black holes in that locus. 
Did the Big Bang exist? Probably, at least in senses five and six. Its effects 
surround us and are us; thoughts about its non-existence are logically coherent. 
It does not seem to satisfy the first, second, third, and fourth criteria. It was not 
located within our system of spacetime because it is our system of spacetime in 
its earliest stages; for the same reason, it does not occupy a finite part of famil-
iar spacetime because it encompasses all such regions; its very early stages may 
have been in principle perceptible but were definitely not so in practice. Its 
cause was neither perceptible nor natural, but its existence excludes the exis-
tence of other universes that might have been created instead. 
Do non-extended Euclidean points exist? When conceived of as mere 
points, 19 do particles like quarks, photons, electrons, and monopoles exist? 
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Some physicists regard this as just a careless way of speaking about "point-like" 
entities that are very, very small;20 others suggest that the notion "has reached 
its limits of validity and usefulness."21 By criterion one, if they are anything 
more than purely conceptual constructs, they have position but no magnitude or 
volume within real spacetime. By criteria two and three, they clearly do not 
exist: they are too small to be regional; and they are in principle imperceptible. 
They do not exist in any obvious way by criteria four and five: if they have 
perceptible causes or effects, the process by which this happens is very mysteri-
ous indeed; only entities with magnitude or spatial extension are perceptible and 
have perceptible effects. Incidentally, most philosophers today reject Cartesian 
dualism with its non-extended minds and extended matter mainly because no 
one can figure out how non-extended entities can act on extended entities; but 
if real matter is also non-extended, the mind/matter problem is a whole new ball 
game! So, too, if real minds are extended! By criterion six, non-extended points 
are not logically necessary beings. In no clear sense could their existence be 
competitive, unless one point excludes another; but since they are all in some 
sense identical, counting them might be difficult. 
Do non-extended Cartesian minds exist? Here philosophers disagree about 
the answer but not about the meaning of the question. Dualistic mind/matter 
interactionists think that non-extended minds exist only in senses four and five: 
they are affected by bodily events, and they cause and are affected by bodily 
events. By criterion six, the existence of other minds can be denied without self-
contradiction, but not our own. I contradict myself if I deny that I exist. Des-
cartes was right about one thing; unless I exist I cannot deny that I exist. Materi-
alists affirm that minds exist as brains in public spacetime, and they can be 
perceived if our skulls are cracked open; but Dualists and Idealists deny that 
minds exist in senses one through three. Clearly, our direct access to our own 
conscious awareness is introspective, not sensory. Since minds have their own 
unique identity, they exclude other minds. 
Now for the really important question: Does God exist? Popular religion 
conceives of God as an old, gray bearded, white skinned, blue eyed, male 
humanoid, dressed in a white robe, sitting on a throne. So conceived, God 
would exist in something remotely resembling the first three and the fifth and 
sixth criteria, except that the relevant spacetime system is that of Heaven, or 
both Heaven and earth, but not this world alone. If these criteria are strictly 
applied only to their natural home-the everyday spacetime of this world-
naturalists are correct: God no more exists than fairies, elves, unicorns, and 
winged horses. Clearly God does not exist in the ordinary way, but then neither 
do most if not all of the other things or realities just discussed. Does God exist 
in some extraordinary way? Is God's existence at all intelligible? 
Paul Tillich insisted that it is atheistic to say that God exists, meaning in 
part that thinking that God's being is like the being of ordinary things is totally 
wrong-headed. 22 Amazingly, Naturalists, Classical Theists, and Process Theo lo-
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gians fully agree that God does not exist-by most ordinary criteria. They agree 
that God does not fulfill any of the first four criteria. Neither does the universe 
as a whole, for that matter. God is not a finite physical, perceptible object or 
being located within a finite region of our system of spacetime. We could never 
literally see God sitting in a chair, standing by a waterfall, or walking through 
a garden. 
Naturalists insist that God does not exist by any of the seven criteria, and 
this settles the question. Theologians, both classical and process, think that God 
fulfills the fifth criterion by being the efficient cause of the Big Bang that 
created our universe, and perhaps by causing miraculous events within the 
universe. Process thinkers, who view the universe as the body of God, think that 
God fulfills criterion 3 in principle, though in practice we cannot perceive the 
whole universe, the whole Consequent Nature of God. Classical Theologians 
would not agree because they think that God is completely incorporeal or 
disembodied, that God occupies no space, includes no space, and has no posi-
tion in space; for that reason an immaterial God could not be perceived. 
Naturalists contend that God's existence is a contingent matter and thus 
fulfills criterion 6, but many theologians in both camps think not, agreeing with 
St. Anselm that necessary existence is an essential divine perfection and that it 
is logically self-contradictory to deny the existence of a perfect Being whose 
non-existence is not possible. Theologians also insist that nothing could com-
pete with God's existence, and in that sense God's existence is not falsifiable. 
Unlike Naturalists, theologians in both camps insist that the question of 
God's existence or reality is not definitively resolved just because God does not 
fulfill the first four criteria. The same must be said for singularities, as well as 
for the universe as a whole, for non-extended Euclidean points, quarks, elec-
trons, and for Cartesian minds. This means only that God's existence is radically 
different from that of ordinary everyday things and that having a unique mode 
of being is integral to Divine perfection. Not fulfilling criteria four, six, and 
seven means that God exists necessarily; and, since every other ordinarily 
existing thing fulfills criteria four, six, and seven, ordinary existence is contin-
gent existence. We must now give more attention to this distinction between 
necessary and contingent existence. 
The Teleological Argument for God developed in the next chapter reasons 
from the observed order or design of the world to the existence of an intelligent 
and benevolent Designer. The Cosmological Argument developed in the final 
chapter reasons from our experience of the contingent existence of the world to 
the necessary existence of God. Whether this reasoning is sound must be and 
will be considered in these later chapters. For now, we must try to comprehend 
the difference between contingent and necessary existence, as understood in 
philosophical theology. Much that is theologically significant hangs upon this 
distinction. 
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B. Necessary and Contingent Existence 
Formal (or modal) as well as factual (or ontological) dimensions of meaning 
belong to both necessary and contingent existence. Both logic and ontology 
inform us about their differences and similarities. 
Necessary Existence 
Formal meaning: Existence that could not not be; non-existence is not 
possible. Denial of necessary existence in this formal sense is logically self-
contradictory. 
Factual meaning: Existence that is self-sufficient, eternal or everlasting, 
uncreated, and indestructible. Denial of necessary existence in this factual sense 
is not self-contradictory. 
Contingent Existence 
Formal meaning: Existence that might or might not be; non-existence is 
possible. Possible or actual non-existence. 
Factual meaning: Existence that is causally derived from or dependent on 
something other than itself; if something exists contingently, it has a cause. 
Contingent existence is created and destructible. Denial of contingent existence 
in either the above formal or the present factual sense is not self-contradictory, 
though it may be factually false when contingent entities really do exist. 
Usually, contingent existence both comes into being and perishes in time; 
but it is logically possible for an existing thing, for example, an everlasting 
universe that does not come into being and perish in time, to be causally de-
pendent on God in some ways throughout endless time. Big Bang Cosmology 
shows that our world is not like this, however, for it came into being within the 
finite past. 
In Classical Theology, necessary and contingent existence mark the differ-
ence between a supernatural God and the natural world. In Process Theology, 
they mark the difference between the Primordial Nature or general abstract 
essence of God and the contents (some world or other) of the Consequent 
Nature. World-events come into being and perish to themselves in time; then 
they are assimilated into God and never perish in, to, and for God's contingent 
Consequent Nature. God remembers, preserves, and cherishes created actualities 
everlastingly. They are ultimately integrated into the contingencies of his Conse-
quent Nature, where they are never lost. (Masculine pronouns are applied to 
God only as a last resort in Process Theology for simplicity of expression and 
should not be taken literally.) 
Classical Theology treated every general aspect and every particular detail 
of God's reality as necessary; yet it insisted, inconsistently, upon the contin-
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gency of creation itself and of God's will or choice to create. Process Theology 
assigns necessity only to the abstract essence or Primordial Nature of God that 
persists unchanged through all other changes. The Primordial Nature includes 
not only God's envisionment of possibilities for creation, but also God's neces-
sary existence, necessary creativeness, and necessary and flawless capacities to 
know, love, influence, and be influenced by all creation. God's Necessary 
Primordial Nature cannot possibly not exist; and it is self-sufficient, everlasting, 
uncreated, and indestructible. The Primordial and Consequent Natures are 
logically or conceptually distinct, but they are never separated ontologically. 
They are not two different Gods, but are inseparable ontological aspects of the 
full reality of one God who exists necessarily but creates and interacts contin-
gently with particulars. 
3. Critique of Process Theology 
On many issues, Process Theologians disagree among themselves and not just 
with atheists and Classical Theologians. To fully understand and appreciate 
disagreement within the process camp, read Lewis Ford's Transforming Process 
Theism, where Ford even disagrees with himself! 23 Almost all Process Theolo-
gians agree that Whitehead's original formulation of Process Theology requires 
many additions and revisions. Many objections to this novel temporalistic way 
of thinking about God are raised by those who have no stomach for theology at 
all. These will be faced in the following chapters. Other objections are raised 
by those who are greatly attracted to many features of process thought but who 
believe that a few amendments are needed to bring it in line with certain reli-
gious and rational requirements. We will next look at a few ways in which I and 
other sympathetic critics think that Process Theology needs to be amended. 
A. God's Influencing and Being Influenced by the World 
Mainstream Process Theology has serious problems about God's ability to 
know, value, and retain the values inherent in the subjective immediacy of 
moments of created time, and about God's ability to influence individuals 
within the world. Its fine-grained analysis of "time," taken from Whitehead, 
seems to be incompatible with its religiously appealing claims that all created 
values are ultimately contributed to God and that God's responsiveness to 
individuals and occurrences within the world adds value and direction to them. 
Except for the data and subjective aims that nascent occasions receive 
initially from their predecessors, the free and self-creative moments of subjec-
tive immediacy that make up our ongoing streams of consciousness are under-
stood by most process thinkers to be closed to all other happenings. They can 
neither influence nor be influenced by, neither experience nor be experienced 
by, other entities during their own brief "duration" or "specious present" of 
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self-creative independence. Supposedly, this causal shut-up-ness prevents the 
independence, freedom, and self-creativity of temporal occasions from being 
overwhelmed by the presence and power of God or by past events within the 
world. Once they get underway, temporal occasions are closed even to God, 
Whitehead thought, Most process thinkers agree. This implies that God can 
know and value temporal occasions only after they achieve their final "satisfac-
tion" or unified definiteness, but not in or during their self-creative subjective 
immediacy. About that, God can know nothing whatsoever. Except at the very 
beginning and end of their becoming, God can neither experience and influence 
nor be experienced and influenced by created actual occasions. 
For preserving creaturely freedom, the standard process fine-grained 
analysis of temporality may be overkill. From a deep religious perspective 
(about which there is ample room for honest disagreement), the God of Process 
Theology may be deficient or less than perfect because he cannot be omni-
present to, omniloving of, or omniscient with respect to all actualities, specifi-
cally, those that are still becoming. That they can be present to God is also 
doubtful because God is also still becoming. At best, the standard process God 
can be present with, love, and know our subjective immediacy only as it was, 
perhaps as we would know it through very short term memory, but never as it 
is in its vibrant subjective immediacy of becoming where its primary value 
resides. 
Robert C. Neville, whose own concept of God is very weak, argued effec-
tively that the most important values of existence are located in the immediacy 
of subjectivity and that the God of mainstream process thought is gravely 
defective in being unable to know, love, and evaluate the immediate subjectivity 
of entities in becoming. In being unable to know immediate subjectivity directly, 
God also cannot remember it and thus cannot give it objective immortality.24 
The chief culprit here is the prevailing process analysis of the fine-grained 
features of temporal becoming, which for many reasons needs to be modified 
or abandoned, as explained later. Process thought's greatest contribution to 
theology is its emphasis on God's temporality and on God's sensitive and 
receptive responsiveness to events in the world, but not its fine-grained analysis 
of the nature of time itself as it applies to God and to us. 
Contributionism, the view that all created values are ultimately contributed 
to God, requires a deeper understanding of divine time and causation. The self-
creative independence of creaturely events would still be intact if God's own 
temporally ordered subjectivity is reconceived to be continuously but passively 
present to, sensitive to, and receptive and appreciative of, developing occasions 
within the world in their immediacy of becoming. As Neville suggests, God 
might even be able actively to influence the internal concrescence of created 
events, 25 but this would have to be through very modest spiritual promptings that 
do not overwhelm our freedom. 
244 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
Traditional Whiteheadian thought distinguishes two kinds of time or 
process, the transitional succession of two or more atomized actual occasions, 
and their singular internal self-development or concrescence. Human conscious-
ness and all other enduring realities within the world are composed of pro longed 
societies of successive momentary occasions. Charles Hartshorne modeled God 
after this pattern; God is an infinitely prolonged society of divine actual occa-
sions. Whitehead, by contrast, thought that God is a single, continuous, ever-
lasting concrescence; and many process thinkers side with Whitehead on this 
issue, as do I. My view is that all of time. God's and ours, is much more like 
concrescence (properly reconceived) than like atomized actual occasions. 
Concrescence occurs continuously; atomization occurs discretely. Discrete 
actual occasions supposedly reach a stage of final unified definiteness or "satis-
faction" when their internal processing is completed. This achieved definiteness 
is then hurled at or infused into succeeding occasions as "data" to be assimi-
lated, then further processed by them in light of their own emerging objectives, 
aims, feelings, and choices. 
Most process thinkers accept the theory of discrete or atomized actual 
occasions within the world, even if not for God; but I, for one, just cannot find 
any totally discrete atoms of time anywhere; and I am convinced that the con-
ventional process account of the very nature of time must be challenged. We 
experience becoming, I believe, as continuously (that is, without sharp atomiza-
tion) exhibiting degrees of unified definiteness, receiving and transmitting data, 
manifesting ongoing and usually extended-range purposiveness, exercising 
selection periodically, interweaving and refining feelings, being receptive to 
novelty and open possibilities, and perishing at some indefinite point. Past 
moments flow into present moments more like streams than like squirts. Yes, 
there is perpetual perishing; but past moments penetrate into present moments, 
and present moments penetrate into future moments, without abrupt atomiza-
tion. At a very fine-grained level (tenths of a second or less), our conceptual 
distinctions between past and present, and present and future, are arbitrary. At 
no absolutely precise experiential point does the past lapse into the present, 
which then in tum becomes abruptly past to its successor. Receptivity, definite-
ness, continuity, duration, purposiveness, synthesis, unification, achievement, 
self-enjoyment, and self-creativity are ongoing features of temporal becoming, 
the stuff we and God are made of; but time is nowhere sharply atomized into 
discrete epochs that endure only for a jiffy. 
Except for never forgetting the past, God's experience of becoming is not 
radically different from ours, I believe, with respect to continuous concrescence, 
persisting creativity, ongoing receptivity and synthesis, constant unity and 
definiteness, and enduring responsiveness. God constantly assimilates data and 
value from the world's past and present (God's Consequent Nature) and gives 
relevant novelty, purpose, and direction back to developing events within the 
world (God's Superjective Nature). We lose much of the past because our 
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capacity for memory is very imperfect; but God's memory, by contrast, is 
flawless. God assimilates the achieved value of the world without losing the 
value of its subjective immediacy because God directly experiences our subjec-
tive immediacy-something else that orthodox process thought cannot affirm. 
Our subjective immediacy perishes to us but not to God, who knows it forever 
as directly as we do fleetingly, and who cherishes it everlastingly.26 Things 
become settled and definite for God as they do for us, not abruptly but continu-
ously. At some indefinite point, experiences become definite and past for God, 
as they do for us. Neither God's nor our own temporality is sharply atomized 
into completely discrete occasions. God continuously experiences and grows in 
value-satisfaction in being acted upon by and in acting upon the world; but 
neither God nor we experience the terminal technical "satisfaction" of the 
abrupt termination of temporal occasions accepted by most process thinkers. 
Time just isn't that atomized or abrupt. 
As Lewis Ford heavily emphasizes,27 Whitehead's position, widely held, 
was that God is a single, present, everlasting, active experience (or concres-
cence, to use the technical word for it) that never reaches final completion, 
unification, and definiteness (or technically, "satisfaction"). This implies that 
God's consequent nature cannot influence particulars in the world in any way, 
for only entities that have achieved final definiteness can exert efficient causal 
influence on ("objectify" themselves within) other entities. God cannot be 
prehended or experienced. Ford's latest position, proclaimed in his Transform-
ing Process Theism, retains God's influencing the world primarily ifnot entirely 
by persuasion, but Ford drops divine influencing through efficient causation 
from past definiteness into present becoming. Ford's God, like Whitehead's, 
never achieves "satisfaction" and thus can never be prehended or experienced 
by us or anything else. Religiously, this is a fatal flaw. 
Ford recognizes that the traditional process account of temporal concres-
cence must be revised; and he proposes that "concrescence" be extended to 
cover the future. In some mysterious way, God exists in, concresces in, acts in, 
and dispenses creativity from the future. God provides initial aims and creativity 
to worldly events through some spooky form of causation from the future. 
I am convinced that process philosophy's unresolved problems can be best 
remedied by drastically revising the very notion of temporal concrescence, not 
in Ford's way, but much more radically than he proposes. Process thinkers, I 
believe, must go back to square one, reinterpret the very nature of time itself, 
and give it a radically non-Whiteheadian analysis. The outcome must not deny 
that process is metaphysically fundamental, and it should save all that can be 
saved of Whitehead and Hartshorne. Here are some preliminary and admittedly 
incomplete suggestions about how to do it. 
Time is clearly the stuff that reality is made of, but what is time made of? 
Following Whitehead, most process thinkers identify two distinct types of 
temporality: (I) transition, the succession of atomized temporal occasions after 
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the self-creative becoming of each one ends, its subjective immediacy ceases, 
it achieves the unity, definiteness, and permanence of being called "satisfac-
tion," and it objectifies what it can of itself for its successor(s) as it perishes; 
and (2) concrescence, the internal process of becoming of each single atomized 
occasion, its subjective immediacy, self-creativity, and self-enjoyment in the 
present moment. Once initiated, the becoming of an immediately present occa-
sion cannot be influenced or experienced by anything outside itself, said White-
head. Becoming, this second mode of temporality, also involves temporal 
elements-both duration or temporal thickness and succession. Human level 
occasions or concrescences endure from a twentieth to a tenth of a second; 
gluon concrescences that hold quarks together endure for only a trillion tril-
lionth of a second;28 but no occasions are infinitesimally thin. 
The elements of concrescence that endure briefly but successively together 
in their internal becoming are so organically interrelated that they cannot be 
separated or sub-divided into distinct atomized units like those involved in 
transition. They are not separate occasions, only components of a single occa-
sion. These inseparable elements, most of which are classified as successive 
"phases" of becoming or concrescence, can be differentiated conceptually; but 
they cannot be sub-divided physically or metaphysically. 
The successive phases were analyzed "genetically" by Whitehead in 
slightly different ways in different writings,29 but they involve at least (a) an 
initial phase in which a nascent occasion both derives data from (prehends) its 
predecessor(s) and derives its initial aim from God. The received initial aim 
consists of an awareness of the possibilities or "eternal objects," some quite 
novel, that it might actualize, as well as a slightly weighted aim, purposiveness, 
or lure towards the best of these possibilities; (b) an intermediate phase of self-
creativity in which it decides for itself what it will be, what real or immediately 
relevant possibilities it will actualize, best or not; and ( c) a final phase, called 
the "satisfaction," in which its definiteness and unity are finalized, after which 
it perishes and infuses what it can of itself into its successors; ( d) the whole 
becoming of concrescence is characterized by a "subjective form," which is how 
the occasion feels, processes, integrates, and values its constitutive elements and 
by (e) creativity, the presumably ubiquitous category by which every occasion 
is partly self-creative. 
The subjective form persisting throughout each occasion provides it with 
a kind of unity from the outset to the end, but how an occasion reacts to its 
components gradually develops, grows, and becomes more unified and definite. 
Subjective forms are thus odd mixtures of unity in variety, of beauty as classi-
cally understood. Note carefully that all the elements that define present becom-
ing are modeled on psychology-experiencing data (receiving information), 
having aims, purposes, attractions, revulsions, feelings, and values, awareness 
of indefiniteness, alternatives, and choosing among them, as well as discerned 
duration, unity, and definiteness. In most occasions, Whitehead thought, these 
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psychological constituents of time itself merely exist unconsciously; only rarely 
do they rise to consciousness. 
This Whiteheadian model oftemporality is wrought with perplexities. For 
one thing, although the elements composing becoming are drawn from psycho-
logical self-awareness, the theory, which pays lip service to faithfulness to 
experience, does not order these elements accordingly. In lived experience all 
these elements are like subjective forms-they occur throughout becoming, not 
sequentially. They pervade our present moments of becoming; they do not 
follow one another successively in experience. 
Another serious difficulty springs from Whitehead's insistence that only 
at its outset can an actual occasion experience anything outside itself, and only 
after it perishes can anything outside itself, and including itself, experience it. 
Only after it achieves the fully unified definiteness of terminal "satisfaction" 
can anything outside ofitselfprehend it. Applied to God, a serious theological 
quandary results. If God is a single everlasting concrescence with no beginning 
and no end (no satisfaction), it follows logically that God never experiences 
anything, and nothing else ever experiences God. God never has either an 
aboriginal beginning or temporal beginnings where data can be received; God 
also never has endings or "satisfactions" where he can objectify himself for 
others. Thus, God cannot know us and we cannot know God! What an embar-
rassment for a theology that revels in God's availability to us and our availabil-
ity to God! Something has to give. 
The Hartshorne/Cobb view that God is an infinitely prolonged society of 
actual occasions rather than a single everlasting concrescence is initially attrac-
tive because from this perspective God has temporal beginnings and endings 
(satisfactions); thus God can receive data from creation and provide feedback 
to it. Before you embrace this view, please consider just one of many difficulties 
with the society of occasions theology. How many divine occasions must occur 
per second for God to be present at the outset and terminus of a succession of 
gluon occasions, each of which endures for a trillion trillionth of a second or 
less? Like most other enduring entities composed of societies of successive 
occasions, gluon occasions do not all occur in sync; they are not like those rare 
fireflies that flash simultaneously in perfect harmony. So how densely packed 
would God's occasions have to be just to cope with all the out-of-sync gluons 
in existence? How densely packed per second must God's occasions be just to 
cope with gluons? Now consider all other kinds, durations, and unsynchronized 
varieties of occasions composing our incredibly complex universe. How dense 
must a Divine society of actual occasions be in order to be there at the begin-
ning and end of each occasion in the world? The obvious answer is that God's 
occasions would have to be infinitely dense! God always has to be there doing 
his job; God can't just flash in and out of existence; God must exist continu-
ously; God has to be an infinitely dense continuum just to cope; God has to be 
an everlasting concrescence continuously interacting with all creation. God must 
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be an infinitely prolonged, infinitely dense continuum; no matter where we cut, 
God is there. But if God is an everlasting continuous concrescence who acts 
upon and is acted upon by the world, the very notion of concrescence must be 
drastically revised. 
Applied to ourselves, the requirement that only terminal satisfactions can 
be experienced means that, despite the vaunted value of subjective immediacy, 
we can never experience or know ourselves directly and immediately. That is, 
the occasions that constitute our stream of consciousness cannot know them-
selves directly and immediately. Process thinkers generally accept Hartshome's 
view that all introspection is really retrospection on immediately past self-
occasions. This means that we never really know or experience ourselves in the 
full subjective enjoyment and self-creation of the present moment. We know 
how we were, but never how we are. Self-enjoyment and self-creativity are gone 
by the time they are experienced, so these vital values are never really known 
as such. This is another very good reason for revising the process analysis of the 
becoming of the present moment. How can anything be remembered (retro-
spected) if it was never experienced or known in the first place? 
"Satisfaction" is the most vicious culprit in the standard process analysis 
of temporal concrescence. As it terminates, every occasion supposedly resolves 
all its indefiniteness and achieves absolute unity and definiteness. This presum-
ably happens every fraction of a second in human experience, but this is totally 
at odds both with quantum physics and with our own immediate experiences of 
temporal becoming. 
Quantum physics says that real indefiniteness is a persisting feature of 
quantum-level physical occurrences, and quantum non-locality involves imme-
diate perceiving and knowing, not temporally ordered retrospection. Indefinite-
ness of position or locus and velocity are only occasionally and never simulta-
neously resolved. Wavicles, which cannot be rigidly atomized, may persist 
through extended periods of time as unresolved sets or superpositions of pure 
potentialities until their wave functions collapse, according to some quantum 
physicists. Instead of classical definiteness of "simple location," wavicles are 
smeared out over small but indefinite regions of the spatiotemporal continuum. 
Particles are embedded in waves, and waves are embedded in even broader 
quantum fields. But none of this could be true if every occurrence begins in 
disarray and ends in completely unified definiteness. Certainly, our own tempo-
rally ordered subjective experiences of becoming do not begin or end that way. 
If all indefiniteness is totally resolved every tenth or so of a second in 
terminal satisfactions, none could ever be transmitted from one occasion to the 
next, so no indefiniteness should ever persist in our lives. In reality, our tempo-
ral streams of awareness are riddled with all kinds and degrees of enduring 
disunity and indefiniteness, mixed with persisting unity and definiteness. If 
Whitehead's theory of becoming-terminating-in-satisfaction were true, we 
should never experience any lingering perceptual, conceptual, volitional, moti-
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vational, or affective confusion, unclarity, ambivalence, ambiguity, or indeci-
siveness whatsoever. But we do! So Whitehead's theory ofbecoming/concres-
cence is wrong. To account for the transmission of indefiniteness, we could say 
that our "satisfactions" end in definite indefiniteness, but Whitehead's account 
of concrescence cannot be saved by that kind of double talk. 
Traditional Whiteheadian models or metaphors for temporality were drawn 
from two primary sources, our own subjective experience of temporal selfhood 
and quantum physics. These are the right models, but I doubt that Whiteheadian 
analysis does real justice to either. My recommendations for reform, especially 
for rethinking the whole notion of concrescence, will doubtless require refine-
ment, but here is a beginning. (I) The elements of concrescence identified by 
Whitehead do not follow one another progressively and successively; they are 
present continuously through every occasion. (2) Occasions within our own 
streams of consciousness are not analyzable correctly into discrete atoms or 
epochs of experience; they begin and end indefinitely. (3) The epochal or 
atomistic model of time that Whitehead abstracted from quantum physics as he 
knew it is an incomplete and misleading model; he neglected waves and quan-
tum indefiniteness; and non-local immediacy was unknown to him. 
( l) In my (our) own immediate experiences of present moments, admit-
tedly durational, the elements that Whitehead adduced to be successive do not 
occur successively but continuously. They are simultaneously present throughout 
concrescence,just like subjective forms. Moments of subjective immediacy are 
continuously and constantly being flooded with data or derived information; 
these data, feelings about them, valuations of them, and aims with respect to 
them are continuously present throughout every present moment of self-becom-
ing, along with high degrees of unity and definiteness. These elements don't just 
occur only at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end respectively of present 
moments. Temporalistic consciousness continuously synthesizes data, possibili-
ties (thoughts), and feelings into high degrees of unity and definiteness. 
Furthermore, practically all of this happens almost unconsciously, auto-
matically, and irresistibly; and very little of it can be accurately described as 
involving conscious choices or voluntary effortfulness. Creative synthesis does 
not involve intentional creativity. We cannot choose to turn on or off our contin-
uous synthesizing of multiplicity into unity. We cannot control it; it transpires 
not because of us; it happens to us and maybe even in spite of us. Decisions, 
properly so described, occur only intermittently, not in every present moment, 
certainly not every tenth of a second or so. Active synthesis of plurality into 
unity is always there in consciousness, but not active choosing or voluntary 
effortfulness. Freedom is intermittent, not ubiquitous. Arriving at a real decision 
about anything takes a while, and the preliminaries run through many present 
moments during which deliberations but not decisions occur. At times we 
actively deliberate, but even that takes a lot of time, not just fractions of a 
second. Our subjective aims, our plans of life, cover extended periods of time, 
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not just the present moment. They do not achieve determinate "satisfaction" 
every tenth of a second. They exist continuously, not discretely. 
High degrees of definiteness and unity run throughout our present mo-
ments of subjective immediacy, self-enjoyment, and self-awareness. Decisions, 
occurring only intermittently but not constantly, do cut things off into memora-
ble definiteness; but unity and definiteness are constantly there to a significant 
degree, and I am always "satisfied" in that technical sense of the term. Clearly, 
unity and definiteness do not happen just at the "end" of each present moment. 
Time is not experienced as a series of oscillations that begin with indefiniteness 
and end with definiteness. Experienced temporality melds indefiniteness with 
definiteness throughout; it does not vacillate identifiably between indeterminate 
beginnings and determinate endings. Present moments don't even have discrete 
and clearly identifiable beginnings or endings. That brings us to atomization. 
(2) Process thinkers should just drop the claims that the elements of 
concrescence exist successively rather than together, and that temporality, 
whether divine or in the world, is sharply atomized into discrete occasions. This 
conceptual theoretical construct, out of touch with all experience, creates all the 
problems. Our experiences of subjectivity are definitely not so synchronized or 
atomized. A quantum-like indefiniteness characterizes every present moment of 
temporal concrescence, experientially. Over the very short term, past, present, 
and future are not sharply divided or atomized. Instead, they interpenetrate and 
flow continuously, not abruptly and discretely, into one another. Experientially, 
we cannot tell with infinitesimal precision where the present ends, the past 
begins, or the future arrives. Perhaps something like this is what Lewis Ford 
means by the presence and activity of the future; but over the very short run it 
makes just as much sense to speak of the presence and activity of the past. 
Our philosophical theories, including our theories of time, should be 
grounded in both subjective and scientific experience. Real time, the basic stuff 
ofreality itself, has to resemble experienced time, which is more like a contin-
uum than like atomized squirts, bursts, flashes, pulsations, or epochs. This does 
not mean that it is infinitely divisible into real parts capable of existing inde-
pendently of durations; but the boundaries of its real parts, concrescences, are 
quantum-fuzzy; their durations flow into one another and are not sharply differ-
entiated. Over fractions of a second, indefiniteness separates immediate past, 
present, and future. This does not mean that experiences and events are not at 
some point definitively past, over and done with; but we can't tell precisely 
when because no absolutely precise "when" separates the present from the past 
or from the future. Rejecting temporal atomism does not mean that no intrinsic 
causal connectedness exists between events; rather, it makes this intelligible. 
The energy of one event infuses and flows imperceptibly and directly into the 
energy of another, and we can tell exactly where one (the temporal cause) ends 
and another (the temporal effect) begins. The cause is, in part, in the effect. 
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Few process thinkers have questioned Whitehead's sharp temporalistic 
atomism; but his analysis of becoming or internal concrescence confuses our 
theoretical constructs, Whitehead's constructs, with both temporally ordered 
experience and reality and thus commits Whitehead's own "fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness." Theory should coincide with experience. When Hartshorne 
confronted the substantial discrepancy between our experience of time and the 
mainstream process theory of time, he conceded, in these words, far too much. 
We here confront one of the subtlest problems which event pluralism has 
to face, that of the apparent continuity of process, its apparent lack of 
discrete units. Dewey, Bergson, Peirce, all three careful thinkers much 
interested in the analysis of experience as such (and to them Husserl and 
Heidegger could, so far as I know, be added), found no definite discrete-
ness in the becoming of human experience. And no process directly exhib-
ited in human experience seems to come in clearly discrete units. Here is 
a splendid example of a seemingly strong (empirical) case for a philosoph-
ical view, a case which is nevertheless inconclusive, and indeed can be 
opposed by perhaps a still stronger though non-empirical case.30 
That the Whiteheadian theory of the very essence of time is radically non-
empirical is a devastating admission! The theory fails to agree both with self-
awareness or subjective immediacy and with physics, quantum or otherwise. 
(3) Whitehead's epochal, atomistic theory of time was at best only incom-
pletely abstracted from quantum physics as he knew it in the 1920s, and, as 
suggested already, it is definitely at odds with quantum physics as we know it 
today. Its physical as well as its psychological models for temporal atomization 
are inadequate and misleading. Contemporary readers familiar with quantum 
physics understand that it blends indefiniteness with definiteness, particles with 
waves. The standard Whiteheadian view of time was modeled microscopically 
on particles alone, not on wavicles. Macroscopically, it was based on successive 
and discrete bursts and flashes, while ignoring their underlying wavelike consti-
tutions and origins. Actual occasions are atoms or particles, not of space, but of 
time; each is discrete; and each has a definite beginning, middle, and end. So the 
theory says, but the theory is wrong. 
What would happen if our theory of time gives at least equal weight to the 
wave model of differentiation? Definiteness (atomization or particularization of 
sorts) would still be there, but it would be smeared out, have fuzzy edges, and 
lack simple temporal or spatial location and infinitesimally precise discreteness. 
Waves have definite peaks and troughs, but they flow almost seamlessly into 
one another. Like circles, determining exactly where one ends and another 
begins is quite arbitrary. So it is with actual occasions. We cannot leap from 
"All energy is transferred only in discrete packets or quanta" to the conclusion 
that "All energy exists only in discrete particles or quanta," for some energy 
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exists as indiscrete waves and encompassing but indefinitely bounded fields, not 
as discrete particles; and time is like that. We should go back to discussing 
"events," as in Whitehead's pre-systematic metaphysics, rather than "actual 
occasions," technically conceived. 
Since no concrescences, not just God's, but ours as well, have absolutely 
discrete beginnings and endings, they cannot be the absolutely closed units that 
Whitehead took them to be; and the absolutely definite beginnings and endings 
he required are not the insuperable obstacles to mutual and self experiencing 
that he took them to be. Past events can penetrate present events sufficiently for 
efficient causation. Inherited definiteness of data, energy, purposes, and feelings 
are always and continuously mixed with degrees of openness and indefiniteness. 
No strictures pertaining to terminal "satisfactions" preclude one event's direct 
awareness of its own or another's concrescent subjective immediacy because 
significant degrees of unity and definiteness are always present, and because 
counting concrescences as "first" then "second" is arbitrary over the very short 
run. Because something like instantaneous non-locality obtains within events, 
they can know themselves directly, not merely retrospectively. 
All of this should be just as true of divine as of human level concres-
cences. God's ongoing concrescence never begins or ends absolutely; yet, 
incredibly significant degrees of unity and definiteness are always present to 
God. This includes the complete definiteness, the full burden, the total joy and 
worth of the world that God takes into himself and saves forever without losing 
the subjective immediacy that we creatures lose to ourselves in the perpetual 
perishing of time. It is not true that God never experiences anything, and noth-
ing else ever experiences God because God is a single everlasting concrescence 
with no beginning, no end, and thus no satisfaction. If unity and definiteness 
define "satisfaction," then God's concrescence is always satisfied, continuously 
satisfied, to a very high degree in this technical sense; otherwise, if achieved 
only in terminal satisfactions, God's everlasting concrescence has no unity or 
definiteness at all. God and nothingness would be indistinguishable! 
Nothing, especially God, has the absolute beginnings and endings required 
by the epochal theory of time. All concrescences, including God's, are highly 
definite and unified throughout. All concrescences, including God's, can receive 
information without having absolute beginnings; they can transmit data without 
having absolute endings. Nothing has to await absolutely terminal satisfactions 
to experience itself or something else, or to be experienced by something else. 
God and the world are indeed available and open to one another-continuously. 
Most process thinkers probably agree with Whitehead that the closedness 
of concrescences to one another is essential for freedom and self-creation; but 
this cannot be true if the traditional account of concrescence is flawed from the 
very outset. (1) Temporal atomism and (2) sequential phases of concrescence 
just don't exist! For many reasons, our freedom is not overwhelmed by God's 
presence with and to us in the present moment, contrary to orthodox White-
Concepts of God's Nature and Existence 253 
headianism. God can be sensitively, passively, receptively present as well as 
actively present; our capacities for including, recognizing, and assimilating God 
are exceptionally limited even when God is fully available. God values our 
conscious individuality with its independence and freedom sufficiently to insure 
that his immediate presence with and to us does not overwhelm us. 
Repudiating temporalistic atom ism allows God to know and experience us, 
not just as we were, not merely after our robust present moments perish, but as 
we are in the full vibrancy and value of our unique subjective immediacy, self-
enjoyment, and self-creativity. This is where our intrinsic value primary resides. 
To that, God gives objective immortality. Ultimately, we contribute what we are 
immediately, not must what we were retrospectively, to God. Unhindered by the 
strictures of technical "satisfactions," which don't exist anyway, God can 
respond lovingly, providentially, and temporally or historically to particular 
events within the world as they occur, not in a timeless eternity, not from a non-
existent future, and without having to wait around forever for a Whiteheadian 
"satisfaction." By reconceiving the present moment of time, all of the religious 
advantages of process thought can be preserved and can flourish unfettered by 
untenable and unempirical theoretical distinctions and strictures. 
B. Our Freedom and God's Self-Limitation 
God is not the sole creative agent operating in the universe; we creatures are 
free to choose between good and evil. This is an important part of the process 
resolution of the problem of theodicy-reconciling the reality of a good and 
powerful God with the brute fact of evil in the world. This theodicy is devel-
oped much more fully in the next chapter, but a difficulty that arises in connec-
tion with it must be considered here. 
If God is not the sole creative agent in the universe, is this because God 
freely chose to limit his freedom? Or is it because God is impotent to create 
unfree creatures or to interfere with creaturely freedom? Process thinkers agree 
that existing realities are partly self-creative, but they may disagree about 
whether this is so by metaphysical necessity or by divine choice. Mainstream 
Process Theologians seem to believe that God is merely the final but never the 
efficient cause of events within the world; but these tenns need to be defined 
carefully. Some might disagree verbally because they define "efficient" and 
"final" causation differently. As here understood, Divine efficient causation is 
God's power to create, infuse, or reorder energy. Divine final causation is God's 
purposiveness, which includes God's power to present developing spatiotemp-
oral occasions with "initial aims," the set of viable possibilities open to them for 
both limited and long-tenn self-creation and choice. (But there is nothing "ini-
tial" about them!) Mainstream Process Theologians hold that God influences 
individuals within the world primarily if not entirely by gently persuading or 
luring them toward the best, by presenting them with aims that are slightly but 
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not overwhelmingly weighted toward the good, but never by directly causing or 
forcing them to conform to the Divine will. Since miracles, by definition, 
involve Divine efficient causation, and since God never exercises efficient 
causation, no miracles or acts of God could inject energy directly into the world 
or redirect it, either at the beginning or subsequently. God never causes or 
prevents evil because God totally lacks the power to do so. Since God never 
causes anything, God never causes evil, ifthat is much consolation! 
Although he would not formulate his position in terms of efficient versus 
final causation as just defined, David Griffin, among others, vigorously defends 
this dominant process solution to the problem oftheodicy.31 Griffin identifies 
efficient causation with transition between occasions and final causation with 
the internal concrescence of occasions, (which unfortunately precludes purpos-
iveness or final causation between occasions); but he also recognizes that final 
causation involves efficient causation.32 Mainstream process thinkers hold that 
God simply lacks the power to bring anything about unilaterally, whether good 
or evil. This implies, fortunately, that we cannot blame God for evil; it also 
means, unfortunately, that God could never create a universe out of nothing, or 
work any miracles, or do anything except nag! God works persuasively, at best, 
but not efficiently, in all natural causation; but since God never reaches "satis-
faction," (on non-Hartshomean interpretations), it is difficult to see how God 
could even work persuasively. 
As exemplified in David Griffin's books on theodicy and in various 
writings by John B. Cobb, Jr., Lewis Ford, Bowman Clarke, and many others, 
process orthodoxy says that God's power over the world is primarily if not 
entirely that of final causation, not efficient causation as just defined. They 
might word the issue differently, but these thinkers clearly hold that God lacks 
the power to do much of anything except persuade. God influences the world 
and its denizens by presenting attractive ideals, by "luring" toward the best; but 
beyond that God seems to do very little, if anything. 
Process Theologians say that God shares creativity with the creatures,33 but 
this is usually tempered if not contradicted by their insistence that God has no 
choice in the matter because creativity is a universal metaphysical category that 
necessarily characterizes all actual entities in all possible worlds.34 This implies, 
says process orthodoxy, that God absolutely lacks the power to create the 
deterministic universes in which predestinationists, Newtonians, mechanistic 
materialists, and others believed. God has no choice but to create co-creative 
creatures; God simply does not have the power to do otherwise, to create 
absolutely predetermined events, individuals, or worlds. 
I would like to see the options open to Process Theology expanded in 
many ways. To illustrate, let me flesh out briefly a notion of a supremely wor-
shipful being, a being than whom none better or more worshipful can be con-
ceived, that is much closer in some respects to the non-process tradition. It 
seems to me, and I recognize enormous room for honest disagreement about 
Concepts of God's Nature and Existence 255 
this, that God would be religiously deficient if he really lacks the power to 
influence or modify events except through persuasion or final causation, and if 
he absolutely could not create deterministic universes, however repulsive they 
might be morally and aesthetically, because he lacks the power to do so and not 
because they are repulsive. 
I regard freedom/creativity as highly desirable, but not as a metaphysically 
necessary feature of the kind of universe that a truly worshipful Divine being 
would create. This implies, contra Whitehead and Hartshorne, that creativ-
ity/freedom is not a metaphysical category that is universally and necessary 
present in all possible temporal occasions and universes. Universality and 
necessity can be separated; creativity could be cosmologically universal in our 
world but not metaphysically necessary for all possible or conceivable uni-
verses. Even if creativity exists contingently in all actual universes, assuming 
more than one, this is by God's choice, not because of metaphysical necessity. 
If creativity is ubiquitous in our universe, this is because God freely and volun-
tarily made it so. Ideally, divine omnipotence involves having the power to 
create both deterministic and non-deterministic universes, but choosing from 
goodness rather than from metaphysical necessity to create free creatures. 
Creativity may not be ubiquitous even within our own universe. It may 
characterize mainly higher or more complex actual occasions like those in living 
beings, particularly conscious animals and human beings. Lewis Ford allows 
that although persisting elemental physical particles like quarks, protons, atoms, 
and molecules are novel in their individual actuality, they do not exhibit novelty 
of form. Except for somewhat rare sensitive and creative occasions in the 
material world, most persisting physical particles just do not have conceptual 
aims, and do not creatively modify their aims.35 
But this means that most elemental physical particles manifest no creativity 
whatsoever. This may also be true of many of the dull moments of human 
experience. I suspect that quantum-level wavicles are uncreative most of the 
time, but periodically they may manifest it. As indicated in Chapter Six, neither 
we nor an ace predictor like God can tell or predict when individual particles 
will change orbits, exactly where they will appear next within broad-band 
orbital shells, which slits they will go through, the directions they will fly when 
scattered, or which ones will decay and produce atomic radiation. Quantum 
uncertainty, indeterminateness, and spontaneity widely pervade physical reality; 
but this does not imply their universal presence. Creativity may be neither 
metaphysically necessary nor cosmologically universal. Either way, when 
present it is a precious gift of Divine grace. 
As usually conceived by process thinkers, God lacks a kind of power that 
Kierkegaard and so many others believed to be of immense worth-the power to 
share power freely and voluntarily rather than necessarily. Wouldn't a being 
than whom none better can be conceived have that kind of power? Wouldn't a 
truly worshipful God have efficient as well as final causation at his disposal? 
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Shouldn't God be able to do as well as lure? Shouldn't God have the power to 
create life-supporting universes from nothing, or to work an occasional miracle 
or two? Ultimately, each of us must answer these questions for ourselves; but 
many devout and thoughtful people answer affirmatively. 
Miracles are another can of worms, I know; and the view I will now 
express is process heresy. But the "omnipotence as only persuasion" God of 
process orthodoxy seems to me to resemble too much a celestial George Bush, 
or some other conspicuous wimp, who espouses noble ideals like kindness and 
gentleness but never budgets for them or does anything about them except 
cajole and nag. George Bush was not that President than whom none greater can 
be conceived, and the God of process orthodoxy is not that Ultimate Reality 
than whom none greater can be conceived! (This was originally written about 
"Big Bush," as Rev. Jesse Jackson calls him; but it will probably also apply to 
"Little Bush." Only time will tell.) 
Many traditional theologians and believers think that God has the power 
to create both free and unfree creatures but actually does the second (predesti-
nationists ); others think that he has that power but actually does the first (free-
willists); others try incoherently to have it both ways. Process orthodoxy says 
that God just doesn't have it, partly because of a power deficit, and partly 
because all creatures are necessarily free (ubiquitous creativity). 
Without wanting to have it both ways, I and many others think that God 
has all consistently conceivable power at his disposal, but God uses it freely and 
benevolently to create free creatures and the kind of universe required to sustain 
them. Adopting this view would help immensely in healing the alienation 
between Process Theologians and more traditional believers; but standard brand 
process thinkers won't like the suggestion. 
The alternative process view of God's power, espoused here, concurs with 
many critics that the divine power-deficit at the heart of the dominant process 
outlook is religiously intolerable. Only a God who is not a supercelestial wimp 
is supremely worthy of human worship, service, and devotion, according to this 
minority perspective. On this voluntary self-limitation view, God voluntarily 
limits his own power and chooses to share power/creativity with free creatures. 
God exercises a desirable balance of both persuasion and efficient causation in 
relation to events within the world. Values, not metaphysical necessities, deter-
mine the balance. God is good, not impotent. Events within the world are partly 
self-creative because God, who could have created another kind of universe, 
chose instead from the outset to share creativity with us creatures and thus to 
limit his own power over and knowledge of the future. 
Although God's omnipotence was often equated with omnicausality by 
Classical Theologians, it can mean instead that although God could predestine 
all, God actually chooses to influence all without determining all. God volun-
tarily uses his power to do the best that an omni-influential agent could do, 
which may include creating universes from scratch and performing infrequent 
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miracles, as well as delegating creative power to others. Freedom within cre-
ation is a deliberate, gracious, and voluntary gift of divine self-limitation, not 
an impersonal metaphysical necessity about which God has no choice. Process 
thinkers can hold the minority view that creativity is general if not universal in 
our cosmic epoch, perhaps in all others, because God cherishes it and chooses 
to make it so, not because God had no altemative.36 
David Griffin critically discusses and rejects the view that co-creative 
creatures are free because God voluntarily self-limits his own power. He recog-
nizes that this "hybrid free will defense," as he calls it, is currently supported 
by such prominent theologians as John Hick, Emil Brunner, and L. Harold 
DeWolf.37 To this list must be added Arthur Peacocke,38 John Polkinghome,39 
Nancey Murphy,40 Ian Barbour, Diogenes Allen, and many others who accept 
Process Theology's emphasis on God's inclusiveness, temporality, sensitivity, 
affective capacities, persuasiveness, and causal efficaciousness, but who are 
reluctant to call themselves Process Theologians because they think that Process 
Theology can make no place for creaturely freedom bestowed by voluntary 
divine self-limitation. Arthur Peacocke explicitly affirms panentheism, the all-
inclusiveness of God, and divine self-limitation, while deploring their historical 
association in the twentieth century with Process Theology, which he repudi-
ates.41 Ian Barbour says that Process Theology is the best model of God avail-
able, while preferring God's voluntary self-limitation in creating co-creative 
creatures.42 I also wish to see God's voluntary self-limitation recognized as a 
legitimate minority perspective for Process Theologians, even if this implies that 
many of the technical distinctions in process orthodoxy must be extensively 
revised or abandoned, especially Whitehead's detailed analysis of the nature of 
temporal concrescence and its application to God, which few have previously 
questioned seriously. 
C. How Process Theology Can Affinn Creation Ex Nihilo 
Many temporalistic theists object to mainstream Process Theology's clear 
repudiation of the traditional Christian view that God created our universe out 
of nothing, ex nihilo, at some point in the finite past. They affinn instead that 
God created our universe out of the chaotic remains of some prior universe or 
cosmic epoch, which in tum was also created out the chaotic remains of some 
still earlier universe, and so on to infinity, because every finite actuality was 
partly created by and out of some prior actuality. 
As David Griffin put it, "Creation of our particular world was not initiated 
by a creation ex nihilo, in the sense of a total absence of finite fonns of actual-
ity, but was a creation out of chaos, out of a less ordered realm of finitude."43 
Integrated into Process Theology, the claim that every reality is created partly 
by and out of antecedent temporal realities (and partly by God) implies that our 
universe or cosmic epoch is just the latest member of an infinite sequence of 
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antecedent universes that God created necessarily because God is necessarily 
creative, social, loving, and embodied in some universe-ad infinitum. 
I wish to show that and how we can retain valuable process insights such 
as that God is necessarily creative, social, loving, and embodied in some actual 
universe and still affirm creation ex nihilo for our universe. Without relating his 
metaphysics to recent developments in scientific cosmology, Robert Neville, 
both a friend and a severe critic of process theology, has previously championed 
creation ex nihilo.44 However, most philosophical-minded Process Theologians 
have not been able to conceive of a way to get around the principle that all 
realities are partly created out of prior actualities and still preserve God's 
necessary creativity, sociality, love, and embodiment. I will show that and how 
it can be done quite successfully employing concepts that are quite readily 
available in contemporary Big Bang astrophysics and cosmology, and that 
reasons given by process thinkers for repudiating creation ex nihi/o can be 
bypassed. In developing these points, I also hope to show how process thought 
can relate its insights to contemporary scientific Big Bang Cosmology, and that 
traditional process thought contains elements out of which a process under-
standing of creation ex nihilo can be constructed. 
i. A New Framework for Understanding Creation Ex Nihilo 
In answering the question "Is God Creator Ex Nihi/o?'~ on the Process and 
Faith website, John B. Cobb, Jr. replies that "Whitehead knew nothing of the 
'Big Bang' and thought instead of cosmic epochs evolving out of earlier cosmic 
epochs with no singularities involved. Process theology followed him."45 Pro-
cess thinkers have indeed followed Whitehead in affirming that our universe, 
our cosmic epoch, was created out of the ashes of some temporally antecedent 
universe, and that both universes belong within an infinitely prolonged series 
of created universes that collectively fulfill the necessity of divine creativity, 
sociality, love, and embodiment. Charles Hartshorne affirmed, admittedly with 
some hesitation, 
That actuality is finite in space I readily believe. It is certainly finite in 
some respects; for to say otherwise would be to say that everything think-
able was also actual, and this is absurd. But the serious question concerns 
the past of the creative process. Is there an actually infinite regress of past 
stages-if nowhere else, then at least in the divine becoming? If not, how 
can a first stage be either avoided or made intelligible, if every experience 
must have antecedent objects ... ? So Kant's first antinomy, his most potent 
argument, stares us in the face. All I can see to do is to reject his disproof 
of the possibility of an actual infinity .... This question I cannot at present 
answer to my own complete satisfaction. 46 
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Hartshorne elsewhere fleshes out his cosmology of finite space and infinite 
time by linking it to Whitehead's doctrine of cosmic epochs, telling us that "I 
incline to Whitehead's view of cosmic epochs, each with its own laws."47 
Presumably all of this means that a series of spatially finite cosmic epochs 
extends infinitely into the past, and that our universe was created out of the 
remains of the preceding epoch. The same interpretation must also be placed 
upon Lewis Ford's "Alternative to Creatio & Nihilo," which affirms: "For if 
the world is not created from nothing, it can possibly have an infinite past. If 
every creative act creates itself out of past acts, ad infinitum, the world must 
have an infinite past"48 and upon Cobb and Griffin's "Process theology rejects 
the notion of creatio ex nihilo, ifthat means creation out of absolute nothing-
ness. Process theology affirms instead a doctrine of creation out of chaos."49 
Griffin positions this chaos within a temporally ordered set of oscillating uni-
verses, explaining that "There was no beginning. The chaos from which our 
world began can be considered the final state of a previous world. Creation is 
the gradual bringing of order out of chaos."50 
How does all of this relate to what is going on in contemporary scientific 
cosmology? Today, for the most part, cosmology is being done by astrophysi-
cists rather than by philosophers or theologians. As seen in earlier chapters, 
most of these scientific cosmologists do not believe in God and seem to know 
little or nothing about process philosophy. They wish to leave the impression 
that their atheistic cosmological speculations are somehow "scientific," although 
this is far from being the case, as later explained. Still, for convenience, let us 
call cosmological speculation being done by astrophysicists and other profes-
sional scientists "scientific cosmology." 
Contemporary scientific cosmology is very diverse. The variety that best 
correlates with the views of mainstream Process Theologians is Oscillationism, 
even though process thinkers have not explicitly affirmed it by using the word 
"Oscillation ism." As explained in Chapter Four, contemporary scientific Oscil-
lationists usually affirm that our universe is but the most recent in a temporally 
infinite series of cosmic epochs, that it was created entirely, not by God, but by 
an influx of energy from an antecedently existing universe, that this prior 
universe originated from its own Big Bang, enlarged to the maximum allowed 
by the tension between the expansive kinetic energy of its Bang and the con-
strictive force of its gravity, began to contract after gravity ultimately prevailed, 
and finally ended in a Big Crunch, from the ashes of which our own Big Bang 
rebounded. 
Most scientific Oscillationists also affirm that the series or set ofBang-to-
Crunch epochs extends infinitely into the past. They do so primarily because 
they think that this is a way of avoiding God. As Alan M. MacRobert recog-
nized in Sky and Telescope in 1983, "The idea of an oscillating universe, in 
which the Big Bang resulted from the recollapse of a previous phase of the 
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universe, gained currency merely because it avoided the issue of creation, not 
because there was the slightest evidence in favor of it."51 
The naivete of the view that an infinitely prolonged natural or spatiotemp-
oral order of things needs no God would be readily apparent to philosophers, 
from Aquinas to Whitehead and beyond, who understand that an infinitely pro-
longed universe or set of successive universes would likely lack the complete 
self-sufficiency essential for naturalistic atheism and would be contingent upon 
God in many respects. For instance, God could and most likely would be re-
quired by each cosmic epoch to squeeze out any residual entropy or chaos 
inherited from an antecedent epoch, to select desirable laws (especially life-
supporting ones) for each new universe, and to choose its initial conditions (like 
the quantity of stuff, energy, or mass in the universe, the strength of the basic 
physical forces, and the asymmetry of matter over antimatter-or vice versa). 
Process thought would add that God is essential to provide each spatiotemporal 
occasion in every epoch with an "initial aim" that includes novel possibilities 
to be creatively actualized by the choice or initiative of every creature, and that 
God preserves and cherishes forever in his faultless memory the values created 
by existing individuals in each cosmic epoch and gives them "objective immor-
tality." 
Pure Oscillationism, which affirms a single infinitely prolonged strand of 
successive universes, has some stiff competition in contemporary scientific 
cosmology. The main competition comes from the many worlds view, or what 
I call "Big Fizz Cosmology," according to which both time and space are 
infinitely extended and creative. Space in today's astrophysics is not just noth-
ingness or an empty Ne\\1onian or Kantian form that separates physical objects 
and processes. As Whitehead recognized, a lot is going on in so called "empty 
space"52 Actual occasions constantly occur there, but they do not consolidate 
into persisting societies. 
As documented in earlier chapters, today's cosmologists are convinced 
that space itself is a kind of physical something, a field with its own physical 
properties, its own actualized mass/energy and density. It has a fine-grained 
foamy texture, best described by the laws of quantum physics; and it can be 
bent, stretched, shrunk, warped, vibrated, and knotted. The seemingly emptiest 
spatial regions are seething or bubbling with "virtual particles" awaiting birth 
or actualization. Scientific-minded cosmologists think that quantum indefinite-
ness allows these virtual or real potential particles to be converted briefly into 
actual particles, so long as they promptly cease to exist so as not to violate-for 
more than an instant-the principle of the conservation or constancy of energy 
Matter and antimatter particles are constantly being created in empty 
space; usually they annihilate one another almost immediately, but perhaps not 
always. The cosmology proposed by highly influential Inflation Theory says that 
effervescent virtual particles occasionally escape from "empty space" into more 
enduring actuality, as allowed by the random fluctuations recognized by quan-
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tum theory, and then they inflate into entire universes. This happens more than 
once; most Inflation Theorists think that it happens an infinite number of times 
to actualize every possible world. Process thinkers should agree here with 
Hartshorne (and Leibniz) that the notion of actualizing every possibility is 
absurd since there are incompossible possibilities within and between every 
conceivable world. Quantum Cosmologists seem to think that every possibility 
is actualized, even if it talces an entirely new universe to accommodate each one. 
Process thinkt:rs dissent, however, on the grounds that for moral and aesthetic 
reasons, God would not create the innumerable horrible, trivial, or boring 
worlds that are logically possible. 
Our spacetime system, the only one we can observe directly (at least in 
part), the one whose origins we can trace back to a chaotic Big Bang, originated 
around 15 billion years ago. All events that compose our spacetime system are 
causally connected with other events within that system, which is in principle 
traceable back to the Big Bang. The cause of the Bang itself lies outside our 
spacetime system; it is transcendent; but it may or may not have been God. 
Most Quantum Cosmologists, those who apply quantum theory to quantum 
questions, hold that our universe is but one of infinitely many universes 
spawned, not by God, but by and from the near-nothingness of quantum-foamy 
empty space. According to this many worlds Big Fizz inflationary scenario, the 
relevant infinitely fertile "empty space" is not a part of, does not belong to, our 
cosmic epoch. Big Fizz Cosmology postulates a transcendent quantum-fizzy 
Motherspacetime or Superspacetime within which infinitely many child-worlds 
or universes co-exist in infinitely extended space throughout infinite time. After 
child worlds are thus spawned, they may or may not then begin to oscillate 
Let us consider the "many worlds" notion of infinite Superspace that 
supposedly accommodates an endless number of independently co-existing and 
spontaneously conceived child universes to see if it can help us to conceive of 
creation ex nihilo. According to cosmological theories widely accepted today, 
since infinite Superspace has always existed, it co-exists with infinite Super 
time. When a spatiotemporally finite universe like ours expands, it pushes into 
pre-existing Superspacetime, not into absolute nothingness. We have seen that 
many scientific-minded cosmologists talce all of this stuff very seriously! 
Developments in contemporary cosmology outlined thus far may strike you 
as utterly wild speculation, having little or nothing to do with empirical natural 
science, even if it originates with professional astrophysicists. Indeed, it is just 
that! All postulated antecedent and contemporary universes, and the infinite 
Supertime and quantum-foamy Superspace within which they are located, 
transcend our cosmic epoch and are totally inaccessible to human experience. 
They exist before and beyond our spacetime system in a time prior to the begin-
ning of our time and in a space beyond and outside of our space, so we can 
never observe them. They are supernatural realities, if real at all, that transcend 
our system of nature or spacetime. If they exist, they are supernatural other 
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worlds. Even science, if this is science, cannot get along without the supernatu-
ral. As philosophical postulates or explanatory hypotheses, their reality (or lack 
thereof) can be considered and debated-as was done in Chapters Three through 
Nine. Obviously, any explanatory appeal to realities that transcend our spatio-
temporal natural order of things always leaves empirical natural science far 
behind. Hereafter, "scientific" cosmology will appear in quotes. 
So, what does this have to do with creation ex nihilo? The concept of 
transcendent Superspacetime developed by Big Fizz Cosmologists is purely 
theoretical and has nothing to do with verifiable natural science, but it may 
nevertheless be extremely useful to theologians! I began by saying that Process 
Theologians have been unable to conceive of how to make sense out of creation 
ex nihilo and still affirm infinite Divine creativity, love, sociality, and embodi-
ment. This is largely because they assumed that finite space is the only possible 
complement to infinite time. Hartshorne, for instance, says that "The divine 
actuality so far as I can grasp the relevant concepts, must involve a numerically 
infinite number of past creatures, but the creation need not, and I think must not, 
be spatially infinite";53 and he repeatedly asserts the finitude of space while 
affirming the infinity of time.54 By default, if in no other way, other Process 
Theologians seem to agree. 
What would happen if, contra Hartshorne, the conceptual framework of 
process theology were expanded to include not only Hartshorne's infinite 
Supertime, but also the infinite Superspace postulated by so many contemporary 
"scientific" cosmologists? Here, our objective is simply to extend our way of 
conceiving of the arena of infinite Divine creativity, love, sociability, and 
embodiment; and this has nothing to do with verifying propositions about other 
transcendent worlds, which we mortals could never do. Neither infinite Super-
time (previously assumed or affirmed by Process Theology) nor infinite Super-
space (hitherto denied by Process Theology) are verifiable by us. Only God 
could do the job. 
Within infinite Divine Superspacetime, God could be infinitely loving, 
social, embodied, and creative without being tied to a single temporal strand of 
spatially finite antecedent-and-successive universes. Within infinite Superspace 
and throughout infinite Supertime, God could create many co-existing universes 
out of nothing, or nothing more than "empty" Superspace itself; and God could 
be infinitely creative, social, loving, and embodied in relation to them. No co-
existing universes would have to be created out of antecedent universes, al-
though some might be. As God wills, some or all co-existing universes could be 
completely independent causally of all the others, so the crucial barrier between 
mainstream process theology and traditional Christian theology would no longer 
exist. 
Divine creation of universes ex nihilo, thus understood, always presup-
poses other actualities, that is, God's embodiment somewhere in Superspace-
time, but actual universes or Divine bodies need not be created out of other 
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actualities, such as temporally antecedent universes. Process Theologians can 
consistently affirm that throughout everlasting Supertime, God may create, as 
willed, many independently existing universes out of nothing, or the near-
nothingness of"empty" Superspace; and if, once initiated, some universes form 
an oscillating series, this is not true of our universe, which God could have 
created ex nihilo. 
In infinite Superspacetime, all child universes could be so far removed 
from every other-infinitely far apart if necessary-that they could never contact 
or causally influence one another or be derived causally from preceding uni-
verses. Or, if God wills, some might have tangential contacts with others, being 
connected perhaps by wonnholes or creative acts of God. Some of these co-
existing child universes might even be Heaven, Purgatory, or Hell; and God 
might be able to figure out how to get us from one to the other! "Beam us over, 
God!" After we die, God could just reconstitute us in transformed and much 
improved resurrected bodies (as John Hick suggests) in the spacetime of another 
world that co-exists with our universe in infinite Superspacetime. Again, the 
point is just to conceive of such things, to make them intelligible, not to verify 
or confirm any beliefs we may have about them. 
The concept of infinite Superspacetime is neither the Newtonian notion of 
absolute space and time, nor Einsteinian relativity spacetime. It derives not from 
classical or relativity physics but from quantum physics applied imaginatively 
to cosmology. My suggestion that God might recreate an improved edition of 
us in another co-existing spacetime system is not as un-Whiteheadian as it may 
seem. If order as we know it is usually a complex emergent achievement from 
pre-existing order, this could not be true of creation ex nihilo; and even if true, 
in light of what quantum physicists have discovered about non-local causality, 
we can no longer assume that all causal influence requires spatiotemporal 
contiguity or proximity. The telepathy in which Whitehead believed55 does not 
presuppose that. According to quantum physics, what Einstein called "spooky 
action at a distance" is a reality; and within Superspacetime, that action could 
transcend local universes. Whether it actually does or not, we do not know. 
If God is actualized in both infinite Supertime and infinite Superspace, the 
everlastingness of divine sociality, love, and creativity would not be subverted 
if a finite universe like ours was created out of nothing about 15 billion years 
ago. Why should God's everlasting creativity be tied to a single temporal strand 
of spatially finite universes, of which ours is the most recent member? God 
could be everlastingly creative in Superspace as well as in Supertime, where 
particular universes need not emerge from antecedent universes. To reconcile 
Process Theology with the creation of our universe ex nihilo, we need a concept 
of Divine Superspacetime as God's sensorium and arena for infinite creativity, 
as further explained in the following discussion. If my analysis is successful, 
Process Theology should adopt the view that God's potential embodiment is 
coextensive with infinite Superspacetime; and God's actual embodiment is 
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coextensive with all the worlds God has chosen to make within Superspacetime. 
God's present body is not confined to our finite Big Bang spacetime epoch, 
which may or may not have antecedents, depending on the plausibility of 
Oscillationism. 
Taking the general concept of Motherspacetime or Superspacetime from 
contemporary many worlds Big Fizz Cosmology does not and should not com-
mit Process Theology to much of the unwieldy baggage often attached to it. 
Process thinkers will want to reject the Principle of Plenitude, so popular with 
today's "scientific" cosmologists, according to which all possible worlds are 
actual worlds. Instead, in infinite Superspacetime, God creates all the worlds 
that he chooses, but not all possible worlds. For many good reasons, God is not 
driven by the ideal of Plenitude, which requires the creation of all possible 
worlds. God may have created an infinite number of worlds in Superspacetime, 
but God understands that infinity cannot be used up and that an infinite number 
will always remain to be created. God also realizes that many possible worlds 
are too horrible, or too trivial and boring, to be created at all. As Whitehead 
noted, "It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would 
be evil as well as good."56 Divine Superspacetime need not be conceived as 
resembling the quantum-foamy spacetime of our universe, in which actual 
particle-occasions are constantly emerging spontaneously but briefly from 
virtuality. Instead, Superspacetime is God's arena for deliberate but selective 
creativity; and it has all the properties that God wants to give to it, even though 
we may not know what they are. 
Mainstream Process Theologians were unable to conceive of creation ex 
nihilo because they were wedded, implicitly if not explicitly, to the model of a 
single strand of spatially finite oscillating universes extending infinitely into the 
past, each member of which arises causally from both God and from its immedi-
ate predecessor. Hartshorne affirmed "an infinity of earlier universes, each 
produced out of its predecessor, more or less catastrophically or gradually;" but 
God created them all, including our universe, out of their predecessors.57 This 
cosmological model precludes the possibility that a universe could arise causally 
only from God at some point in the finite past-the essence of creation ex nihilo. 
It assumes that God's infinite creativity was only temporally ordered; but it may 
also be spatially ordered as Divine Superspacetime, where God might be ever-
lastingly creative of multiple universes that have no causal relations with our 
system of spacetime; and our system of spacetime could arise directly from 
God's Superspacetime and creative will alone, without being preceded by 
antecedent universes. Other universes or cosmic epochs could be "beyond" ours 
spatially, to use Whitehead's word for it, without being "before" ours tempo-
rally, as mainstream Process Theology has assumed. 
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ii. Elements of Superspacetime in Process Thought 
Elements out of which a theory of Divine Superspacetime can be constructed 
already exist in Process Theology. In discussing the possible existence of many 
independent worlds in an essay in Science and Philosophy, Whitehead proposed 
that and how we might conceive of independently existing universes that have 
no causal, temporal, or even spatial relations with one another. 
We can imagine that, in the realm of existence, there may be an alternative 
space-time process other than that of nature; but nature and the alternative 
process do not conjoin to make one process. In fact we are aware of such 
alternative processes in dreams, where we apprehend a process of events 
which in respect to nature are nowhere and at no time.58 
Despite any philosophical problems we might have with Whitehead's 
dream world analogy, this shows that historically the idea of multiple inde-
pendent worlds is not entirely alien to process thought. The most effective and 
trouble-free way to conceive of independent worlds and to relate process theol-
ogy to contemporary Big Bang Cosmology is to think of other worlds as co-
existing, not in dreams, but within Divine Superspacetime, within which some 
worlds (like ours) could be created deliberately out of nothing, that is, out of the 
real potentiality and virtuality of genuinely "empty space." 
Whitehead was unaware ofBig Bang cosmology, as Cobb indicates. Harts-
horne, by contrast, was well aware of it; but he neither made a serious and 
detailed attempt to relate his cosmological commitments to it nor verbally 
affirmed Oscillationism. However, he clearly had a concept of Divine Super-
time, that is, of God's time before (and after) our time, the time of our fifteen 
billion year old universe. He wrote that: 
Certainly someone ought to correlate metaphysics and physics. For in-
stance, even if the supreme reality is a kind of becoming, then it seems 
there must be a sort of divine time (even Barth says something like this), 
and the correlation of this with worldly time, as construed by relativity 
physics, is a neglected and apparently extremely formidable task. Perhaps 
this is rather a problem in cosmology than in pure metaphysics, cosmology 
being the application of metaphysical principles to what science reveals as 
the structure of our "cosmic epoch." Yet unless either physicists or meta-
physicians have erred, there must be an at least possible way of harmoniz-
ing what the physicists say is true of our cosmic epoch and what metaphy-
sicians say is true of all possible epochs.59 
As we have seen, today's "scientific" cosmologists do not restrict them-
selves only to our epoch, but this just makes them metaphysicians in disguise. 
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I suggest that today's metaphysical (and only pseudo-scientific) cosmologists 
have done Process Theologians a great service in providing us with a concept 
of Superspace to complement the Supertime that Hartshorne and mainstream 
Process Theologians postulate to accommodate antecedent cosmic epochs. 
Superspacetime is the proverbial transcendent space beyond our space and 
time before our time. Although the concept of Superspacetime originated with 
infinitely many worlds atheism, it can be united with the process concept of God 
to form the notion of a Divine Superspacetime, within which both infinite divine 
creativity and universes created out ofnothing are possible and conceivable. If 
time and space are inseparable, as process thought and contemporary physics 
both suggest, then divine Supertime, affirmed by Hartshorne, also implies divine 
Superspace. Divine Superspace can be more inclusive than the finite space of 
our own and preceding oscillating epochs; it can embrace other co-existing 
universes. 
Hartshorne likely had only the spacetime of our cosmic epoch (or similar 
antecedent oscillating epochs) in mind in insisting upon the finitude of space. 
If so, his insistence on the spatial finitude of our cosmos in no way conflicts 
with affirming infinite Superspacetime as the ultimate arena for divine creativ-
ity. As far as I have been able to determine, Hartshorne does not give a good 
argument for his insistence that space must be finite. He just affirms spatial 
finitude without argument, as if it were intuitively certain or obvious, which it 
clearly is not to contemporary "scientific" cosmologists; but his writings were 
never informed by the concept of Superspacetime that they have developed. 
A good argument for the finitude of our space can be given, namely, at or 
immediately after the onset of the Big Bang, the space of our universe began as 
finite (slightly larger than a singularity); it has since expanded at a finite rate 
(the Hubble constant or cosmic expansion rate, plus perhaps a brief exponential 
but still finite inflation rate); and the expansion has endured for only a finite 
amount of time (about 15 billion years). From these premises we can conclude 
that our space is finite. A parallel argument shows that our time is finite and has 
a "first moment"; but this is perfectly compatible with the idea that our finite 
spacetime exists within and is expanding into the "empty" quantum-foamy 
virtuality of infinite Superspacetime, which has no "first moment." 
We might conjecture, as suggested to me by Lewis Ford, that Hartshorne 
would argue for the finitude of space by appealing to the premise that there can 
be no actualized infinities at all, that such things are unintelligible, from which 
we could conclude that there can be no actualized infinity of space, that space 
is finite. Yes, but when reflecting on the far distant past, Hartshorne bites the 
bullet and reluctantly admits that process thinkers must affirm an actual infinity 
if they hold that each creaturely event is created out of some other creaturely 
event-ad infinitum; otherwise one must affirm creation ex nihilo! 60 In these 
passages, Hartshorne clearly affirms an actual, not just a potential, infinity of 
past events for our world and for God. Anyone who wants to avoid creation ex 
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nihilo is logically committed to an actualized infinity and thus must repudiate 
the above argument that space is finite. 
As quoted earlier, Cobb says that Process Theologians accept Whitehead's 
notion of distinct "cosmic epochs." Whitehead invented this terminology, 
though he was not very specific about its scope. Under the influence of early 
quantum theory in the 1920s, Whitehead thought that our own cosmic epoch is 
dominated by electromagnetic energy that exists only in discrete quanta. He 
defined a "cosmic epoch" as "the widest society of actual entities whose imme-
diate relevance to ourselves is traceable."61 Our present cosmic epoch can be 
traced "to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our ideals,"62 Whitehead 
believed; but there are other cosmic epochs "far beyond our immediate cosmic 
epoch" that are ordered very differently from our own. 63 He knew nothing about 
Big Bang Cosmology, which was still in its infancy when these words appeared 
in Process and Reality in 1929; and he did not explain whether his "beyond" is 
to be construed spatially, temporally, or both. Mainstream process theology has 
interpreted Whitehead's wording temporally; but "widest" and "beyond" are 
actually spatial words, not temporal words; he did not say "oldest" or "before." 
Perhaps Whitehead spoke better than he knew! Or perhaps he knew about 
Superspace as well as Supertime! Isn't it just his "extensive continuum" con-
strued not simply as the realm of"real potentiality" for our own cosmic epoch, 
but "in its full generality beyond the present epoch"?64 Notice especially his 
emphasis on potentiality. The in-depth explication of Whitehead's concept of 
"extensive continuum" by Jorge Luis Nobo is almost perfectly compatible with 
the understanding presupposed here. 65 Whitehead distinguishes this more 
general extensive continuum from that of our own epoch, which is dominated 
by societies of electromagnetic occasions.66 He describes it as 
... a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediate cosmic epoch. It 
contains in itself other epochs with more particular characteristics incom-
patible with each other .... We cannot discriminate its other epochs of 
vigorous order in our own epoch. This ultimate, vast society constitutes 
the whole environment within which our epoch is set.67 
Whitehead uses the spatial word "beyond" rather than the temporal word 
"before" to refer to alternate cosmic epochs. He certainly does not say that our 
epoch's "whole environment" is merely temporal, as pure Oscillationism would 
have it. Co-existing universes in infinite Superspace are no more "traceable" by 
us than antecedent universes in infinite Supertime. 
iii. Process Objections to Creation Ex Nihilo 
As documented earlier, mainstream Process Theologians have clearly repudiated 
the traditional Christian belief in creation ex nihilo, and they have given a 
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number of reasons for rejecting this belief. With one such reason I wholeheart-
edly agree, namely, the (Protestant) Bible teaches only that our universe was 
ordered out of chaos, but not unequivocally that it was created out of nothing. 68 
Let us begin with the reasons that John Cobb, Jr. gives in his Process and Faith 
website discussion of "Is God Creator Ex Nihilo?" 
First, Cobb explains, the traditional theology of creation out of nothing 
reserves the word '"creation' ... for a single act, the one in which the world is 
brought into being out of nothing." To this he opposes the process view that 
"God is creatively at work at all times and places." But these positions are not 
really opposed. Whether Cobb intends to make a historical point or a logical 
point here is unclear, but much of the hostility of mainstream Process Theolo-
gians toward creation out of nothing may issue from confusing historical associ-
ations with logical connections. It is true historicaily that traditional Christian 
theology tended to reserve the word "creation" for God's origination of our 
universe from nothing, but it did not deny that God is creatively at work at all 
times and places. It just used other words for God's ongoing creativity, words 
like "sustaining" the universe and exercising general and special "providence" 
over and within it. 
Traditional concepts of God's sustaining and providential activities were 
usually qualified by the deterministic or predestinationistic assumption that 
everything that happens is implicit in creation itself from the very outset, or 
from the immutable vantage point of God's changeless eternity. Perhaps some-
thing like this is what Cobb has in mind. In their Process Theology: An Intro-
ductory Exposition, Cobb and Griffin raise this more subtle metaphysical 
objection. They tell us that the doctrine of creation out of absolute nothingness 
"is part and parcel of the doctrine of God as absolute controller."69 
Viewed logically rather than historically, creation out of nothing, ongoing 
creation, and the creation of co-creative creatures are in no way incompatible 
with one another. Creation out of nothing is logically contradicted by the main-
stream process assumption of creation out of something, but not by the notion 
of God's ongoing creative activity within our world; and God's creating co-
creative creatures is logically contradicted by the traditional notion of creating 
totally programmed non-creative creatures, but not by the notion of God's 
creating the universe out of nothing. No logical obstacles exist to combining 
creation ex nihilo with ongoing divine creativity and divine creation of co-
creative creatures. 
Cobb clearly wants to make a logical point when he says in "Is God 
Creator Ex Nihi/o?" that " ... the implication of the doctrine of creation is that 
God is quite external to the world and the world quite external to God." Closely 
related is Cobb's charge that creation e'( nihilo encouraged "exclusive emphasis 
on divine transcendence." 
Historically, Classical Theologians consistently affirmed God's imma-
nence as omnipresence and made some solemn efforts to take this seriously; so 
Concepts of God's Nature and Existence 269 
it is not entirely true that Classical Theology made God and the world to be 
totally external to one another. The real difficulty is that what the Classical 
Theologians gave with one hand, they usually took away with the other. They 
did indeed characterize the contrast between God and the world so severely 
(pure being/pure becoming, pure cause/pure effect, spatially extended/incorpo-
real, and so forth) that the two were "quite external" to and mutually exclusive 
of one another. 70 
Does creation out of nothing inevitably involve such catastrophic con-
trasts? I can't see that it does. The opposition here is between our universe or 
epoch as caused by both God plus a series of antecedent worlds extending 
infinitely into the past, and as caused solely by God at the beginning of its own 
finite past. Both have God as a causal factor; the latter has only God. Necessary 
and everlasting Divine creativity, sociality, love, and embodiment presuppose 
the everlasting actualization of other universes somewhere in Superspacetime, 
but God's creative actualization need not be confined to a single line of tempo-
rally ordered and spatially finite cosmic epochs in Supertime, of which ours is 
the latest member. If, through either metaphysical necessity or God's voluntary 
self-limitation, the laws of quantum physics apply throughout Superspacetime 
and its products, and are not limited just to our spacetime and its antecedents, 
then every actualized universe is grounded in indeterminateness, spontaneity, 
and creativity,just as process metaphysics affirms. However, there is no logical 
necessity that "empty" Superspace be quantum-fizzy. A purely Newtonian 
Superspace is at least logically conceivable and thus possible. 
In "ls God Creator Ex Nihi/o?" Cobb himself recognizes that "the event 
in which our universe arose certainly seems to be markedly different from all 
the subsequent events"; and process metaphysics has its own ways of differenti-
ating between God, the world, and occasions within the world without implying 
that God, the world, and finite occasions are "quite external" to one another. 
As we have seen, some Process Theologians believe that God lacks the 
power to prevent evil, to work miracles, to create a universe out of nothing, or 
to bring about any effects where "persuasion" is not involved.71 But must pro-
cess thinkers presume that persuasive final causation applies absolutely every-
where? Might there not be some "markedly different" situations, for example, 
originating universes-creating the mass/energy out of which partly self-creative 
actual occasions emerge-in which God acts only as an efficient cause without 
being a final cause in the sense of giving initial aims to occasions that issue 
from pre-existing societies? Insisting that God, who has his own aims for newly 
created universes, must be able to persuade everything by imparting initial aims 
to successive occasions could not apply before the first moment of creation ex 
nihilo. Before that, nothing exists to be persuaded; the first moment of creation 
out of nothing succeeds nothing. Beginning with the very first moment, how-
ever, something may exist to be persuaded. The absolutely original grandly 
unified and undifferentiated mass/energy presumed to exist at the very begin-
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ning of our Big Bang might not be susceptible to persuasion; but as soon as it 
is sufficiently unwound, expanded, and diversified to generate actual occasions, 
it would. We cannot simply equate physical energy with persuasive creativity; 
the basic physical conditions that make partly self-creative entities possible must 
come first. Dictating that persuasion must be exercised even on the non-exis-
tence that preceded our Big Bang is an irrational demand, like insisting that 
circles must be squared. Non-existence cannot be a co-creator with God; but 
from or very near the outset, a new universe created ex nihilo could be. 
In his website discussion, Cobb relates the process view of infinitely 
prolonged ongoing creation to Big Bang Cosmology by indicating that the latter 
calls for an initial "singularity" from which our universe emerged, and by 
doubting that this means strictly "out of nothing." About this, at least four 
points need to be made. 
First, singularities are defined as being infinitely small, dense, compressed, 
hot, and curved; an initial singularity has no magnitude or locus in our space-
time since that is what emerged from the initial singularity. Some versions of 
Big Bang cosmology really do affirm that our universe emerged from a singular-
ity. Clearly, something infinitely small is absolutely nothing empirically and 
physically. Not even God could perceive something infinitely small, and nothing 
can be physical that is absolutely devoid of all spatial properties, having no size 
at all, because spatial extension is the very definition of the physical. As all 
modem philosophers agree, "All bodies are extended." 
As noted earlier, initial singularities have many problems that make them 
cosmologically unattractive. In brief, being absolutely nothing empirically and 
physically is surely one of the most serious difficulties; another is that non-
physical things cannot be physical causes, so an initial singularity does not 
provide a physical explanation for the origin of our universe. Closely related is 
the problem that no one knows what would make a singularity explode because 
no known laws of physics apply to them. Again, cosmic epochs separated by 
singularities could not belong to a single, continuous, spatiotemporal, causal 
sequence because space, time, physical causation, and all natural laws break 
down completely and do not exist in or apply to singularities. Yet again, we 
could not reason back to singularities separating cosmic epochs, or to earlier 
epochs themselves, by extrapolating from the natural laws that we know because 
these laws presuppose spacetime for their application and terminate absolutely 
at singularities. 
Second, Oscillation Cosmology is not bound inextricably to the idea that 
successive universes arise from and are separated by singularities. Many con-
temporary Oscillationists agree with Stephen Hawking that quantum effects 
would prevent a prior universe undergoing gravitational collapse from shrinking 
to a singularity. According to Big Bounce Oscillationists, a universe or cosmic 
epoch being terminated by a Big Crunch would rebound from a small finite state 
of intense compaction into a subsequent cosmic epoch initiated by a Big Bang 
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without first proceeding all the way to total collapse into an infinitely condensed 
singularity. 
As Cobb indicates, Whitehead thought "of cosmic epochs evolving out of 
earlier cosmic epochs with no singularities involved." Process Oscillationists 
would presumably find Big Bounce Oscillationism very congenial, for it re-
quires no singularities between crunch/bounces. It has its own problems, as 
indicated in earlier chapters, but by appealing to it Process Oscillation ism could 
affirm a Big Bang that rebounds from an antecedent universe without having to 
embrace troublesome singularities. 
Third, our universe may not be derived from a singularity or a crunched-up 
antecedent cosmic epoch at all. If and when singularities form at the end of a 
Big Crunch, why don't they just stay there forever? No one knows what would 
cause a singularity to explode. No physical laws that we know could account for 
it, for all of them break down in singularities. The quantum fluctuations to 
which Inflationary Cosmology appeals would not do the job because they 
presuppose the laws of quantum physics, which, along with all other natural 
Jaws, would also break down in singularities. Inflationary Cosmology does not 
derive its many worlds from singularities or from crunched-up antecedent 
universes. Inflation requires just the right kind of quantum-foamy "empty 
space" in Superspacetime; and singularities and crunches just aren't the right 
stuff. 
For the reasons just given, with or without singularities, Process Cosmol-
ogy need not and should not give an oscillationistic account of the origin of our 
universe. The most plausible view is that our world or cosmic epoch was not 
created out of a preceding universe. Instead it was created out ofnothing (with-
out other-world antecedents) within divine Superspacetime. If our low mass 
universe is open, as it now appears to be, especially in light of the very recent 
revolutionary discovery that the rate of Hubble expansion is increasing, not 
decreasing as previously assumed,72 then our universe does not belong within 
any kind of an oscillating series because all members of such a series must be 
closed to sustain infinite oscillations. 
Fourth, Cobb doubts that the nothingness to which contemporary cosmolo-
gist appeal is really nothing. Although singularities are empirically nothing and 
have many other problems, what about the "empty space" of Superspacetime? 
Well, it is not a full-fledged antecedent universe, so we are at least that close to 
creation out of nothing. Superspacetime may but need not have the actualized 
quantum-foamy physical mass/density that contemporary cosmologists assign 
to "empty space" within our existing spacetime system; on no empirical or 
scientific grounds can we infer that Superspacetime is like our universe's 
quantum-fizzy spacetime "vacuum." It could be closer to a realm of real potenti-
alities than to an actualized energy field. Aside from the co-existing universes 
that God has created, Superspacetime could consist mainly of potential rather 
than actual occasions; and nothing is to potentiality as something is to actuality. 
272 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
As the everlasting arena for creativity, Divine Superspacetime is God's infi-
nitely extensive potency for creativity and social sensitivity. Its "spontaneity" 
is God's well-considered selectivity and creativity. 
The actualized regions of Divine Superspacetime would contain, not all 
possible worlds, but only those universes deemed desirable by an infinitely 
loving Creator. Just how many co-existing worlds there are, if any, only God 
knows; but at least one universe must exist in perpetuity to satisfy God's loving, 
social, creative nature and the plausible requirement that all minds are embod-
ied. Any number of successive and/or co-existing universes could come and go, 
given an infinite amount of time to play with them. Unlike us, God doesn't have 
to rush to do anything. Presumably, as many universes would co-exist as God 
freely chooses to be involved with; but only God knows how many. 
The view proposed here does not locate God entirely outside of our cos-
mos. It allows for all the divine immanence that metaphysics and religion find 
desirable; but it recognizes, as do most Process Theologians, that God's Primor-
dial Nature, comprised of the everlasting and omnipresent features of divinity, 
transcends our cosmic epoch. It also does not violate Whitehead's "ontological 
principle," according to which explanatory reasons are always located in actual 
entities, but not necessarily in actual occasions.73 God is not located in Super-
spacetime; rather, it is located in God, the ultimate all-inclusive actual entity, 
without whom there would be no space, no time, no actuality, no potentiality. 
Finally, Hartshorne maintained very explicitly that the finitude of past time 
is inconceivable. After conceding that if we conceive of the past as infinite, 
what we could know of it is "negligibly small," he then argued, 
Conceive of it as finite, and then it seems fairly clear that we never grasp 
what is meant by a first stage of creation, a process preceded by no pro-
cess. All our thinking seems to break down at that point. We would have 
either an effect of an inconceivable cause, or something which simply 
transcended the causal idea, and hence our concept for explaining concrete 
things.74 
In response, we must distinguish the finitude of our spacetime, which is 
conceivable, from the infinitude ofSuperspacetime. Creation of our universe ex 
nihilo does not presume an absolute "process preceded by no process." It 
presupposes the everlasting processing of Divine creativity, which need not be 
located solely in oscillationist Supertime but could be expressed in many worlds 
that either co-exist within and/or are created successively within Divine Super-
spacetime. If so, God's occasions or experiences of created worlds would 
always be preceded by other divine occasions or experiences, even ifthe series 
of occasions that constitute our world originated ex nihilo around fifteen billion 
years ago. The God of Process Theology can be both the final (purposive), 
efficient (creating ex nihilo ), and formal (the Divine vision of eternal objects) 
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cause of a universe created out of nothing. If efficient causation acts from the 
past to the present, God's creative act of bringing our world into being out of 
nothing could be in God's past without being in our world's past. Creation ex 
nihi/o is possible and conceivable without violating the "no process preceded 
by no process" principle from God's perspective, though it might seem so from 
a non-process-theism human perspective. If the "all creation" refers to Super-
spacetime, God could still be "not before all creation but with all creation"75 
while definitely and necessarily existing "before" the creation of our spacetime 
system fifteen billion or so years ago. 
Is it God as transcendent cause, or the world as an ex nihi/o effect, that 
Hartshorne regards as inconceivable? 
If God is everlastingly creative in Superspacetime, God's creation of our 
universe out of nothing would not be an inconceivable effect of "an inconceiv-
able cause" because God, the cause, really is conceivable, at least in the ab-
stract. Hartshorne has argued extensively and persuasively that we can and do 
have an abstract concept of God (the cause) without knowing God's full con-
creteness. The crucial issue is whether a universe caused by God alone is any 
less conceivable than a universe produced by God out of an antecedent universe. 
If God is conceivable at all, then a universe caused by God alone would not 
result from an "inconceivable cause." Perhaps it is inconceivable that a neces-
sarily creative, loving, social, and embodied Supreme Becoming should exist 
without having created anything to love, but other universes in Superspacetime 
having no causal relations with our own epoch could fill that bill. 
Hartshorne's main point could be that a universe created out of nothing 
would be an inconceivable effect. I contend, and I believe Hartshorne would 
agree, that the notion of causation as such is broader than that of physical, that 
is, spatiotemporal, causation. It is the notion of conditions that are either neces-
sary and/or sufficient for producing an effect. Even if, contrary to the absolute 
incorporeality and timelessness of the classical God, all efficient causal condi-
tions must be in some sense spatiotemporal, then the relevant spatiotemporality 
for creation ex nihi/o could just be transcendent Divine Superspacetime; it need 
not be the spacetime of an antecedent universe from which our universe was 
causally derived. Our Big Bang could have been created out ofnothing within 
God's Superspacetime without violating any defensible presupposition of 
Process Theology. 
Thus, subtle and not so subtle replies can be given to the central objections 
that mainstream Process Theologians have raised against the traditional doctrine 
of creation ex nihi/o. The preceding account of how Process Theology can 
accommodate creation ex nihi/o may need a bit more tweaking and development 
here and there; but its affirmation would permit Process Theology to avoid 
alienating those more conventional Christians who are convinced that in the 
beginning, God created our universe out of nothing. 
274 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
In sum, with a few minor revisions, Process Theology is the most reli-
giously viable and rationally intelligible option available to us today. It can be 
saved from some of its own mistakes like its contention that God cannot know 
us in our subjective immediacy, that God creates free creatures because crea-
turely creativity is a metaphysical necessity not a Divine voluntary self-limita-
tion or choice, and that God could not and did not create our universe out of 
nothing. 
Armed now with a better understanding of what it means to exist and a 
more viable concept of God, whether God exists and whether God caused the 
Big Bang can now be addresses more intelligibly. 
Eleven 
THE BIOPIC TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
No appeal to infinitely many worlds, either antecedent or contemporary, can 
explain the existence and order of our life-supporting world unless infinitely 
many worlds actually exist. Likewise, God cannot explain our life-supporting 
world unless there actually is a God. Theistic Cosmology affirms that God 
caused the Big Bang, that God is THE necessary condition for its occurrence; 
but this claim is true only if God exists. What reasons support the belief that God 
exists? 
Rational evidence for God was expressed traditionally in philosophical 
arguments for God's existence. Two traditional arguments for God, the Teleo-
logical and the Cosmological, are of special interest to us because they directly 
invoke what we know about the cosmos. 
When he considered evidences for God drawn from our knowledge of the 
world, the philosophical theologian John Hick concluded that "The universe, as 
presently accessible to us, is religiously ambiguous in that it is capable of being 
interpreted intellectually and experientially in both religious and naturalistic 
ways." 1 Since all phenomena can be interpreted in both Theistic and Naturalistic 
terms, neither position can win a clear victory over the other, Hick contends. 
Yet, the crucial issue is not whether all observations can be interpreted in a 
certain way. Rather, it is whether one interpretation is more defensible rationally 
than another. Hick is too generous and kind toward Naturalism. We saw in 
Chapter Two that no strong case can be made for Naturalism, especially when 
measured by its own appeal to scientific method alone; and in the ensuing 
chapters we saw that contemporary atheistic cosmologists fail to explain ade-
quately the origin, order, and existence of our universe without God. 
Can a good case be made for God's existence based partly on the order or 
design of the universe disclosed to and through contemporary Anthropic or 
Biopic Cosmology? Granted that they will not be absolutely certain, can our 
inquiry produce theistic results that are rationally warranted and compelling? 
1. God's Purpose for the Universe and Cosmic Teleology 
The Teleological Argument or Argument from Design affirms that the observed 
order of the world provides powerful evidence both for the existence of God 
and for divine attributes like power, intelligence, and benevolence or good 
intentions. A well-designed cosmos implies not only that God exists but also 
something about what God is like. The Argument from Design expresses the 
deep religious intuition that the ultimate cause of the universe knew what it was 
doing and did it well from commendable motives. Perhaps no one ever really 
believes in God without that intuition, but reflection may make it plausible. 
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From the time of Plato, innumerable versions of the Argument from 
Design have been offered, criticized, defended, and attacked. Today's Anthrop-
ic Cosmology presents us with dazzling indications that our world was deliber-
ately designed by an intelligent and benevolent being of Divine proportions. 
Amazingly, most Anthropic Cosmologists reject a theistic explanation of the 
data and favor some version of an infinite world-ensemble metaphysics, accord-
ing to which a Ii fe-supporting world I ike ours occasionally happens accidentally 
in a infinite number of tries. Barrow and Tipler acknowledge the possibility of 
a Theistic Anthropic Cosmology, but they and most other Anthropic Cosmolo-
gists reject it. Should we follow their lead? 
A Biopic Teleological Argument for God contends that all oflife, not just 
intelligent life, requires God. Is the Biopic Teleological Argument for God's 
existence defensible? Consider the following premises of a strong Biopic 
Teleological Argument for God. 
Premise 1: Our universe is exceptionally fine-tuned for the production of 
an immense variety of intrinsically valuable complex forms of life. 
Premise 2: This fine-tuning was caused by either by the existence of: A. 
infinitely many universes, or B. the Principle of Plenitude, or C. nothingness, 
or D. God-a transcendent, benevolent, Supercosmic Intellect. 
Premise 3: It was not caused by the existence of: A. infinitely many 
universes, or B. the Principle of Plenitude, or C. nothingness. 
Premise 4: Probabilities favor God. 
Therefore: Our universe's fine-tuning for life was caused by an existing 
God, a transcendent, benevolent, Supercosmic Intellect. 
Both Teleological and Cosmological Arguments for God reason from 
something that is known to be true of the world through sense experience to the 
existence of a transcendent Ultimate Reality who best accounts for that some-
thing. The Teleological Argument reasons from the presence of order, design, 
and purpose in the universe to the existence of a supreme, intelligent, skillful 
orderer or designer, and benevolent purposer-God. The Cosmological Argu-
ment, examined in Chapter Twelve, reasons from contingency or dependence 
in and of the world to the existence of a Divine ground for all contingency. 
Teleological and Cosmological Arguments for God contain some empirical 
premises that are known to be true on the basis of observation and inductive 
inference; but scientists are usually not interested in these kinds of experiential 
truths. Other premises in the arguments are philosophical and must be defended 
philosophically, with no pretense of doing natural science. Philosophy can 
operate at a level of generality that goes beyond the natural sciences, even 
though the line separating them is not exact. Although not done in the Teleolog-
ical Argument, philosophy can even appeal to other types of experience-intu-
itive, introspective, religious, mystical-to which natural science, confined to 
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sense experience, cannot appeal. Philosophy's repertoire of arguments, con-
cepts, and analysis transcends the natural sciences. Absolute certainty is not 
available to us anywhere, especially in philosophy and natural science. A falli-
bilistic approach to philosophy concedes from the outset that absolute certain-
ties are unreachable, but it also eschews absolute skepticism. Without giving us 
absolute certainty, philosophy can at least give us rationally warranted asser-
tions and an enlightened faith-something far superior to blind faith. 
Now let us examine and defend the premises of our Biopic Teleological 
Argument more carefully. 
A. Extraordinary Cosmic Coincidences that Favor Life 
The first premise of the Biopic Teleological Argument points out that our 
universe is exceptionally well-designed for the production of an immense 
variety of intrinsically valuable complex forms of life, human and otherwise. 
Atheistic versions of the Anthropic Principle, discussed previously, agree that 
scientific cosmology has discovered impressive empirical evidence that our 
universe is extraordinarily fine-tuned to engender and sustain our existence. If 
it were not, we would not be here. But we are here! Why must we regard our 
universe as fine-tuned for life, and what best explains that? 
Our universe is exceptionally suitable for the production of complex 
intrinsically valuable life during certain prolonged cosmic periods like the one 
in which we exist. Exceedingly small changes in the most basic physical fea-
tures of our universe would make complex and valuable life impossible. About 
that, very little disagreement exists. Tiny changes, usually much less than one 
percent, in the numerical values of fundamental physical features of nature like 
gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force, and the weak force, would 
have resulted in a lifeless universe. So would minute changes in initial condi-
tions, natural laws, and many other primary components of the cosmos. All the 
fundamental components of our cosmos, as well as their harmonious interrela-
tionships, must be calibrated with incredible exactitude to produce a life-sus-
taining universe. 
In what follows, most of the numbers are omitted; but physicists attach 
precise numbers to all the incredible life-supporting "coincidences" that make 
up the basic physics and chemistry of a life-supporting universe like our own. 
To the finite range of every numerical value essential for the production of a 
life-sustaining universe corresponds an infinity of numerical values that would 
insure lifelessness. For example, the speed oflight at roughly 186,000 miles per 
second is a very fundamental constant in a relativity universe; but, as with all 
numerical values essential for life, a World-designer could get it wrong in an 
infinite number of ways. If the speed oflight were 184,000, 188,000, or 189,000 
miles per second, life would probably be impossible. An infinite number of 
ways to go wrong correlate with the very small range of permissible numbers 
278 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
for every physical condition that supports life. An infinite number of whole 
numbers above 186,000 miles per second, and an infinity of fractions between 
all these whole numbers, would yield lifeless universes. 
Every possible lifeless universe would be an actual universe if all possible 
universes are actualized, as dictated by the Principle of Plenitude. This includes 
infinite variations on the numbers for all physical conditions that could enter 
into the constitution of possible universes. According to Stephen Hawking, 
It seems clear that there are relatively few ranges of values for the num-
bers that would allow the development of any fonn of intelligent life. Most 
sets of values would give rise to universes that, although they might be 
very beautiful, would contain no one able to wonder at that beauty.2 
Getting all the numbers right for life is a task for Infinite Intelligence. All 
the physical fundamentals of our universe and their collective hannony were 
precision-tuned for life production, and this is overwhelming evidence that our 
universe was deliberately contrived for life by a Divine Being who loves life. 
Consider just a few cosmic fundamentals that are specially designed for life. 
i. Matter/ Antimatter Asymmetry 
Either broken matter/antimatter symmetry, or primordial asymmetry, is neces-
sary for the emergence of valuable life. We really do not know whether symme-
try prevailed in the beginning, or whether asymmetry was an original feature of 
our universe. Assuming broken symmetry, as do most cosmologists, the pro-
cesses that upset the balance of matter and antimatter in the earliest universe are 
very mysterious; but if symmetry had not been broken, the universe would not 
have evolved beyond a primordial fireball fueled by endless matter-antimatter 
collisions and explosions. Astrophysicists believe that when symmetry was 
broken, only one material particle survived for every billion matter-antimatter 
pairs that were annihilated. Without these exceptionally rare survivors, there 
would be no stable baryonic matter (protons and neutrons) and leptonic matter 
(electrons and neutrinos). No stable physical world would exist at all, and ifno 
stable physics, then no life. A universe of stable antimatter would serve just as 
well for life, but it too would require either broken symmetry or primordial 
asymmetry. 
Symmetry might have snapped in an infinite variety of ways, very few of 
which would be life-supporting. It looks as if the symmetry/asymmetry deck 
was stacked deliberately; so also were all the other most basic features of our 
cosmos. Of course, for all we really know, the universe was created from the 
outset with a great preponderance of matter over antimatter as an initial condi-
tion; but this primordial asymmetry would also be a stacked deck. For us to 
exist, our universe must contain just the right amount of free matter. 
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ii. A Weaker or Stronger Force of Gravity 
If the force of gravity were slightly weaker, the universe would have expanded 
too rapidly for galaxies, stars, and planets to fonn. Gravity would have been too 
weak to pull local clouds of gaseous mass/energy together into heterogeneous 
clumps. With weaker gravity, the universe would have undergone a rapid heat 
death. Mass/energy would have dissipated too fast for life to fonn. The evolu-
tion of valuable life is impossible without just the right tug from gravity to fonn 
planets with suitable physical and chemical conditions for life's emergence and 
development. To be life-supporting, hospitable planets also must have stars 
(suns) produced by gravity over billions of years of time that furnish them with 
just enough sustained energy, not too little, not too much. 
If the force of gravity had been slightly greater, suns would suck in their 
planets or fail to release enough energy to sustain life. On planets with slightly 
increased gravity, living things would have to be extremely small and light in 
weight to avoid breaking apart when they fall. If gravity had been somewhat 
more powerful, no suns and planets at all would have fonned; all regions of the 
universe in which they actually fonned would have undergone rapid gravita-
tional collapse. More powerful gravity would yield a universe full ofblack holes 
but no galaxies, stars, and planets. If a universe with greater gravity were to 
begin with a Big Bang, it would end shortly in total gravitational collapse. 
iii. More or Less Mass/Energy 
If the force of gravity were unchanged, but the initial quantity or density of 
mass/energy or physical particles in the universe were slightly greater or less, 
the results would resemble those from variations in the force of gravity. With 
either too much mass/energy or too much gravity, a universe would not expand 
rapidly enough. It would be too hot for life, and its total duration would be too 
short for life to evolve. With too little mass/energy or gravity, the universe 
would expand too rapidly and quickly become too cold for life. Stephen Hawk-
ing points out that "If the rate of expansion one second after the Big Bang had 
been smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million it would 
have recollapsed before it reached its present size. "3 
iv. The Size and Age of the Universe 
Both the size and the age of the universe are closely related to its mass/energy; 
and as B. J. Carr and M. J. Rees put it, "The Universe must be as big and 
diffuse as it is to last long enough to give rise to life."4 A closed universe no 
bigger than our Milky Way would pass through its entire expansion/contraction 
cycle in about a year of our time; and valuable life could not evolve. In a small 
universe of short duration, nucleosynthesis could not produce heavy elements 
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like carbon, oxygen, and nitrogen, so essential to life as we know it. Even non-
carbonaceous life fonns, ifthere are any, would require some heavy elements, 
though we do not know exactly which ones or in what proportions. 
No enduring life fonns could exist within universes consisting solely of 
volatile hydrogen and/or helium gasses-not even in infinite quantities and 
configurations. Life requires a diversity of cohesive chemical elements; it 
cannot be composed solely of hydrogen and helium. No heavy elements were 
produced in the Big Bang. They require billions of years of cooking time in 
stellar furnaces. The earliest stars contained no chemical elements heavier than 
hydrogen, helium, and traces of deuterium and lithium. No life evolved until 
after the first generation of stars synthesized heavy elements and then exploded 
as supernovas to scatter their contents through spacetime. Afterwards, gravity 
slowly reassembled this heavy stardust into later generations of stars with 
planets. At our stage of cosmic development, this has happened many times; but 
if it never happened, no life would exist. Anthropic Cosmologists finnly believe 
that life could not have evolved much faster anywhere than it actually did on 
earth. Barrow and Tipler recognize that their arguments "use evolutionary time-
scales as a crucial step."5 This assumption seems fair enough. 
v. Variations in the Electromagnetic Force 
If the electromagnetic force that binds electrons to atomic nuclei were much 
weaker, no atoms would fonn, not even hydrogen, much less the heavier ele-
ments. If it were only slightly weaker, all stars would be inhospitable blue 
giants. Ifit were slightly stronger, no long-lasting hydrogen-burning stars would 
exist. All stars would be red dwarfs that could not explode as supernovas to 
distribute heavy elements throughout the universe. Whether slightly weaker or 
stronger, no long-lasting main sequence stars like our sun would exist to provide 
the duration and stability of life-supporting conditions essential for the evolu-
tion of life. 
vi. Alterations of the Strong Force in Atomic Nuclei 
If the strongforce that binds protons and neutrons in atomic nuclei were slightly 
greater, there would be no atomic nuclei, no protons, and thus no atoms at all. 
If atoms were to fonn, all hydrogen would burn quickly into helium. The phys-
ics is complex, but if the relative strengths of the electromagnetic and strong 
nuclear forces had been ever so slightly different, either three helium atoms 
would not have fused to fonn carbon, or carbon would have been so unstable 
that it would have fused quickly with a fourth helium atom to fonn oxygen.6 
Either way, the cosmos would contain no stable carbon. The very existence of 
carbon in the universe for the construction of carbon-based life is a striking 
cosmic coincidence. If the strong force had been slightly weaker than it is, the 
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universe would be composed entirely of hydrogen gas, with no heavy elements 
and no living things. No deuterium, heavy hydrogen composed of one proton 
and one neutron in its nucleus, would have formed because the nucleus of 
deuterium is too easily tom apart. No hot stars would exist in an all-hydrogen 
universe, for even if proto-stars had formed, nuclear fusion could never com-
mence without deuterium to ignite it. 
vii. Variations in the Weak Force Controlling Nuclear Decay 
The weakness of the weak force that controls nuclear decay must be very precise 
to produce biochemical life. A precisely calibrated weak force is essential for 
fusing protons into elements heavier than hydrogen. If the weak force were 
slightly weaker, all the hydrogen in the universe would fuse quickly into helium; 
and there would be no slow-hydrogen-burning main-line stars like our sun. 
Heavier elements like carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and the chemical compounds 
upon which life depends would not exist. No supernovas could explode to 
distribute heavy elements through the cosmos if the weak force were any stron-
ger. If the weak force had been only slightly stronger than it is, everything 
would have turned immediately into iron. What a dead universe that would be! 
viii. Different Spatial Dimensions 
Innumerable features of our world are exceedingly fine-tuned for the production 
of intrinsically valuable lives. With only two instead of three spatial dimen-
sions, no life could exist. Without three spatial dimensions, there would be no 
sub-atomic particles, no atoms, no molecules, and no organic chemistry to form 
biochemical life. Edwin A. Abbott's two dimensional "Flatlanders"7 exist only 
in fiction, not in fact. Stephen Hawking explains how awkward, indeed how 
impossible, two-dimensional life would be. Two dimensional animals "would 
have to climb over each other to get past each other," and a digestive tract 
passing all the way through them would cut them in half! 8 More than three 
spatial dimensions would also be incompatible with life; so, Hawking con-
cludes, "Life, at least as we know it, can exist only in regions of space-time in 
which one time and three space dimensions are not curled up small."9 
ix. Additional Fine-Tuned Features 
Contemporary astrophysicists have uncovered a vast array of additional fine-
tuned physical features of the universe like large number coincidences and 
exacting initial conditions that are necessary for the appearance and develop-
ment of all life, especially complex valuable life. Very detailed and thorough 
discussion of the incredibly fine-tuned cosmic coincidences presupposed by the 
existence oflife were published in 1989 by John Leslie, who interprets the data 
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Platonically, 10 and in 1993 by M.A. Corey, who interprets the data theistically. 11 
For more details, read their books! 
We have seen enough at this point to understand why Anthropic Cosmolo-
gists accept the Anthropic Principle, which affirms that the production of 
valuable lives is the purpose of our universe. For very good reasons, Atheistic 
Anthropic Cosmologists accept the Anthropic Principle, the first premise of our 
Biopic Teleological Argument for the existence of God. Our universe is indeed 
exceptionally fine-tuned for the production of an immense variety of intrinsi-
cally valuable complex forms of life. But they reject the second premise, that 
God did it; so we must scrutinize their reasons for doing so. 
B. Inadequate Non-Theistic Explanations 
No matter how impressive the cosmic coincidences are that sustain our exis-
tence, the Biopic Teleological Argument for the existence of God does not 
succeed if it can be shown that our universe's fine-tuning for life results from 
something other than a divine transcendent benevolent Supercosmic Intellect; 
but this cannot be done. 
In earlier chapters, we saw that most Anthropic Cosmologists reject the 
theistic solution and try to account for the life-sustaining order of our world 
with the hypotheses that it was caused by: i. Infinitely Many Universes, or ii. the 
Principle of Plenitude, or iii. Nothingness. All these non-theistic solutions 
presuppose that our favorably ordered world was produced by blind chance. 
Earlier chapters demonstrated that none of these alternatives can be defended. 
This does not show with absolute certainty that God is the best explanation 
because other unanticipated explanations might arise (always a problem with 
disjunctive arguments); but these will just have to be confronted if and when 
they appear. Without repeating every detail, consider these reminders of why 
atheistic explanations of cosmic teleology fail. 
i. Infinitely Many Worlds 
Most Atheistic Anthropic Cosmologists think that a divine Supercosmic Intel-
lect can be avoided by appealing to the unverified and unverifiable existence of 
infinitely many worlds. They claim that there are or have been an infinite num-
ber of transcendent antecedent and/or contemporary universes, that this infinity 
of universes in Supertime or Superspace actualizes all possible individuals, 
universal properties, and relations, and that it occasionally includes a life-sup-
porting universe like ours purely by accident. If these metaphysical assumptions 
are indefensible, infinite worlds metaphysics fails to provide a plausible alterna-
tive to a Divine Supercosmic Intellect. Earlier, we determined that these as-
sumptions do fail-for the following reasons. 
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No good scientific or empirical reasons or evidences show that infinitely 
many worlds exist, even if prominent scientists say so. No infinitely transcen-
dent Supertime or Superspace containing an infinite number of particular space-
time systems or universes can be verified directly or inferred inductively or 
indirectly from available evidence. The creation of our world by an infinity of 
antecedent worlds, by infinite Mother Spacetime, or by infinite world divisions 
is not an empirically confirmed belief. "Scientifically" postulating infinitely 
many universes flagrantly, infinitely, violates Ockham's razor. No antecedent 
oscillating universes can end in singularities because, by definition, time, space, 
and physical causation are non-existent in singularities. Singularities provide no 
spatiotemporal or causal corridors for linking universes. Yet, without singulari-
ties, increasing entropy would carry through an infinity of antecedent oscillating 
universes and make our world infinitely chaotic-anything but life-supporting. 
But here we are! 
Roger Penrose maintains that although singularities are infinitely small, 
dense, and curved, they can nevertheless be structured with low entropy. The 
initial singularity that originated our universe was structured with low entropy 
or disorder, and it has been losing it ever since. Recall that since singularities 
are not empirical entities, any claims about them can be translated without loss 
of empirical content into the language of creation ex nihilo. Thus, Penrose's 
claim about the low-entropy singularity that initiated our universe is empirically 
indistinguishable from the theistic claim that the original stuff that God created 
from nothing (or from a "singularity") at the beginning was divinely ordered 
with low entropy. 
That God created the low-entropy grandly-unified mass of energy that 
began our universe is much more plausible than that it was caused by an ante-
cedent universe's Big Crunch. Most cosmologists today agree that an antecedent 
universe's final singularity, culminating its Big Crunch, would contain ex-
tremely high entropy or disorder. 12 Even if the initial singularity of our universe 
were really nothing, as in "created out of nothing," our cosmic epoch was 
ordered from the outset with low entropy. No high entropy Big Crunches could 
ever produce the low entropy Big Rebounds required by Oscillation Cosmology 
because great chaos is never the direct and immediate cause of great order-
another well confirmed empirical truth. More technically, no state of affairs 
being torn apart by rippling Wey! curvature is ever followed immediately by its 
total elimination. 
Atheistic Anthropic Cosmology's other worlds are just as transcendent, 
non-empirical, and Other Worldly as Heaven and Hell in traditional Christian 
theology. Atheists may believe in them by a heroic leap of faith, but no ratio-
nally defensible evidence supports their existence. Naturalists should reject all 
cosmological other-world-ensembles for the same reasons that they repudiate 
religiously based Other Worlds. Yet, Naturalism can be defended only by 
284 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
appeal to Other Worlds! We know, because of the Big Bang, that our world has 
not always existed. 
Even if infinitely many worlds were actual, they would not explain the 
existence of our life-supporting world. An infinity of universes in time or space 
will not actualize all possible individuals, universal properties, and relations. 
Infinity cannot be "used up," not even by infinity. Infinity minus infinity equals 
infinity. Numerical spatiotemporal infinity alone does not guarantee that a life-
supporting universe will come along after a sufficient number of lifeless ones 
have been used up. Lifeless universes could easily be repeated inexhaustibly in 
time and/or space, either by causal necessity, or by accidental quantum fluctua-
tions. Atheistic explanations commit the inverse gambler's fallacy. 
David Hume maintained that all possible configurations of matter would 
be actualized in an infinite amount of time, but the very idea is incoherent, for 
many configurations are incompatible with others. It is logically possible that 
a monkey typing the letter "a" would type only that one letter from infinity to 
infinity, to the exclusion of all other possible worlds. Nothing in the concept of 
infinity requires any diversification at all. A monkey banging on a typewriter 
could just hit one key forever-in Eternal Recurrence. The assumption that our 
life-supporting universe is made more probable by the prior existence of an 
infinite number of lifeless worlds commits the inverse gambler's fallacy. 
A numerical spatiotemporal infinity should not be confused with infinite 
individual, qualitative, and relational diversity. Bare infinity lacks a mechanism 
for insuring any diversity, much less the right kind of physical diversity for life. 
Unless some Divine Agent of Limitation and Selection chooses diversity, 
neither spatial nor temporal infinity as such is compelled to manifest any diver-
sity at all among actual universes, much less infinite diversity. Some diversity 
among bubble universes, if any others exist, may happen accidentally through 
quantum fluctuations; but an infinite number of accidental universes cannot use 
up an inexhaustible class oflifeless universes to guarantee the actual appearance 
of a life-supporting one like ours. Given an infinite number of shoes, it is 
possible that no shoe fits! Trash universes could easily be repeated endlessly, 
even if caused by quantum fluctuations. Without God, they probably would be. 
Mere infinity gives no assurance of any diversity at all; inane sameness can be 
reiterated forever. Either the Principle of Plenitude or God might account for 
diversification among universes, but God alone really explains it because 
plenitude will not work. Why not? 
ii. The Principle of Plenitude 
The Principle of Plenitude affirms that all possible worlds are actual. It is a 
theological principle, not an empirical or scientific fact. It is empirically unveri-
fied and unverifiable; and it violates the principle of parsimony, Ockham's 
razor, in every conceivable way. 
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The Principle of Plenitude is derived from Platonic Theism, where it 
defines the Greek ideal of divine perfection. There are other arguments for its 
truth, but none that can really be defended philosophically. 13 Theists need not 
accept it unless they agree that Divine perfection necessitates the actualization 
of every possibility-including horrible as well as beneficent possible worlds; 
but actualizing all possibilities is not possible; the very idea is incoherent; and 
infinity cannot be exhausted. World-ensemble metaphysics is not natural sci-
ence. Blind faith may postulate infinitely many diversified worlds; but that is all 
it is-blind faith. With or without singularities, no evidence available to us indi-
cates that infinitely many worlds exist, diversified or not. Consider the follow-
ing argument. 
If infinitely many diversified worlds exist, a life-supporting world like 
ours will come along occasionally purely by accident. 
Therefore, our life-supporting world came along purely by accident. 
Deductively, this conclusion does not follow. From "If p, then q" alone, 
we cannot conclude "q". Only if we also know "p"-that infinitely many diversi-
fied worlds exist-can we conclude "q"-that a life-supporting world like ours 
will come along occasionally purely by accident. We do not know that "p" is 
true, and we have many good reasons for thinking that it is false. The existence 
of an infinity of diversified worlds-plenitude of creation-may be advanced as 
an explanatory hypothesis, but it does not explain a life-supporting world, and 
it cannot be successfully defended. 
Admitting that other worlds are logically possible concedes absolutely 
nothing about their actuality. For every contingent "possibly so," there is a 
"possibly not." Possibly, many other worlds exist; possibly, no other worlds 
exist. These possibilities are mutually exclusive. Possibly, you are extremely 
wealthy; but that puts no money into your bank account. We should not confuse 
abstruse possibility with high probability, credibility, actuality, or reality. Athe-
istic Anthropic Cosmologists regularly make such confusions. 
Plenitude, the actualization of all possible worlds, is logically incoherent. 
The non-existence of every possible world is also a possible world. Mutually 
exclusive whole universes and sets of universes are logically possible, and so 
are mutually exclusive alternatives or variations within any one universe. Our 
own world (or all worlds) could have been either life-supporting or non-life-
supporting, quantum or non-quantum, oscillating or non-oscillating, Divinely 
created or not so. 
Plenitude's requirement that all possibilities be actualized in an infinite 
number of universes is not logically coherent. As Leibniz knew, there are 
logically incompatible, mutually exclusive, or "incompossible" possibilities. It 
is logically possible that an infinite number of worlds are all life-supporting, and 
that none of them are; but these possibilities are incompossible, that is, they are 
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possible separately but not possible together. Possibly, nothing exists; possibly, 
something exists; but these possibilities cannot both be realized. Possibly, every 
strand of past oscillating universes ended in nothingness, in which case there 
would be nothing now; possibly they all ended in openness, in which case they 
could not explain our Big Bang. The realization of all possibilities implies that 
nothing now exists, which is obviously false! It also implies that everything now 
exists, which is equally false! Possibly, a single lifeless universe recurs eternally 
in every tiny detail; but this would rule out all possible life-supporting uni-
verses, including our own. The very idea of realizing all possibilities makes no 
sense. We cannot infer from an incoherent concept that our kind of universe is 
bound to occur accidentally from time to time. It is logically impossible, logi-
cally false, that everything possible is actual. Incompossibles are possible 
separately but not together. Choices between possible worlds have to be made; 
actual existence is competitive and selective. Who chose our life-supporting 
cosmos? Not plenitude! 
Plenitude is an abstract, disembodied, normative principle. At best it can 
only be a formal cause. Nothing totally abstract, disembodied, and normative 
can make actual choices or be the efficient cause of anything. Abstract, disem-
bodied, normative principles bring about results only when contained within and 
intentionally acted upon by concretely existing individuals who understand 
them. God is required for the causal efficacy of plenitude, or more selective 
creation. A good God would not act upon it, would not create every possible 
evil or trivial world. 
Atheistic appeals to plenitude to avoid God are self defeating. If all possi-
bilities are actual, then a God who selects among possible worlds exists since 
such a God is possible! Indeed, all conceivable gods exist, assuming that the 
idea of such is coherent. And no God exists, since that too is possible. 
iii. Nothingness 
Nothing is ever caused by pure nothingness. Out of nothing, nothing comes. All 
experience and theory grounded in experience, including quantum physics, is 
against the Big Accident hypothesis that nothing causes something. Quantum 
physics does not abandon causality altogether; it always retains necessary causal 
conditions and relinquishes only sufficient causal conditions. Abstract disem-
bodied physical principles like quantum laws cannot exist and act within noth-
ingness, for then nothing would be something after all. No good empirical 
scientific evidence shows that infinitely transcendent Superspacetime exists 
beyond or before our spacetime, or that it has a quantum bubbly structure that 
produces spontaneous fluctuations. Theology may require Superspacetime, but 
not science. Non-quantum worlds devoid of quantum perturbations are logically 
possible in infinite numbers. Pure nothingness cannot guarantee anything, 
especially that endless universes are governed by quantum laws, or that an 
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occasional quantum universe is accidentally life-supporting. Since non-quantum 
worlds are possible, universes capable of quantum fluctuations require their 
own explanation and do not ultimately explain anything. What selects for 
quantum instead of for non-quantum worlds? Nothingness selects nothing. 
B. Probabilities Favor Divinity 
The best explanation for our universe's fine-tuning for life is that an existing 
God, a wise and benevolent being of supercosmic proportions, chose and 
created it knowingly and intentionally. Various strategies tend to show that this 
conclusion is true. Up to this point my strategy has been to demonstrate that 
alternative explanations of the cause of the Big Bang are indefensible. Non-
theistic explanations really do not work. Often, the winner of a contest is the last 
one left standing on the field. 
Yet, it would be nice to have more positive or constructive evidence for 
thinking that God chose the life-supporting features of our world. Probabilities 
positively favor Divinity, but this needs some explaining. 
In one sense, we cannot determine the probability of the occurrence of a 
life-supporting universe. Probabilities are normally assessed statistically by 
comparing an actual instance with other actual members of a known class; but 
no existential probabilities are available for unique entities that belong to classes 
having only one member. Charles Sanders Peirce remarked that universes are 
not as plentiful as blackberries. As far as we really know, our 15 billion-year-
old universe is unique, the only one of its kind. We have access to no other 
actual universes with which we can compare it. 
Recognizing that we experience only one world, David Hume argued that 
we are entitled to proclaim the truth of our theory of the origin of the universe 
only if innumerable universes have been formed before our eyes. Obviously, 
this has not happened. Neither theists nor atheists have ever seen worlds formed 
before their eyes, so they are both in the same boat in this respect. Atheistic 
world-ensemble metaphysicians seem to be unacquainted with David Hume, or 
they read him very selectively! Hume's own supposition of innumerable worlds 
existing in infinite time is inconsistent with his own skepticism! 
In another sense, however, probabilities about ordered universes can be 
determined. A unique actual entity can be placed within a class of possible 
entities, and its absolute probability can be calculated. To determine the proba-
bility of a life-supporting world order, our actual ordered-for-life universe can 
be compared with all possible members of the class of universes that might 
exist. Appeal to absolute probability is commonplace in quantum mechanics, 
where determining the probability of a quantum event involves summing over 
all logical possibilities for that event. 
Recall that physicists can assign numbers to every basic physical dimen-
sion of the universe-its density, expansion rate, entropy, the force of gravity, the 
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strong nuclear force, the weak and electromagnetic forces, the speed of light, 
Hubble's constant, Planck's constant, and so on. For life-supporting universes, 
permissible numbers for each such basic component oflife-supporting physical 
reality fall within a very limited range. This leaves an infinite range ofnumbers 
for each component that would result in lifeless universes, all of which are 
possible worlds. For every measurable component of life-supporting universes, 
the range of right numbers is finite; the range of wrong numbers is infinite. This 
is also true of the way in which all the relevant numbers must be integrated 
harmoniously in order to make a life-supporting universe. 
Each wrong number correlates with a possible lifeless universe. Within the 
class of possible designs for universes, life-supporting ones are infinitely im-
probable. Recall Stephen Hawking's comment that 
There are relatively few ranges of values for the numbers that would allow 
the development of any form of intelligent life. Most sets of values would 
give rise to universes that, although they might be very beautiful, would 
contain no one able to wonder at that beauty. 14 
Steven Weinberg conjectures that "The existence of some form oflife will 
turn out not to require any very impressive fine-tuning of the laws ofnature,"15 
and he doubts that we will find "any sign of the workings of an interested God, 
in a final theory. " 16 Yet, even if conditions favoring the existence of life are 
fairly broad and do not require extensive fine-tuning, the range of permissible 
physical numbers is still very finite, and the range of impermissible numbers is 
infinite. Our own world order is very impressive because the number of ways 
to go wrong with any two basic physical components is infinity multiplied by 
infinity-which is still just infinity, but putting it this way makes the point more 
impressive! If all possibilities are actual, no life-supporting universe exists now 
anyway, since it is possible that no life-supporting universes exist at all. An 
infinity oflife-defeating aberrations corresponds to every finite range of cosmic 
conditions that would support life. Incomprehensible (to us) intelligence and 
skill are necessary to get single as well as conjoint conditions right for a life-
supporting cosmos. 
The order of our universe most resembles the intricate order of the most 
complex products of purposive human intelligence, not the order of chaos or 
chance. Anthropic Cosmologists are well aware of this. Roger Penrose, for 
example, points out that a life-supporting universe must begin in a state of 
extremely low entropy or disorder, and that the possibilities and probabilities for 
high entropy universes are immensely greater than for low entropy universes. 
To understand how enormous the odds are against getting a low entropy uni-
verse, Penrose suggests, we should picture the Creator poised before a system 
of space as voluminous as our physical universe, each point of which represents 
a distinctive universe. The Creator's task is to stick a pin into this vast system 
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of space at exactly the one right point that will produce an initially low entropy 
life-supporting world. The rest of the volume corresponds to lifeless high 
entropy universes, so they would be exceptionally easy to hit; but the chances 
of hitting the tiny volume that represents a life-supporting low entropy universe 
are exceedingly minute. 17 The Creator's aim must be precise to an accuracy of 
"one part in 1010123" if the intended target is a low entropy life-supporting 
universe. This number is so enormous, says Penrose, that we could not write it 
down in ordinary mathematical notation even if we wrote a "O" on every particle 
of matter in the universe! 11 
Penrose actually underestimates the odds because his huge number is still 
finite; and the odds against life are really infinite. The number ofnon-life points 
on the Creator's target is infinite; life-points are finite indeed! Arranging a 
universe for life is no task for mere chance. The probability is overwhelming, 
indeed infinite, that a numerical infinity ofuniverses in space and/or time would 
be wrong for life. Only a Divine Supercosmic Intellect could successfully select 
for and create a low entropy universe. 
In 1980, Fred Hoyle, traditionally no friend of Theism, was overwhelmed 
by the realization that the chances are astronomically small that any universe 
would accidentally produce two things essential for life, enzymes and carbon. 
Hoyle says he was "plagued by the thought that the number of ways in which 
even a single enzyme could be wrongly constructed was greater than the number 
of all the atoms in the universe," and he found the conclusion irresistible that 
enzymes are produced 
by thought, not by random processes. Rather than accept the fantastically 
small probability oflife having arisen through the blind forces ofnature, 
it seemed better to suppose that the origin oflife was a deliberate intellec-
tual act. By "better" I mean less likely to be wrong. 19 
In 1953, Hoyle was the first to discover how nearly impossible it is to get 
stable carbon and oxygen from stellar nucleosynthesis. In 1980, he reflected on 
the odds against getting carbon, with properties so essential to life as we know 
it, by pure chance. He concluded that "Some supercalculating intellect must 
have designed the properties of the carbon atom." and that "The carbon atom is 
a fix."2° Considering the chances of getting roughly equal quantities of carbon 
and nitrogen by stellar nucleosynthesis. we must again conclude that this is 
"another put-up, artificial job." Hoyle continued, 
A common sense interpretation of the facts suggest that a superintellect 
has monkeyed with the physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and 
that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers 
one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this 
conclusion almost beyond question. 21 
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Theism is more probable than Atheism because it provides the most 
reasonable and thus the best justified explanation for the existence of our kind 
of universe. Saying that one philosophical position is "more probable" than 
another is just a shorthand way of saying that the philosophical case for the one 
is stronger than for the other. In that sense the Teleological Argument in modern 
biopic dress affirms that the existence of God is more probable than God's non-
existence. 
The Teleological Argument tells us something important that the Cosmo-
logical Argument does not disclose, namely, that the ultimate cause of the 
universe is intelligent and well-intentioned or benevolent. The beneficial order 
of the world, especially its capacity for producing an immense variety of intrin-
sically valuable forms of life, including human life, reflects the stupendous 
knowledge, skill, and generosity of a benevolent, transcendent, personal, causal 
agent-God. 
The central question raised by the Biopic Teleological Argument is simple. 
Did the ultimate cause of the universe know and care about what it was doing, 
or not? Did our life-supporting universe originate by intelligent choice or by 
blind chance? Naturalistic, atheistic, infinite worlds metaphysics says, "By 
dumb chance." Theism says, "By brilliant choice." 
Conclusion: God Ordered Our World 
Our Biopic Teleological Argument concludes that an existing God, a benevolent 
Supercosmic Intellect, intentionally and knowingly selected and brought about 
the life-supporting order of our universe; but this conclusion does not follow 
simply from the authority of preeminent cosmologists like Penrose and Hoyle. 
The evidence to which they call attention is crucial, and it strongly supports all 
the premises of our Biopic Teleological Argument. Thus, most likely, a universe 
ordered for the production of an immense variety of complex and intrinsically 
valuable forms of life was caused or created intentionally by a transcendent 
benevolent Supercosmic Intellect. 
Alternative accounts fail to explain the stupendous cosmic coincidences 
that conspire to produce life in our world. The only reasonable hypothesis is that 
an Ultimate Cause, namely God, who knew and cared about what it was doing, 
is responsible. 
Eliminating the competition is a perfectly respectable way to argue in 
philosophy. Often, the best available proof is a disproof of the alternatives; the 
solution that best withstands the process of critical examination is the winner. 
At this point in the battle, only one plausible explanation remains: God did it. 
God knowingly and intentionally designed our universe for life. 
Many objections may be raised to the teleological argument. Atheists do 
not give up without a good fight, so let us turn now to some commonplace 
misgivings. 
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2. Critique and Defense of the Biopic Teleological Argument 
The Teleological Argument, though very popular with religious believers, has 
been under assault almost from its inception in ancient Greece. Most profes-
sional philosophers today mistakenly assume that critiques by Hume and Kant 
made it utterly indefensible. The most serious contemporary objection to the 
Teleological Argument is that an infinite worlds metaphysics makes God unnec-
essary; but we have already disposed of that alternative, along with the difficulty 
that probabilities cannot be calculated for life-supporting universes. Other 
objections remain, and to these we must now tum. 
A. Natural Creation of Order 
If the universe naturally creates order, no external Divine Designer is required, 
some critics insist. Victor J.Stenger maintains that the life-supporting order of 
the universe occurred by chance, Not by Design, as the title of one of his books 
indicates.22 In both Not by Design and The Unconscious Quantum, Stenger 
stresses matter's capacity to organize itself into meaningful patterns and con-
tends that this obviates the need to resort to a divine designer to explain the 
order of the universe and the origin of life and mind. Eric Lerner also claims 
that, not divine guidance, but a "natural tendency of all matter, both animate and 
inanimate, to evolve toward higher rates of energy flow, toward the capture of 
greater currents of energy," adequately explains humanity's origin and develop-
ment.23 Both Stenger and Lerner take the creatively self-organizing capacity of 
the physical world as a given that needs no explanation; but it does. Why is our 
physical world capable of self-organization when infinitely many alternative 
worlds would have no such capacity? Explaining that is imperative! 
According to Stenger's Not by Design, the natural order of things permits 
chance occurrences; and chance occurrences eventually add up to an ordered 
world in an infinite amount of time. However, an infinite amount of time is not 
available if the Big Bang is right; and even if time were infinite, we could not 
know it scientifically. Also, random or chance events presuppose order and can 
be recognized as such only against a background of order. Given all the laws of 
physics, a deck of cards can be randomly shuffled; but with no laws of physics 
at all, there can be no random shuffle. Randomness presupposes orderliness 
Stenger has the effect before the cause, the cart before the horse. The basic 
natural order of things permits chance occurrences that further increase order; 
but without a very special basic initial order, no increase would occur. Certain 
types of minimal order produce more order, but absolute chance or chaos 
produces nothing. That a very minimally ordered universe would not be cre-
atively self-organizing is infinitely probable. 
Even if absolute chance could produce well ordered universes, which it 
doesn't, the probability is overwhelming that they would be lifeless. Why do we 
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live in a quantum universe where chance is real instead of an old-fashioned 
Newtonian universe devoid of unpredictable spontaneity? Why do we live in a 
universe in which law and chance together contrive to produce intrinsically 
valuable fonns of life instead of desolation? Given a minimal degree of order, 
why does chance (or creativity) produce more order, life-supporting order in 
particular, when it could produce infinite chaos or an infinite number of comp-
lexly ordered hostile-to-life environments? These questions require answers. 
Skeptics and naturalists like Stenger and Lerner have no good answers. 
According to Lerner, there exists a "natural tendency" toward order. Yet, 
this natural tendency depends upon a deep structure of order in nature, which 
is exactly what the Biopic Teleological Argument is all about. Why is the basic 
order of the universe so constructed that it produces more order rather than less? 
In particular, why does it regularly produce beings who capture higher and 
higher energy flows, as Lerner puts it, when there are infinitely many other ways 
to order, or to disorder, a universe, some of them very complex? Why does our 
universe exhibit what Holmes Rolston, III calls an "upslope" to the long-range 
curve of evolutionary development, when neither survival nor adaptation to 
environment require it?24 Why does the most basic physical order of the uni-
verse pennit life to occur at all when there are infinitely many ways to fail? 
Natural tendencies are existing patterns of order, but any primal creative 
order that produces more order requires its own explanation; it cannot just be 
taken for granted. Why does our universe have a life-supporting order when 
life-defeating orders are overwhelmingly more probable? The best explanation, 
according to the Biopic Teleological Argument, is that our world was designed 
by Divine premeditation to have a deep level of life-promoting, partly self-
creative, partly self-organizing order. Atheists do not and cannot explain ade-
quately why fundamental self-organizing propensities exist within our universe. 
They just take them for granted. 
B. The Insignificance of Life in a Vast Universe 
In a preceding chapter, we confronted the unsubstantiated view that life as we 
know it is insignificant because it is so small and short in relation to the vastness 
of spacetime. This fallacy-smallness equals insignificance-frequently resur-
faces as an explicit objection to the Teleological Argument. The problem is, 
how can God's purpose for the universe be the creation of intrinsically valuable 
life when complex life exists only on earth, and merely for a few hundred 
thousand or million years at most? Intelligent life-fonns belonging to the species 
Homo sapiens have existed for less than five hundred thousand years or so in 
a fifteen to twenty billion year old cosmos. Putting time scales for cosmic and 
biological evolution into perspective, Philip Hefuer wrote, 
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If we were to plot this sequence of events on a calendar with one day 
equaling 14 million years and one hour equaling a half million years, our 
natural history would look like this: on January I the earth's crust con-
gealed; dinosaurs appeared on December 21 ; Neanderthal man arrives 
only at 11 :50 p.m. on New Year's Eve. Relative to the overall history of 
the natural cosmos, the role of the human species is staggering in its 
minuteness. 25 
By now we know that and why the intrinsic value of our lives does not 
depend on vastness of size or duration, or on our utility in contributing toward 
some Enduring Grand Objective. God does not treasure us for these reasons, 
and we should not disvalue ourselves and one another for such spurious defi-
ciencies. Our lives as they are exist for themselves, for other creatures, and for 
God. The value of life is located in the process of living and enriching it. All 
living things are beloved by God, and God's interests in creation are biopic, not 
merely anthropic, if Process Theologians are right. 
Though presently unverified, that living creatures exist on numerous 
planets in innumerable galaxies scattered throughout the cosmos is highly 
likely.26 Life in some of these places is probably far older and much more 
advanced than on earth. As Robert Jastrow speculated in 1980, 
If life is common in the cosmos, which is possible, then most of that life 
has advanced billions of years beyond us in evolution. And what does a 
billion years mean in evolution? A hundred years means nothing; that is 
only a few generations. A thousand years is not much more. A million 
years is the time it takes a new species to develop. What does a billion 
years mean? A billion years ago the fossil records show that the highest 
form of life on earth was the worm. So, if there are intelligent entities in 
space, out there, they are as far beyond us as we are beyond the worm. 
They may know the answer to the cosmic mysteries. They may know the 
meaning of the big bang. 27 
In 1997, Jastrow warned that if we ever make contact with extraterrestrial 
civilizations far older and more advanced scientifically than our own, our 
civilization might be destroyed. This seems to be the fate of all "primitive" 
societies that come into contact with technically advanced cultures separated by 
only a few thousand years of cultural evolution. Jastrow observes that "On this 
planet, contact between scientifically advanced civilizations and a primitive 
society ... typically results in the destruction of the less-developed culture"; and 
he asks, "What may be expected of a meeting between civilizations separated 
by a billion years? Will we survive the encounter? I see no grounds for opti-
mism. "28 
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Perhaps we should hope that long-distance space-travel is not possible, 
that Star Trek and its sequels are only pipedreams (which they are}, that the 
basic physics of the universe forbids long distance space travel even for scientif-
ically advanced societies. Perhaps we should be thankful that stars with inhabit-
able planets are separated by such vast distances, and that no living beings can 
get from there to here. Perhaps God in his wisdom made it so! 
Or perhaps we should hope that, unlike here on earth, ethical development 
has matched pace with technological progress in advanced civilizations beyond 
our corner of the Milky Way. Usually, the most ethical thing to do in relation 
to lesser forms of life is just to leave them alone. Far, far away, some alien 
civilization with a "prime directive" ofnoninterference may be doing just that 
for us. Maybe so; maybe not. 
At any rate, cosmic life is probably of much greater duration and extent 
than earth life. If so, God knew, loved, and interacted with intrinsically valuable 
living things for billions of years before he had the dinosaurs or us to love. 
Extraterrestrial conscious beings would also be ends in themselves. So were and 
are members of more "primitive" human cultures and humanoid species. So 
were the dinosaurs. So were and are all sentient living things, including our-
selves. If and when our species is sufficiently advanced, our ethical ideals and 
practices will reflect this ecological theology. 
Life is scarce in our universe in the sense that vast regions of spacetime are 
unoccupied by any forms of life. No other planets in our solar system support 
life as far as we can tell, though Mars may have done so in the distant past. In 
1996, two meteorites from Mars discovered in Antarctica were determined to 
contain organic compounds, best explained, some said, by bacteria-size organ-
isms that lived on the red planet billions of years ago. In December 1996, 
NASA scientists announced that a large lake of frozen water has been located 
on the dark side of our moon. Since then, water has been found on Jupiter's 
moon, Europa, and in vast regions of "empty" space. Do traces of primitive 
aquatic life exist in some of these places? Continued space exploration may 
soon give us the answer. 
All stars are directly inhospitable to life and many have no planets at all, 
much less inhabitable planets. In 1994, astronomers discovered the first solid 
evidence-orbital deviations of stars-for the existence of a planet in another 
solar system, and many others have since been identified.29 Skeptics originally 
suggested that in some instances astronomers were seeing only earthquake-like 
vibrations on the surface of these stars, not wobbles caused by orbiting planets, 
but defenders justifiably did not concede defeat. In 1999, a large extra-solar 
planet was actually photographed as it crossed its star. Sky and Telescope 
exclaimed, "For the first time a planet of another star has been seen crossing the 
star's face, allowing astronomers to measure directly the planet's size, mass, and 
density."30 Despite their relative scarcity, billions of sun/planet systems probably 
exist, and many of these may teem with life. If, on average, only one life-sup-
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porting planet is located in every galaxy in the universe, at least one hundred 
twenty-five billion life-supporting planets would exist! 
If most of the universe is uninhabited, this does not mean that it is a 
wasteland. God could, and probably does, take keen aesthetic interest and 
delight in non-living nature, just as we do. Astronomers have discovered that the 
universe is much more active and violent than once thought. Perhaps God 
enjoys celestial fireworks as well as sunsets, grand canyons, frozen wastelands, 
and scorched deserts. Just because God created the universe primarily for life, 
it does not follow that God can have no other interests. Since God's time is 
limitless, God never has to rush anything. God has plenty of time for everything, 
including appreciating the sublime beauty of vast expanses of lifeless nature. 
We find great beauty and sublimity in the non-living parts ofnature, including 
the starry heavens above, so why can't God? God's reality includes all reality, 
both living and non-living; but the starry heavens above would be no less 
magnificent if they were starry heavens within, as they are for God. 
C. The Big Mess: Evil and The Religious Ambiguity of Order in Nature 
Must every detail of ordered reality result from a Divine plan or design if God 
is as intelligent, powerful, and morally good or benevolent as the monotheistic 
religions profess? David Hume suggested that our evil-infested universe could 
have been ordered only by a stupid, weak, or demonic divinity. Perhaps it was 
designed and created by a Malicious Demon who formed it for the purpose of 
torturing its inhabitants. From the observable order of nature, can we really tell 
that its transcendent Divine cause is intelligent enough to know what it is doing, 
and that God's enduring character and intentions are morally good or benevo-
lent? Skeptics have serious and legitimate doubts. The world is such a big mess 
that it really might not have been designed by an intelligent, powerful, and 
benevolent God. Can we conceive of a better way to introduce and organize the 
initial conditions of and conditions within the universe for producing life and 
for avoiding evil? 
The reality of evil is particularly perilous to the Teleological Argument. 
The God of Classical Theism foreknows, causes, and plans every minuscule 
detail of creation. Both the general design of and every particular feature of the 
universe expresses God's Grand Plan. This is implausible for many reasons in 
addition to the problem of evil. Defenders of absolute grand design have actu-
ally claimed that God deliberately created fleas and bedbugs to be black so that 
people could detect them more easily on white sheets, that God intentionally 
created dogs multicolored so that we can distinguish them more easily from the 
fumiture,3 1 that God purposefully created more human males than females so 
that surplus males can be expended in war, and that absolutely every horrible 
thing that happens expresses God's will and God's deep but mysterious plans 
and purposes for creation. In the final analysis, God created the best of all 
296 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
possible worlds. Leibniz said so explicitly, but Voltaire vanquished the idea in 
his Candide. 
Whywouldn 'tan omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent deity create 
only the best of all possible worlds-one in which every particular evil contrib-
utes necessarily, directly, and decisively to some great good? Why would God 
ever settle for a merely good world-one in which, on the whole good prevails, 
or at least has an opportunity to prevail, over evil? 
The "best of all possible worlds," traditionally understood, was a universe 
for which God foreknew, preordained, and selected every detail of existence to 
achieve an absolute concord in which every distinct evil, whether apparent or 
real, contributes in perfect measure to the achievement of some greater good, 
some ultimate harmony of all things. In this best of all possible worlds, a flaw-
less, eternal, and changeless divine plan is played out in every spatiotemporal 
event; and God is the ultimate decision-maker who decides and determines 
everything, including what we will decide. In it, absolutely everything that 
happens directly expresses "the will of God" and God's Grand Plan for all of 
creation. This feature of Classical Theology often infects popular religion. 
The trouble with the best of all possible worlds, thus conceived, is that it 
is not the best of all possible worlds! It contains no creaturely initiative, free-
dom, creativity, or originative decision-making. God makes all the decisions and 
is responsible for absolutely everything. However, an even better world is 
conceivable-one in which every complex individual knowingly, freely, cre-
atively, and responsibly chooses what is good or best and acts rightly. But this 
is precisely the kind of world that God alone could not create because, in this 
really best of all possible worlds, God is not the sole originative decision maker. 
In it, creativity is distributed to many if not to all creatures; and they are co-
creators with God. God always has to settle for a merely good, not an absolutely 
perfect, world because in the truly best of all possible worlds, God is not and 
could not be absolutely in control of everything. Absolutely controlling free 
creatures is logically impossible and morally repugnant. 
Creating a universe containing co-creative creatures is always risky busi-
ness, for free creatures must, by definition, be able to choose without encum-
brance both for and against the right and the good. The overwhelming probabil-
ity is that at times they will choose against, and then there will be no perfect, 
calculated, and preordained harmony in which every evil achieves some particu-
lar good, in addition to the goodness of creativity and freedom themselves. 
Process Theism denies that God absolutely controls and plans everything 
from eternity, especially particular evils. God's eternal Primordial Nature has 
general aims and objectives-like creating richly populated worlds in which 
desirable feelings and other goods are actualized in many species of living 
creatures; but God did and could not plan every detail of existence from eternity 
because the creatures are partly self-creative, are co-creative with God, and thus 
have some say-so themselves about what will come to be. 
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God did not timelessly calibrate and predestine that any individual person 
will exist, that he or she will have specific parents, marry a specific soul-mate, 
have a specific character, suffer particular ills, make very specific right or 
wrong moral and religious choices, and end up in Heaven or Hell. In his Conse-
quent Nature, God makes and remakes plans to fit contingencies and choices as 
they arise in the created world. God responds appropriately to decisions made 
freely by spatiotemporal creatures and wills the best possible outcome for every 
undesirable spatiotemporal impasse, both within his own experience and within 
the world itself; but even this Divine will can be thwarted by co-creative deci-
sion-making creatures. God deals with unpredictable free choices and contin-
gencies within the universe as they arise, not from eternity. God envisions 
alternatives for future realization while not knowing in advance which path will 
be chosen by co-creative creatures. No matter what the creatures decide, God 
wills to bring the best out of every bad situation, to assimilate evil into his own 
experience in the best way possible, and to bring as much good as possible into 
the world out of the evil within it. Even here, God's will can be frustrated and 
impeded by creaturely freedom. 
The existence of evil is an insuperable obstacle to believing, not that a 
good and powerful God exists, but that God has an absolute, detailed, and 
eternal Grand Plan for everyone and everything, that God is a doting parent who 
will not let his children go and grow on their own. 
When innocent persons, especially children, suffer pointlessly and die 
prematurely, as they so often do, could these particular events express the 
foreknowledge, causation, and inscrutable but still benevolent purposes of God? 
Classical Theism answers affirmatively, but always with the qualification that 
we cannot always understand how. When horrible natural catastrophes and 
moral atrocities occur, popular religion, perverted by Classical Theism, often 
assigns them to "the will of God." If this is right, however, we should conclude 
that God is really our enemy, not our friend, that God and the Devil are identi-
cal, that God really is a Malicious Demon after all. With an ultimate friend like 
such a vicious God, who needs a supreme enemy like the Devil? 
If God, the transcendent cause of all creation, is timelessly omniscient as 
Classical Theists believe, he surely knows from eternity that horrors happen; if 
he is the omnipotent and sole originative or first cause of all that transpires, he 
surely causes all particular horrors; and if everything that occurs expresses 
God's purposes, he surely purposes or intends such horrors in every instance. 
From a world deliberately ordered to produce innumerable unthinkable harms 
to innocent creatures, how can we infer the existence of a divine Benevolent 
Superintellect? The task of theodicy is to reconcile the obvious presence of 
enormous evil in the world with belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-
benevolent, and all-compassionate God. Can this be done? 
The eternally predetermined best of all possible worlds of Classical Theol-
ogy is not acceptable. A plausible theodicy requires Process Theology's world 
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in which good predominates over evil, or at least has a decent chance to do so, 
and where freedom and creativity are among the greatest goods of all. A credi-
ble theodicy must show that more good than evil exists on the whole within the 
universe, or at least that the universe is ordered to allow for this possibility. 
Some attempts to show this are clearly implausible. 
i. Solutions that Don't Work 
Classical Theists often argue that all evil is really good in disguise; but this 
makes us wonder if all apparent good isn't really evil in disguise. Ifwe cannot 
identify and distinguish between good and evil when we see them, all our value 
judgments are suspect. If seemingly bad things can be good on the whole, then 
seemingly good things can be bad on the whole; and we cannot tell which is 
which. Theodicy tries to show that God is really good, despite all the evil in the 
world; but this conclusion is completely unwarranted if what we construe as 
goodness can be evil in disguise, and vice versa. Consider the fate of the rooster 
who concludes that its human feeder is a benevolent provider; but then the fatal 
day comes when it loses its head! 
Classical Theologians often contend that evil in parts of creation is neces-
sary for the perfection of the whole, but our finitude and ignorance prevent us 
from seeing how. As the dark areas of a painting contribute to the beauty of the 
whole painting, or as the bass notes of_~musical composition contribute to its 
overall harmoey;,.so ~ thevmrlUfiftributes to its comprehensive perfec-
tion, even ifon!Y:&~s how, Despite aP{llal'aDCCs, they say, we live in the 
best of all possible worlds. .,,,.--
Unfortunately, neither dark colors nor bass notes are evil, so the aesthetic 
analogy is inappropriate from the start. We can understand how they contribute 
to the goodness of aesthetic wholes, but this cannot be said for many familiar 
situations containing great evil. The aesthetic analogy supposedly shows that the 
whole of creation is perfect in every detail, even though we cannot comprehend 
how. Only our ignorance can make it work. "Inscrutable" is an attribute of God 
in Classical Theology, including the "Westminster Confession." 
Jonathan Edwards argued that sending the great bulk of mankind to eternal 
perdition is necessary for the perfection of creation as a whole; but, he admitted, 
we may not see exactly how, especially if we happen to be one of the damned! 
His God clearly violates Kant's Categorical Imperative and treats damned 
persons and all victims of tragedy merely as means to the perfection of the 
whole of creation, not as ends in themselves. The aesthetic analogy fails to tell 
us whether the transcendent Creator is benevolent or malicious in intent. If the 
totality is beautiful to God but inscrutable or horrible to us, this does not solve 
the problem of evil/or us! Saying that God knows the answer does not provide 
us with an answer! We are the ones who need a solution to the problem of 
theodicy, especially if the Teleological Argument works. 
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So how can a powerful transcendent Creator be a Benevolent Superintel-
lect, despite the presence of evil in the world? No single, simple magic bullet 
neatly solves the problem of theodicy. Its solution, if one is available at all, 
results from the cumulative weight of many considerations. The success or 
failure of theodicy is a matter of fallible and variable judgment. Thoughtful 
persons can honestly disagree about it. Massive evil in the world really is the 
greatest obstacle of all to belief that a good God designed the universe for 
benevolent purposes. Without a theodicy that is intelligible and plausible to us, 
God deserves our contempt, not our devotion; and the Argument from Design 
fails to show that a good and worshipful God designed our universe. 
ii. A Process Theodicy that Works 
Its handling of the problem of evil is one of the greatest strengths of Process 
Theism; and we will next explore the key elements in its highly credible theod-
icy. No one consideration can solve the problem of theodicy all by itself, so the 
cumulative weight of all of the following pieces of the puzzle must be consid-
ered. A credible theodicy must incorporate a. The Free Will Defense, b. The 
Soul-Making Defense, c. The Utility of Law and Order, d. The Conflict of Good 
with Good, e. Consolation, and perhaps f. Compensation. 
a. The Free Will Defense 
If evil decisions originate with free creatures within the world rather than with 
God, then God is not responsible for them. Being responsible for a choice and 
its consequences means originating that choice knowingly. A free and responsi-
ble choice originates with the intelligent moral agent who makes it. If, as Classi-
cal Theism affirms, God, the sole originative cause of all things, predetermined 
all choices ever made by created moral agents, then God is responsible for them. 
Human moral agents who deliberately inflict unspeakable harms on others do 
not originate their own malicious decisions if God programs and predestines 
every human choice from eternity. 
Jonathan Edwards argued that all human choices are determined by our 
strongest desires or sets of cooperating desires, which, in turn, are ultimately 
caused by God. Being responsible and blameworthy, he said, means merely that 
a choice is evil and that the desire to do evil predominates; but the origin of the 
choice is irrelevant, he contended. Other Classical Theists appealed, inconsis-
tently, to the free will defense, while clinging to the belief that God plans, 
foreknows, and foreordains everything. 
Believers in free will, including Process Theologians, think that the ques-
tion of the origin of our choices is highly relevant. Moral agents are responsible 
only for choices that they originate. Because our choices are originative or 
creative, the free will defense partly solves the problem oftheodicy. Our choices 
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would not originate with us if they originate with a God who programs them 
into us from eternity. What greater evil could a Malevolent Demon inflict upon 
us than to make us incapable of choosing to be virtuous or to do what is right, 
and then to punish us with Hell's infinite agonies for being and doing exactly 
as he created us? How better could we conceive of a Malicious Demon? 
Process Theology says that finite agents are responsible co-creators with 
God. We originate our own free decisions. God is not the only existing creative 
or originative agent. When we freely choose to inflict evil on others, we are 
responsible, not God. Events in the world, including the human psyche, are 
influenced but not completely determined by the past. As free agents, we are 
partly created, partly self-creative. God makes relevant possibilities for choice 
available to us; but we freely select among them. Efficient causation consists of 
necessary but not sufficient conditions that partly structure present moments of 
partial self-creativity at the quantum level and in human and animal conscious-
ness. All relatively complex created individuals are co-creative with God. 
But why did God not predestine all creatures always to choose and do 
what is right, never what is wrong? Why did God not create the Kingdom of 
God in all its glory from day one? The free will defense answers that freedom 
is worth the price of its potential and actual abuse, and that without the potential 
to choose either good or evil we would not be free. Free creatures, by definition, 
may choose to do wrong as well as right; creating or originating our own 
choices between right and wrong is the paradigm instance of freedom. 
Well, if freedom is so valuable that its availability outweighs the potential 
for its misuse, why did God not create us so that we always freely choose the 
right and the good? The answer is that this very notion is incoherent, like the 
idea of a round square. A Divine Reality who originates all choices must origi-
nate and pre-determine all creaturely choices to do what is right (or wrong). 
Creatures would not have a free and unconstrained choice between right or 
wrong if they are utterly constrained from eternity always to choose rightly and 
could not choose otherwise. The claim that God could cause free and originative 
creatures always to choose what is right just makes no sense. All free choices 
could have been otherwise. 
Mainstream Process Theologians, we saw earlier, claim that God could not 
create unfree creatures who necessarily do what is right because being any kind 
of a concrete individual at all involves creative freedom. Creativity is a univer-
sal metaphysical category. Just as quantum events cannot exist at all at less than 
Planck dimensions, so it is impossible for any concrete events to exist at all 
unless their becoming is partly indeterminate and self-creative, says traditional 
Process Theism. The Divine self-limitation view, by contrast, affirms the wide-
spread prevalence of creativity, even if it is not absolutely universal, because of 
the value of creativity itself, not because of its metaphysical necessity. Inde-
terminations, ifnotcreativity, at lower levels of physical and biophysical organi-
zation is a necessary condition for freedom at higher levels. At the very lowest 
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level of quantum events, creativity is minimal if not non-existent much of the 
time; but from the lowest to the highest level of physical reality, quantum 
physics is radically incompatible with rigid detenninism. Quantum indetermi-
nacy makes room for creative freedom at higher or more valuable and complex 
levels of biological and psychological organization. Even at the level of the 
most primitive individuals, the universe is always slightly out of control, includ-
ing Divine control. Quantum level realities behave spontaneously and unpre-
dictably occasionally. At higher levels of integration, absolute Divine control 
is completely out of the question. Creation is risky business, even for God. 
Even the course of evolution always was and will always be slightly out 
of Divine control. Free decisions made by God and by living creatures, and 
indeterminateness in subatomic and atomic level quantum flukes, influenced the 
flourishing, survival, and evolution of all living things, including human beings. 
God was not the only decisionmaker directing and contributing to human evolu-
tion. We were created in part by God and in part by the free decisions made by 
all our pre-human ancestors throughout billions of years. If some of our progen-
itors had made different decisions, some species resembling us or our hominid 
ancestors, but not necessarily homo sapiens, might have resulted and prevailed. 
Given the power that modem medicine has given us to control and reorder 
genetic blueprints transmitted to future generations, we can now significantly 
influence the future course of evolution. Will we use this knowledge and power 
wisely? Not even God knows the answer! 
The free will defense is possible only in a slightly wild and unpredictable 
universe. If the world is slightly untamed, out of control, and unpredictable at 
every level of actuality, the free will defense has some bearing upon the problem 
of natural evil as well as moral evil. The free will defense is usually applied 
only to evils caused by moral agents, not to evils caused by natural processes. 
Process Theologians repudiate this limitation. If creativity or at least indetenn-
inacy belongs to every actual entity, then God cannot and does not absolutely 
control everything, including those natural processes that are hostile to living 
beings and their projects. Natural disasters like earthquakes, hurricanes, torna-
does, droughts, and diseases result partly from the operation of natural laws and 
partly from the inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable-by-others self-
creativity and/or indeterminacy of all physical and biological events, including 
those at quantum levels of physical reality. 
Quantum physics definitely rules out Classical Theology's concepts of 
both Divine omnipotence as absolute control, and Divine omniscience as knowl-
edge of every minute detail of the entire past, present, and future of the universe 
all at once, for such definiteness about the self-creating present and the 
uncreated future is just not there to be known. God does not have the knowledge 
and will not use his power to prevent all evils, natural or otherwise, because 
God, by voluntary self-limitation, is not the sole originative agent functioning 
in the universe. 
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b. The Soul-Making Defense 
Many desirable human traits of character would never develop in a world 
without evil. John Hick stresses the soul-making defense, according to which 
evil is necessary as a means to moral and spiritual development. 32 Process 
Theology can easily incorporate this as an important element in a workable 
theodicy, but not the sole element. 
All human beings start very low (a single fertilized ovum) on the scale of 
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and personal development. Newborn infants begin 
their lives in relative ignorance, innocence, and impotence, as Adam did in the 
Genesis creation myth. Because evolution is true, the biblical Adam and Eve 
never really existed; but we all begin our lives as little Adams or Eves. Initially, 
as infants, we do not know the difference between good and evil, right and 
wrong, even if a predisposition is there. Our intellectual, moral, spiritual, and 
personal potentials develop and mature only within supportive social and physi-
cal environments. Their development also requires individual creative effort in 
response to real and dangerous challenges. 
Adversity really is a necessary condition for the development of many 
highly desirable traits of character and moral and spiritual virtues. Without real 
evils, real dangers, we could never develop courage. Without scarcity, hardship, 
and suffering, we could never become generous, self-sacrificing, patient, kind, 
and compassionate. Without real and constant threats to happiness, security, and 
those we love, including ourselves, we would never develop moral conscien-
tiousness and responsibility. Without frailty and death, we would never be able 
to appreciate strength, health, and life itself. The existence of evil is a necessary 
condition for the realization of many soul-making goods. 
The soul-making defense may be carried too far; its scope is definitely 
limited. It solves part of the problem of evil but not all of it by a long shot. John 
Hick, its principal patron in our time, is well aware of this. Some attempts to 
make it work are very implausible. 
Some theologians argue that without evil, there could be no good at all; 
correspondingly, without goodness, there would be no evil at all. If this were 
true, Heaven, lacking all evil, could not be good; and Hell, lacking all goodness, 
could not be evil. Even Heaven might be a challenging place to live! 
Unless good and evil co-exist in a complementary relationship, it is often 
said, we would not be able to recognize either one, for contrast is essential for 
recognition. Without evil, the argument goes, we could not recognize goodness; 
without pain, we could not recognize pleasure, a significant ingredient in human 
happiness. But this is not true. There are degrees of pleasure; and contrasts 
between high and low degrees of it would be quite sufficient for recognition 
purposes; so would the contrast between any given degree of pleasure and a 
neutral state of consciousness that is neither pleasurable nor painful. Pleasure 
definitely could be recognized and appreciated in a world without pain, so the 
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reality of pain cannot be justified merely because it is essential for the recogni-
tion of pleasure or happiness. However, pain has other constructive uses. 
Pain has tremendous survival value. By alerting organisms to danger, it 
often prevents much greater injury or harm. Its presence in the world has con-
siderable justification. Thomas H. Huxley, following Alfred Lord Tennyson, 
characterized the world of nature as "red in tooth and claw;" but many of the 
horrors of the "struggle for existence" may be greatly exaggerated. 
In the wild world of non-human animals, much less pain and struggle, and 
much more joy, empathy, and cooperation, exist than we often suppose. Many 
of the cooperative and self-sacrificial features of human morality may be found 
also in the non-human animal world;33 but non-human animals can foresee 
relatively little of what is to come and do not suffer greatly from the anxieties 
about the future that trouble members of our species with more foresight. 
Most living species and individuals are plants, and so are most things that 
are killed and eaten for food. As Mary Midgley indicates, "In fact, nature is 
green long before she is red, and must be green on a very large scale indeed to 
provide a context for redness."34 Most animals, both individuals and species, 
including the dinosaurs, were and are plant-eating herbivores, not carnivores or 
omnivores who consume the flesh of other living creatures. Carnivores, dino-
saurs included, have a vital role in maintaining ecological balance and the vigor 
and zest of individuals and species, as does death itself. Much of the animal 
pain that we imagine to be involved in being killed and eaten by predacious 
carnivores is actually suppressed by endorphins and other natural analgesics 
secreted during the chase and attack, especially when predators kill quickly. 
Unfortunately, they do not always kill quickly; and we do not know how long 
a dying animal can benefit from "stress induced analgesia. "35 
Pain is genuinely troublesome for theodicy because all too often its inten-
sity and duration are way out of proportion to its usefulness for soul-making or 
any other rational purposes. Agonizing bodily pain and mental anguish suffered 
while dying from cancer and many other diseases and injuries often do not 
correlate with valuable practical or spiritual lessons learned from suffering or 
with virtues developed by enduring anguish. All too often, both human and 
subhuman animals are simply and speedily crushed by overwhelming adversity, 
and they neither learn from it nor grow in moral and spiritual character as a 
consequence of it. God cannot and does not always bring from evil the sort of 
good that we would like to see. Tragedy and loss are very real in our universe. 
Clearly, despite its importance, the soul-making defense alone does not 
resolve all the problems of theodicy. Too many individuals suffer and perish 
with little or no opportunity for soul-making, even if on the whole the world-
system tends toward the best. In many instances, soul-making is a good brought 
forth from evil; but all too often it does not happen. If the God who designed 
and made our world-system is to be regarded as worthy of worship, the soul-
making defense must be bolstered by further considerations. 
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c. The Utility of Law and Order 
Many very real evils cannot be explained and justified by the free will and soul 
making defenses. Premature deaths, grave incapacitations, and grievous suffer-
ings that serve no legitimate purposes of the sufferer appear to be pointless 
evils; but are they entirely pointless in the great scheme of things? Some great 
good other than soul-making might justify the existence of many seemingly 
pointless evils. 
The immense usefulness and practical value of natural law and order 
resolves many of the remaining difficulties. Laws of physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, sociology, history, and psychology are neutral to good and evil in the sense 
that they are necessary conditions for both. Beneficial sunshine and rain fall 
upon the just and the unjust alike; so do harmful diseases and other natural 
adversities. The same natural laws are in effect no matter what. 
A category mistake is made when moral categories like "unjust" or "un-
fair" are applied to the undesirable effects of the workings of natural laws and 
processes. When bad things happen naturally to good people, only non-moral 
categories like "tragedy" or "misfortune" are appropriate. Tragedies do not call 
the moral goodness of God into question. Ours would be a strange world, 
indeed an impossible world, ifone set of physical ornatural laws were operative 
for righteous people and another set for the wicked. 
On the whole, natural laws and all the initial components of our life-
supporting universe are more beneficial than harmful. Without them, we would 
not be here at all. Individuals who master the laws of nature and learn how to 
use them can, within broad limits, control their own destinies and greatly im-
prove their chances for having a good life relatively free from suffering, inca-
pacitation, deformity, and premature death. Informed individuals may use the 
laws of nature to enrich their lives by cultivating happiness, adventure, beauty, 
virtue, and other consciousness-enriching goods in effective ways. 
Many life, health, and happiness enhancing behaviors are wired into non-
human animals as instinctive responses to environmental conditions; and, to our 
great benefit, we human beings can learn the laws of nature and adjust our activ-
ities accordingly. Laws of nature can and do work for us rather than against us 
most of the time, but not always. 
Steven Weinberg complains that we will find no evidence of a God who 
cares for life, intelligence, morality and beauty in the laws of nature because 
"The God of the birds and trees would have to be also the God of birth defects 
and cancer."36 But what else would one expect from a wise and benevolent 
Deity? How otherwise should God have created the world? How could and 
should the order ofnature be different? Be specific! If the laws of nature were 
changed very much, no life would be possible. It is very doubtful that either we 
or God could create a significantly better world if we tried. Birds, trees, birth 
defects, and cancers all exemplify the same basic laws of nature. 
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Should an intelligent, powerful, and benevolent Deity suspend the laws of 
nature to prevent hann to beloved creatures when natural laws work against 
them? Some Theists believe that God occasionally works miracles for such 
purposes. Miracles result, by definition, from an influx of transcendent energy 
or efficient causation that temporarily interrupts, suspends, or redirects existing 
laws of physics and chemistry. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that 
miracles can happen, sometimes, perhaps, in response to prayer. Why then does 
God not work many, many, more miracles to prevent much more pointless 
suffering, incapacitation, deformity, and premature death? Loving parents would 
protect their children from these ills if they had the knowledge and power; so 
why does a God who is supposed to be much more loving, powerful, and knowl-
edgeable not do as much? 
The answer, in part, is that a lawful and orderly environment, one that 
loving human parents are in no position to change, is itself a very great instru-
mental good; and the dependability of nature is worth the price of most if not 
all evils that result from the orderly workings and habituated activities of con-
crete entities. We abstract and generalize these regularities into natural laws. 
The advantages of natural laws or regularities clearly outweigh their disadvan-
tages most of the time, but not always. So why aren't they occasionally sus-
pended? 
Ifwe knew that we could expect God to solve all our problems for us and 
save us miraculously every time we get into a jam, we would never develop into 
conscientious and responsible persons. People who expect too many miracles 
are usually not very responsible individuals! Soul making reenters the picture 
unexpectedly at this point. The laws ofnature enable and promote it. Even non-
human animals who learn and generalize from experience, as most do, would 
not learn and grow in their own more limited yet significant ways if miracles 
were commonplace. 
To announce God's presence and concern, miracles may happen occasion-
ally. Another process heresy! If they do they are exceedingly rare; and we 
cannot count on them. If miracles were so frequent that we could predict and 
rely upon them to deliver us from all evils, then they would be the laws of 
nature, and we would assume that they had natural causes! Natural laws just are 
the regularities that we can count on and predict. But little or no soul-making 
would exist in a world where miracles were laws of nature. 
d. The Conflict of Good with Good 
Process Theologians point out that much seemingly pointless evil actually 
results from the conflict of good with good in a pluralistic universe, one that 
contains a significant number and variety of living beings, where legitimate 
interests are bound to conflict. No moral evil is involved when legitimate inter-
ests are pursued at the expense of others, but tragic non-moral evils may result. 
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Our world manifests many examples of the conflict of good with good. 
When two people apply for the same job, both cannot have it; but the winner 
normally does nothing immoral in taking it at the loser's expense. A violent 
death for a wildebeest or gazelle provides food for lions, cheetahs, wild dogs, 
and their young. They would otherwise die painfully of starvation. Seeming 
inefficiency, waste, and death for some means vibrant life for others. All indi-
viduals must die eventually to allow room and resources for others to live. 
Organic matter is never wasted; in the struggle for life, evil is transformed into 
redeeming, sacramental goodness. 
Holmes Rolston, 11137 and M. A. Corey38 forcefully developed the thesis 
that the apparent randomness, wastefulness, and inefficiency of the evolutionary 
process is actually God's deliberate rational strategy for assuring species sur-
vival, adaptability, and complexity under environmental conditions that are 
likely to change drastically over the course of time. A creator God who cher-
ishes biodiversity must consider the design and well-being of vast unfolding 
ecosystems within which individuals and species exist and interrelate, as well 
as the design and well-being of the individuals and species themselves. At a 
systems level, earth's ecosystems, where one individual's loss is always an-
other's gain and nothing is ever wasted, are remarkably efficient and well-
ordered. They are models of rational foresight and planning. 
Still, individual losers in the conflict of good with good can be greatly 
frustrated and disturbed; some suffer unbearably; and many perish prematurely. 
Grief is commonplace over losses in love, athletics, business, the struggle for 
life, and every legitimate competitive interest. Painful conflicts, serious frustra-
tions, deep disappointments, unbearable sufferings, irrevocable losses, and 
premature deaths are inevitable in an orderly world containing a great diversity 
of consciously active and creative individuals. This is the price that must be paid 
for richness, diversity, freedom, and creativity. 
Conflicts of good with good may also evoke positive virtues like wisdom, 
patience, resoluteness, inventiveness, heroism, and sacrifice. The immense 
worth and extent of both human and non-human cooperation, ingenuity, forti-
tude, and voluntary self-sacrifice should not be underestimated. Fortunately, 
shared interests do not always conflict; and innovative strategies for minimizing 
conflict are often available. 
Could God, should God, do anything to prevent evils resulting from the 
conflict of good with good? Not if the price is too high. What exactly would 
God have to do? Eliminating all or most conflict of good with good would 
necessitate either abolishing or preventing the existence of great numbers of 
active individuals, or else significantly diminishing their creative power or 
freedom. If the existence of many and diverse individual centers of conscious 
experience, creative activity, and valuation has sufficiently great worth, lesser 
evils resulting from the conflict of good with good are justified. 
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God does not deliberately cause every bad thing that happens to good 
people; in this sense, evils are no part of God's grand plan. But God always 
aspires and tries to bring as much good out of evil as possible, so there is this 
much truth to the common belief that everything is a part of God's plan. God 
always plans to bring good out of evil! For example, mad cow disease is a 
horrible thing for its animal and human victims; but great good may come from 
it in the long run. It may be one of the best things that ever happened to further 
vegetarianism! God may use this horrible disease to inspire us rethink the 
exploitative destructiveness of our relations with other living things and our 
environment as a whole, when otherwise we would be oblivious. 
Theodicy requires an ideal balance between divine and creaturely power. 
A loss of desirable creaturely power correlates with every increase in desirable 
divine power and control; and every increase in creaturely power must be 
accompanied by diminished divine power and control. To empower his 
creatures, God voluntarily limits his own power by divine choice. Every desir-
able reduction in conflicts between individuals would require undesirable 
decreases in the number, variety, intensity, zest, vigor, virtue, and creativity of 
creatures, as well as radical and inefficient modifications of the inclusive eco-
systems that support them. All good things have their price. If we were God 
choosing a design for a good world as complex as our own, could we do any 
better? That we could is very doubtful. 
e. Consolation 
In Process Theology, God is "The great companion-the fellow-sufferer who 
understands," as Whitehead put it.39 The profound conviction that an all-com-
passionate God genuinely understands and suffers with all creaturely suffering 
and loss gives great consolation in times of sorrow and woe. The God of Pro-
cess Theology literally suffers with all who suffer; and Jesus on the cross is the 
supreme historical symbol of this. All evils inflicted upon all sentient creatures 
are ultimately inflicted upon God, who endlessly bears all suffering, loss, and 
every creature's cross so that an orderly world can be rich in intrinsically valu-
able, creative, responsive, and responsible individuals. 
In Classical Theism, all forms of feeling are judged to be unworthy of 
God, even the highly desirable feelings necessarily involved in love, mercy, 
empathy, and compassion. God loves without feeling, is merciful without 
passion, and has compassion without pity, said the Classical Theologians. Kant 
considered any love composed even partly offeelings to be "pathological." 
To the contrary, total affective insensitivity robs love, mercy, empathy, and 
compassion of most of their meaning and significance. Yes, cognitive elements 
are present in love, mercy, empathy, and compassion; but mere cognition is not 
enough. Divine attributes of immutability and impassivity betoken emotional 
insensitivity and moral impoverishment; but God truly bears our burdens. 
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Classical Theism actually affords no deep religious consolation for evils 
suffered because in himself God is really not compassionate, as St. Anselm 
forthrightly acknowledged. God's works make it appear that he is compassion-
ate, but he really isn't! For Classical Theism, the discrepancy between divine 
appearance and divine reality is absolute. In Process Theism, by contrast, 
desirable kinds of feeling are perfections; stony immobility is an imperfection; 
and God quite literally suffers with all who suffer. God cares deeply, fully 
understands, empathizes with, and is all compassion, pure unbounded love. God 
bears all our sorrows and griefs. In that insight is deep comfort and consolation. 
f. Compensation 
Do the elements of theodicy presented thus far really succeed in reconciling 
belief in an immensely knowledgeable, powerful, caring, and worshipful God 
with the hard facts of evil in the world? There is still room for honest doubt. 
Many individuals, human and non-human, are crushed by the evil of over-
whelming suffering. Others are profoundly retarded or irreversibly comatose 
from birth. Others are gravely incapacitated or struck down as infants, children, 
or in the prime of life. Many die so prematurely that they have little or no 
chance for a worthwhile life or for any soul-making experiences, efforts, and 
adventures. If a sadistic maniac entertains himself by shooting a tiny baby to 
death before the eyes of its mother, the poor infant has little or no opportunity 
for happiness, spontaneous creativity, self-development. and soul-making. How 
could a good, powerful, and benevolent God allow such things to happen? How 
could everything that happens be a direct expression of the will of God, as 
Classical Theists claim? Do we never fail to do God's will, not even when we 
perpetrate unthinkable atrocities like the Holocaust? 
In this world, evils suffered pointlessly are sometimes compensated. Theo-
logians like John Hick hold that God will eventually compensate unfortunate 
individuals for their tragic sufferings and losses in a better life to come. Heaven 
will make all things right in the sweet by and by. Hick's book, Death and 
Eternal Life,40 defends this theological perspective in depth and effectively 
replies to philosophical charges that the idea of survival after death is empiri-
cally meaningless or nonsensical. 
Hick shows that the idea of compensation after death for evils suffered in 
this world makes sense, at least to the extent that we can imagine experiences 
that would verify survival after death, but not in the sense that we now have 
experiential access to other worlds. Hick argues convincingly that compensation 
in a life after this life would go very far toward solving all the residual problems 
oftheodicy. However, sensitive rebels like Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov may 
want no part of such an "eternal harmony." By the time we reach the end of 
Hick's book, we discover that he provides no evidence whatsoever that other 
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worlds exist or that we survive within them after death. Intelligibility is not 
equivalent to knowledge and truth, even if it is a first requisite. 
Actual evidence for survival after death in another world is indecisive but 
not totally nonexistent. The transcendent spacetime of Heaven is vulnerable to 
the same objections previously raised against world-ensemble cosmologies. We 
have neither direct observational nor indirect inductive evidence for other 
worlds, including Heaven, antecedent universes, or contemporary bubble uni-
verses. If Heaven exists, we could never know it rationally in this life. Yes, a 
compensatory Heaven is logically possible; but this concedes only that the 
concept is intelligible and free from logical self-contradiction. 
Compensation theodicy resolves residual problems of evil in this world by 
appealing to worlds about which we now know nothing; but a successful Teleo-
logical Argument requires that an adequate solution to the problem of evil be 
based upon the observed order of this world alone. It contends that the order of 
our world implies an intelligent and beneficent world designer. If the problem 
of theodicy cannot be solved by reference only to the discerned design of our 
universe, the Teleological Argument fails, for it aspires to infer God's existence 
from the observed order of our world. Uncompensated evils permitted by the 
observed order of this world may (or many not) be incompatible with the exis-
tence of a supercosmic, benevolent, and intelligent God. We do not know with 
certainty. 
This author believes that elements a. through e. in the preceding discussion 
are sufficient to resolve the problem oftheodicy; but if they fail, the Teleologi-
cal Argument is not successful. Whether any theodicy succeeds or fails depends 
on fallible and variable human judgments that weigh existing goods against 
existing evils. People who sincerely want to be rational about such immense 
complexities and uncertainties must often just agree to disagree without ques-
tioning one another's integrity. 
We have no knowledge of or control over what happens to us after death. 
At that point, everything is in the hands of God. We have no legitimate claim 
to anything more, but God's love may give us more than we deserve. There may 
or may not be compensatory survival after death, just as Quantum Cosmo logy' s 
many worlds may or may not exist in Divine Superspacetime. We cannot know 
such things now, even if they are so. Theistic religions usually teach compensa-
tory survival after death; faith often affirms it; but rational evidence for individ-
ual survival after death is presently inconclusive. If God chooses to give it, there 
could be ultimate compensatory justice; but about this we now have no suffi-
cient rational knowledge. 
Evil in the world menaces the Teleological Argument for the existence of 
God; but even without postmortem compensation, the threat is significantly 
abated by the collective weight of the free will defense, the soul-making de-
fense, the usefulness of natural law and order, the inevitability of the conflict 
of good with good in a pluralistic universe, and the consolation of Divine 
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compassion. Compensation for evils suffered may or may not be operative in 
some Other World. About that we really do not know; but we can hope. 
Twelve 
THEISM AND COSMIC CONTINGENCY 
The Cosmological Argument forthe existence of God begins with our awareness 
of the contingency of things within our world; from this it tries to reason philo-
sophically, not scientifically, to the necessary existence of God. In Process 
Theism, God's Primordial Nature has necessary existence. Classical and Process 
Theologians agree that God exists necessarily. The Cosmological Argument 
expresses a widely shared deep cosmological intuition to the effect that the 
existence of any contingent thing-anything that might or might not be, ultimately 
implies the existence of a Necessary Being-one that could not not be. The 
concept ofNecessary Being that applies to God in the Cosmological Argument 
is the same as the one that applies in the Ontological Argument (which is not 
here discussed in any detail). Kant maintained, correctly, that the Cosmological 
Argument depends on the Ontological Argument in one important respect-both 
employ an a priori concept of God, that is, one that is not derived from sense 
experience. Thus, ifthe Cosmological Argument is valid, so is the Ontological; 
for the Necessary God on whom all actual and possible worlds depends is an 
everlasting, uncreated, indestructible Reality who could not not exist and whose 
existence cannot be denied without self-contradiction. 
As indicated in Chapter Ten, by definition, contingent beings might or 
might not exist; if they do exist, they have causes, can be created or destroyed, 
and normally come into being in or with time. A Necessary Being could not not 
exist and has no cause, exists self-sufficiently, and is everlasting, uncreated, and 
indestructible. St. Thomas Aquinas reasoned from the contingency of perceived 
motion and change, and from contingency itself, to the necessary existence of 
God. Contingency involves possible or actual nonexistence. Descartes reasoned 
cosmologically from the contingent existence ofhis idea of God to the necessity 
of its referent as its adequate cause; he also reasoned ontologically from the very 
meaning of this idea of God to the necessity of its referent. If the Cosmological 
Argument is any good at all, it should be possible to start with any experience 
of anything that exists contingently, including the whole contingent universe, and 
infer the reality of God. Formulating and defending an argument that gives 
adequate expression to this cosmological intuition is difficult. Since Plato, phil-
osophers and theologians have tried and generally failed for a variety ofreasons. 
This chapter will proceed directly to a contemporary formulation of the 
Cosmological Argument that has a decent chance to succeed, partly because it 
avoids suspicious premises of traditional formulations like "There is a Great 
Chain of Being that leads from the earth at the center of the universe to God 
above," or "An infinite regress of causes either in time or in the Great Chain of 
Being is impossible."' Saint Bonaventure argued for the impossibility of an 
actualized temporal infinity. A more influential St. Thomas Aquinas thought 
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that the finitude of the past is disclosed only by revelation, not proved by rea-
son. He insisted that the impossibility of an actualized infinity applies only to 
causes that simultaneously coexist and act within the Great Chain of Being, not 
to causes that could exist and act successively in an infinite cosmic past. 2 
The following Cosmological Argument from Contingency makes no 
appeal to these antiquated and highly suspect elements of Thomistic metaphys-
ics. It is perfectly compatible with and builds upon the empirical discoveries and 
well tested theories of contemporary scientific cosmology; but it goes beyond 
them. It is philosophy, not natural science. 
1. A Cosmological Argument from Contingency 
The basic premises of a plausible contemporary Cosmological Argument from 
the Contingency of the world to the existence of God are: 
Premise I: If each of the parts of any whole has contingent existence, then 
the whole itself has contingent existence. 
Premise 2: Each of the parts of nature or the universe as a whole has 
contingent existence. 
Deduction and Premise 3: Therefore. nature or the universe as a whole has 
contingent existence. 
Premise 4: Definition: If something exists contingently, it is causally 
derived from or dependent on something other than itself. 
Deduction and Premise 5: Therefore, nature or the universe as a whole is 
causally derived from or dependent on something other than itself. 
Premise 6: The something on which nature or the universe depends is 
either the Principle of Plenitude, which requires infinitely many worlds in time 
and/or space; or it is God. 
Premise 7: The something on which nature or the universe depends is not 
the Principle of Plenitude or infinitely many worlds. 
Final Conclusion: The something on which nature or the universe depends 
is God. 
A sound deductive argument actually proves its conclusion if it has both a valid 
form and all true premises. The above argument is deductively valid. Foil owing 
discussions will argue that its premises are all true. Thus, the conclusion is true: 
The something on which nature or the universe depends is God. 
A. Naturalistic Metaphysical Options 
If Naturalists wish to attack this argument and establish their own metaphysics, 
they must prove the truth of at least one of the following propositions that 
contradict one or more of the premises of this Cosmological Argument from 
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Contingency. Not knowing whether one or more of these premises is true or 
false makes us agnostics, not Naturalists. Lack of knowledge does not establish 
naturalistic metaphysics or anything else. Naturalists themselves must prove 
something iftheir own metaphysics is rationally justified. The burden of proof 
in philosophy is on anyone who has anything to say, so Naturalists must estab-
lish the truth of their own alternatives to Theism. Naturalists could disprove the 
premises of our Cosmological Argument from Contingency only by showing 
that any one, perhaps all, of the following propositions are true; but they cannot 
do so. All of these Naturalistic metaphysical claims are false, as demonstrated 
in what precedes and in what follows. 
1. Each of the parts of some whole has contingent existence, but the whole 
itself has necessary existence. 
2.Some part (or parts) of nature or the universe as a whole has (or have) 
necessary existence. 
3. Nature, the universe as a whole, has necessary existence. 
4. Something may exist contingently without being causally derivative. 
5. Nature, the universe, is not causally derived from or dependent on 
anything other than itself; it was caused by nothing. 
6. Our system of nature, our universe, ultimately depends on either infi-
nitely many diverse worlds in Supertime and/or Superspace, as required by the 
Principle of Plenitude, or on God. 
7. Nature, the universe, ultimately depends on the Principle of Plenitude's 
infinitely many worlds. 
Therefore, the universe does not depend on God. 
Which cosmological claims are best justified, those of Theism, or those of 
Naturalism? What is the evidence? 
The case against naturalistic alternatives to theistic cosmological premises 
4 through 7 above has already been made and does not need to be repeated. 
With respect to 4 and 5, we already know from earlier discussions that if 
something exists contingently, specifically our system of nature, it is causally 
dependent on something other than itself, and that no plausible case can be 
made for the Big Accident contention that contingent beings can come to exist 
without a cause, specifically, that our universe just popped into being from 
absolute nothingness without a cause. With respect to 6 and 7, we know from 
Chapters Four through Eight and Chapter Eleven that variations on many worlds 
metaphysics cannot be defended, and neither can the Principle of Plenitude, so 
the best explanation for the existence of our world is that God created it. If the 
Big Accident, the Principle of Plenitude, infinitely many worlds in time and/or 
space, and so on, are indefensible, as previously established, the God hypothesis 
remains as the most plausible account of the supreme transcendent, ultimate 
reality on which our universe depends. 
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Only the first two premises of our Cosmological Argument from Contin-
gency need further defense. The third premise is but an intermediate conclusion 
from these that functions as an additional premise in the wider argument. We 
must now dispose of the naturalistic options that some necessary wholes are 
composed entirely of contingent parts, and that some parts of our universe exist 
necessarily. The remainder of this chapter first develops and defends this part 
of the Argument, then explores some common objections. 
B. Contingent Parts and Wholes 
That all wholes exist contingently if they are composed entirely of contingent 
parts is universally verified in experience. This is the best reason we could 
possibly have for thinking that the first premise of our Cosmological Argument 
from Contingency is true. In absolutely no circumstances do we find wholes 
having necessary existence when they are composed entirely of contingently 
existing parts. In fact, we experience no necessary wholes at all. 
The notion of a "whole" in this argument is not necessarily limited to well 
integrated organic wholes; any collection or totality, integrated or not, would 
probably do; but we will assume hereafter that relevant wholes are integrated in 
the sense that all their parts have a common ultimate origin and all these parts 
have causal relations with some other parts of the whole. All the parts of a 
unitary universe have a common ultimate cause and somehow hang together in 
linked causal cones. Everything in our universe has a common origin in the Big 
Bang and, despite relativity and the mutual independence of contemporaries, all 
existing entities have linked spatiotemporal and cause/effect relations with at 
least some other members of our universe. 
The empirical first premise of our Cosmological Argument is an inductive 
generalization from observed wholes to all wholes. Like all inductive empirical 
claims, it might prove false in some as-yet-undetected situation. Admittedly, we 
have not empirically tested absolutely all existing wholes. Cosmological argu-
ments that contain empirical premises are infected by the same sort of uncer-
tainty that plagues all inductive inferences. Nevertheless, our first premise is 
just as well established as any and all other scientific generalizations like Ein-
stein's "E = mc2 ,"or Hubble's "The whole universe is expanding," or thermody-
namics' "Disorder always increases in closed systems." After all, we have not 
empirically tested all the mass/energy in the universe, or its universal expansion, 
or the entropy of all closed systems; but as far as experience takes us, these 
generalizations are universally confirmed, without exception. Hubble's law of 
uniform expansion is found to be true one hundred percent of the time because, 
excluding galaxies that are gravitationally bound to our Milky Way or to other 
galactic systems, all galaxies are moving away from us and from one another at 
speeds proportional to their distance. 
Theism and Cosmic Contingency 315 
Surface appearances may suggest that the contingency of all wholes 
composed entirely of contingent parts is even better verified than Einstein's 
energy/mass equation. Some astrophysicists affirm that photons, which carry the 
energy of light, have no mass; and this may be true of some other strange parti-
cles as well. 3 If photons have energy but no mass (even if only in an idealized 
rest state), then it is not universally the case that E = mc2, for E cannot equal mc2 
where there is no m. Actually, photons have zero mass only in a purely hypo-
thetical state of rest; and in that ideal state of masslessness, they are energy less 
as well. This purely hypothetical state must be expressed by a zero on both sides 
of Einstein's equation, but real photons are never purely at rest. All real photons 
have both mass and energy; so no anomaly here challenges E = mc2• 
Similarly, one hundred percent of the time, as far as experience takes us, 
if each of the parts of any integrated whole has contingent existence, then the 
whole itself has contingent existence. This empirical truth could actually count 
as a scientific truth except that scientists traditionally have not been interested 
in it. Woltbart Pannenberg points out that scientists ignore contingency and 
concentrate instead upon formulating natural Jaws or uniformities. 4 As Aristotle 
indicated, the sciences carve out limited domains of being as their subject 
matter, while philosophy is concerned with truths that apply universally to 
everything. The contingency of all wholes with completely contingent parts is 
true of all empirical subject matter; it applies to all the parts of and to the whole 
of contingent existence. In my "Philosophy of Religion" courses, I regularly 
offered to give students an "A" on the spot if they could identify a directly or 
inductively verified instance of an integrated whole that exists necessarily even 
though all of its parts exist contingently. I never gave the "A." 
Critics may object that our first premise applies only to finite wholes but 
not to the universe as an infinite whole. All finite wholes composed entirely of 
contingent parts are themselves contingent, but this may not be true of infinite 
wholes. We cannot reason inductively from the finite to the infinite. Thus, ifthe 
universe is an integrated infinite whole, it could have necessary existence even 
though composed entirely of contingent parts. 
That the universe is an infinite whole is logically possible, but this could 
never be verified either directly or inductively, and the evidence to the contrary 
is overwhelming. Remember the Big Bang! Verification and falsification move 
far beyond toying around with possibilities. Possibilities are not actualities, and 
they should not be confused with probabilities. We definitely do not know that 
the universe is an infinite whole. Even if it is, we could never know or verify the 
claim, and Big Bang Cosmo logy provides convincing evidence that the universe 
is not an infinite whole. Temporally, the universe is only fifteen billion or so 
years old; spatially, though astronomically immense, it is finite but expand-
ing-finite in actuality, even if infinite in potentiality. 
Mathematicians tell us that any line has an infinite number of parts (Eu-
clidean points); and each sub-section of a line contains just as many parts as the 
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whole. Since lines depend for their existence upon the causes that draw them, 
or on the mathematicians that imagine them, we know that theoretically infinite 
wholes, those composed of an infinite number of parts, exist contingently. 
Yet, according to quantum discreteness, mass/energy cannot actually be 
sub-divided below the spatiotemporal minimals of Planck dimensions. Particles 
exists and energy is transmitted in minimal quanta or not at all; even space has 
an irreducibly granular quality. Thus, no actual line drawn in the objective 
world is an infinite physical continuum. Observed quantum-atomized lines are 
not infinite as wholes actually having an infinite number of parts; but this is not 
incompatible with our first premise. 
Conceptually constructed imaginary lines are only potentially infinite 
wholes with potentially infinite parts; but they depend for their existence upon 
conscious thinkers or imaginers. Since infinite wholes with potentially infinite 
parts exist contingently, and we know of no instances to the contrary, the uni-
verse as a whole should be contingent if it has an infinite number of parts only 
potentially. We cannot generalize from potentiality to actuality, and the thought 
of infinity, dependent on the mind of the thinker, is not an actual infinity. The 
actual thought of "infinity" is not an actual infinity of thoughts; it is only one 
thought, just as the actual thought of "blue" is not a blue thought. 
Note carefully that our Cosmological Argument from Contingency makes 
no appeal to the contingency of actually infinite wholes, for our universe is 
definitely finite. It is not actually infinite in any respect. According to Big Bang 
Cosmology, our universe is vast; but it is finite in expanse, past duration, mass, 
and in all other denumerable ways. The Planck-dimension minimals of quantum 
physics prohibit this finite mass from being actually divisible into an infinite 
number of real parts. Naturalists can identify no necessary infinite wholes 
composed entirely of contingent parts. Our universe is certainly not such an 
infinite whole, and it does not have an infinite number of parts. All experienced 
finite wholes composed of contingent parts are themselves contingent. This 
empirical truth can be generalized inductively to include our universe. Protests 
will be explored later. 
The Cosmological Argument from Contingency may be defective just 
because it reasons from parts to the whole of nature. Logic texts say that reason-
ing from parts to wholes commits the informal logical Fallacy of Composition, 
according to which inferring that a whole possesses a certain property merely 
because each of its parts possesses that property is erroneous. Despite what 
introductory logic texts say, it is not always fallacious to conclude that a whole 
possesses a property because all of its parts have that property. Sometimes so 
to reason really is a mistake, but sometimes not. How can we tell the difference? 
Arguments from parts to wholes can be formulated, or reformulated, as 
deductive arguments. Unjustified conclusions can be drawn from deductive 
arguments in at least two ways. First, the argument form or pattern may be 
invalid; second, one or more of the premises may be false or not known to be 
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true. The first three of the following arguments are obviously erroneous; but 
what kind of a mistake do they make? 
Argument I. 
(I) If all the microscopic parts of a machine are invisible to the naked eye, the 
whole machine is invisible to the naked eye. 
(2) All the microscopic parts (atoms) of this car are invisible to the naked eye. 
Therefore, this whole car is invisible to the naked eye. 
Argument II. 
(I) I fall the microscopic parts ofa body (the cells, molecules, atoms, and so on) 
are devoid of consciousness, the whole body is devoid of consciousness. 
(2) All the microscopic parts of my body (the cells, molecules, atoms, and so 
on) are devoid of consciousness. 
Therefore, my whole body is devoid of consciousness.1 
Argument III. 
(I) If each of the elemental parts of a chemical compound is a gas, the whole 
compound is a gas. 
(2) Each of the elemental parts of water (hydrogen, oxygen) is a gas. 
Therefore, water is a gas. 
These three arguments from parts to whole obviously fail to prove their 
conclusions. The next two arguments also move from parts to wholes, but they 
are not faulty. They commit no fallacy; they involve no falsehoods or uncertain-
ties; and they show that we can reason successfully, deductively, and correctly 
from parts to wholes. 
Argument IV. 
(1) If all the macroscopic parts of a machine are made of metal, the whole 
machine is made of metal. 
(2) All the macroscopic parts of this water pump are made of metal. 
Therefore, this whole water pump is made of metal. 
Argument V. 
(I) If each island in a group is in the Pacific Ocean, the whole island group is 
in the Pacific Ocean. 
(2) Each island in the Hawaiian group is in the Pacific Ocean. 
Therefore, the whole group of Hawaiian Islands is in the Pacific Ocean. 
No fallacious pattern of reasoning is involved in any of the above arguments. 
They all involve an instantiation with respect to particulars and manifest the 
valid pattern of modus ponens: Ifp, then q; and p; therefore, q. What then is the 
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error in arguments I, II, and III that is absent in IV and V? The first three do not 
contain any ambiguous concepts, though logic textbooks regularly but mistak-
enly classify the Fallacy of Composition as a Fallacy of Ambiguity. The only 
difference is that the first premises ofl, II, and III are false, as shown by experi-
ence; but experience confirms the first premises of arguments IV and V. 
Our Cosmological Argument from Contingency is a valid deductive 
argument that commits no informal logical fallacy. Its first premise resembles 
the first premises of IV and V, not those of I, II, and III. 
Some reasoning from parts to wholes is illegitimate, some not, depending 
on the formal pattern ofreasoning and/or the truth or falsity of the premises. We 
cannot correctly infer that a whole machine is invisible because each of its 
atomic parts is invisible, or that a whole body lacks consciousness because each 
of its cells lacks consciousness, or that a compound is a gas because each of its 
elemental parts is a gas, or that a whole machine weighs one pound because 
each of its ten parts weighs one pound, or that a whole painting is beautiful 
because each of its parts is beautiful. Yet, we can infer correctly that a whole 
macroscopic machine is made of metal because each of its macroscopic parts is 
made of metal, that an island group is in the Pacific because each island is in the 
Pacific, and that a whole chair is painted green because each of its visible parts 
is painted green. With a valid argument form, these inferences commit no 
logical fallacy. The only legitimate question is whether the premises are true. In 
IV and V, experience shows that the premises are true; and because the forms 
are also valid, the conclusion is proved.6 
Some properties like being metal, being in a geographical area, and being 
a certain color can be inductively extended or extrapolated from parts to wholes; 
and others, like being invisible, being conscious, weighing a pound, and being 
beautiful, cannot. &perience tells us which is which. 
Contingent existence is an extrapolatory property, as experience also 
invariably shows. If each of the parts of any whole has contingent existence, we 
know from experience that the whole itselfhas contingent existence. We know 
that its non-existence is logically conceivable, that its mode of being is not self-
sufficient but depends on some cause or causes, that it has not existed forever, 
and that it is destructible and will probably cease to exist at some point in the 
future. This includes wholes that are combined into even larger wholes up to 
infinity, and perhaps including infinity (though infinity is irrelevant to our finite 
cosmos). Verifying experiences support the first premise of our Cosmological 
Argument from Contingency one hundred percent of the time; and the form of 
the argument is perfectly valid. This is as good as philosophical arguments ever 
get! Our intermediate conclusion-nature, the universe, has a contingent form of 
existence-will follow ifthe second premise is true, that is, ifthere are no neces-
sary parts of the universe. Naturalistic metaphysics from the time of the Greek 
atomists has been based partly upon the possibility of finding some necessary 
part(s) of nature; but the enterprise is futile! 
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C. No Necessary Parts of the Universe 
The second premise of the Cosmological Argument from Contingency affirms 
that all parts of nature are contingent. Is this false or at least not known to be 
true? The universe would not be a whole composed entirely of contingent parts 
if some of its parts exist necessarily. Naturalists often make this claim, but they 
must do much more than just proclaim it. They must actually show that some 
parts of the universe exist necessarily. The burden of philosophical proof is not 
always on the Theist. It is on anyone who has anything to say. 
Naturalists agree with everyone else that all macroscopic bodies like stars, 
planets, and human bodies are contingent. They locate the necessary parts of 
nature in its microscopic innards. The naturalistic presumption that the necessity 
of the universe is situated in the subject matter of particle physics was never 
effectively challenged before the twentieth century. The Greek Atomists and 
naturalistic Materialists through the centuries believed that spacetime itself and 
its most primitive contents, the atoms, exist necessarily; the atoms and the 
infinite void are self-sufficient, everlasting, uncreated, and indestructible. 
Atomists once called the smallest particles of matter "atoms" and pronounced 
them necessary beings, but we now know that they are not. Exactly which parts 
of matter get classified as "smallest" changes as our knowledge of sub-atomic 
physics advances; but nothing at atomic or sub-atomic levels exists necessarily. 
Particle physics gave naturalistic metaphysics an enormous shock in the 
twentieth century. Traditionally, naturalistic confidence in the eternity and 
necessity of the world presumed that the most primitive particles of matter are 
self-sufficient, everlasting, uncreated, indivisible, and indestructible. Physics 
today finds no physical particles or sub-particles that have such attributes, not 
those now called "atoms," and not their more primitive sub-atomic components. 
All physical particles exist only derivatively or contingently. Some endure only 
for only thousandths or millionths of a second. Nucleosynthesis and nuclear 
fusion bring all atoms and all their sub-atomic parts into being, so they haven't 
been around forever; and nuclear fission can destroy them all and convert them 
into energy or other particles or forms ofradiant energy. 
The Greek Atomists were totally wrong in thinking that the smallest 
physical particles have always existed unchanged and uncreated. We now know 
that even the smallest parts of atomic nuclei, the quarks, exist contingently, and 
so do the electrons that orbit atomic nuclei. Quarks always come in pairs (in 
mesons) or three at a time (in protons and neutrons). Pairs or triplets of quarks 
cannot be separated, but they can be created and destroyed. Bombarding them 
with larger particles in accelerators to try to separate them merely creates addi-
tional pairs or triplets of quarks out of the exchange of kinetic energy. Quarks 
can thus be created in the laboratory out of energy; and anything that is or can 
be created in the laboratory or elsewhere has a merely contingent form of 
existence. Quarks are not necessary beings, and neither are electrons, which can 
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also be produced and destroyed by the same processes. One type of quark is 
called the "Higgs particle," or "Higgs boson." In defending Naturalism, specifi-
cally its claim that our universe is eternal, Kai Nielsen wrote, 
Even if the big bang theory is true, it does not show that the fundamental 
particles were brought into explosive existence by the big bang. The Higgs 
particle need not be thought to have so come into existence, or to have 
come into existence at all, and it stands as a candidate for a necessary 
being and a more plausible one than God.7 
On the contrary, innumerable articles in the literature of physics describe 
the production of Higgs particles in cyclotrons under many different conditions. 8 
No kind of entity that is or can be produced by something else is an eternal, self-
sufficient, and necessary being. Also, Big Bang and Grand Unification Theories 
say that in the beginning all existing particles emerged from a more primitive 
state of unified pure energy, which in turn had its own cause. 
The most stable and enduring sub-atomic particle is the proton. Once 
created, protons last for billions of years. The protons in the nuclei of most 
atoms existing in the material world today were created within the first three 
minutes after the Big Bang, but they were created. Most physicists believe that 
protons eventually decay; but elaborate experiments designed to detect proton 
decay have failed thus far. Nevertheless, protons are not eternal and necessary 
beings. They are composed of quarks, and quarks are not eternal and uncreated. 
Protons may naturally decay very slowly, but they can be destroyed in pro-
ton/antiproton collisions and in nuclear reactions. In fact, any kind of particle 
can be destroyed by its antiparticle; and all particles and antiparticles were 
created after the onset of the Big Bang by the primordial grandly-unified matter-
less, particle-less energy that preceded them. The same is true of the four basic 
forces of nature that once were one, says Grand Unification Theory. No created 
and destructible entity or force is a necessary being. 
Though all particular physical entities exist contingently, perhaps space-
time and/or pure physical energy exist necessarily. No, spacetime and physical 
energy also exist contingently if the Big Bang originated in a singularity of 
nothingness totally devoid of spacetime and energy, or if the Big Bang and all 
its contents were created at some point in the past by anything whatsoever. So 
what caused the Big Bang? 
In contemporary physics, space, time, and physical energy are inseparable; 
but the emphasis is on time. Time has not been spatialized; rather, space has 
been temporalized. Neither space nor time are merely empty forms into which 
actual events and particles are infused. Space is not vacuous nothingness; it has 
its own energy density; it is an elastic physical reality that may be warped, 
stretched, condensed, straightened, curved, expanded, and contracted to noth-
ingness (almost?). All physical particles and configurations of energy are 
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constituted by both time and space. Particles, waves, and all microscopic entities 
are warped, knotted, or stringed concentrations of spacetime. In contemporary 
physics, neither atoms nor any sub-atomic particles, waves, fields, or other 
entities are basic necessary beings. 
As Werner Heisenberg indicated, in contemporary science, energy is "The 
primary substance of the world.''9 Is energy the necessary being? No. According 
to the Standard Model of Big Bang Cosmology, space/time/mass/energy was 
created in the beginning out of what was empirically nothing-often called an 
initial singularity. No alternative cosmology actually proves otherwise. If our 
universe emerged from an initial singularity, neither spacetime nor physical 
energy exist necessarily. Yet, other possibilities remain to be examined. 
Perhaps pure energy as such exists necessarily, though all particular forms 
of energy exist contingently (as suggested by the quotations from Corliss 
Lamont with endnote numbers 15 and 16 in Chapter Two). Electrical energy is 
derived from dynamos; atomic energy is derived from nuclear reactions; solar 
energy is derived from the sun. Every empirically observable manifestation of 
energy is derived from some energy source other than itself. Having a derivative 
existence is precisely what existing contingently means. 
Does pure (non-empirical) energy as such exists necessarily? If so, it is too 
pure to count as something empirical or observable! All observable forms of 
energy exist contingently, being derived causally from something else, from 
other forms of energy. Furthermore, all of these emerged initially from, were 
caused by, the Big Bang. So we are back to our original problem, What caused 
the Big Bang? It was something transcendent, something outside our spacetime 
system, something beyond nature! Naturalists, like Theists, resort finally to 
explaining things visible (natural) in terms of things invisible (non-natural). Not 
all natural effects have natural causes. Naturalist and theists have their backs to 
the same wall. 
One hundred percent of the time, verifying experiences confirm that all 
parts of the universe exist contingently. True, we have not tested every last part 
of the universe, just as we have not tested every last speck of energy to verify 
that E = mc2• Neither proposition is absolutely certain, but both are as well 
confirmed as anything that we know. 
Indisputably, if space/time/mass/energy originated at some point in the 
finite past either from nothing or from extra-natural antecedents, our whole 
universe and all its parts exists contingently. This is exactly what Big Bang 
Cosmology proclaims. Neither any parts of nature nor nature as a whole are 
necessary, self-sufficient, uncreated, everlasting, and indestructible. Even a 
reified infinitely transcendent Superspacetime/mass/energy would exist contin-
gently if it were wholly comprised of contingent parts. An infinite whole com-
posed of an infinity of contingent parts is an infinitely contingent whole, not a 
necessary being, but this can be disputed. Let's try to imagine how. 
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Assume for the sake of the argument that Oscillation Cosmology's claim 
that later universes are caused by antecedent universes at least makes sense, 
even if unverifiable. Even so, "Any whole is contingent when composed entirely 
of contingent parts," applies to all combinations of contingent antecedent 
universes linked by a common thread of causation. Let our world of nature, our 
universe, be Ul; and let it be our first whole, WI. Let UI be caused by an 
antecedent universe, U2, which is our second whole, W2. Together they will 
form a Third whole, W3. If both universes are themselves contingent, W3 will 
also be a contingent whole. This process can be repeated any number of times, 
perhaps even an infinite number of times, and all repetitions will be swallowed 
up by the premise: if any whole is composed entirely of contingent parts, the 
whole itself is contingent. We will return to this later in replying to objections 
to the Cosmological Argument. 
Our universe as a whole does not have a necessary mode of existence. The 
first two premises of our Cosmological Argument from Contingency are true, 
and its logical form is valid. Our universe does not exist necessarily, and Natu-
ralists are wrong in believing otherwise. All wholes, including our universe, 
composed entirely of contingent parts are contingent wholes; and our universe 
is composed entirely of contingent parts. Therefore, our whole universe exists 
only contingently. Once established, this deduction is used as an additional 
premise in our more extended Cosmological Argument from Contingency. 
Theology is not tied inextricably to creation ex nihilo, even if it now seems 
to be a very reasonable position. A theology for rational persons must be com-
patible with the most firmly established conclusions of the natural sciences, but 
theology should proceed with caution in binding itself too tightly to particular 
scientific theories, concepts, and discoveries. Sometimes, a healthy agnosticism, 
an open mind, is the most reasonable theological response. Still, the preponder-
ance of evidence as we see it cannot be ignored. All philosophical knowledge 
falls short of certainty; but we want the most reasonable belief about what 
caused the Big Bang that we can find; and our best informed guess is that 
creation ex nihilo by God is it. 
Two basic options, (I) creation out of nothing and (2) out of spatiotem-
poral antecedents, are now both available to Process Theologians, who tradi-
tionally presupposed something like theistic oscillationism. Whitehead said that 
God does not exist before the world but always with the world-some world. 
Yet, creation ex nihilo is a viable process option, as explained in Chapter Ten. 
From the perspective ofSuperspacetime, God could create all worlds either out 
of nothing, out of his own Superspatiotemporality, or out of the ashes of ante-
cedent universes. No matter which, we could expect God to choose laws and 
initial conditions that would make each world interesting and worthwhile. 
But our own world is our most immediate problem. Do we know enough 
at this point to draw any conclusions about it? Is it a necessary being? A contin-
gent being? Did it have a cause? What really caused the Big Bang? 
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D. Conclusion: The Dependence of the Universe on God 
Our Cosmological Argument from Contingency concludes that nature, the 
universe, our system of spacetime, ultimately depends on God. St. Thomas 
Aquinas said that the ultimate cause and designer of the universe is what "all 
men call God"; but this is really not true according to Naturalists. They don't 
call it God! St. Thomas also said that the Cosmological Argument can tell us 
that God exists but not what God is like, nothing about God's essence. If so, it 
generates very little useful or valuable infonnation about God. Actually, taken 
with the Teleological Argument, it does tell us some religiously significant 
things about God. Together these arguments infonn us that our contingent world 
of nature requires a cause that is ( 1) transcendent, (2) immensely powerful, (3) 
creative, ( 4) necessary, ( 5) infinite, ( 6) intelligent, (7) purposive, and (8) benev-
olent. All arguments for the existence of God must work together to give us this 
much information. The Cosmological Argument gives us (1), (2), (3), (4), and 
( S); and the Teleological Argument gives us ( 6), (7), and (8). Only the Ontologi-
cal Argument (not explored in depth in this book)10 can give us all divine perfec-
tions, including (9) perfect virtue or optimal righteousness, (10) supreme holi-
ness, and so on. All three of these arguments taken together bring us to an 
ultimate Divine reality in whom all our questions about why there is something 
rather than nothing finally come to rest. On rational grounds, they bring us to 
God as the supremely worshipful, creative, everlasting, uncreated, and inde-
structible Ultimate Reality who could not possibly not be. 
2. Critique of the Cosmological Argument from Contingency 
Replies to several important objections to the Cosmological Argument were 
implicit in many earlier discussions. We now know that our universe is not a 
Big Accident having no cause at all, that it is not a chance occurrence within 
infinitely many worlds, and that cosmological reasoning from the world to God 
does not commit the informal logical Fallacy of Composition. The following 
additional charges must now be confronted. A. An everlasting universe needs 
no God. B. Contingent wholes imply only contingent causes. C. God must have 
a cause if everything has a cause. D. The concept of the universe as a whole, 
and thus of God's creating it, is meaningless. E. Transcendent reality is un-
knowable. Can plausible replies be given? 
A. The Universe Needs No God 
If creation ex nihilo is true, the universe as a whole and all its parts depend on 
God for their very existence since God created all the primoridal spacetime/ 
mass/energy of our universe from nothing. Many atheistic oscillationists assume 
that the universe, some universe, has always existed, and that an everlasting set 
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of successive universes is itself a necessary being that needs no God. As we saw 
in Chapter Four, Oscillation Cosmology is often adopted mainly to avoid God, 
but it may not be true that an everlasting universe or set of universes would not 
be contingent upon God in any respects, and it is definitely not true that ours is 
an everlasting universe or that it belongs to an everlasting set of sequential 
universes. 
The evidence already given is overwhelming that our universe is finite but 
expanding spatiotemporally, and it is not divided into an infinite number of tiny 
but real parts, some of which exist necessarily. The contingency or derivative 
existence of the universe might not depend totally upon its finitude in time or 
space. Naturalists suppose that the universe (or some universe) has infinite 
temporal duration. This means, they conclude, that our universe exists necessar-
ily; but they are mistaken. Unlike ours, an eternal universe might resemble 
necessary existence in being uncreated and everlasting, yet it would still be 
causally contingent if it depends everlastingly in some way on something tran-
scendent. 
Traditional theism says that God both created the world and continues to 
preserve or sustain its existence. The world depends on God originally and at 
every moment. Either (or both) implies that the universe has a contingent or 
dependent form of existence and that God is the world's ultimate necessary 
condition. Theism is not inescapably tied to creation out of nothing in the finite 
past or to Big Bang Cosmology. The universe would have a derivative or caus-
ally dependent mode of being if either of the following propositions is true: 
(1) The whole universe came into being at some point in the finite past; 
and/or 
(2) The universe, or other universe(s) to which ours is connected, depend 
somehow on God at some or all moments throughout an infinite past and/or an 
endless spatial expanse. 
If all contingent wholes in a finite or an infinite series depend on God 
either originally, continuously, or historically in any way at all, the claim that 
"All wholes within the universe are caused by contingent beings" is only part 
of the truth. The whole truth adds, "and by a necessarily existing God." 
St. Thomas Aquinas believed on the basis of divine revelation (as he 
interpreted it) that (I) is true; but, he contended, the Cosmological Argument for 
God hangs on the second type of contingency, not the first. Aquinas thought 
that Aristotle, for whom the world co-existed eternally with God, set the defini-
tive standard for what reason could or could not accomplish. In deference to 
Aristotle, Aquinas held that reason cannot prove that the world has a beginning 
or disprove its everlasting co-existence with God. Revelation may say other-
wise, but not reason. A world co-existing with God throughout an infinite past 
would nevertheless depend infinitely on God for its order and being, just as rays 
from the sun would depend infinitely on the sun if the two co-existed forever. 
Though Aquinas did not say so, a spatially infinite universe would also be 
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contingent if it somehow depends on God at any or at every real unit of spatial 
extension. An infinitely prolonged or extended set of contingencies does not add 
up to necessity, especially where causal dependence exists at spatial and/or 
temporal units along the way. An infinite spatially and/or temporally contingent 
world is not a necessary being; it is an infinitely contingent being. For many 
good reasons, now we know that we do not live in an infinite world. 
St. Thomas Aquinas anticipated neither contemporary Biblical criticism 
nor Big Bang Cosmology. Perhaps he was wrong in thinking that revelation 
teaches creation ex nihilo in the finite past, and that reason cannot show that the 
universe originated at some point in the finite past. Modem Biblical scholarship 
affirms that creation ex nihilo is not clearly taught in Genesis or elsewhere in the 
Protestant Bible; and Big Bang Cosmology shows that the universe, the whole 
shebang, was created in the finite past-about fifteen billion years ago. 
St. Thomas was convinced that creation ex nihilo is a clear deliverance of 
Christian revelation, 11 but this is far from certain. Modem Biblical scholars 
generally agree that the first chapter of Genesis does not clearly affirm creation 
out of nothing. In the King James translation of the Bible, the first verses of 
Genesis read, "In the beginning, God created the Heavens and the earth; and the 
earth was without form and void." Biblical scholarship in the twentieth century 
concludes that these verses may, with perfect faithfulness, be translated to read, 
"When God began to create the Heavens and the earth in the beginning, the 
world was without form and void." In margins or notes, current translations of 
Genesis give this as a perfectly legitimate rendition of Genesis I: I. Genesis 
declares that God created the universe, not ex nihilo, but out of the formless 
chaos that already existed "when God began to create." Creation itself was 
initiated only when God said "Let there be light." In Genesis, at the beginning, 
God brings order to the world but does not bring it into being absolutely. God 
is a world-designer but not a world-creator. 
Although not clearly taught anywhere in what Protestants recognize as the 
Bible, creation ex nihi/o is taught perhaps in the intertestamental literature that 
Protestants do not regard as scriptural, though Catholics do. Specifically, the 
idea seems to occur for the first time in II. Maccabees, Ch. 7, verse 28, which 
reads, "I beg you, child, look at the sky and the earth; see all that is in them and 
realize that God made them out ofnothing, and that man comes into being in the 
same way."12 This was written perhaps as early as 125 B.C., but scholars debate 
its date. St. Thomas Aquinas regarded //. Maccabees as scriptural, but the 
authors of the "Westminster Confession," along with most Protestants, did not 
and do not so regard it. In any event, Eric Lerner's assertion that creation ex 
nihilo originated with Tertullian in the third century A.D. is incorrect. 13 As far 
as biblical religion is concerned, God ordered the universe from pre-existing 
chaos, which may have co-existed everlastingly with God. The God of Genesis, 
like Plato's Deimurge in the Timaeus, ordered the world out of pre-existent 
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materials. Neither created the universe out of nothing. Still, creation ex nihilo 
might be true in spite of Genesis. 
i. Creating and Sustaining 
To return to philosophy again, how might a created or a continuously existing 
universe or everlasting set of universes depend on God, and how much of it 
makes sense within the framework of Process Theology? 
(I) The first and most obvious way in which the universe depends on God 
is with respect to its creation, its existence. If God created our universe out of 
nothing, Process Theologians must join with Classical Christian Theologians 
in recognizing the most obvious way in which our universe depends upon God. 
God produced from nothing the very stuff of physical existence, all the space/ 
time/mass/energy of creation. Except for God's creative activity, there would 
be no space/time/ mass/energy, no chain of secondary causes within the world, 
no world to sustain. Creation out of nothing does not explain how God sustains 
all creation, but it is the most conspicuous way in which the world depends on 
God. 
Traditionally, Process Theologians repudiated the claim that God creates 
our world out of nothing; but from the revised process perspective developed 
in Chapter Ten, Process Theology can incorporate creation ex nihilo. Thereby 
it can further emich its understanding of how the world depends on God. Cre-
ation out of nothing and ongoing providential directing were emphasized tradi-
tionally by Classical Theologians, but Process Theologians can also make a 
prominent place for them. 
(2) Closely related to depending on God for its existence is dependence on 
God for its form, its life-supporting law and order or structure. Some important 
features of original creation are ongoing. Our teleological inquiries show that 
our universe depends on the intelligent and purposive foresight of a being of 
divine proportions for its life-producing and preserving law and order, its life-
favoring natural laws or habits. If natural laws are only statistical abstractions 
from the collective habits of massive numbers of kinds of things like electrons, 
protons, photons, paramecia, and people, then claiming, as Charles Hartshorne 
did, 14 that God chooses natural laws for our universe or cosmic epoch is just a 
roundabout way affirming that God created a plurality of creatures having 
certain natures which, on average, behave in certain calculable ways. Hartshorne 
was well aware that natural laws are formal, statistical, and changeable; but he 
might not have appreciated fully the very concrete causal efficaciousness in-
volved in this claim. This means that God selects and produces not the lawful 
forms as such, but the basic kinds of entities that exist. God gives them the 
natures that their habits express statistically. The basic structures and habits of 
existing things can evolve, along with the laws that express these changes. 
Today's "scientific" cosmologists agree that no laws for physical particles 
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existed before particles separated from the grand initial unification; and no laws 
of human psychology existed before human beings evolved. Still, the "hand"-
the anticipations, intentions, and influences-of God is in all of this. In 
formatively influencing the natures of things that act lawfully in nature, God 
acts as an efficient cause of particular kinds of entities, not just as the final 
cause of the abstract lawlike patterns that describe their activities. 
Our universe depends on God for its basic life-supporting structural 
features, its original life-assuring initial conditions, including its initial low 
entropy, the kinds and strengths of its basic physical forces, its asymmetry of 
matter over antimatter, and many other initial conditions previously discussed. 
If ours belongs to an extended set of oscillating universes (as seems 
unlikely), there might be a place after for a God of the Gaps, especially if the 
gaps fall between or at the beginning of universes. Science can know only our 
own cosmic epoch. Existing originally only in the Primordial mind of God, 
beneficent life-favoring natural laws (general patterns) and initial conditions 
could vary in and need to be chosen anew for each cosmic epoch. As we know 
and discover them, the formal patterns of the enduring habits of primitive 
physical entities in our universe are expressed in the laws of physics, chemistry, 
biology, psychology, and the other natural and social sciences. The earliest 
emergent laws ofnature and the original conditions of the universe belong more 
to initial creation than to continuous sustenance, but they or their effects persist 
even today. Here the Cosmological Argument (dependence) merges with the 
Teleological Argument (purposefulness). The beneficent order of nature is both 
ongoing and evolving. 
(3) Theologians have held that God sustains the world in being whether 
created or everlasting. If the universe in some form existed infinitely into the 
past, might it still depend on God? Many cosmologist seem to believe that this 
would be a way avoiding God. Not so! St. Thomas Aquinas, the most influential 
classical theologian, strongly believed that if our world existed throughout an 
infinite past and depended on God for something through it all, it would defi-
nitely be contingent upon God, just as rays coming from the sun would depend 
infinitely upon the sun if they co-existed throughout an infinite past. This 
analogy would also hold for a modem process theistic oscillation cosmology in 
which each member of an infinite set of successively existing worlds somehow 
depends on God. But how could an infinite past actuality or chain of past 
actualities depend on God in the absence of original creation from nothing? 
The classical answer that God constantly sustains or preserves the world 
in existence might do the job if we really understood what "sustains" means and 
were sure that an infinite series of contingencies lacks the ability to sustain 
itself, or that physical mass/energy, once created, lacks the intrinsic self-exis-
tence attributed to it by the First Law of Thermodynamics. The meaning of 
"God preserves" has been difficult to specify. We definitely cannot argue 
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without circularity that the world cannot sustain itself because it depends on 
God, for that is precisely what is at issue. That is what must be clarified. 
Most attempts to explain the meaning of"God sustains the world" get no 
further than identifying sustaining with continuous creation, preservation, or 
dependence, all of which are then defined as sustaining. Getting beyond this 
conceptual circularity is extremely difficult. 
Consider briefly some implausible analyses of what it means to say that 
"God sustains the existence of all creation." Since sustaining applies to every-
thing in the universe, an account of how it works must have universal signifi-
cance and application. Because they have only local significance and applica-
tion, particular miracles (if any) and acts of providence (which are not necessar-
ily miraculous) do not count as sustaining. Sustenance belongs to general 
providence, not to particular providence. 
Some explications of how God sustains the universe are clearly implausi-
ble. (A) Perhaps new matter/energy is constantly being created everywhere, as 
suggested by Fred Hoyle, except God rather than matter is its cause. Yet, little 
or no evidence supports such ongoing violations of the principle of the conser-
vation of energy. This may or may not happen occasionally at that fuzzy border-
line between potentiality and actuality that the physicists call the space/time 
"vacuum" where the world merges with God. If it happens constantly, the pace 
of it is too slow to account for the entire mass of our universe within finite Big 
Bang time. 
(B) Perhaps, as Bishop Berkeley and Quantum Observer Theorists main-
tain, an actual world exists only as something being perceived either by our-
selves, by other finite minds, or by God, who is always around to keep things 
going when no one else is looking. The universe would cease to exist if God 
quit thinking or perceiving it if Idealists are right. For Idealists, God's sustain-
ing the world just consists in his continuing to think it. Yet, this book opts for 
and defends a critically realistic theory of knowledge and a corresponding 
realistic metaphysics. 
(C) Perhaps sustaining is just constant recreation every instant, as Des-
cartes and a few others maintained. Jonathan Edwards, who held this view, 
argued that no real causal relations obtain at all between events within the 
world; the world continues to exist because God recreates the whole of it from 
nothing at every moment. 15 Edwards anticipated David Hume's empirical reduc-
tion of causation to mere temporal succession and spatial contiguity devoid of 
"secondary" causal efficacy. Yet, despite Edwards and Hume, things within the 
universe do seem to have real causal relations and connections. Existing entities 
really do transmit their energy, structured patterns, and purposes to other things; 
and constant recreation just seems like a lot of unnecessary repetitive work for 
God. So does creating a world that is not self-sustaining once created. 
(D) Traditional theology simply decreed that created things in themselves 
lack the power to continue to exist and that God alone supplies that power. 
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Naturalists regard this as question-begging; and Theists who say this must 
explain how God supplies things with the power to exist, which is not accom-
plished simply by declaring that he does. Theists might hold that God made the 
universe to be self-sustaining, once created, that God himself is behind the first 
law of thermodynamics. Once created, the world's mass/energy cannot be 
destroyed. Perhaps making it so from the outset is one of God's ways of sustain-
ing creation. 
"Sustaining" is a difficult concept to make intelligible. Process Theology's 
distinctive accounts of how the world depends on God can be construed as ways 
in which God constantly sustains creation. According to process thought, God 
does not act on the world merely at the beginning. Rather, God continuously 
interacts with it, and it constantly depends on God in a variety of ways. God's 
influence on the world is ongoing. How so? 
ii. Influencing and Saving 
How else might a universe or many universes depend on God? Are other ac-
counts of "sustaining" more plausible? Some forms of dependence belong to 
initial creation, some to ongoing preservation. Perhaps ongoing preservation is 
ongoing creativity. The several ways in which the world depends upon God 
according to Process Theism may help to make sense of the vague notion of 
"sustaining the world." As mainstream Process Theologians contend, God 
continues to influence creatively and include within himself the course of events 
within the world, so sustaining is ongoing creation and preservation. But how 
does this happen? 
( 1) Temporal entities within the world rely on God to supply them with an 
"initial aim," consisting of an awareness of novel possibilities for creative 
activity and self-development. Efficient causation within the world is mixed 
with final causation, purposiveness, or teleology derived from God. 
(2) Temporal entities depend on God to lure them gently toward goodness, 
without overwhelming their ability to choose otherwise. Alluring visions or 
intuitions of the true, the beautiful, the right, and the good within the world 
ultimately come from God. Higher or more complex organisms like us clearly 
have them, but their pervasiveness is open to debate. In our awareness of and 
sensitivity to values that transcend time and place, God's presence is ongoing. 
(3) All individual events depend on God's memory for the preservation 
of their concrete being and value once they perish in time to themselves. Every 
universe, if others exist, depends on God to preserve all intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
systemic worth achieved within it. Without God, contingent goodness perishes 
altogether with the passage of time. Divine value-conserving activities are 
ongoing, universal, and count as "sustaining." By remembering them flawlessly, 
God sustains and conserves within himself all values actually achieved in 
330 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
ongoing creation. Plausibly, sustaining is God's remembering. This way of 
sustaining the world is its eternal salvation. 
(4) Finally, once the mass/energy of existence is created, God voluntarily 
shares creativity itself. Newtonian universes devoid of creativity are logically 
possible, but God grants freedom and co-creativity to his creatures. The transi-
tion, transmission, and transformation of mass/energy belongs to the subject 
matter of physics; the internal self-creation of actual entities belongs to psychol-
ogy, axiology, metaphysics, and theology. Self-creation and final causation or 
persuasion may not apply everywhere, but they are widely distributed. In origi-
nating universes, in creating the intensely concentrated stuff out of which partly 
self-creative actual occasions emerge, God acts only as an efficient cause 
without imparting final causation to existing subjects, without giving initial aims 
to pre-existing individuated occasions, for none exist at the initial moment of 
grand unification and perhaps for some time thereafter. Non-existence and non-
individuation cannot be co-creators with God; but very near the outset of a Big 
Bang, individuated entities in a newly created ex nihilo universe could be. God 
caused and designed the Big Bang, and the Big Bang produced both freedom 
and order. 
(5) Plausible versions of both Classical or Process Theology may make a 
place for special acts of divine providence and self-disclosure to particular 
individuals in the course of history. Special acts of God and Divine self-disclo-
sures have huge moral and religious significance and make momentous differ-
ences in the course of human events; but this type of dependence is particular, 
not universal. 
Acts of God and Divine self-disclosures involve interactions between God 
and created individuals in specific situations and lack the universality required 
to count as sustaining the universe; since they occur within an established 
universe, they do not count as world-creation; but they are instances of ongoing 
Divine creativity and the world's contingency upon God. Some critics suggest 
that Process Theology cannot allow for personal historical interactions between 
God and human individuals, 16 but this is not true. The world may depend in 
special ways on God for what it knows about how God has related himself to 
particular people in particular times and places. As Charles Hartshorne ex-
plained: 
With Crisis Theology ... our theory can agree that God is personal and self-
related to the creatures, and that his acts of self-relationship are not ratio-
nally deducible, but require to be "encountered." However, as Barth and 
Brunner seem not to see, this is compatible with there being an essence of 
God which is philosophically explicable and knowable. The concrete 
volitions of God may be contingent ... For each man-religion is a matter of 
the actions of God as self-related to him, that is, to a wholly contingent 
being, or to humanity, likewise contingent. Relations whose terms are 
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contingent can only be contingent. Philosophy seeks that general principle 
or essence of the divine being of which such concrete actions of God are 
mere contingent illustrations. But from a religious point of view, it is the 
illustrations that count. Thus the religious and the philosophical attitudes 
are complementary, not conflicting. Our doctrine appears, then to effect 
a peculiarly comprehensive synthesis of past and present thought concern-
ing theism. 17 
The success or failure of any act of divine self-disclosure depends upon 
the openness of human receivers to God. Some Christian Process Theologians 
hold that Jesus was both fully man and fully God in the sense that he was the 
one man in all of human history who was most fully open and sensitive to God's 
nature, thoughts, values, sensitivities, emotions, desires, and decisions. The 
historically limited and conditioned intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and religious 
capacities, predispositions, and perceptivity of human receivers and interpreters 
always color and may even distort divine disclosures. Sinners who may distort 
the message are always on the receiving end of divine communications. 
To return to the objection that an everlasting universe would be a neces-
sary being, recall that if a thing exists contingently, this means that (I) its non-
existence is possible or conceivable without contradiction; (2) it is caused to 
exist or created in some or all respects by something other than itself; (3) it is 
corruptible and destructible; and, normally, it (4) comes into being in time and 
(5) perishes or is capable of perishing in time. A necessary being has just the 
opposite properties. A temporally infinite set of contingent things, for example, 
contingent but successive universes, would not be a necessary being because ( 1) 
its non-existence is possible or logically conceivable; and thus (2) its existence 
is not fully self-explanatory. It is (3) destructible in principle unless some 
Necessary Being sustains it, or causes it to be self-sustaining once created. If a 
temporal setofuniverses is infinite, (4) (a) each part(each epoch) would come 
into being in time, albeit infinite time; (b) no part of it would be absolutely 
uncreated and persist through all time. (5) Still, the whole of it would embrace 
an everlasting past; and it would in this respect resemble the everlastingness of 
a single necessary being. If ( 6) it continues infinitely into the future, the whole 
would not perish in time, even though each of its parts does, so in that respect 
also it would also be everlasting. Still, it fails in many important respects-{ l) 
through (4}-to be a fully necessary being. 
Most importantly, ours is not a temporally infinite universe. Remember the 
Big Bang! The most crucial cosmological fact about our universe is (2) above. 
The one and only universe that we know to exist was caused to exist by some-
thing other than itself. The first premise of our cosmological argument applies 
to it. If any whole is composed entirely of contingent parts, that whole is itself 
contingent. Many ways in which our universe depends on God have now been 
identified. 
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Would an infinite string of universes depend on God the way ours does? 
No available evidence supports the claim there is or was an infinite string of 
universes in either space or time. Infinity is not a real problem for our spatio-
temporally finite universe, the only one we know to exist. Epistemologically, 
infinite universes are just postulates proffered to avoid God by atheists, or to 
imagine how God could be infinitely creative in space as well as time by Pro-
cess Theists. Our problem is, What caused our Big Bang? 
B. Contingent Wholes Do Not Imply Necessary Causes 
At least one difficulty with applying "If the parts are contingent, the whole is 
contingent" premise to our universe is serious. Applying the Principle of Con-
tingent Wholes to the universe as a whole enables us to conclude that it, too, is 
a contingent whole that has a cause. Yet, one way of applying it-as an inductive 
generalization-seems highly problematic 
Recall that inductive logic allows us to generalize to more of the same, but 
it does not allow us to infer something different. The Principle of Contingent 
Wholes is an empirical truth derived inductively from what is "evident to our 
senses" about relations between parts and wholes within our own world of 
spacetime. When we extend it to apply to the universe as a whole, we are still 
reasoning from parts to wholes, so what is the problem? 
The difficulty is with respect to the nature of that cause. Here, even if so-
far-so-good with respect to reasoning from parts to wholes, other inductive 
generalizations seem to count against a Necessary Cause. Empirically, all 
experienced wholes derive their existence from other contingent beings, not 
from a necessary being. Thus, it seems, we are warranted inductively to general-
ize only that all contingent empirical wholes are caused by other contingent 
entities. Applied to the universe itself, this means that even if our contingent 
universe had a cause, we are warranted inductively to infer only that a contin-
gent being (or beings) brought our world into existence. If this is all we are 
entitled to infer, the first premise of our Cosmological Argument from Contin-
gency cannot generate the conclusion that a set of contingent beings or wholes, 
whether finite or infinite, depends ultimately upon a necessary being that tran-
scends that set. 
So, how does omnipresent contingency entail the reality of a transcendent 
necessary being? Inductive logic will take us from wholes to their causes, but 
will it take us from contingency to necessity? If not, Naturalism is in the same 
boat; it can't get the necessity of Nature by inductive reasoning either. Recall 
Naturalism's claim that "Nature as a whole exists necessarily." 
In response, the existence of a necessary Divine Being is not an inductive 
inference. Even though it cannot be inferred inductively, it is still the most 
plausible explanatory hypothesis available to us. From contingency and finitude 
alone, neither Theists nor Naturalists can derive the infinity and necessity of 
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God or Nature by direct observation or inductive inference. Still, they might get 
them as the most plausible explanatory hypothesis, that is, by abduction. Who 
has the best case? 
Some analogies between nature and its parts seem to hold, for example, if 
any whole is composed entirely of contingent parts, the whole itself is 
contingent. Many other analogies cannot hold between intra-universe and extra-
universe causation. Not counting miracles, ifthere are any to count, experience 
shows that all empirical contingent wholes are caused by other empirical contin-
gencies; but we have good reasons for not applying this very different general-
ization to the ultimate cause of the universe as a whole. 
Many valid inductive generalizations cannot be applied to the ultimate 
cause of our total universe. Experience shows that all wholes within our uni-
verse are caused by other beings inside the universe. Yet, the universe as a 
whole cannot be caused by something within itself. The universe as a whole 
could not be caused to exist by another being (or beings) inside the universe 
because they are effects of the universe's existence, not its cause. Even cosmo-
logical Naturalists do not resort to that. Before Big Bang theory, they said ithas 
always been around in some form, which isn't true. Now, they say, something 
transcendent like Superspacetime or an Antecedent Universe caused our Big 
Bang about fifteen billion years ago, but they do not claim that something within 
it caused it to be. Even Big Accident Theorist do not claim that something 
within our universe caused it to be; rather, it had no cause at all. 
Another inductive generalization that applies to all wholes within our 
universe could not hold true of the ultimate cause of the universe itself. All 
wholes within our universe are caused by a finite set of natural events that go 
back no further than the Big Bang, but naturalistic oscillationists and all other 
infinitely many worlds metaphysicians postulate an infinite set of antecedent 
conditions as the ultimate cause of our universe. Naturalists deny both that 
nature as a whole is caused either by a finite set of causal conditions or by 
conditions that are parts of our own natural system of spacetime. They think that 
as whole it just isn't caused at all; it is itself the Necessary Being; like God, 
nature is "self-caused." But this is where the first premise of our Cosmological 
Argument from Contingency shows them to be wrong: all contingent wholes, 
nature included, have causes. 
Many other inductive analogies of causation do not hold when dealing 
with the origin of the universe as a whole. All causes within nature are 
spatiotemporal; but singularities are not spatiotemporal. All causes within 
nature obey the laws of quantum physics; but antecedent and contemporary 
"many worlds" may have their own very different laws. The truth is, character-
izations of the very nature of the ultimate cause (an infinite set of crunching 
antecedent universes, perhaps correlated with an infinite set of initial singulari-
ties, infinitely many co-existing worlds, an infinite and self-sufficient Nature, 
or what have you) are explanatory hypotheses, not inductive generalizations. 
334 WHAT CAUSED THE BIG BANG? 
The same is true of God as the ultimate Necessary Being. So the question is, 
which explanation is best? Preceding chapters demonstrated that non-theistic 
explanations just do not work. 
That our universe as a whole had a cause is denied by Big Accident 
Cosmologists, who say that it just popped into being without a cause, and in a 
peculiar way, by Naturalists, who say that it is itself the self-sufficient Neces-
sary Being. Both have been refuted in earlier discussions. Our reasoning about 
nature as a whole cannot be entirely nature bound. The cause of our universe 
was not the universe or some part of itself, not some finite set of causal condi-
tions, and not a contingent set of conditions because no such entities are ulti-
mately self-explanatory. 
In one respect, Process Theology can easily accept contingency as an 
element of that which created our universe. As indicated earlier, most Process 
Theists affirm the reality of infinitely many temporally successive worlds or 
cosmic epochs on theological (but not empirical) grounds. It is reasonable to 
expect that an infinitely loving, social, and creative God would be infinitely 
creative of creatures to love and with whom to socialize. In a very important 
sense, "All contingent wholes have contingent causes" applies even to God; but 
this is not embarrassing to Process Theology as long as it is not the whole 
truth-as next explained. 
An element of contingency pertains to God's creating all particulars. 
God's decisions to create particular actualities belong to God's contingent 
Consequent Nature, not to God's necessary Primordial Nature. God's decisions 
to create particular worlds are freely and contingently made. Particular manifes-
tations of God's causal efficacy are contingent, not necessary. That the Divine 
cause of our universe is contingent, in part is compatible with the dominant 
process view that God creates new contingent worlds out of old contingent 
worlds, as well as with the oscillationist position that contingent old worlds 
enter into the creation of new worlds. In fact, most Process Theists have been 
implicit if not explicit oscillationists who think that God had important contin-
gent roles to play in an infinite string of previously existing contingent universes 
or cosmic epochs. 
The element of contingency in the God who created our finite and contin-
gent world cannot be pushed too far. Not everything about God is contingent, 
or God himself would fall prey to the first premise of our Cosmological Argu-
ment from Contingency: God would also be a totally contingent being if every-
thing about God is contingent; but there is an important disanalogy between 
Divine and mundane causation. If a totally contingently God caused our uni-
verse, then the world plus God would constitute another contingent whole 
requiring a higher order God as its cause. This higher order God is either contin-
gent or necessary. If contingent, the Principle of Contingent Wholes applies 
again. No matter how many totally contingent Gods exist, the principle contin-
ues to apply until we come at last to a necessarily existent God. All contingen-
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cies, no matter how many, are swallowed up by the Principle of Contingent 
Wholes; and the process comes to rest only in a Necessary Being. No contingent 
wholes are self-existent or self-explanatory. 
If our finite universe as a whole depends on God either originally, continu-
ously, or historically in any way, the claim that "All contingent wholes are 
caused by contingent beings" is only part of the truth. The whole truth requires 
us to add, "And by a necessarily existing God." The most plausible explanation 
is that our universe depends for its existence and order on the reality of a tran-
scendent Divinity who could not not exist, who knew what it was doing, did it 
intentionally, and did it well. 
C. "Cause" Cannot Apply to the Universe as a Whole 
With no necessary natural wholes or parts, our world is doubtless derived 
causally from something other than itself; but another small problem remains. 
Perhaps the very notion of causation makes sense only when applied within the 
universe and cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. Experienced causes 
are always associated with space, time, and natural laws; but all of these disap-
pear at T = 0 if the universe as a whole is created by a Divine transcendent 
reality out of absolutely nothing or the empirical nothingness of a singularity. 
An analogy between God and an initial singularity as the cause of the 
universe may help us to understand how God can be its cause. Recall that some 
versions of "scientific" Oscillation Cosmology affinn that an antecedent uni-
verse collapsed into a singularity and then caused our universe on the rebound. 
The existence of neither a single antecedent universe nor a self-sufficient 
infinite totality of prior universes can be established scientifically. Everything 
to which science appeals in tracing causal connections just plays out at an initial 
singularity. A singularity is spaceless, timeless, and lawless; and without space 
and time, the concepts of physical energy, causation, and natural laws are 
meaningless. Thus, even in this "scientific" account, our system of spacetime 
erupts from something nonspatiotemporal, nonphysical, and nonnatural. 
Given an initial singularity, our space and time begin just this side of T = 
O; and it makes no sense to say that the initial singularity was earlier than the 
onset of the primordial fireball itself. Nothing can be temporally earlier than the 
first moment of time, neither a singularity, nor an antecedent universe, nor an 
atemporal God. According to George Mavrodes, an initial singularity must have 
the same relation to creation that God has in Augustinian/Thomistic Classical 
Theism. 18 It is a logical, theoretical, hypothetical, metaphysical-but not a tem-
poral-prerequisite for all space, time, and physical energy and causation. 
Natural or physical causation also plays out at an initial singularity. Being 
the effect of something natural, of spatiotemporal energy, can be traced back no 
further than the very first "products" of an initial singularity. Scientific or 
empirical knowledge of natural, that is, spatiotemporal causes tenninates 
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abruptly at that point; no spatiotemporal or natural causes exist where no space-
time exists at all. Looking backward, all scientific knowledge based upon 
natural causal relations ends where natural causes begin. A singularity is a non-
physical, non-spatially extended cause or ground of everything physical. 
If, as many scientific cosmologists hold, the habits and laws of nature are 
themselves products of a colossal cataclysmic explosion that emerged from we 
know not what, there can be no natural law for-or underlying-creation itself. 
Natural laws themselves are (very abstract) creatures, no matter whether God, 
an initial singularity, or an antecedent universe produced them. As John 
Wheeler cautioned, "There never has been a law of physics that did not demand 
'space' and 'time' for its statement.. .. With the collapse of space and time the 
framework falls down for everything one ever called a law ofphysics."19 
Ifwe extrapolate mathematically from observationally confirmed laws of 
Hubble expansion. the redshift of the galaxies, and cosmic entropy, then make 
proper allowances for an increasing (once thought to be declining) pace of 
expansion as the explosion winds down (or up!), and finally calculate retroac-
tively the past natural history of the cosmos, we arrive at zero space and time 
somewhere close to fifteen billion years ago. Natural laws take us back that far, 
but they can carry us back no further than the point at which they themselves 
originate. Thus, we cannot extrapolate scientifically back to even one antecedent 
universe, much less an infinite number of them. Scientific knowledge ends at 
T = 0, or just this side of it. From our perspective within this world, an initial 
singularity, antecedent universes, and a transcendent Superspacetime are super-
natural, atemporal, non-natural-causal entities,just as God is in Classical Theol-
ogy. They may be just two ways of thinking about the same thing-an initial non-
physical cause or pre-condition of the universe. 
Nothing remains of the notion of physical or natural causation once space, 
time, physical energy, physical causation, and natural laws are eliminated; but 
this is no embarrassment to Theologians, for whom the creation of the universe 
ex nihilo had a transcendent Divine cause. not a natural cause. If cosmological 
reflection comes to this, the theologians can say: "I told you so." 
Natural laws can not "govern" or enable us to predict something that 
happens only once. The unique creation of a unique universe is more like the 
expression of choice or will than an effect of lawful physical regularities; but 
a puzzle lingers. Does any meaning remain for "cause" after its natural associ-
ates-space, time, physical energy, and natural laws-are altogether expunged? 
Can "cause" still have metaphysical meaning when stripped of all natural or 
physical meaning? Some critics think not. A Classical Theist might reply: 
"Well, I hope so; but if it doesn't, the singularity of Antecedent Universe 
Cosmology is in the same boat. God, who caused the Big Bang, is somehow a 
necessary condition for the existence of our universe." Yet, just what this 
"somehow" means is less than clear. 
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Process Theism, or some form of temporalistic theism. has a much easier 
time with such puzzles of causation and creation. George Mavrodes concedes, 
perhaps somewhat grudgingly, 
If God Himself is a temporal being, sustaining temporal relations, then 
indeed there can be time outside of the singularity. And God, the cause of 
the existence of the world, can temporally precede the existence of the 
world.20 
Divine spatiality could also exist literally outside our world as all-embracing 
Divine Superspacetime; the temporal God of process theology is everlastingly 
embodied. Our finite universe may be and likely is only one part of God's body. 
Divine causation could be non-physical or "incorporeal" as Classical 
Theology maintained; but if efficient causation is unintelligible without space, 
time, and embodied energy, then Process Theism attributes all of them ever-
lastingly to God and thus can make theoretical sense of initial Divine transcen-
dent but still spatiotemporal causation or creation from God's Superspacetime 
to our spacetime. 
But our inquiry is not quite complete. Until both Divine and non-divine 
transcendent but contingent causes are ruled out, our Cosmological Argument 
from Contingency does not come to rest in God as a Necessary Being who 
always was and ever will be. 
D. God Also Must Have Had a Cause 
If everything has a cause, then God has a cause. So, who or what caused God? 
Naturalistic cosmologists really seem to savor this common objection to Theism. 
Carl Sagan expressed it nicely in his Cosmos. 
In many cultures it is customary to answer that God created the universe 
out of nothing. But this is mere temporizing. lfwe wish courageously to 
pursue the question, we must of course ask next where God comes from. 
If we say that God has always existed, why not save a step and conclude 
that the universe has always existed?21 
Sagan's question ignores several important things. First, we know from 
Big Bang theory that the universe has not always existed. It is only fifteen 
billion or so years old. Just pronouncing that our universe is eternal cannot 
overcome that. Next, even if the universe were infinitely old, it would still be 
contingent because it depends on God in various ways at every moment, as 
previously explained. Sagan's premise-Everything (even God) has a cause-is 
inconsistent with his conclusion-The universe has no cause ("has always ex-
isted," as Sagan put it). If everything has a cause, then the universe has a cause. 
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Even Sagan does not really want to say that everything has a cause. Sagan's 
atheistic Naturalism supposes that our necessarily existing universe had no 
cause; but this is false. That our universe is an everlasting necessary being is 
decisively falsified by all the evidence supporting Big Bang Cosmology. Fi-
nally, Sagan misunderstands the concept of God. Nothing falsifies God's 
existence. God, unlike the universe, has always existed because God is that 
being who could not not exist. As St. Anselm discerned, if it were possible for 
God not to exist, God would not be God, the supremely worshipful reality than 
whom none greater can be conceived. Sagan's analogy between contingent and 
necessary being does not work! 
The desire to "save a step" cannot change a world that every human exper-
ience shows to be contingent, temporal, finite, and capable ofnon-existence into 
an everlasting world that could not not exist. The very idea is self-contradictory. 
By contrast, neither experience nor logic conflicts with the concept of God as 
the one reality who could not not exist and who is causally self-sufficient, 
uncreated, everlasting, and indestructible. Experience clearly discloses that the 
world does not resemble God's everlasting and self-sufficient Primordial Nature 
in any of these ways. Nature does not manifest these divine attributes, and we 
cannot make an unworkable analogy go through merely to "save a step." Experi-
ence and inductive extrapolation show that our universe is a contingent entity, 
and no ingenious conceptual gerrymandering can alter that brute fact. 
Poor philosophical reasoning is repeated interminably in cosmology. In 
The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins argues that it is futile to appeal to 
God to explain features of the world like DNA and proteins because this 
leaves unexplained the origin of the Designer. You have to say something 
like 'God was always there,' and if you allow yourself that kind of lazy 
way out, you might as well just say 'DNA was always there,' or 'Life was 
always there,' and be done with it. 22 
But we know for a fact that DNA and life were not always there, and saying so 
does not make it so. They are contingent wholes that require causes beyond 
themselves. Similarly, when Paul Davies considers the Theistic claim that God 
is the necessary being who has within himself the explanation of his own exis-
tence, he asks, "Why can't we use the same argument to explain the universe?"23 
The answer is, the fifteen billion-year-old universe is composed entirely 
of contingent beings; and any whole composed entirely of contingent beings is 
a contingent whole, as experience clearly shows. We know that our world's 
existence is not everlasting, self-sufficient, or self-explanatory: and that is why 
we cannot use the same concepts to explain the universe that we use to explain 
God, whose Primordial Nature exists necessarily. 
Stephen Hawking grew increasingly agnostic if not decisively atheistic 
over the years. 24 Hawking suggested in A Brief History of Time that there is 
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really nothing for God to do if his "no boundary" proposal for cosmology is 
correct. 
So long as the universe had a beginning, we could suppose it had a creator. 
But ifthe universe is really completely self-contained, having no boundary 
or edge, it would have neither beginning nor end: it would simply be. 
What place, then, for a creator?25 
We should now understand why Sagan, Dawkins, Davies, and Hawking 
are philosophically confused. A universe unlike ours with no beginning or end 
nevertheless would exist contingently if, like ours, it were composed entirely of 
contingently existing parts. The contingency of any universe like ours that had 
a beginning should be patently obvious. Our universe also contains no parts that 
exist necessarily-without any causal dependence of any kind on anything. A 
contingent universe with or without a beginning still needs God; and our uni-
verse had a beginning. 
E. Atheism Is Simpler than Theism 
Philosophers and scientists alike appeal to the Principle of Parsimony or Sim-
plicity as a significant nonn of rational explanation. Ockham's razor, as it is 
often called, says that we should not multiply explanatory entities unnecessarily, 
that our explanations should be as simple as possible. The lure of simplicity is 
as much aesthetic as rational. It is where the true and the beautiful come to-
gether. Yet, the ideal of simplicity must always be balanced by the nonn of 
comprehensiveness, for we should not oversimplify. As Whitehead suggested, 
we should "Seek simplicity and distrust it. "26 
Naturalists may want to argue that the hypothesis of an infinite and self-
sufficient nature or cosmos is simpler than the hypothesis of a contingent 
universe plus God. Pierre Simon Laplace, who believed in a self-sufficient and 
everlasting system of natural causes, told Napoleon that he had no need of the 
God hypothesis. Unfortunately, the naturalistic hypothesis is not scientifically 
verified or verifiable; in fact, it is falsified by Big Bang Cosmology. And neither 
an infinite single world nor infinitely many worlds is simpler than one infinite 
God. To avoid God, atheists have to resort to infinity-to something just as 
complex as God! 
Simplicity is detennined by counting either the number or the complexity 
of explanatory entities, or both. A theory with fewer or with less complex 
explanatory entities is simpler than one with more. Naturalist may reject theism 
on the grounds that one world alone is simpler than one world plus one God. 
Obviously, one is simpler than two. But things are not so simple. The universe 
of Naturalism is either one infinitely complex world, or infinitely many finite 
worlds. Is this really simpler than Theism's minimal postulate of one world and 
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one God? The answer is complicated by the fact that this one God is said to be 
infinitely complex in Process Theism and infinitely simple in Classical Theism. 
In arguing that Theism is not as simple as Naturalism, Naturalists may 
have in mind either the number of explanatory entities or their internal complex-
ity. Complexity is a function of the number, kinds, and order of inner parts. 
In number, one (finite) world plus one (finite) God is less simple than one 
(finite) world; so at this simplistic level, Naturalism wins the battle of simplic-
ity; but, as already shown, Naturalists really do not believe in a finite world. The 
viable options for both Naturalism and Theism are much more complicated. 
Expressed in terms of contemporary cosmology, Naturalists are committed to 
either one infinite world (ours) or infinitely many finite worlds in a Superworld 
beyond and/or before ours. These options are very different; but which is the 
simplest? At the same order ofinfinity, a whole comprised of an infinite number 
of finite entities is just as complex as, indeed is numerically identical with, a 
single infinitely rich entity. Dennis Sciama argues that an infinite worlds meta-
physics is simpler than a Theism in which God decides to create only one world 
because the it places as few constraints on reality as is compatible with observa-
tion.27 Sciama obviously confuses simplicity with plenitude and observation 
with concoction. Victor J. Stenger remarks, 
Several commentators have argued that a cosmology of many universes 
violates Ockham's razor. I beg to differ. The entities that the law of parsi-
mony forbids us from multiplying beyond necessity are theoretical hypoth-
eses, not universes. The cosmology of many universes is more economical 
if it provides an explanation for the origin of our universe that does not 
require the highly nonparsimonious introduction of a supernatural element 
that has not heretofore been required to explain any observations. 28 
In reply, other universes are supernatural elements. And the standard 
objections are that theism multiplies the number of entities, not the number of 
hypotheses, and that it explains the existence of our world by appeal to an other-
worldly being or beings. In both respects, however, there is no difference at all 
between God and infinitely many other worlds, except that God is numerically 
one, and the many worlds are numerically infinite. Stenger elsewhere character-
izes the innumerable other worlds of many worlds metaphysics as "bizarre," 
"untestable,"29 and a matter of"uneconomical speculation."30 The Other Worlds 
of Quantum Cosmology are just as transcendent, supernatural, and inaccessible 
to direct sensory verification and warranted inductive inference as a transcen-
dent God; and they outnumber God by infinity to one! So which hypothesis is 
the most "nonparsimonious"? 
lfwe shift focus from extensional referents (things) to intensional mean-
ings (hypothetical constructs), exactly the same point applies to hypotheses as 
to entities. Epistemologically, as explanations of the origin of our universe, God 
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and infinitely many worlds are both theoretical hypotheses; and the claim that 
only the God-theory is really a theory is question-begging nonsense. Stenger's 
argument against God-as-a-theory is like dismissing evolution because it is just 
a theory. 
The strongest and most appealing forms of Theism really do not conceive 
of God as infinite in every conceivable or verbalizable respect. God is infinite 
only in every logically consistent respect compatible with supreme goodness 
and worshipfulness. In number of explanatory entities, one infinite world alone 
seems at first to be simpler than one or more infinite worlds plus one infinite 
God, for one is simpler than two. We are habituated to finitistic thinking, but we 
are now dealing with infinities that do not sum up like finites. Infinity added to 
infinity just equals infinity. In complexity, it is not at all obvious that one 
infinite world is simpler than one infinite world plus one infinite God. 
Richard Dawkins also failed to consider infinities when he argued that 
God is more complex, thus less simple, than the world. In his words, 
Any God capable of intelligently designing something as complex as the 
DNA/protein replicating machinery must have been at least as complex 
and organized as that machine itself. Far more so if we suppose him addi-
tionally capable of such advanced functions as listening to prayers and 
forgiving sins.31 
Where infinities are involved, determining simplicity and multiplicity or 
complexity requires the use of transfinite mathematics. Most critics of theism 
fail to consider this, which is why Naturalists often seem to win the simplicity 
contest. In transfinite mathematics one infinity plus another (or plus any finite 
number) is equal to one infinity, assuming that the infinities are of the same 
order; so one infinite God plus an infinite world has no more members than an 
infinite world alone, or an infinite God alone. If God's infinity is of a higher 
order than the world's, then God plus one or more infinite worlds is equal to 
God's more complex order of infinity. The sum is still just one infinity. When 
infinities are totaled, no matter how many, they always sum up to one infinity, 
and one is the paradigm ofnumerical simplicity. All the foregoing options seem 
to be equally simple. 
A further complication with respect to the complexity of explanatory 
entities must be considered. Classical Theists insist that God is absolutely 
simple in himself; only our thoughts about God are complex. In himself, God 
is somehow pure undifferentiated unity of being, and that constitutes God's 
simplicity. So what could be simpler than that? Well, we hardly know how to 
assess the meaning or the simplicity of such double-talk. By contrast, Process 
Theism drives no absolute wedge between God and our thoughts about God. We 
think of God as infinitely complex because God really is infinitely richer in 
properties than all lesser beings. God is more complex than an infinite world, 
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for God's infinity is of a higher order than the world's. Theological comprehen-
siveness, explanatory power, and correctness sometimes demand complexity at 
the expense of inordinate simplicity. 
So, is a naturalistic infinite-world-ensemble metaphysics really simpler 
than Theism? Where the order of infinity is the same, in number of explanatory 
entities, Naturalism's infinitely many worlds without Divinity are certainly no 
simpler than Creation ex nihilo Theism's one infinite God plus one finite world 
because God's infinity plus a finite unit (one finite world) just equals God's 
infinity. 
Considering only the number of worlds involved, naturalistic infinite 
worlds metaphysics, not Theistic creation of our one world ex nihilo, egre-
giously violates Ockham's razor. One-world monotheism clearly wins the 
simplicity contest. One finite world is infinitely simpler (less numerous) than an 
infinity of worlds. 
Process Theists postulate a loving God's creative involvement with an 
infinite number of worlds to love. This gives us an infinite God plus an infinity 
of worlds, but these sum up to one infinity, God's. In complexity of ultimate 
explanatory entities, infinitely many finite worlds considered as a totality would 
not rival God's own infinite complexity if God's richness belongs to a higher 
order of infinity. If their order is the same, they are equally complex. 
No matter what, that Naturalism is simpler than Theism is by no means 
evident. To avoid God, non-theists must appeal to something almost if not 
entirely as rich and complex as God. 
The most simple-minded naturalistic atheistic metaphysics would affirm 
the existence of a single completely self-contained, self-sufficient, and everlast-
ing but totally finite world without Divinity; but this metaphysics is incoherent 
because infinite time, required for everlasting self-sufficiency, is incompatible 
with total finitude. Older Naturalists postulated the infinite duration of our one 
world, but the Big Bang came along. Naturalists are now driven to postulate 
infinitely many transcendent worlds-while still complaining about traditional 
religion's other worlds! The actualized infinity of infinite worlds metaphysics 
is not verified, not verifiable, lacks an Agent of Diversification and Selection, 
and fails to account for the remarkable fine-tuning of our universe for the 
production of complex valuable life. Creation ex nihilo Theism is the simplest 
theory that can account for our well-ordered world and satisfy rational explana-
tory nonns of both simplicity and comprehensiveness, but even it must come to 
tenns with the concept of God as infinitely creative. 
F. There Is No Universe as a Whole 
Kai Nielsen contends that the very notion of the universe as a whole is unintelli-
gible. If true, this implies that the idea that anything, including God, created or 
caused the universe is also unintelligible. Ifhe is right, the whole project of this 
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book, the search for the cause of the origin of our universe in the Big Bang, is 
totally misguided; and its conclusion, that God did it, is utterly unintelligible. 
As Nielsen expresses the argument: 
It is only by thinking of the universe as some kind of gigantic thing or 
some kind of entity or totality that we can have a shot at intelligibly speak-
ing of the universe as a whole. But "universe" may be just an umbrella 
term for the various things, events and processes there are. We cannot 
intelligibly speak of the sum of things so that we could intelligibly speak 
of them as a whole and ask if, and, if so, how, this universe was created 
and is sustained. Moreover, since the universe is not an object, event, 
process-not any kind of entity at all-there is no such thing as the universe 
for "universe" to stand for. Rather the term "universe" is an umbrella term 
standing for the objects, events, and processes there are. But there is no 
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the universe as a whole. "Universe" does not stand for some mysterious 
entity, but indifferently for those various discrete things. Things of which, 
since "object" is not a count word, we cannot count the sum. There is, that 
is, no way of summing them up and fixing the number of them that there 
are. This being so, we cannot coherently speak of the universe itself-that 
totality-being caused, created, sustained, and the like. To ask for the cause 
of the universe is to make what in the good old Ryleian days would have 
been called a category mistake.32 
This argument suffers from many defects. First, Nielsen assumes that the 
only way to give meaning to the notion of the unity of nature, the universe as a 
whole, is to be able to count the number of its ingredients. This is itself a signif-
icant departure from the views of traditional Naturalists, who consistently 
identified nature or the universe with our system of space/time and all of its 
ingredients, no matter how many, and no matter whether they are practically 
countable. Naturalists traditionally claimed that this system ofnature infinitely 
or eternally predated our existence. Traditional Naturalists would grant that we 
probably cannot count all natural things, events, and processes, even in principle 
(except perhaps by using transfinite mathematics, which really is a way of 
counting); but this would not persuade them that the concept of nature as a 
whole is unintelligible. Nielsen disagrees. Perhaps he thinks that the entities 
within the universe are not countable because they are infinite in number and 
cannot be counted finitistically, even in principle. Or he may think the rich 
natural order of things, whether finite or infinite, is so lacking in unity that 
thinking of it as "a whole" makes no sense. Either way, he is mistaken. Infinity 
is also a way of counting; but our universe is finite; and it has much more unity 
than Nielsen allows. 
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Our universe is not infinite in time, space, or number of real parts; and 
strategies are available for making the unity of the concept of the universe as a 
whole perfectly intelligible. Nielsen seems to ignore contemporary Big Bang 
Cosmology completely. It has developed and explicated these strategies for us 
in great detail, as by now we well know. We need not be capable in practice of 
counting the number of things in the universe in order to know many things that 
make the concept of"the universe as a whole" intelligible. ( l) Everything within 
our system of spacetime had a common, intensely concentrated, and totally 
unified origin. (2) All cones of causation within our contemporary universe are 
derived from an original grandly unified Big Bang. (3) By extrapolating from 
pervasive laws of nature, we can trace the common evolutionary physical 
history of everything within our system of spacetime back to highly unified Big 
Bang origins. (4) This history goes back for approximately fifteen billion years 
and no further. For details, read again Chapter One of this book and subsequent 
discussions! Nielsen finds unintelligible what contemporary astrophysicists find 
exceedingly intelligible! And they show us exactly how to conceive meaning-
fully of our universe as a unified whole. 
Nielsen has not learned an important lesson from contemporary "scien-
tific" astrophysics and cosmology: asking about the duration of the totality of 
what he calls "the objects, events, and processes there are" makes perfectly 
good sense. Without being able in practice to count each of them individually, 
traditional Naturalists gave this answer: Their collective duration is infinite; our 
universe has existed throughout an infinite past. Nielsen may presuppose this 
without making his commitment explicit; perhaps he half-consciously hopes that 
no one will pry too deeply into the topic. Contemporary cosmologists both ask 
and effectively answer the question. The totality of "The objects, events, and 
processes there are" has endured for only fifteen billion years or so, no longer, 
and certainly not forever. All of the overwhelming evidence for the Big Bang 
given in Chapter One of this book attests to this conclusion. 
Since the notion of our universe as a whole really does make sense, and 
since traditional Naturalists were clearly wrong in insisting upon its infinite 
duration, the question of a transcendent cause or creation of the universe is 
intelligible after all. Even atheistic Oscillationists and Quantum Cosmologists 
think so. Even cosmological atheists affirm a transcendent causes or causes of 
our universe, as previously explained. But was it God? That is the viable issue. 
Consider one of Nielsen's principle arguments against the supernatural. 
"It isn't that we do not have to go beyond nature, but that we do not understand 
what such talk comes to. We have no idea of what it would be like to go beyond 
nature."33 To find out what it would be like, all Nielsen has to do is ask any 
Oscillationist or Quantum Cosmologist. Atheistic supernaturalism is rampant 
in contemporary astrophysical cosmology. For Theism, transcendence is no 
problem because even a scientifically well informed Naturalism is unintelligible 
without it. 
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G. Transcendent Reality Is Unknowable 
Immanuel Kant contended that all arguments for the existence of God fail 
because they apply conceptual categories of the understanding-like causation, 
purpose, and necessity, which legitimately pertain only to appearances-to real 
things in themselves. For Kant, all reality is experientially, causally, spatially, 
and temporally transcendent and theoretically unknowable; only appearances are 
knowable, spatial, causal, and temporal. Kant believed that appearance and 
reality in no way resemble one another with respect to spatial, temporal, causal, 
and all other metaphysical properties and relations. 
The problem is, if all spatiotemporal and causal properties and relations 
are removed from our concept ofreality, or from reality in itself, nothing is left. 
Since "being" is also a Kantian category of the understanding that applies only 
to appearances, not even being is left! Kant rejected all cosmological attempts 
to know the real world of nature, along with critically realistic theories of 
perception according to which appearances are like realities at least in being 
spatiotemporal and in being caused by the realities they resemble. Kant rejected 
philosophical and scientific realism in epistemology, cosmology, and theology 
largely because they apply the concept of"cause" to realities; but when ask why 
he must introduce real things in themselves at all, his answer was that they have 
to be there to cause us to have the perceptions or "appearances" that we have. 
Critical Realism applied to cosmology does not conceive of transcendent 
reality as something merely beyond or before our sensory perceptions. Instead, 
transcendent reality is "beyond" and "before" our objectively existing world of 
nature, our universe, our cosmos, our very real system of space/time/mass/ 
energy. This is what "transcendent" meant traditionally in both theistic and 
naturalistic metaphysics. Nature is our public, objective system of spacetime, 
as opposed to the private spacetimes of dreams and hallucinations and the 
inaccessible spacetimes of transcendent Other Worlds. Nature includes all 
things that exist within and have causal relations with at least some other entities 
within our public world; and anything that transcends this world is supernatural. 
Even if it has causal relations with it, transcendent reality either logically or 
temporally antedates our system of spacetime and has no fixed or ascertainable 
limited position within it. In Process Theism, the eternal Primordial Nature of 
God is always embodied in some concrete, contingent, spatiotemporal Conse-
quent Nature; it is a necessary condition for every particular contingency in our 
world; yet it both transcends and is immanent in all actual worlds-if God, who 
alone knows for sure, has created more than one. 
Scientific Cosmological Agnosticism, we saw in Chapter One, indicates 
that we can really know many features of our objective spacetime system scien-
tifically, but we cannot have scientific knowledge of transcendent realities like 
Other Worlds, whether the otherness be supertemporal, superspatial, or both. 
Can we then have no rational or philosophical knowledge at all of the transcen-
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dent? Ifnot, Teleological and Cosmological Arguments fail, for the God who 
allegedly caused our Big Bang and ordered our universe is a transcendent 
reality. Most contemporary "scientific" cosmology also fails if transcendence 
is beyond all human knowledge. Like God, antecedent or co-existent universes 
are transcendent realities, ifreal at all. The God hypothesis is a philosophical, 
not a scientific, explanation of our universe. So is any version of infinitely many 
Other Worlds. The world disclosed to us in natural science leads to the very 
edge of scientific knowledge and demands a rational philosophical explanation 
that natural science cannot give. 
What caused the Big Bang itself to erupt? What caused a life-supporting 
universe instead of chaos or lifelessness to issue from the Big Bang? Physical 
science poses the questions, but it cannot answer them. Science periodically 
answers previously unanswered questions, but "What caused the loaded-for-life 
Big Bang?" is unanswerable in principle by natural science; its methodologies 
just do not extend that far. Can philosophical reflection do any better? Theistic 
meta-physics (after-physics) replies that some transcendent-imminent Ultimate 
Reality who knew what it was doing was responsible. Neither the God hypothe-
sis nor that of infinitely many worlds is directly or inductively verified empiri-
cally; both postulate unseen transcendent or supernatural realities to explain the 
origin of our universe. But, all things considered, (as we have done!), the God 
hypothesis is the best explanation. 
A life-supporting universe might happen by pure accident, given an infi-
nite number of diversified universes. But we have no good reasons for giving 
that, and mere infinity requires an Agent of Diversification to yield a life-sup-
porting universe. Logical possibility as such says nothing whatsoever about 
empirical probability. Mere infinity contains no Agent of Selection and Diversi-
fication. Infinitely many worlds metaphysics cannot explain why our ordered-
for-life world exists or why lifeless universes are not repeated infinitely many 
times; it cannot guarantee an infinite diversity of individuals, their qualities, and 
their relational combinations. The Plenitudist notion of realizing all possibilities 
is not logically coherent. Pure infinity requires no diversity at all, much less the 
kind that selects for life. Plenitude is merely a ghost without a machine. 
A teleological explanation of the life-supporting cosmic coincidences of 
our finite but well-ordered universe is needed; a personal, intelligent, benevo-
lent, and life-loving Agent of Diversification and Selection best explains the 
origin and structure of our exquisitely designed contingent universe. That our 
world was designed for life-flourishing by a Divine, supercosmic, supercalculat-
ing, life-loving intellect is the most plausible hypothesis, the explanation best 
supported by a preponderance of the anthropic, cosmological, and philosophical 
evidence. Without a supercalculating God, our life-supporting universe would 
be infinitely improbable; and reason rejects infinite improbabilities. Reasonable 
persons certainly may, and perhaps must, come to this conclusion: God caused 
the Big Bang. 
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